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ABSTRACT.
The thesis examines corporatism from a rational cooperation, 
comparative and case study perspective. It analyses how 
corporatism distributes gains in "fair economic weather" and 
costs in "foul economic weather". Fair or foul weather outcomes 
are determined more by factors exclusive of the degree of 
corporatism. Corporatism aims to achieve a pareto-optimal 
exchange between three actors: Labour, Capital and Government, 
who confront collective action problems. Labour, in particular, 
is fragmented into high and low pay workers. Foul weather results 
in a relative inequality shift, and the iterative and centralised 
bargaining solutions to the prisoners' dilemma become much more 
susceptible to "insider-outsider" behaviour in foul weather. The 
analysis suggests that growth-based corporatism breaks down in 
foul weather, and reassesses the role of centralisation and 
encompassing group behaviour.
The thesis examines corporatist performance in fair and foul 
economic weather empirically using cross-national data. A
typology is defined and performance is compared in terms of
economic indices and indices which reflect general societal
welfare. Corporatism succeeds more in terms of sustaining
employment and societal welfare than in terms of producing 
superior economic performance and avoiding foul weather. Sweden 
is identified as a critical case study of corporatism in foul 
weather. The evolution of Swedish corporatism is analysed and the 
operation of the model is shown to have been dependent on fair 
weather and the distribution of gains. Decentralisation of wage 
bargaining in Sweden provides strong support for the theorised 
impact of foul weather and insider-outsider problems of 
conditional cooperation involving high and low pay workers. But 
the Swedish system also makes a series of efficient adjustments 
to foul economic weather. Swedish comparative wage restraint 
performance is examined empirically and shown to be remarkably 
strong. It is not therefore possible to conclude that rational 
cooperation has broken down in Sweden.
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INTRODUCTION.
'Surely there is no problem in the social sciences that is 
more important than that of explaining why people 
cooperate'. Jon Elster.1
At one time, in the early 1980s, much was being claimed for 
corporatism as a "third way” between free market and centrally 
planned political economies.2 Yet by the late 1980s most of the 
political science voices seemed to fall silent with a growing 
consensus that the hopes for corporatism had not been realised.3 
This is despite an apparent consensus among some contemporary 
Nordic and European economic commentators that corporatism had 
succeeded in many respects in achieving a cooperative solution to
1 Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, p.366.
2 According to Polanyi, the "third way" is that of 
reciprocity: giving and receiving according to need. Karl 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation. Boston, Beacon Press, 1957. 
See Jon Elster and Karl Ove Moene, 'Introduction', in Jon Elster 
and Karl Ove Moene (eds), Alternatives to Capitalism. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989, fn.4, p.3.
3 Most of these doubts arose from the impact of recent 
"disorganising tendencies" on corporatist forms of organisation, 
explored by Stuart Lash and John Urry, The End Of Organised 
Capitalism. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, and Claus Offe, (John 
Keane, ed) , Disorganised Capitalism. Contemporary Transformations 
of Work and Politics. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985. For a 
summary of the increasing scepticism in the literature, see 
Markus M. L. Crepaz, 'Corporatism In Decline? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic 
Performance and Industrial Disputes in 18 Industrialized 
Democracies', Comparative Political Studies. 25, 2, 1992, pp.139- 
41.
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the problems of restructuring in the modern OECD economic context 
of generalised relative contraction.4
If corporatism is a third way, and it is an intriguing 
possibility to explore, then it may be a feasible political 
project to build a cooperative society in which all actors 
interact in such a way that their collective wellbeing is 
maximised. In formal terms, corporatist cooperation maximises 
collective utility over time and is an attainable equilibrium 
solution to the prisoners' dilemma afflicting economic interest 
groups in a capitalist economy.5
But can corporatism really work? In formal theory, its 
stability depends primarily on iteration. But it is also 
vulnerable to a wide range of instabilities, such as 
informational and monitoring problems, backfiring trigger- 
strategies, high discount rates, complex multiple-actor 
scenarios, and so forth. It seems, on the face of it, that these
4 Tarantelli led the way in transposing corporatism for the 
economics profession. See Ezio Tarantelli, 'The Regulation of 
Inflation in Western Countries and the Degree of Neo- 
Corporatism', Economica. 7, 1983, pp.199-238. For recent
examples, see Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn 
(eds), Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?'. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1992; Richard Jackman, 'Where Corporatism 
Works', LSE Quarterly. 3, 3, Autumn 1989, pp.213-235; and Bob 
Rowthorn and Andrew Glyn, 'The Diversity of Unemployment 
Experience since 1973', in Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor 
(eds), The Golden Aae of Capitalism. Reinterpreting the Postwar 
Experience, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp.218-266. For the 
economic flavour of the current times, see Larry Elliott, 'OECD 
warns that rising unemployment could destroy social cohesion of 
West', The Guardian. June 2, 1993; Colin Narbrough, 'OECD cuts 
growth forecast as concern over jobs escalates', The Times. June 
2, 1993; Philip Bassett, 'OECD sees jobless total hitting 36m', 
The Times. July 21, 1993.
5 Here we refer to distributional struggle and wage cost 
prisoners' dilemmas. See K. Schott, 'Investment, Order, and 
Conflict in a Simple Dymamic Model of Capitalism', in J.H. 
Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp.81-97.
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instabilities must overwhelm any cooperation based around a 
complex equilibrium solution which is, after all, constantly 
changing. It seems that corporatist cooperation must be very 
difficult to sustain. And yet in the case of Sweden we have an 
apparently corporatist system surviving for at least 20 years.
The explanatory limits of formal theory are in part 
compensated for by institutional theory, which shows that 
corporatist cooperation is strengthened by factors such as high 
centralisation and institutional interlocking, and by the support 
of left wing incumbency. A number of institutional mechanisms or 
their functional equivalents are sometimes viewed as necessary to 
secure the cooperation of member trade unions with a wage 
restraint policy that underutilises potential bargaining 
strength. As seen by Regini, these are:
1. Centralisation and representational monopoly to limit 
alternative sources of authority and compel obedience to 
wage policies.
2. The "insulation” of internal decision-making from 
members' demands.
3. Use of solidaristic ideology.6
Trade unions, employers and governments do not act in a vacuum. 
Institutional theory complements game theory because it suggests 
that "rational" choices are made within a framework delineated by 
size and encompassingness, institutional memory, high levels of 
organisation and professionalism, and so on, which strengthen the 
capacity of the actors to reach conditional cooperation. The 
awakening of the "new institutionalism" in economics reflects a 
recognition that the utility-maximising, selfish and rational
6 M. Regini, "The Conditions for Political Exchange: How 
Concertation Emerged and Collapsed in Italy and Great Britain", 
in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict in Contemporary 
Capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon, 1984, p.130.
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individual of economic theory makes choices in a structured 
environment.7
The possibility of corporatism as formal cooperation is 
greatly enhanced by institutional theory, but despite the 
validity of the institutional arguments there is currently 
empirical evidence of corporatism becoming increasingly subject 
to instability. The travails of Sweden, seen as perhaps the best 
example of a corporatist political economy, and its apparently 
increasing trend towards liberalisation and labour market 
decentralisation, raises two seperate hypotheses. First, it 
confirms the institutional argument because it shows the 
dependency of corporatism on institutional factors. Second, it 
confounds the institutional argument because it shows that, with 
no change in institutions, cooperation breaks down in a prolonged 
and deepening economic crisis and that in fact current 
institutions need to be redesigned and deepened.
A key explanation for the breakdown of corporatism in 
countries such as Sweden is undoubtedly loss of centralisation 
caused by the rise of new actors such as public sector and white 
collar unions. The fact that these new groups have not entered 
into the centralised framework devised by the employers and the 
blue-collar workers leads to increasing economic difficulties, 
encourages the alternative strategy of more decentralised, 
market-led wage determination practices, and challenges the 
stability of left-wing incumbency. This explanation of events 
seems a valid and important part of the picture and we can 
conclude that it is correct.
Are there any reasons to believe that corporatism is a third 
way, and that it has the capacity to adapt to economic crisis? 
Ironically, we will find that most of the reasons do not fully
7 For an introduction to the "new institutionalism", see 
Sanford M. Jacoby, 'The New Institutionalism: What Can It Learn 
from the Old?', Industrial Relations. 29, 2, 1990, pp.316-359.
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support the institutional argument. While it is true that the 
logic and mechanics of cooperation have been admirably combined 
by the institutional approach the mechanics appears to be stuck 
at the level of centralisation. The evidence for rational 
cooperation seems, on the other hand, to support a blend of 
encompassing viewpoint and decentralised interaction.
1. Growth-Based Corporatism.
The role of economic growth in relation to corporatism has 
perhaps not had the attention it might deserve. It has been taken 
for granted that economic growth determines in some sense the 
conditions for cooperation. Low economic growth is seen as an 
obvious contributory factor in the breakdown of corporatism. But 
since corporatism is supposed to maximise economic growth, and 
since game theory postulates that cooperation produces maximum 
collective gain (in prisoners' dilemmas by definition), and since 
corporatist strategies are designed to translate short-term 
restraint into long-term gain, the impact of low economic growth 
on cooperation could be viewed from a purely rational choice 
perspective as a less significant causal variable than 
developments such as the rise of new actors and increasing 
decentralisation.
According to game theory, or the mathematics of utility 
maximisation, it doesn't seem that cooperating to distribute 
costs should be any different, in terms of rational choice, to 
cooperating to distribute gains. Corporatism shouldn't break down 
because "the numbers change" from positive to negative. An 
experienced observer of the labour market might point out that it 
is clear that in a growing economy there is more output and hence 
more income to distribute among the workers, easing the problems 
of making pay-offs for cooperation and realising high 
expectations of success. In a contracting economy, actors can 
only be rewarded with fewer payoffs until the recovery, and high 
expectations cannot be met. But the game theorist could, it
5
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seems, reply that within the bounds of even a contracting 
economy, a rational decision to cooperate would remain the best 
collective strategy and a functioning corporatist system would 
simply adjust expectations to the reduced payoffs.
In this thesis we examine separately the operation of 
corporatist strategies in economic conditions of growth and 
stagnation and conclude that centralisation and corporatism 
operate in distinctly different ways in these two contexts. The 
centralisation explanation, while important to the stability of 
rational cooperation, is something of a red herring.8 
Centralisation may contribute to the strength and stability of 
cooperation, but "economic weather conditions" in turn determine 
the effectiveness of centralisation. In "foul economic weather", 
centralisation, like the Emperor's clothes, becomes revealed as 
a rather transparent artifice. Whereas local actors might accept 
and passively cooperate with an encompassing plan that delivers 
constant gains, when it delivers costs the central plan must 
somehow compel their cooperation. For local actors the cost of 
agreeing literally increases and they have to be much more
8 Which poses a puzzle to the rational choice theorist, as 
Wallerstein writes, '[T]he real puzzle is not the instability of 
cooperation in the absence of centralised bargaining but the 
instability of centralised bargaining itself'. Michael 
Wallerstein, 'Centralised Bargaining and Wage Restraint', 
American Journal of Political Science. 34, 4, November 1990,
p.997. As a start to unravelling this puzzle, see Goran Therborn, 
'Lessons from "Corporatist" Theorizations', in Jukka Pekkarinen, 
Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn (eds), Social Corporatism; A Superior 
Economic System?. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p.27, who points 
out that corporatism ("sotto voce") is all about class 
organisation, consensus, and associative action, and cannot be 
reduced to the "anodyne" variables of size, encompassingness and 
centralisation. For an earlier statement, see Colin Crouch, 
'Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint', in L.N. Lindberg and 
C.S. Maier (eds), The Politics of Inflation and Economic 
Stagnation. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1985, p.109; 
and David Cameron, 'Distributional Coalitions and Other Sources 
of Economic Stagnation: On Olson's Rise And Decline Of Nations', 
International Organisation. 42, 1988, pp.561-603.
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involved in the decision-making process. The relative absence of 
such decentralised mechanisms of cooperation exposes the 
explanatory power of centralisation to a dependence on the 
distribution of gains.9
What exactly are "fair-weather" and "foul-weather" economic 
phenomenon? In fair weather, an economy is producing an 
increasing rate of growth in national income, and hence in 
output, productivity, competitiveness and so on. The causal 
determinants of this underlying growth rate have less to do with 
cooperation and more to do with long-wave innovation and 
technology trends, the availability of raw materials, the 
strength of competitors, and so on. In foul weather, each of 
these factors conspires to cause the rate of growth of the 
economy to contract, so that in the worst case it shifts into 
negative figures. This can happen even to a successfully 
functioning corporatist system. In the absence of cooperation, a 
struggle over the distribution of incomes then ensues.10
With the aid of these concepts, we can speak of cooperation 
as either maximising gains under fair weather or minimising costs 
under foul weather. Either way, cooperation over the long term 
should still be rationally preferred. In this thesis, however, we
9 As Olson argues, short of abolishing the freedom of 
organisation itself, it is impossible to prevent narrow fragments 
of encompassing organisations from lobbying and electing 
leaderships that will adopt a redistributive policy stance (at 
the cost of overall economic efficiency). Mancur Olson, 'A Theory 
of the Incentives Facing Political Organisations', International 
Political Science Review. 7, 2, 1986, pp.165-89. See also Michael 
Kendix and Mancur Olson, 'Changing Unemployment Rates in Europe 
and the USA: Institutional Structure and Regional Variation',in 
Renato Brunetta and Carlo Dell'Aringa (eds) , Labour Relations and 
Economic Performance. London, Macmillan, 1990, pp.40-67.
10 Leo Panitch used the term "fair weather" in relation to 
corporatism. Leo Panitch, 'Recent Theorizations of Corporatism - 
Reflections on a Growth Industry', British Journal of Sociology. 
31, June 1980, pp.159-87.
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focus on how the absence of economic growth can undermine the 
foundations of cooperation even if "new actors" are not around to 
complicate the bargaining environment and even if the system is 
highly centralised.11 But why should lack of economic growth 
destabilise a cooperative equilibrium or cause a decrease in 
centralisation and lead to a more right-wing incumbency? If it 
does, we hope to show, this raises questions about the dependence 
of the cooperative equilibrium on distributing gains in fair 
economic weather.
According to prisoners7 dilemma modelling, cooperation 
should maximise economic growth. It is at first difficult to see 
why actors who already enjoy the benefits of strong stability- 
inducing variables such as centralisation and left-wing 
incumbency should cease cooperating simply because economic 
growth slows down. They should be cognizant that they are already 
enjoying the maximum benefit from the underlying level of growth. 
In rational choice terms, a strategy of wage-restraint produces 
positive sum outcomes if the outcome of distributional conflict, 
that is to say, the alternative strategy outcome, is worse. Thus, 
it simply does not matter if an actor is worse off than they were 
before cooperating, instead it matters if they are better off 
than they would be by not cooperating.
If the fair weather cooperative equilibrium is dependent on 
an exchange of "restraint” for gains and compensatory payoffs, 
then a shift to foul weather will require a change from 
distributing growth in income to distributing real costs. This
11 A similar argument is made by Karl Hinrichs, Claus Offe 
and Helmut Wiesenthal, 'Time, Money, and Welfare-State 
Capitalism7, in John Keane (ed), Civil Society and the State. New 
European Perspectives. London, Verso, 1988, pp.221-43. For 
example: 7It ... appears highly unlikely that any union - even 
the most comprehensive, solidaristic and united - will be able to 
pursue strategies which aim solely at the collective (as opposed 
to the average individual) interest of wage-earners in a high 
aggregate level of employment7, p.228.
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change in the game complicates the difficulties inherent in n- 
person cooperation in ways that are not apparent in fair economic 
weather.
A counter argument that we have to deal with is that a 
successful corporatist system might produce growth itself.12 
Corporatist cooperation is designed to produce wage restraint 
combined with a host of active policies designed to maximise 
economic restructuring, which results in lower inflation, a 
stronger export sector, lower distributive conflict, higher 
profits, greater innovation and flexibility, higher investment, 
full employment, stable demand, and economic growth (so the story 
goes). In this understanding of the cooperative equilibrium it 
produces a constantly increasing income and employment share for 
the cooperators.
This is an assumption that we question. Even if all this 
were true, it may be that other factors contribute with equal or 
greater impact to the overall level of growth of these factors. 
Much of the impetus to growth is given by factors such as 
efficiency and innovation, flexible systems of education and 
labour utilisation, high responsiveness to technological change, 
and so on. But even an efficient corporatist system might
12 This is the argument of Alexander Hicks, 'Social 
Democratic Corporatism and Economic Growth', Journal of Politics. 
50, 1988, pp.677-704; and Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The 
Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic
Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', 
Journal of Politics. 47, 1985, pp.792-827. Wage restraint from 
the unions ensures cost competitiveness in industry, and social 
democratic political power ensures capital investment and 
restructuring, so that corporatism produces economic growth. As 
Hicks writes: 'Organisationally, and governmentally, strong
labour movements may emerge as major social benefactors, as 
purveyors of relatively rapid income growth, and also of somewhat 
more equal distribution of income' (p.700). See also, W. Streeck, 
"Qualitative Demands and the Neo-Corporatist Manageability of 
Industrial Relations: Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in 
West Germany at the Beginning of the Eighties", British Journal 
of Industrial Relations. 14, 1981, pp.149-69.
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encounter "foul economic weather”. Corporatism might not simply 
need to survive long enough for the in-built success mechanisms 
to begin to function.
2. Methodological Approach.
The thesis mixes three methodological approaches to the 
study of corporatism. As the first step, we use rational choice 
and game theory to provide a model of the corporatist political 
economy. The game theoretical material aims to go beyond existing 
models of corporatist cooperation in two ways: first of all we 
make a distinction between cooperation to distribute gains and 
cooperation to distribute costs, and argue that the common 
understanding of corporatism as a "growth-based” strategy that 
rewards cooperation with economic and political gains is flawed 
if it does not recognise the possibility of relative gains. Once 
we accept that the gains from cooperation can only be understood 
relative to the gains from non-cooperation it becomes 
theoretically meaningfull to speak of a successful corporatist 
system even in a context of poor economic performance. 
Corporatism need not always produce growth in output and 
productivity in order to be said to be functioning at maximum 
efficiency.
Secondly, in our game theoretical model we attempt to model 
a little more closely the complexity of the real world. Instead 
of a model in which the principle actors are simply labour and 
capital, we make a distinction between three major actors: 
labour, capital and government. Within the labour actor itself, 
we make a further distinction between centralised actors (the 
peak federation) and lower level trade union actors, and within 
the universe of trade union actors we make yet a further 
distinction between low and high pay groups. Then we take these 
actors and model the rationality of their cooperation when the 
only feasible objective is to minimise costs and not distribute 
gains. We thus model corporatism in "foul economic weather".
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The result of this theoretical modelling shows that in foul 
economic weather the difficulties for achieving cooperation are 
considerably increased. This raises a further provocative 
question about what is actually being achieved through existing 
examples of corporatist cooperation in fair economic weather.
The second methodological approach we employ is cross­
national comparison. The empirical testing of political-economic 
hypotheses using OECD data from the advanced capitalist economies 
has been a fruitful avenue in the past two decades. In terms of 
corporatism and its relative performance, a large number of 
empirical studies demonstrated that corporatist countries 
appeared to achieve a superior mix of employment, inflation, 
economic growth and welfare objectives. The development of the 
current prolonged economic crisis has placed increasing doubt on 
these achievements. Our objective is to reassess these 
explanatory associations by making a distinction between the 
performance of corporatism in fair economic weather and foul 
economic weather. We examine the achievements of corporatism in 
the late 1970s and 1980s to see if corporatism has continued to 
warrent the claims for its efficacy made earlier.
But cross-national comparison has its limits, principally 
derived from reliance on aggregate, quantitative data and a 
relatively small sample of countries. In social science terms, by 
searching for probabilistic generalisations regarding the 
association of empirical variables and relying on inductive forms 
of explanation we are forced to oversimplify and ignore 
historical and particularistic factors.13 The Calmfors-Driffil 
thesis, for example, argues for an empirical link between 
decentralisation and low unemployment largely on the basis of the
13 For a general discussion, see A. Przeworski and H. Teune, 
The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York, Wiley, 1970.
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performance of Japan, Switzerland and the US.14 It could be 
argued that Japan and Switzerland in fact utilise a high degree 
of bargaining coordination and that the US is better described as 
a country in which there is no bargaining at all.15 With such a 
small sample the presence of one or two outliers, or the 
coincidence of performance in one direction or another due to 
factors wholly unrelated to corporatism, renders causal 
generalisations at the very least worthy of much closer 
examination.
The marginal utility of cross-national comparison has 
declined in the past decade.16 This leads us to the third 
methodological approach used in this thesis: the critical case 
study method. In this approach cross-national comparison provides 
a vital map, helping us to identify cases which provide an 
exception to otherwise predicted outcomes.17 The cross-national
14 L. Calmfors and J. Driffill, 'Bargaining Structure, 
Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance', Economic Policy. 6, 
1988, pp.14-61.
15 See Andrew Henley and Euclid Tsakalotos, 'Corporatism and 
the European Labour Market after 1992', British Journal of 
Industrial Relations. 30, 4, 1992, p.581.
16 See F.G. Castles, 'Comparative Public Policy Analysis: 
Problems, Progress and Prospects',in F.G. Castles, Franz Lehner, 
Manfred G. Schmidt, Managing Mixed Economies. New York, Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988, pp.197-223; F.G. Castles, 'Introduction. Puzzles 
of Political Economy', in F.G. Castles (ed), The Comparative 
History of Public Policy. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, pp.1-15.
17 Following MacIntyre, who suggests that in order to 
determine whether or not the theory really fits the facts we 
examine cases where a will to achieve the same end was achieved 
with greater or lesser success in different contexts. We can then 
identify the features which "explain” the success of failure in 
achieving the outcome. A. MacIntyre, 'Is a Science of Comparative 
Politics Possible?', Comparative Politics. 1978, pp.46-65. For a 
discussion of the critical case study method, see F.G. Castles, 
The Working Class And Welfare. Reflections On The Political 
Development Of The Welfare State In Australia And New Zealand. 
1890-1980. Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1985.
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examination of the performance of corporatism in the late 1970s 
and 1980s points to Sweden as a critical case. Sweden appears to 
be a country which is strongly corporatist and which has entered 
a comparatively severe episode of foul economic weather. The 
economic difficulties experienced by Sweden, moreover, were 
clearly not primarily caused by any breakdown of corporatism even 
if they were exacerbated by its subsequent deterioration. 
According to our game-theoretical model Sweden should have 
encountered increasing difficulties in sustaining corporatist 
cooperation between high and low pay groups, with stronger actors 
preferring to redistribute costs to weaker actors rather than 
continuing to maintain a cooperative and collective distribution 
of costs.
Sweden certainly, on the face of it, fits the model but the 
real question is whether the breakdown of cooperation and 
subsequent trend to decentralisation is explicable in terms of 
the theory we have developed or whether an alternative 
explanation is better. According to our game theoretical model, 
Sweden only approximated a corporatist system which would have 
been capable of distributing costs effectively in sustained foul 
weather. The alternative explanation is that corporatism in 
Sweden broke down because the bargaining environment itself 
changed dramatically from the 1970s, in which case the older 
Swedish-style corporatism would have been expected to otherwise 
deal effectively with the foul economic weather.
To settle this question of the importance of centralisation 
and of the efficacy of institutional arrangements in foul 
economic weather we make a detailed case study of Swedish 
corporatism. This thesis argues that corporatism in foul economic 
weather must function not through reliance on greater 
centralisation per se. but through reliance on bargaining 
institutions of a sort which link the strategies of local and 
industrial actors to the encompassing strategies identified as
13
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necessary to solve prisoners dilemmas. In this respect, recent 
developments in the formulation of wage bargaining strategies by 
the blue collar unions and their peak federation in Sweden 
suggest such a possibility.
The major conclusion is that the expectations of a 
corporatist system in foul economic weather have to be revised. 
It can be a burden to view corporatism as a "growth strategy" 
when this may be actually impossible. The expectation that it 
should, to be judged successful, turn around foul economic 
weather and produce a virtuous circle leading to continually 
improving fair economic weather is equally mistaken. Corporatism 
should be viewed as a type of political economy which maximises 
gains in fair economic weather and minimises costs in foul 
economic weather while combining both socialist objectives and 
the use of market mechanisms. The determinants of these "weather" 
conditions may not be as amenable to cooperation as has been 
thought.
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CHAPTER ONE.
CORPORATISM AS RATIONAL 
COOPERATION.
' "Corporatism” has become a bit like God. Many people 
believe it is an important phenomenon, crucially affecting 
social life. But nobody really knows what it looks like, so 
disagreement persists, apparently for ever, about what it is 
and what it does'. Goran Therborn.1
Corporatism is, at heart, all about collective action 
involving labour, capital and government. Is corporatism then 
essentially the same as socialism? The more successful Nordic 
Social Democratic political economies, where socialism and labour 
movements enjoyed political strength, were based on class 
cooperation or collective action applied within the context of a 
capitalist economy. Hence the familiar concept of the "Historical 
Compromise”.
Collective action is hardly at the theoretical heartland of 
socialism. Przeworski and Sprague, for example, provide us with 
a list of socialist goals.2 The first is to abolish exploitation, 
understood primarily as the extraction of surplus labour (in the
1 Goran Therborn, 'Lessons from "Corporatist”
Theorisations', in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn 
(eds), Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1992, pp.24, 25.
2 Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History 
of Electoral Socialism. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 
1986, p.22.
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form of profit) from wage labourers forced to sell themselves, 
like commodities, for a wage which tends to merely reproduce 
their labour power in a free market. The second is to end the 
division of society into classes. The third is to remove all 
political and economic inequalities. The fourth is to avoid 
market failures or wastefulness in capitalist production. The 
fifth is to eradicate injustice and prejudice. The sixth is to 
emancipate not only the working class, but all humanity. Only 
with the seventh goal are we enjoined, almost as an after­
thought, to build a political economy based on cooperation.
Somehow, within socialist theory, collective action is 
imagined to take care of itself and lead naturally to 
cooperation. Marx had made a distinction between what can be 
called "labourism” and "socialism", the former referring to more 
narrowly economistic collective action. Elster interprets Marx as 
arguing that workers would only become conscious of their 
"collective interests" through the process of organising into 
trade unions and pursuing their more limited "individual 
interests". But for Elster class consciousness is precisely the 
ability of individual workers to overcome the temptation to free- 
ride on the organisational activity of their fellows.3
Class consciousness enables effective collective action 
through trade union organisation. But in socialist theory class 
action and collective action are conflated in a way which does 
not take account of a higher order collective action problem: the 
prisoners' dilemma. To paraphrase Hardin, while "market failure" 
is a case of the invisible hand slapping us in the face 
"collective action failure" is a case of class action kicking us 
in the guts.4
3 Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, pp.347, 349.
4 Russell Hardin, Collective Action. Baltimore, The John 
Hopkins Press, 1982.
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Collective cooperation is clearly an important ingredient in 
socialism. We could go so far as to argue that corporatism is the 
only viable organisational form of socialism, precisely because 
it is the only organisational form that directly addresses 
collective action problems. Unless these problems are addressed, 
socialism must fail to deal adequately with distributive 
conflict, and its economic consequences. But many of the goals of 
socialism as stated by Przeworski and Sprague are not necessarily 
those of corporatism. Corporatism and socialism are not 
interchangeable concepts. In fact, corporatism is also compatible 
with capitalism: it is compatible with the presence of classes 
(actors), and inequality, and consists of an equilibrium 
distribution of utility among the actors which is regarded by 
them as being preferable to the next alternative.
1.1, Actors and Processes.
Corporatism, defined in terms of rational cooperation, is a 
type of political economy in which the societal actors labour, 
capital and government, reduce distributional struggle and wage- 
cost prisoners' dilemmas through processes of political 
bargaining and cooperative mechanisms. The outcome is the 
maximisation of collective material well-being.
This use of the term corporatism does not depend on the 
actors being organised in any particular way, whether in 
centralised unions, as in Sweden, or in decentralised work 
stations, as in Japan. It does not refer to the structural design 
of the system, or the degree of centralisation, it refers the 
relationship between the actors, or to an ideal-typical societal 
representation of the equilibrium solution to the n-person 
prisoners' dilemma. Such a solution would be consensual because 
it would be fair, efficient and maximising. No country could ever 
realise this ideal of equilibrium cooperation, but they might do 
well enough at approaching it in fair economic weather.
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A corporatist system, by our definition, is simply a country 
(measured in terms of its strength of corporatism) which by 
cooperative processes manages to restrain wage earners within the 
space delineated by the need for investment, and growth in 
output. Theoretically, it does this by an equilibrium 
distribution of income between capitalists, government, and other 
wage earners that maximises future income growth for all the 
actors and is achieved through a series of complementary 
restructuring interventions, welfare payoffs and 
redistributions.5
Structurally, then, a corporatist system can be analytically 
subdivided into the three fundamental actors in a modern 
political economy: government, labour, and capital. Government as 
an actor refers to all the expenditure needs of government, such 
as wages (hence public sector workers are located within the 
sphere of this actor) , and public policy (hence incumbent parties 
are located also within the sphere of this actor) , that are a 
cost exacted in fiscal terms from the output growth of the 
export-trading sector and the sheltered sector. Labour as an 
actor refers to all wage earners (private sector blue and white 
collar), who operate in the competitive sector and the sheltered 
sector.6 Capital as an actor refers to all the actors who take
5 This is a somewhat different interpretation from the 
"classic" view of corporatism, as centralised and monopolistic 
interest "intermediation", and as policy-making concertation 
between state and interest groups. See Phillippe Schmitter and 
Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds), Trends toward Corporatist Interest 
Intermediation. London, Sage, 1979; Gerhard Lehmbruch and 
Phillippe Schmitter (eds) , Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. 
London, Sage, 1982. On the 19th century etymological origins of 
corporatism, see Colin Crouch, 'Pluralism and the New 
Corporatism: A Rejoinder', Political Studies. 31, 1983, p.460.
6 These terms are derived from Gosta Edgren, Karl-Olof 
Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner, Wage Formation and the Economy. London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1973. See Chapter Five.
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their income almost entirely from stocks, shares, interest, 
managerial salaries and properties, and so forth.
The issue is, then, how can labour, capital and government 
cooperate in a corporatist system? Here we are interested not so 
much in the particular, historical, institutional forms of 
cooperation, which clearly differ from country to country, but in 
the substantive theory of cooperation.
1.1.1. Labour and Capital.
In neo-pluralist and neo-Marxist theory (they are pretty 
much the same and meet in the middle), a structural conflict is 
hypothesised between labour and capital in which capital bears a 
decisive influence. The neo-pluralists accept the neo-Marxist 
argument that power is distributed unequally among interest 
groups, and that interests favouring capital can be more 
pervasive and powerful than interests favouring labour.
It is not unusual, then, to find the view expressed that 
corporatism is primarily in the interests of capital, since it 
involves wage restraint and is designed to produce economic 
outcomes which necessarily benefit capital.7 Unions are seen as 
either being duped or unable to resist corporatist tendencies. It 
has also been argued that the organisational work unions are 
required to do to compete with capital is more difficult in 
comparison to that of employers' associations, because workers 
are such a numerical majority and large groups are difficult to 
organise. Labour and capital do not have an equal capacity to 
form collective organisations to realise their material 
interests, hence corporatism is a form of institutional 
subjugation of labour by capital.8
7 For example, L. Panitch, "Trade Unions and the Capitalist 
State", New Left Review. 125, 1983, pp.21-44.
8 Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State. London, 
Hutchinson, 1984, and Disorganised Capitalism. Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1985.
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Classical Marxist theory argues that there is an inherent, 
structural conflict of interest between labour and capital in a 
capitalist economy. Capitalism involves an unavoidable degree of 
class struggle between incompatible interests. Neo-Marxist theory 
accepts that the structural conflict is assuaged by the mixed 
economy, the welfare state, and strong economic growth. But 
whether the conflict is open or assuaged, it is held to exist by 
both Marxists and neo-pluralists.
Despite the validity of these arguments, however, it is 
possible to argue that corporatism serves the interests of labour 
as well as that of capital. Marin, for example, argues that 
corporatist arrangements offer the possibility for labour to 
strengthen its position vis-a-vis capital.9 Walter Korpi and 
Gosta Esping-Andersen argue that, since governments often take 
responsibility as part of the corporatist bargain for maintaining 
the level of economic activity and promoting employment growth, 
corporatism improves the relative power resources of labour.10
9 B. Marin, "Austria - the Paradigm Case of Liberal 
Corporatism?", in W. Grant (ed), The Political Economy of 
Corporatism. London, Macmillan, 1985, pp.89-125.
10 W. Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle. London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1983; G. Esping-Andersen, Politics Against 
Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power. Princeton, NJ., 
Princeton University Press, 1985. The classic statement of 
political exchange is Alessandro Pizzorno, 'Political Exchange 
and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict', in C. Crouch and 
A. Pizzorno (eds), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western 
Europe Since 1968. Volume Two, London, Macmillan, 1978, pp.277- 
98. Colin Crouch also argues that "bargained corporatism" is an 
exchange relationship from which labour derives some benefit from 
positive-sum bargaining. See C. Crouch, "Corporatism in 
Industrial Relations: A Formal Model", in Wyn Grant (ed), The 
Political Economy of Corporatism. London, Macmillan, 1985, pp.63- 
88. See also Marino Regini, "The Conditions for Political 
Exchange: How Concertation Emerged and Collapsed in Italy and 
Great Britain", in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict in 
Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p.127; 
and Marino Regini, "Political Bargaining in Western Europe During 
the Economic Crisis of the 1980s", in Otto Jacobi et al (eds),
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This is a view which is largely accepted here, since we 
assume that a corporatist bargain must be understood in terms of 
an equilibrium solution to the prisoners' dilemma of cooperation 
which entails a level of improvement in the welfare of both 
actors and which is preferable to both actors. Workers would 
certainly stand to gain from such cooperation as long as the 
distribution of gains and costs were such that workers were not 
simply transferring income from themselves to capitalists, but 
were contributing to future growth through the investment 
mechanism.11 The proviso to this, however, is that labour and 
capital have unequal power resources: capital controls the
accumulation process whereas labour only has the capacity to 
indirectly influence production.12
Economic Crisis. Trade Unions and the State. London, Croom Helm, 
1986, pp.61-76. Gerhard Lehmbruch argues that "Wage restraint 
could ... be traded for high and stable employment as a result of 
a shared insight into the logic of market procedures rather than 
as the result of a barter transaction"; and for Walter Streeck 
corporatism enables trade unions to enhance their "capacity for 
strategy". See Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Concertation and the Structure 
of Corporatist Networks", in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed), Order and 
Conflict, p.67; and Walter Streeck, "Neo-Corporatist Industrial 
Relations and the Economic Crisis in West Germany", in J.H. 
Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict, p.292.
11 As Przeworski writes: 'The only conceivable reason for
workers to consent voluntarily not to claim the entire social 
product is to treat current profits as a form of workers' 
"delegated" investment'. Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social 
Democracy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 180. On 
this subject, see Colin Crouch, 'Varieties of Trade Union 
Weakness: Organised‘ Labour and Capital Formation in Britain,
Federal Germany and Sweden', in Jack Hayward (ed), Trade Unions 
and Politics in Western Europe. London, Frank Cass, 1980, p.87; 
Kerry Schott, Policy. Power And Order: The Persistence Of
Economic Problems in Capitalist States. New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1984; and Bob Rowthorn, Capitalism. Conflict 
And Inflation. London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980, p.134.
12 Matti Pohjola, 'Threats and Bargaining in Capitalism. A 
Differential Game View', Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 8, 1984, pp.291-302.
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Thus corporatism does not simply function to achieve by 
institutional means outcomes which would have been produced by 
the market anyway. Both capitalists and government are expected 
to act in specific ways under corporatism, as much so as labour. 
There is an apparent paradox in the way the corporatist strategy 
of the encompassing peak federation seems to be 'compatible with 
the stability of that market economy against which labour started 
to organise itself in the first place'.13 This paradox is 
resolved when we consider that the corporatist strategy involves 
an exchange between labour, capital and government. As Roland 
Czada writes:
'"Encompassing" unions can hardly obtain rational choice 
criteria from inside their organisations. If they help 
modernize the economy they risk dismissals and hurt their 
members' immediate interests; if not, they slow-down the 
economy and thereby infringe on the long-term interests of 
their membership and of the society as a whole. This dilemma 
can only be solved with the aid of governments'.14
1.1.2. The Role of Government.
Sometimes corporatism is seen as a government-led strategy, 
involving heavy-handed, central direction of wages policy that is 
designed primarily to achieve wage restraint. Wage restraint, in 
this view, is of little benefit to labour, and simply functions 
to maintain government in office and capitalists in the lifestyle
13 Colin Crouch, 'Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint', 
in Leon Lindberg and Charles S. Maier (eds) , The Politics of 
Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington DC., The Brookings 
Institution, 1985, p.139.
14 Roland Czada, 'The Impact of Interest Politics on Flexible 
Adjustment Policies', in Hans Keman, Heikki Paloheimo, Paul F. 
Whiteley (eds), Coping With The Economic Crisis. Alternative 
Responses to Economic Recession in Advanced Industrial Societies. 
London, Sage, 1987, p.45.
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to which they have become accustomed.15 Corporatism can also be 
seen as a form of authoritarian state direction and intervention 
in business decision-making.16 In this view, corporatism enhances 
the directive power of the state, and is the early stages of a 
new, organic political economy, directed from above.
Certainly in a corporatist political economy the role of 
government is interventionist, in the sense that active policy 
measures are necessary to ensure that both labour and capital 
gain from their cooperation. But government cannot simply provide 
the solution to the problem of cooperation on its own. It is 
correct to attribute power and authority to the state, but it is 
a mistake to neglect the power of labour and capital. Although 
the state has some power to authoritatively enact its directives, 
the experiences of many countries have shown that governments 
prefer, if possible, not to resort to a head-on clash with strong 
trade unions and employers.17
The basic function of government is to promote social peace 
and capital accumulation, which requires either the satisfaction 
of societal interest group demands or the constraint of
15 Leo Panitch writes that incomes policies are 'primarily 
about state-induced collaboration. Above all else, [they are] a 
political structure designed to integrate the organised working 
class in the capitalist state'. Leo Panitch, 'Recent 
Theorizations of Corporatism: Reflections on a Growth Industry', 
British Journal of Sociology. 31, 2, 1980, p.161.
16 J.T. Winkler, "The Coming Corporatism", in R. Skidelsky 
(ed) , The End of the Kevnesian Era. London, Macmillan, 1978, 
pp.78-87. Philippe Schmitter is another theorist who adopts a 
more statist and less class-analytic approach to corporatism. See 
P. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (eds), Trends Towards Corporatist 
Intermediation. London, Sage, 1979.
17 It seems wise to neither underestimate the importance of 
"the state factor" nor to reduce corporatist theory to class 
relationships only. For a critical analysis, see Pierre Birnbaum, 
States and Collective Action: The European Experience. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.112.
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alternative sources of power and authority. In a capitalist 
economy, government is fiscally dependent upon profits in the 
private sector for the rents which sustain government activities. 
It must contend with interest groups which wield substantial 
economic power, and which can engage in "strike” activity (both 
investment strikes and labour strikes). In stagnant periods, 
government must walk a fine line between policies which maintain 
legitimacy through winning the political support of interest 
groups seeking privileges, and policies which force some groups 
to bear excess costs but also promote economic rationalisation.18
Government, then, may have an interest in corporatism as a 
means to promote collective gains, strengthen legitimacy and 
promote profit accumulation all at the same time. Corporatism 
could be a viable, long-term economic policy strategy. 
Government, however, is a relatively autonomous institution which 
acts partly as a competitive mechanism for representing the 
conflicting demands of labour and capital through party politics, 
partly as an independent actor with political and material 
interests in its own right, and partly as a governmental system
18 Most corporatist theorists interested in the role of the 
state focus on the fusing of the processes of interest 
representation and state intervention under capitalism. See C. 
Offe, 'The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups: 
Observations on the West German Case', in S. Berger (ed) , 
Organising Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism. Corporatism 
and the Transformation of Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, pp.123-58. B. Jessop, 'Capitalism and 
Liberal Democracy: The Best Possible Political Shell?', in G. 
Littlejohn et al (eds), Power and the State. London, Croom Helm, 
1978, pp.10-51; A. Cawson, 'Pluralism, Corporatism and the Role 
of the State', Government and Opposition. 13, 1, 1978, pp.178-98; 
A. Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory. Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1986, p.24; A. Cawson, 'Introduction: Varieties of 
Corporatism: The Importance of the Meso-Level of Interest
Intermediation', in A. Cawson (ed), Organised Interests and the 
State: Studies of Meso-Corporatism. London, Sage, 1985, p.6; P.C. 
Schmitter, 'Neo-Corporatism and the State', in W.P. Grant (ed), 
The Political Economy of Corporatism. London, Macmillan, 1985, 
pp.32-62.
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circumscribed in its economic and social policy choices by the 
profit criterion of capital.19
Its policy interests are therefore indeterminate. Government 
might play the role of authoritative dictator, impassive 
facilitator, capitalist agent, and even political wing of the 
labour movement. Determining its income share of the societal 
product could involve either a corporatist compromise with both 
labour and capital or an alliance with either labour or capital 
against the remaining actor.20 Government is not a Hobbesean 
leviathan, in a corporatist exchange it can only bargain with 
labour and capital.21
To sum up the discussion, corporatism is best understood in 
terms of voluntary, liberal-democratic exchanges between the 
three actors, within the context of a capitalist political
19 See M. Olson, ”A Theory Of The Incentives Facing Political 
Organisations, Neo-Corporatism and the Hegemonic State", 
International Political Science Review. & (2) , April 1986, 
pp.165-89. Przeworski and Wallerstein also argue that even a 
Labour government is, in large measure, structurally determined 
(in particular during periods of economic constraint) by 
dependence on private capital accumulation, and unlikely to 
automatically respond to trade unions' distributive interests. 
See A. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp.7-46; and A. Przeworski and 
M. Wallerstein, "Structural Dependence of the State on Capital", 
American Political Science Review. 82, 1, March 1988, pp.11-29. 
On the relative autonomy of the capitalist democratic state, see 
Eric Nordlinger, On The Autonomy Of The Democratic State. 
Cambridge, Mass., 1981; and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and 
Markets, New York, Harper, 1977.
20 On the effectiveness of interest group influence over 
government, see Paul Brace, Yousef Cohen, Virginia Gray, and 
David Lowery, 'How Much Do Interest Groups Influence State 
Economic Growth', American Political Science Review. 83, 1989, 
pp.1297-1308.
21 Manfred E. Streit, 'The Mirage of Neo-Corporatism', 
Kvklos. 41, 1988, pp.603-623.
25
1 - Corporatism As Rational Cooperation
economy.22 Each of the three actors is dependent upon the other 
for their cooperation, in particular, labour and capital depend 
on government to obviate inefficiency and inequality produced by 
market outcomes.23 These exchanges must benefit each of the three 
actors, but the overall context is overshadowed by the economic 
requirements of a capitalist economy.
1.1.3. Collective Action Difficulties.
A crucial assumption in corporatist theory is that trade 
union members have a collective interest in investment, price 
competitiveness and full employment, and that a corporatist 
policy of wage-restraint combined with economic policies designed 
to distribute costs will contribute toward realising these 
interests. Once realised, wages are assumed to increase at an 
optimal rate.
The approach taken here is to make rational choice 
assumptions about the actors. Hence, the actors are taken to 
maximise their preferences (or utility) subject to the interplay 
of strategies in a game-like environment. It is assumed that 
economic self-interest predominates. The weaknesses of such an 
approach are important, and must be kept in mind. Materialist 
rationality cannot exhaust the causes of human motivation, and 
this applies particularly to the conflict-ridden labour market 
relationship we are examining. As Peter Swenson points out,
22 On corporatism as liberal-democratic exchange, see G. 
Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government", 
Comparative Political Studies. 10, 1, 1977, pp.91-126; Prakash 
Sarangi, 'Determinants of Policy Change: A Cross National
Analysis', European Journal of Political Research. 14, 1986,
pp.23-44; Harold L. Wilensky and Lowell Turner, Democratic 
Corporatism and Policy Linkages. Berkeley, Institute of 
International Studies, 1987, pp.10-11.
23 David Soskice, 'Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining 
Unemployment: Coordinated and Non-Coordinated Market Economies', 
in Renato Brunetta and Carlo Dell'Aringa (eds), Labour Relations 
and Economic Performance. London, Macmilllan, 1990, pp.174-75.
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"anger” is not necessarily instrumentally rational, and nor is 
"solidarity".24 Moral principles may inform behaviour which takes 
little or no account of material gain, behaviour which may be 
sacrificial or even "suicidal". Individual choice can be moulded 
by institutions and cultural norms, and by leadership.25
Despite the lack of any completely solid ground, it is 
assumed here that material interests in income growth, relative 
worth, and "social wage" gains, and political interests in power, 
authority and control, play a significant enough role in 
motivating our actors' behaviour with respect to wage restraint 
for useful analysis to proceed. Although moral principles may 
motivate behaviour which is materially "irrational" for a time, 
it is assumed here that this is enough of an exception to the 
general rule for the rational choice model to be of some use.
It is well known that trade unions face a collective action 
problem in cooperating to sustain a cooperative wage-restraint 
strategy.26 In a classical collective action problem individuals 
or groups with a collective interest will not necessarily 
cooperate to further that interest, instead their rational
24 P. Swenson, Fair Shares. Unions. Pav. and Politics In 
Sweden And West Germany. London, Adamtine Press Limited, 1989, 
p.13f.
25 Because trade unions have to organise unity and collective 
action, union leadership plays a significant role in shaping 
workers' definitions of their interests. See C. Offe and H. 
Wiesenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action", in C. Offe, 
Disorganised Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and 
Politics. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985, pp.170-220.
26 M. Olson, The Logic Of Collective Action. Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965 and The Rise And Decline Of 
Nations. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982; see also Peter 
Lange, "Unions, Workers and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases 
of Consent", in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict in 
Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon, 1984, pp. 107-108, and 
S. Lash and J. Urry, 'The New Marxism of Collective Action: A 
Critical Analysis', Sociology. 18, 1, 1984, pp.33-50.
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interaction has unintended consequences, so that there is a 
paradox in which individual and collective rationality are in 
conflict.
In deciding whether to contribute toward a policy of wage- 
restraint, individual unions first have to calculate the effect 
of their own wage-rate on the overall rate of inflation, 
unemployment, and investment, which are indivisible and non­
excludable collective goods (or bads). They also have to consider 
the responses of capitalists and government. If noncooperation 
has low visibility, low imitative effects, and there are few 
sanctions available, and if the prospects of cooperation by other 
trade unions are high, then defection is obviously the best 
strategy.27 The union enjoys a free ride while everybody else 
fights inflation.
Importantly, defection is still the best strategy if the 
prospects of cooperation by other trade unions are low. The 
leadership can judge that a sacrifice on the part of their union 
will bring minimal benefit in terms of lower inflation, while 
extracting a substantial cost in terms of wage restraint from the 
union members.28 On the other hand, a militant strategy from the 
union, if the firm can survive by raising prices to compensate, 
can net a share of whatever gains are available, and the costs 
can be passed on to retiring workers, the unemployed, and social
27 See P. Dunleavy, "Group Identities and Individual 
Influence: Reconstructing the Theory of Interest Groups", British 
Journal of Political Science. 18, 1988, pp.25-27.
28 For the argument that each trade union reasons its own 
wage setting behaviour will not affect the general level of 
prices, see: R.F. Elliott and J.L. Fallick, "Incomes Policies, 
Inflation and Relative Pay: An Overview", in J.L. Fallick and 
R.F. Elliott (eds), Incomes Policies. Inflation and Relative Pay. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp.251-52; E. Tarantelli, "The 
Regulation of Inflation in Western Countries and the Degree of 
Neo-Corporatism", in A.A.C. Silva, Economic and Social 
Partnership and Incomes Policy. Faculdade De Ciencias Humanas Da 
Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, 1984, pp.4If.
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transfer recipients. Defection will produce maximum gain for the 
members while the costs will be distributed among the membership 
of society as a whole.
How could individual trade unions ever cooperate, then, in 
a corporatist wage restraint policy? In institutional theory, 
centralisation provides the solution, since centralisation 
reduces the independence of local wage bargaining units and in 
effect "redesigns the bargaining table”. Mancur Olson's work on 
the logic of collective action showed that large encompassing 
interest organisations should be expected, if they act 
rationally, to take into account the wider redistributive effects 
of their economic strategies.
Olson argued, in The Rise and Decline of Nations, that 
pluralist interest group activity in capitalist democracies tends 
to be characterised by a bias in favour of narrow distributional 
interests at the expense of general economic welfare, causing 
what he called "institutional sclerosis”.29 According to Olson, 
special interests have greater political influence, due to the 
greater ease of their effective organisation and mobilisation, 
and hence are able to secure protective government intervention. 
This "rent-seeking” behaviour then adversely affects the 
economy's capacity to adapt to changes in economic circumstances. 
The result is a reduction in efficiency and the rate of economic 
growth, with the social and economic consequences that follow.30
Olson's general argument seemed rather neatly contradicted 
by the experience of the corporatist countries, at least in fair 
economic weather as we shall show, in which large heterogeneous 
groups of interests were organised (into peak federations of 
trade unions and employers' associations) , and in which they were
29 M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1982.
30 See also, M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. 
Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.
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also incorporated into policy strategies which did explicitly 
take into account the general interest.31
But Olson also included a proviso in his theory: the "size 
effect". This held that, despite being pluralist in social 
organisation, some societies overcame the tendency of organised 
interests to pursue economic strategies with little regard for 
the general welfare because they organised their interests into 
large, central federations. Such large organisations could no 
longer externalise the costs of their strategies and so the logic 
of their strategy choice changed from the pursuit of costly 
narrow interests to the pursuit of the general welfare. Their 
strategies became more encompassing.
What is important here is the proportion of income-producing 
capacity influenced by the cooperation or defection of a trade 
union. The "size effect" can be achieved in one way, by having 
the membership of the trade union represent a large proportion of 
social membership. Any good or harm the union thus does to the 
social interest it does, pari passu, to its own members. But note 
that a small organisation in terms of members might also be 
unable to externalise the costs of its wage-setting behaviour, if 
its strategies have large enough implications for the well-being 
of society as a whole (or directly for its own well-being) . Thus, 
via high visibility of defection and imitative effects, a small 
union in terms of membership may have "size".
31 For critical analyses of Olson's theory, see David R. 
Cameron, 'Distributional Coalitions and Other Sources of Economic 
Stagnation', in International Organisation. 42, 1988, pp.561-603; 
Roland Czada, 'The Impact of Interest Politics on Flexible 
Adjustment Policies', in H. Keman, H. Paloheimo and Paul F. 
Whiteley (eds), Cooing With The Economic Crisis. London, Sage, 
1987, pp.20-53; Franz Lehner, 'Interest Intermediation, 
Institutional Structures and Public Policy', in Cooing With The 
Economic Crisis, pp.54-82; and Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 
'The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic
Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-80', 
Journal of Politics. 47, 1985, pp.794-796.
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The usual point made about the size of the organisation is 
that centralised, unified and encompassing trade unions will be 
particularly conscious of the difficulties in externalising the 
costs of wage-push inflation and at the same time will have the 
institutional power to direct a cooperative agreement. The 
availability of an organisational capacity to knit together 
divergent interest meshes neatly with the more encompassing, or 
collective perception of the group's interests.32
So far, however, we have talked only about a collective 
action problem which is solved by centralised authority: the 
"Hobbessean solution”.33 While encompassing organisations might 
be expected to have a greater capacity to reach cooperative 
agreements, the truth is that centralisation as a means of 
achieving this aim has its limits. Lower level actors have to be 
convinced that the strategy is also in their interests, a 
condition that we will show is much more easily satisfied in fair 
than in foul economic weather. Moreover, the encompassing 
organisations themselves must somehow solve their dilemmas of 
interaction. Setting aside the issues of centralisation and 
institutional factors in general for the moment, we have to 
examine why actors (even encompassing actors) might overcome the 
perverse logic of their situation and reach a cooperative 
solution.
32 R. Czada, "The Impact of Interest Politics on Flexible 
Adjustment Policies”, in H. Keman, H. Paloheimo and P.F. Whiteley 
(eds), Cooing with the Economic Crisis. London, Sage, 1987, 
pp.20-53.
33 Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee, 'Institutional 
Structure and Collective Action', American Political Science 
Review. 81, 1, March, 1987, p.131; see also, Heikki Paloheimo, 
'Micro Foundations and Macro Practice of Centralised Industrial 
Relations', European Journal of Political Research. 18, 1990, 
pp.389-406.
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1.1.4. Iteration and Conditional Cooperation,
In game theory, the collective action problem is modelled as 
the "prisoners' dilemma”. In the prisoners' dilemma (see Table
1.1.), non-cooperation is always the dominant strategy for all 
players, given the value of the payoffs. No matter whether the 
other players cooperate or defect, it always pays to defect.34 
Since all players have a dominant strategy, the game has an 
equilibrium, or a strategy vector such that no player can get a 
larger payoff using a different strategy while the other players' 
strategy remains the same. If each player expects the equilibrium 
to be the outcome, they will have no incentive to adopt a 
different strategy.
Table 1.1.
The Two-Plaver Prisoners' Dilemma.
Player A.
COOPERATE DEFECT
COOPERATE 1, 1 -2, 2
Player B.
DEFECT 2 , - 2  -1# -1
Despite the existence of an equilibrium in the prisoners' 
dilemma, however, the outcome is not pareto-optimal. All players 
would prefer the outcome (C,C) over (D,D) . The key to the 
dilemma, then, is not simply that each player reasons that "since 
my opponent will defect in any case I may as well defect", or 
even the fact that the risk of being a "sucker" is very great. It 
is that defection is always the dominant strategy, no matter what
34 See R. Hardin, "Collective Action as an Agreeable N- 
Prisoners' Dilemma", Behavioural Science. 16, 5, 1971, pp.472-81.
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the other player does. The dominant strategy produces a sub- 
optimal outcome for all players.35
Played only once, the prisoners' dilemma produces no 
incentive to cooperate, but game theorists have shown that 
iterative plavs change the incentive structure. The underlying 
idea here is that a sufficiently large number of repeated games 
makes the possible gains from cooperation (C,C) appear 
increasingly attractive. This changes the preference order of 
outcomes for player A from:
(D,C) > (C,C) > (D,D) > (C,D) ;
to:
(C,C) > { (D,C) = (D,D) } > (C,D).
Several conditions have to be met, however. First, the two 
players must have a sufficiently large enough probability of 
meeting again for them to have a stake in the outcome of future 
interactions. Second, the potential payoff from iterated (C,C) 
outcomes depends on the discount ratio of future to present 
payoffs. Game theorists assume that the future will be less 
important to a player than the present, since a player tends to 
value payoffs less the further they are in the future, and 
because the probability of meeting the same opponent again 
decreases as the number of games increases. That is to say, your 
opponent may change, the game may come to an unexpected end, the 
payoff values might change, and so on.36
35 M. Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
36 Some game theorists argue that if the game is to be played 
a known finite number of times the players will again have no 
incentive to cooperate. This is because on the last move they 
will have no future to influence by cooperation, so that 
defection is once again the best strategy. Logically it would 
seem that the second-to-last move would then become the next 
"last” move, and the game would unravel all the way back to the 
first move. The probability of a rational player defecting on the 
last move is 100 percent, but shifting to a (D,D) outcome too
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Robert Axelrod has demonstrated that the most successful 
cooperation strategy in a repeated two-person prisoners' dilemma 
is Tit for Tat (TfT) .37 TfT is a conditional cooperation strategy 
of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the 
other player did on the last move. Axelrod shows that for TfT to 
be collectively stable the next move has to be at least two 
thirds as important as the current move. Over iterated play, 
neither player could do better than TfT by reaping a one-off 
gain.
An important point to make about TfT is that, given the 
payoff structure (T=5, R=3, P=l, S=0)38 , a player using TfT can 
never actually score better relative to the other player. TfT 
always cooperates on the first move, lets the other player defect 
first, and never defects more times than the other player has 
defected. Therefore TfT can only achieve at most the same score 
relative to the other player, making it a non-zero-sum game, in 
which a player does not have to do better than the other player 
to do best.
In other words, from an unequal starting point, both actors 
could improve their collective position without necessarily 
improving their relative position. TfT simply succeeds by 
eliciting cooperative behaviour from the other player, making 
each player's proportionate success contingent upon the 
proportionate success of the other. It follows, then, that TfT is 
a strategy which is undermined by a high rate of excess 
inequality. If the value to a player of keeping ahead or of
early might negate the one-off gain of free-riding by wasting 
potential gains from (C,C). On the other hand, leaving it too 
late allows your opponent to make the one-off gain.
37 R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, Basic 
Books, 1984.
38 T = temptation; R = reward; P = punishment; S = sucker.
34
1 - Corporatism As Rational Cooperation
catching up is greater than the value of the mutual cooperation 
outcome, then TfT will become collectively unstable.
The notion of the "shadow of the future" is also captured by 
Russell Hardin in his investigation of cooperation in an n-person 
prisoners' dilemma.39 Hardin imagines a game involving ten 
players in which each player chooses between contributing or not 
contributing toward the provision of a public good. Each unit of 
cost produces two units of collective good, which is non­
excludable. Since the dominant strategy for each player is not to 
pay, the outcome appears to be collective failure. But Hardin 
points out that the cooperative outcome would in fact be chosen 
in a voting situation, making it a (weak) Condorcet winner.
The point which Hardin's example illustrates is the 
distinction which must be made between choosing strategies and 
choosing outcomes. In the prisoners' dilemma, the mutually 
cooperative outcome would always be preferred to the mutually 
non-cooperative outcome. It is only for strategic reasons that 
each player chooses to defect. If the only issue were the 
relative value of the outcomes, then (C,C) would always be 
chosen.
Several conclusions follow from this discussion of game 
theory for our rational choice perspective on the cooperation of 
trade unions in a corporatist wage-restraint policy:
1. Where it is difficult to measure the discount rate, the 
value of the payoffs, the effects of external disturbances, 
the value of contributions and costs, and where "punishment 
phases" are necessary to trigger cooperation from shirkers, 
estimating parameters for an equilibrium "solution” of a
39 R. Hardin, "Collective Action as an Agreeable N-Prisoners' 
Dilemma", Behavioural Science. 16, 5, 1971, pp.472-81.
35
1 - Corporatism As Rational Cooperation
cooperative type and avoiding accidentally triggering 
punishment phases will be very difficult.40
2. The likelihood of the players "meeting again" or meeting 
regularly is very important. For trade unions this is 
particularly important since the costs are borne before the 
gains, if any, are realised, and trade unions are vulnerable 
to a change in the policy environment. If it likely that the 
gains from cooperation will only last as long as it takes to 
reduce inflation, and that other actors will then cease 
cooperating, it may seem best to be the first to reap the 
gains of unilateral defection.
3. An industrial relations environment characterised by 
distrust and acrimony corresponds to a scenario of mutual 
unconditional defection. Shifting to conditional cooperation 
would require a great deal of bargaining over outcomes, and 
clear agreement as to what could be expected from the 
policy.
4. In a TfT strategy, the conditional cooperator never does 
better than the other actors. Yet in a liberal-capitalist 
economy, the outcomes of corporatism are likely to be 
limited in their implications for equality. Employers seek 
the cooperation of unions in increasing profits, but seldom 
appear to share the burden of income restraint themselves. 
Trade unions have to offer cooperation to a partner who 
expects as a matter of property right to reap a greater 
gain. Exploitation by actors is therefore likely to 
undermine the conditions for cooperation.
In sum, these difficulties must make us look again at corporatist
countries that have supposedly solved the prisoners' dilemma with
40 For a discussion of "monitoring problems", see Jonathan 
Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee, 'Institutional Structure and the 
Logic of Ongoing Collective Action', American Political Science 
Review. 81, 1, March, 1987, pp.129-54.
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new wonderment. Do the concepts and ideas discussed above make 
any explanatory sense when applied to the adoption by the Swedish 
blue-collar unions, for example, of a policy of voluntary wage 
restraint in the 1950s and 1960s? Did the unions offer 
conditional cooperation because the shadow of the future was such 
that they estimated the gains from restraint over the long term 
outweighed the costs of free-riding? If so, why did cooperation 
in Sweden begin breaking down from the mid-1970s onward?
The collective action problem understood as a prisoners' 
dilemma does not exhaust the possibilities for game theoretical 
situations to be repeated in real life. There are two other 
important categories of game-like situation which we will 
consider briefly here: chicken games and assurance games.
In the chicken game the cost of mutual defection is so great 
that each player would prefer to supply the collective good on 
their own, if need be. However, each player would not prefer to 
cooperate if the other player will do the work, so that there is 
no equilibrium in a chicken game. There is no best strategy, 
since this depends entirely on the other actor's strategy.
In chicken situations, each player has an incentive to pre­
commit to a strategy of non-cooperation, thereby forcing the 
other player to supply the collective good. The dilemma is, that 
both players may reason that the other will be forced to back 
down first and so the worst possible outcome occurs.
In the assurance game, there is an equilibrium at (C,C). 
There is effectively no collective action problem, since the 
gains can only be maximised through cooperation, and this is the 
dominant strategy for each player. The assurance game suggests 
that the public good is structured in such a way that cooperation 
is the only way it can be provided. Each player acting alone is 
unable to provide enough of the good, and (D,D) is a disaster. 
Therefore, so long as one player cooperates, the other will do 
likewise. But since neither player would prefer to cooperate if
37
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the other defects, the equilibrium is weak, and vulnerable to one 
defection.
In the context of the corporatist exchange, the assurance 
game is important because it might lie in the shadow of the 
prisoners' dilemma. The potential outcome of mutual cooperation 
over iterated play is great enough, we have seen, to change the 
preference structure from defection to conditional cooperation. 
If the outcome of mutual cooperation over a long period can be 
shown to be great enough to counterbalance the risks of 
cooperation and the temptations of one-off gains (with their 
consequences), and if the risks of free-riding are high enough, 
then the corporatist game can become an assurance game.
1.2. Two Fundamental Problems.
While rational cooperation, by definition, benefits capital, 
may strengthen labour, and could be viewed as a stable, long-term 
policy regime for government, the political exchange is subject 
to a number of management problems. The root cause of many of 
these is the problem that rational cooperation must be undertaken 
in a changing environment. Iteration is both a help and a 
hindrance: while it allows actors to escape the more narrow
confines of the one-shot prisoners' dilemma it produces 
relatively unpredictable consequences. This means effectively 
that the processes and the solutions to the iterated political 
exchange must themselves be constantly adapted. The renegotiation 
processes which must be undertaken in order to manage rational 
cooperation (in such a way as to achieve outcomes perceived by 
each of the three actors as pareto-optimal), are also costly and 
difficult.
The changing environment forces the three actors to make 
constant updates on their assessment of outcomes and strategy 
responses. But it also affects them materially, since shocks to 
the system invariably affect one or other of the actors in 
detrimental ways for at least as long as it takes for the system
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to respond and make an adjustment. The three actors, of course, 
are unequal in power, and are not homogenous single entities.
In particular:
(1) over time workers are forced to bear costs even if they 
have long since ceased to cooperate;
(2) an equilibrium solution to the prisoners' dilemma in
real life is never going to be attainable as pure equality.
Instead, the "voluntary exchanges" are going to have to encompass 
unequal shares;
(3) If the outcome of (1) is worse than the outcome of (2)
over the long term then the cooperative solution will be
preferable. Otherwise, if (2) is worse than (1), the inequality 
or degree of excess inequality is too great and workers are 
better off continuing to defect.
1.2.1. Inequality.
A cooperative solution must be reached despite the 
competitive opposition of labour and capital in a corporatist 
exchange which is, after all, by definition capitalist. According 
to game theory, labour and capital are in a prisoners' dilemma 
which only appears to have the character of fundamental conflict. 
"Exploitation" can be solved by cooperation which yields a pareto 
optimal outcome for both actors, in which inequality persists but 
each actor rationally perceives itself to have maximised its 
utility.41
41 Since "exploitation" is such a value-charged term, we will 
attempt to avoid it as much as possible. Roemer, however, has 
developed a rational choice account of exploitation which is 
useful in this context. He defines exploitation as the 
consequence of "free" choices in a "perfect" market system in 
which actors have unequal endowments. Exploitation is derived 
from the fact that workers are paid a wage enabling them to buy 
only an amount of output embodying less labour than they expended 
in production, the remainder being embodied in profit. Given the 
scarcity of capital relative to available labour, workers compete 
for access and their wages are kept low enough for profits to be 
accumulated. J.E. Roemer, Free To Lose. An Introduction to
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At what point does inequality become "excess inequality” or 
"exploitation”? One way of understanding wage restraint as 
"exploitation" is to recognise that wage-restraint entails an 
acceptance that profit is the necessary condition for future 
economic growth, and introduces capitalist profit criteria into 
the design of trade union wages strategy. This ties wages 
strategy to serving the interests of capital, and effectively 
represents the domination of capital over labour.42
The acceptance of capitalist profit criterion is an integral 
part in the calculation of the solution to the prisoners' dilemma 
but labour's primary mission is to fight excess inequality. 
Excess inequality, then, represents the excess income capitalists 
consume after capitalist profit criterion such as investment and 
improvements have been met. Labour must be satisfied that 
capital's level of consumption is low enough to obviate a 
disproportionate unloading of costs onto workers before it will 
cooperate.
The true level of excess inequality is given by the degree 
to which capitalists appropriate a share of profits as their own 
personal income which is not only above that of workers but 
should be used for investment and research and development. 
Formally, this can be demonstrated as follows: the increase in 
capitalist's income is equal to a proportion K of the profit (Pt) 
produced.
Ct+1 = C* + KPt (1)
Marxist Economic Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1988, pp.41-42.
42 For more neo-Marxian analysis, with a rational choice 
flavour, see Adam Przeworski and A. Wallerstein, 'The Structure 
of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies', American 
Political Science Review. 76, 1982, pp.215-38; Alan Carling,
'Rational Choice Marxism', New Left Review. 160, 1986, pp.24-62; 
J.E. Roemer, A General Theory of Exploitation and Class. 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982.
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Total profit, in turn, is equal to total income minus all wages.
Pt - Yt - (Ct + Wt + Gt) (2)
Total income, in turn, is equal to income plus a fair weather 
growth parameter a minus a foul weather contraction parameter
Yt+1 = Yt + a - 0 (3)
If the rate of output per investment slows, then the share taken
by capitalists, K, will have, along with workers' wages, a 
dampening effect on productivity and output trends. This means 
that Pt will decline, which means that a constant rate of 
consumption will result in a relatively greater cost being 
unloaded onto Wt and Gt. In other words, excess inequality simply 
means that capitalists are not bearing a fair share of the wage 
restraint necessary to stimulate investment and output growth.
Thus, if capitalists appropriated a 75 percent share, and a 
constant rate of investment produced 1 unit of growth in output, 
and £ was -.50, then in the following time period investment 
would produce only 0.50 units of growth and capitalists should 
then be expected to appropriate 75 percent of 0.50, or 0.37. 
Instead, if they still appropriate 0.75, this means that a cost 
of -0.25 must be distributed among the other actors.
If we imagine, on the contrary, that capitalists appropriate
75 percent, and Pt = 1 and a — +.50, or that fair weather in
combination with sufficient research and development, innovation 
and investment, efficient public policy and "labour quiescence" 
produced a growth of an additional 1/2 of total income 
(admittedly a fantastic sum), then although wages would still be 
unequal they would have increased (from 0.25 to 0.37).
So although workers will still be being outperformed in 
individual consumption terms by capitalists, they will perceive 
only an improvement in their own material wellbeing. Workers 
could find it rational to cooperate in fair weather conditions, 
since wage restraint would still result in gains that outweigh 
any continuing inequality. But if the long-term gains from
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restraint or cooperation are outweighed by the perceived costs of 
the inequality, then until the employers cooperate labour would 
be acting rationally to defect.
Thus excess inequality would be perceived to increase in 
foul economic weather in cases where capitalists cannot stimulate 
growth with investment, but do not want to curb their conspicuous 
consumption. This would be so until labour and capital agree on 
a renegotiation of the shares of income and it became clearer 
that a more equal distribution of income fails to produce much 
more growth. It is disputable whether or not an "appropriation of 
capitalist's incomes for investment" would produce an economic 
solution to foul weather. Would the extra investment make a 
difference? In empirical terms, that would depend on how much of 
the national income is consumed by investment already, and how 
much of an addition the higher "tax" would make.
If we accept for the moment the Marxist proposition that 
labour is, by definition, being exploited through the operation 
of capitalist wage relations, then labour must rationally choose 
whether to cooperate and accept the exploitation or struggle to 
earn a larger share of the national income. The theory of 
cooperation and the economic theory of exploitation are then 
interwoven. Any understanding of a particular rational political 
exchange must recognise that labour, while gaining something, 
must live with the fact of a continuing inequality of outcomes in 
a capitalist economy.
Clearly, the rationality of cooperation depends to some 
extent on policies designed to reduce excess inequality, but the 
effectiveness of these policies are sensitive to the shock effect 
of increases in either fair or foul economic weather. The degree 
of excess inequality increases during foul economic weather 
because the relative shares (and by implication, the policies) 
remain unchanged for an indeterminant time. The three actors,
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therefore, must make efficient bargaining decisions in order to 
minimise the effects of a foul weather shock.
1.2.2. Bargaining.
The distribution of material income in a rational 
cooperation model must be determined in a bargaining process 
between the three main actors, which is itself another related 
class of collective action problem. Jon Elster in fact argues 
that the pure free-rider problem is a less serious obstacle to 
collective action than problems which arise from the complexities 
of bargaining over the distribution of costs and benefits.43
In the bargaining theory developed by John Nash, bargaining 
is assumed to be a cooperative game.44 That is, the difficulty is 
in deciding on which outcome both actors can agree on. Both 
actors face the possibility of disagreement, which might be very 
costly to one or both of them. In bargaining theory the set of 
feasible bargains is represented in terms of a set of feasible 
utility pairs. Nash constructed a bargaining function which could 
identify a rational solution to any bargaining problem of this 
type. He did this by laying down four conditions for rational 
bargaining, and then showed that only one function could meet 
them all. The four conditions are:
1. Pareto Optimalitv: the outcome cannot be improved for one 
party without loss for the other.
2. Invariance: the solution should be invariant with respect 
to positive linear utility transformations.
3. Symmetry: if the set of feasible solutions is symmetrical 
around the 45 degree line, and the disagreement point is on 
that line, then the solution should also be on that line.
43 J. Elster, The Cement of Society. A Study of Social Order. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.155.
44 See J. Nash, 'The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica. 18, 
1950, pp.155-62; and J. Nash, 'Non-Cooperative Games', Annals of 
Mathematics. 64, 1951, pp.286-95.
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4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: if the solution 
in a game is still feasible after the set of feasible 
solutions has changed in size, it should remain the 
solution.
One important problem with bargaining theory is that of measuring 
and comparing the preferences of the actors for different 
outcomes, since this must crucially affect their bargaining 
power. In Nash bargaining theory we measure not interpersonal 
utilities for different distributions, but rather relative 
utilities for each actor (akin to hypothetical choices among 
lotteries). Each utility gives a ratio of the actor's relative 
preference for a distributive outcome. Thus an actor in a weak 
bargaining position would have a greater interest in achieving a 
small distribution than a stronger actor, who can afford the 
greater risk of going for more. According to the Nash solution, 
rational actors will end up consenting to a distribution which 
reflects the maximum product of their utilities (or all that they 
could reasonably expect to get, given their relative bargaining 
strengths). This would be on the Pareto-optimal frontier of 
distributions where no other outcomes could be achieved without 
one of the actors (at least) doing worse.
The core element of the Nash solution is that each actor 
gains equally, in terms of their relative utilities, from some 
assigned non-agreement point. This can lead to a very unequal 
result in absolute terms, of course, since the utilities depend 
crucially on relative bargaining strength. At the Nash point, 
each actor will have an equal amount to lose by risking non­
agreement .45
Applying these ideas to our developing model, we can readily 
see that capitalists, workers and government are going to have
45 This discussion is derived from B. Barry, Theories of 
Justice. A Treatise on Social Justice. Volume I. London, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989.
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different degrees of bargaining power, and that these degrees are 
going to depend upon a range of factors. Firstly, the actors will 
have different resources at their disposal. Using Elster's 
terminology, we can define these resources in terms of "outside 
options" and "inside options".46 Outside options describe the 
resources available to the actors if cooperation broke down 
entirely and the actors had to rely on alternative sources of 
income. For workers, this means the likelihood of finding another 
job and the degree of government support available. For 
employers, it means the likelihood of finding replacement 
workers, or of relocating or selling out (if these latter two 
options are in fact viable). For government, it means the 
likelihood of successfully managing the economy without the 
cooperation of workers in the labour market.
Inside options, on the other hand, refer to the resources 
that are available in a conflict. They determine how credible 
threats to hold out will be. For workers, these consist of the 
strike fund, the degree of support which would be forthcoming 
from other workers in other sectors, and the damage the strike 
might cause employers and the economy if it were to be carried 
out. Employers also have strategies to enable them to survive 
industrial conflict, including their own strike funds, and 
strategic stockpiling. Governments have the inside option of 
changing the rules which determine the legal nature of the 
bargaining environment, but they are also answerable to the vote 
if the conflict becomes too costly.
Outside options only come into play when there is danger of 
the bargaining breaking down completely. An actor would not 
rationally agree to a bargaining offer that was worse than the
46 The link with "insider-outsider" theory in labour 
economics is explored in the next chapter. Jon Elster, The Cement 
of Society. A Study of Social Order. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, p.77.
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outside options which were available. Inside options determine 
the outcome of bargaining within these larger constraints. Ii a 
bargaining situation, then, actors can increase their bargaining 
power when they can credibly communicate that:
1. Their costs of waiting during protracted bargaining are 
low in comparison to the other actor(s).
2. The costs of conflict are not as high for them as they 
are for their opponent.
3. They do not have as much to gain from the agreement, 
hence their opponent has more to lose and is in a weaker 
bargaining position.
4. They are slower at reaching a decision, which makes the 
opponent anxious to speed up the process by making a better 
offer.
These bargaining strategies must be considered to lead to serious 
problems for collective action. As Elster writes:
'to increase their distributive shares, bargainers engage in 
tactics that either decrease the probability of reaching 
agreement or decrease the size of the total to be 
shared' .47
1.3. A Simple Model of Outcomes.
The tripartite corporatist process, to survive, must be seen 
to be delivering a material improvement to each of the three 
cooperating actors over iterations. Relying on this notion of 
"delivering the goods", there is a substantial body of the 
corporatist literature which argues that the stability of 
corporatism can be explained using "rational actor" assumptions.
In a number of models used by economists and political 
scientists, capitalists control investment and workers have 
variegated labour market power to determine how much profit is
47 Elster, The Cement of Society. A Study of Social Order.
p. 82.
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left for investment.48 If labour exercises restraint in squeezing 
profits, sufficient investment is made to ensure a steadily 
growing real share of income.49 Both labour and capital are 
better off.
In game theory, much depends on whether or not we 
characterise the rational interaction between labour and capital 
as a cooperative game or as a non-cooperative game. If the game 
is cooperative, then workers can act as Stackelberg leaders 
knowing that their restraint will result in investment as the 
most likely rational response from capital, given the assumption 
that capital is also willing to cooperate. But if the interaction 
is uncooperative, then neither actor would want to be the leader 
and the actors are in stalemate.50
48 A. Przeworski and M. Wallerstein, "The Structure of Class 
Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Countries", American Political 
Science Review. 2, 76, June 1982, pp.215-38; Marick F. Masters 
and John D. Robertson, 'Class Compromise In Industrial 
Democracies', American Political Science Review. 82, 4, 1988,
pp.1183-1201; G. Lehmbruch, "Concluding Remarks: Problems for 
Future Research on Corporatist Intermediation and Policy-Making”, 
in P.C. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (eds), Trends Toward 
Corporatist Interest Intermediation. London, Sage, 1979, pp.299- 
309; K. Schott, "Investment, Order and Conflict in a Simple 
Dynamic Model of Capitalism”, in J.H. Goldthorpe, Order and 
Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon, 1984, 
pp.81-97; Matti Pohjola, 'Corporatism and Wage Bargaining', in 
Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn (eds), Social 
Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1992, pp.44-81.
49 In the model which follows several simplifying assumptions 
are made: (1) the economy operates at full employment; (2) 
inflation is assumed away: that is, wage militancy results in 
less income being available for investment. Since a successful 
corporatist economy should be characterised by full employment 
and low inflation, these assumptions seem applicable; (3) The 
wages impact on aggregate demand is assumed not to influence 
investment.
50 See Matti Pohjola, 'Nash and Stackelberg Solutions in a 
Differential Game Model of Capitalism', Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control. 6, 1983, pp.173-86; Aart de Zeeuw, 'Note on
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In the following model, we assume some sort of conditional 
cooperation as the basis for the "Restraint Strategy” and the 
••Moderate Strategy” , whereas the "Militant Strategy” would be 
classic non-cooperation. The model is designed to demonstrate the 
material outcomes of cooperation in foul weather and to show how 
theoretically, at least, corporatism could be construed as a 
system which at times would be required to distribute only costs 
and not just adjust gains downward in order to maximise future 
gains. It supports the interpretation that rational cooperation 
can be a growth-strategy, but also demonstrates that there may be 
foul weather time periods in which there is negative growth.
In the model there are four time-dependent variables:
Yt: output at time t.
It: investment at time t.
Wt: workers' wage at time t.
Q: capitalists income at time t.
Wages are divided between two actors: labour and capital, which 
in turn distribute their share among their members.51 Investment 
is determined by the amount of output after wages have been taken 
out:
It = Yt - (Wt + Ct) (1)
Nash and Stackelberg Solutions in a Differential Game Model of 
Capitalism', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 16, 1992, 
pp.139-145; Matti Pohjola, 'Union Rivalry and Economic Growth: A 
Differential Game Approach', Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 
86, 3, 1984, pp.365-70.
51 The choice of these two actors is for purposes of 
simplification. It would not add much to the exposition to 
include Government as an actor at this point. The point is that 
these two actors must distribute wages in such a way that future 
wages are maximised. Thus the two actors could also be "High Pay” 
and ”Low Pay” workers within the trade union actor. The 
possibilities depend on the point of definition. Similarly, the 
inequality in consumption rates is not designed to make any 
specific point about inequality between workers and capitalists, 
it is meant to be suggestive.
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An increase in the level of output from time t to time t+1 is 
proportional to the level of output at time t plus the rate of 
increase in output per unit of investment:
Yt+1 = Yt + alt (2)
The parameter a represents the increase in output per unit of 
investment. The actors in the cooperative solution must choose as 
their wages a fraction <p of the realised increase in output:
(Wt+1 - Wt) + (Ct+1 - Ct) = 0(Yt+1-Yt) (3)
The higher the value of 0, then, the more aggressive the actors 
are. According to (2) and (3) we have:
(Wt+i ~ Wt) + (Ct+1 ~ Ct) — 0alt i.e.
(Wt+1 - Wt) + (C,+1 - CJ = SIt (4)
where S = 0a. The value, 6, then, signifies both the efficiency 
and the amount of investment, which in turn determines output. 
Assuming that a is positive, the cooperative solution is for the 
actors to choose an 0 such that over time W and C are maximised. 
That is to say:
It+1 = (1 + a - S)It (5)
If the actors choose an 0 which is less than a, then the growth 
path of It, Wt and Yt will be positive, generating grounds for a 
positive sum agreement over time.
In the graphs which follow we have set a model which has the 
following characteristics at T:0:
Yt = output = 100.
It = investment = 20 
Wt = Workers = 40 
Q = Capitalists =40 
We assume, then, that workers and capitalists begin the "game" 
with equal shares and a given quantity of investment. Much now 
depends on the rate of a, since this will determine the rate of 
output growth per unit of investment.
a (rate of increase in output per unit of investment) =0.1
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a is our fair economic weather parameter. The increase in output 
per unit of investment will depend on technology, innovation, 
work efficiency, and global market conditions. Assuming wages 
remain constant, output now increases by 2 at every time unit. 
The rate of 0 is thus important, since this determines the amount 
of investment left over after wages.
0 = T + K
t = workers' consumption rate
K = capitalists' consumption rate 
The fraction 0 is shared between workers and capitalists. We 
assume that capitalists will take a larger share of 0, and that 
both actors can choose between either a wage restraint line in 
which investment grows, a moderate line in which the rate of 
investment remains constant, or a militant line in which case the 
rate of investment shrinks.
The consumption rates, respectively, of labour (t) and 
capital (K) , are determined in relation to a, which we have 
assumed to be a constant: 0.1.
RESTRAINT: T = 0.03; K = 0.05. [a > 0]
MODERATE: r = 0.04; K = 0.06. [a = 0]
MILITANT: r = 0.07; K = 0.09. [a < 0]
Figure 1.1 shows the wage outcomes for workers given the 
three pairings of t and K. We can see that "Restraint” is clearly 
a long-term strategy. It does lead, by an exponential increase, 
to enormous income levels after T30, but for much of the initial 
period it clearly does worse than the other two.52 "Militant" 
maximises the short term, while "Moderate" simply maintains the 
steady "0.1 x 20 = 2" gain to output.
52 At Time = 200, workers wages for "Restraint" are 1,553, 
compared to 199 for "Moderate". Similarly, investment at T200 is 
1,029 compared to 20, and output is 5,145 compared to 498.
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Figure 1.1.
Three Wages Strategies.
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The effect on investment is clear in Figure 1.2., which over 
100 time periods shows a clear upward trend for "Restraint”, no 
change for "Moderate", and for "Militant" a trend to zero. If 
workers and capitalists cannot choose an r and an K, such that <p 
< a, then future output and future wages will suffer. In this 
model the function of wage restraint is to prevent investment 
reaching zero. At t  = 0.07 and K = 0.09 the economy will atrophy.
It is instructive to view this model from a game-theoretical 
perspective. We can say that the "Militant" scenario represents 
defection from mutual cooperation. We have seen that one 
eguilibrium solution for workers and capitalists is r = 0.04 and 
K = 0.06, our "Moderate" strategy. In the "Moderate" strategy 
workers and capitalists simply have to agree on any t  and K so
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Figure 1.2.
Three Investment Outcomes.
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Table 1.
The Strategies Which Lead To A
2.
Prisoners' Dilemma.
Capitalists
C D
c .04, .06 • o • O VO
Workers
D .07, .03 .07, .09
long as 0 equals a. Thus workers and capitalists struggle over 
their relative shares within the bounds of the "Moderate"
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strategy, and a particularly militant struggle could yield a 
combination of strategies as illustrated in Table 1.2.
In Table 1.2. workers and capitalists each have a defection 
strategy which heavily exploits the other. In terms of outcomes 
over iterative encounters, the situation is a prisoners' dilemma, 
with mutual defection being the rational equilibrium in a one- 
shot game but mutual cooperation being the optimal long-term 
collective strategy. Over iterative encounters, the gains from 
(C,C) could become attractive enough to trigger conditional 
cooperation, especially since (D,D) leads to the atrophy of 
investment. The consumption rates may appear so high as to be 
unintelligible in terms of any real life experience of workers 
and capitalists, but the prisoners' dilemma construction of the 
collective action problem shown here is nevertheless instructive.
In our model so far there is only fair economic weather and 
it is constant. That is, a is 0.1, which generates 2 units of 
output under the "Moderate" strategy for every 20 units of 
investment, which workers and capitalists divide unevenly between 
themselves. But a can change. We illustrate the effect of an 
exponential improvement in a with Figure 1.3., which shows the 
effect on workers wages in the "Militant" strategy of an increase 
at T:10 of 0.0123 per time period. We can see that in relation to 
the new, growing a, the "Militant" strategy is no longer damaging 
to investment and output.
The lesson is clear. In fair economic weather the rate of 
militancy depends not only on the other actors' strategy choices 
and outcomes, but also on a shifting value: a. Innovation and 
productivity improvements can give such a boost to a as to make 
a previously unsustainable "Militant" strategy becomes 
effectively a "Restraint" strategy. Conversely, if a falls, even 
a "Restraint" strategy may turn into an unsustainable wage curve, 
where investment quickly shrinks to zero.
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Figure 1.3.
The Impact of Growth in a on the "Militant1' Strategy.
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One interpretation of foul economic weather would be a 
declining a rate. But it seems counter-intuitive to imagine that 
the contribution to output of investment might fall away to zero, 
so in our model we will introduce a new parameter, /?, which 
represents the rate of output depreciation.
0 (output depreciation rate) = 0.005
Foul weather could be caused by a number of factors in this 
model: a price shock resulting from an increase in the cost of 
imported raw materials, such as oil; a loss of external markets 
due to changes in global production and demand, resulting from, 
for example, the decline of key export sectors such as steel and 
shipbuilding industries and/or deflationary macroeconomic 
policies pursued by major trading partners; an increase in the
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Figure 1.4.
The Impact of Growth in Q on Investment Outcomes.
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cost of full employment due to population growth, changes in age 
structure and the entry of new labour market participants, such 
as women, resulting in increased costs of maintaining employment 
and income provision; natural disasters such as drought; 
increasing costs of rapid technological change and restructuring, 
such as labour retraining and placement; and so forth. The 
depreciation parameter is a "catch-all" for all of these 
processes. Thus, modifying equation 2 we now have output growth 
being determined not only by investment at the rate of a but also 
by the depreciation of 0.
Yt+1 - Yt + alt - 0Yt (6)
We set /? at 0.005. Thus for Output = 100, the unit depreciation 
rate will be 0.5. We can see in Figure 1.4. that, with the new
55
1 - Corporatism As Rational Cooperation 
Ficrure 1.5.
The Impact of Growth in 3 on Wages Outcomes.
workers wages
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foul weather variable in operation, the old strategies all fail 
to achieve either "Moderate" or "Restraint" outcomes. Figure 1.5. 
shows the long-term prospects for workers' wages under the foul 
weather scenario. Interestingly, it can be seen that over the 
long-term, in terms of outcomes, the old "Restraint" strategy 
becomes the most "Militant" strategy. This is because the 
"Restraint" strategy achieves the largest gain in the middle- 
term, which in turn has the most damaging effect given over the 
longer term. This may be an important factor in determining the 
impact of foul weather on a corporatist system, since it suggests 
that because the successful corporatist system in fair weather 
achieves the greatest income gains it has further to fall in
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Ficrure 1.6.
Effect on Wages of a Shift to a MNew Restraint11 Strategy.
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making an adjustment. In the absence of an adjustment to 0, those 
gains effectively become a greater liability.
In foul economic weather, a is gradually overwhelmed by 0. 
In such a case, either investment or wages must fall. Since 
investment cannot fall without adverse consequences for both 
wages and output, wages must fall. In Figures 1.6. and 1.7. we 
see the effect of a shift at T=25 from r = 0.03 and K = 0.05 to 
r = 0.02 and K = 0.03. Moving to a lower collective rate of 
consumption is sufficient in this case to compensate for the 
0.005 depreciation factor. The shift to a "New Restraint" 
strategy ensures that the overall increase in output, investment 
and wages is sustained. Workers and capitalists simply 
appropriate less of the increase in output, and leave enough
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Figure 1.7.
Effect on Output, Investment, and Wages.
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A Comparison
Table 1.3. 
of Outcomes Under Different Conditions and
Strategies.
T = 30. Wage Restraint.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Output 177 133 168
Investment 35 13 44
Workers 63 55 57
Capitalists 79 65 65
Case 1: ’Restraint’ with fair weather, a = 0.1; 0 = 0.0; t = 0.03; K = 0.05. 
Case 2: "Restraint" with foul weather, a =  0.1; 0 =  0.005; 
r  =  0.03; K =  0.05.
Case 3: "New Restraint" with foul weather, a = 0.1; 0  = 0.005; 
r = 0.02; K = 0.03.
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surplus for investment to be sufficient to generate growth
despite the /? value of 0.005.
Table 1.3. shows how the relative level of investment has 
had to rise in the "New Restraint" strategy to produce growth in 
output in the foul economic weather scenario. Even given the 
reduced rate of <p, it now takes more units of investment to
produce less growth than was the case in the fair weather
Figure 1.8.
Zero Wages Growth With Increasing 8.
Zero Wages. Grcmtn
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scenario. But with the new, reduced collective consumption rate, 
growth is once again achieved. In Case 2 it is clear that 
investment is declining and on the way to zero.
Reducing the rate of t  and K can, then, in some cases be 
sufficient to restore investment growth in response to an given 
rate of 0. But what if the level of /3 can vary, like a? If foul
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weather could increase, perhaps due to an oil shock, raw material 
limits, population growth, or other sources of uncompetitiveness, 
then we could imagine a situation in which even consumption rates 
of t  = 0 and K = 0 are insufficient to prevent investment
declining to zero. Figure 1.8. shows what happens if we raise 0 
from 0.005 to 0.05 and reduce r and K to zero. Wages stay at 40, 
but this is not enough. At this point, instead of increasing at 
a lower rate, some real wage restraint is needed.
Ficrure 1.9.
The Effect of a Fall in Wages on Investment and Output.
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To achieve the necessary wage restraint, we amend formula 4 
by adding the depreciation factor to wages.
Wt+1 = Wt + SIt - 0Wt (7)
Thus wages now make an adjustment for /?. Figure 1.9. shows that 
the effect of the drop in wages on output is dependent upon
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Ficrure 1.10.
The Return to Consumption Growth
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investment reaching a level high enough to turn the output 
decline around. Where the output line flattens out is the point 
where wages have fallen enough. Obviously, wages could keep on 
falling to the point where investment produces a maximum increase 
in output, but at some point the actors are going to prefer to 
consume rather than produce. Thus once growth is resumed there is 
once again room for the consumption rates of workers and 
capitalists to increase.
Figures 1.10. and 1.11. show what happens if workers and 
capitalists shift to a r of 0.02 and K of 0.03 at T=30. Given the 
initial real wage restraint, output once again begins to 
increase, and from that point on the two actors are able to 
consume part of that increase, although unequally.
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Figure 1.11.
The Adjustment Effect on Output, Investment, and Incomes.
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From our model we can see that the cooperative solution to 
the prisoners' dilemma functions much less problematically in 
fair economic weather than in foul. In fair weather, thanks to 
the presence of a and the absence of /?, the actors are better off 
in absolute terms despite cooperating and exercising restraint in 
determining income shares of growth. Moreover, if a is growing 
then a wage strategy can involve quite substantial improvements 
while still remaining a "Restraint” strategy. Cooperation to 
achieve future gains becomes somewhat meaningless if a approaches 
infinity, since virtually any strategy would be sustainable over 
the long term.
In "foul" weather the demand upon available income for both 
wages and investment threatens to outstrip output growth, so that
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wages must fall in real terms. Here the outcome of mutual 
cooperation is still positive sum, but until the negative effects 
of 0 have been compensated for by the wage restraint, the actors 
are not any better off. In fact, they are worse off. Thus much 
will depend upon the capacity of the corporatist actors to agree 
upon some rate of real restraint that is sufficiently high enough 
to reverse the fall in output. In Figure 1.9. we assumed that r 
and K are set at zero, and that the depreciation factor 0 applies 
equally to both series of incomes, but in the real world actors 
with different capacities and power resources are likely to 
distribute the restraint unequally. Each of the three actors in 
a corporatist exchange are dependent upon the others for the 
achievement of a pareto-optimal outcome, and at the same time 
each are vulnerable to exploitation in offering cooperation to 
achieve such an outcome.
Conclusion.
Labour, Capital, and Government must reach a cooperative 
equilibrium agreement in a corporatist economy despite the 
presence of inequality, and the shifting impact of relative 
changes in fair and foul economic weather. Rational cooperation 
must be achieved in a costly and difficult bargaining process.
We have seen in the literature a range of positions which 
differ in the degree to which they argue that corporatism is in 
the interests of, respectively, the state, capital and trade 
unions. Yet given our definition of corporatism as fundamentally 
a tripartite system, it must be that these are the three actors 
who cooperate in some way and reduce prisoners' dilemmas. 
Therefore we adopt the view that a corporatist solution must 
benefit all three actors.
The impact of foul weather on the trend line of iterative 
outcomes strengthens the argument that corporatist processes 
operate far more effectively in fair weather, where the 
underlying growth in incomes assuages both the continuance of
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inequality and the costs of bargaining. Schwerin specifically 
examines the impact of "resource constraint" with respect to 
Norway. He concludes, in strikingly similar fashion, that 
perceived outcome inequity is a greater problem than resource 
constraint, but argues that it may be more of a problem in 
periods of rapid economic growth. We argue that foul weather 
destabilises intended equity outcomes and fair weather covers up 
most of the ill-effects of continuing inequality. Schwerin writes 
that in foul weather lower level actors might be more likely to 
cooperate because:
'organisational authority and rank-and-file compliance 
increase as opportunities for wage drift decline. The fall 
in opportunity costs makes wage moderation less 
burdensome'.53
This may be true to an extent, but it seems odd that corporatism 
should even be necessary if the actors are rationally likely to 
exercise restraint anyway.
A number of institutional variables assist labour, capital 
and government in the construction and management of a rational 
cooperation process. As recognised in the corporatist literature, 
chief among these are centralised peak organisations of labour 
and capital and institutions of interest intermediation. 
Centralisation of collective bargaining and a strongly unified 
trade union movement are said to enable the leadership to 
authoritatively deliver the cooperation of affiliates to a wage- 
restraint strategy.54 Interaction between the central,
53 Don S. Schwerin, 'The Limits of Organisation as a Response 
to Wage-Price Problems', in Richard Rose, Challenge To 
Governance. Studies In Overloaded Polities. London, Sage, 1980, 
p. 80.
54 See the following chapters. Sources which discuss 
centralisation with special reference to the UK include: C.
Crouch, Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action. Glasgow,
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encompassing actors, however, involves the management of the 
interests of vast agglomerations of individual actors. This 
implies that very large-scale centralisation, as would be 
necessary in large closed economies, may be impractical and that 
smaller sub-collectivities in a large state may be more optimal 
for cooperation. The vulnerability of small states to external 
markets has been argued to be strongly associated with policies 
of social protection and intervention. The rationale of economies 
of scale can enhance economic centralisation and specialisation, 
and the common fear of economic vulnerability can generate 
support for a corporatist policy.55
Rational cooperation depends to a great practical extent on 
the government actor, which tends in practice to be a left-wing 
government. Ideological similarity between the government and 
trade union movement allows greater possibility of agreement on 
policy goals.56 The government actor is required to make 
redistributive interventions that are designed to maximise 
employment spreading and income spreading. The cynical 
interpretation of this holds that the connection between Left 
control of government and union centralisation implies that
Fontana, 1982; L. Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial 
Militancy. The Labour Party, the TUC. and Incomes Policy. 1945- 
1974. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976; L. Panitch, 
"The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", in P.C. 
Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (eds), Trends Towards Corporatist 
Intermediation. London, Sage, 1979, pp.119-46.
55 P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change; Austria. 
Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry. Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1984; P. Katzenstein, Small States in World 
Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1985.
56 B.W. Headley, "Trade Unions and National Wages Policies", 
The Journal of Politics. 32, 1970, pp.407-39; K. Armingeon, 
"Determining the Level of Wages: The Role of Parties and Trade 
Unions", in F.G. Castles (ed), The Impact of Parties. London, 
Sage, 1982, pp.225-82.
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government "buys off" trade union acquiescence to wage 
restraint.57
But understood in terms of rational cooperation, the role of 
government as well as that of labour and capital is best 
understood in terms of concepts such as "political exchange" and 
"consensus".58 Whatever possible intervention the government 
makes in an efficient corporatist exchange, it would have to 
result in an equitable outcome, or at least be perceived as the 
best attempt at the fairest intervention. Without this element of 
fairness, there would be no consensus and no cooperation. 
Redistributive elements would be necessary, as would the taxation 
levels required to fund them, to achieve any agreement about 
fairness.59 Similarly, whatever investment and income restraint 
rational cooperation between labour and capital produces it must 
be perceived to be fair and equitable over time. In foul weather 
these outcomes can change in abrupt and unforseen ways.
57 See W, Korpi and M. Shalev, "Strikes, Industrial Relations 
and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies", British Journal of 
Sociology. 30, 1979, pp.164-87; and D. Cameron, "Social 
Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation 
of Economic Interest", in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed), Order and 
Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon, 1984, 
pp.170-74.
58 Alessandro Pizzorno, 'Political Exchange and Collective 
Identity in Industrial Conflict', In C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno 
(eds), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 
1968, Volume Two, London, Macmillan, 1978, pp.277-98; Franz 
Lehner, 'The Political Economy of Distributive Conflict', in R. 
Wildenmann (ed), The Future of Party Government. Berlin, Walter 
de Gruyter, 1988, pp.54-96.
59 Bureaucratic structures shape the style and capacities of 
government to intervene through public investment, and industrial 
and labour market policies. Private firms cannot be sanctioned by 
corporatist policy, leaving trade unions dependent upon the 
public sphere for delivery of policy goals. R. Czada, "The Impact 
of Interest Politics on Flexible Adjustment Policies", in H. 
Keman, H. Paloheimo and P.F. Whiteley (eds), Cooing with the 
Economic Crisis. London, Sage, 1987, pp.44-45.
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CHAPTER TWO.
FOUL ECONOMIC WEATHER AND TRADE 
UNION COOPERATION.
'For the corporatist compromise to survive, the underlying 
problems of the economy must be tackled. An acceptable rate 
of growth must be achieved and fundamental weaknesses in 
economic structure eliminated. If this is not done, the 
institutions of social solidarity will come under increasing 
strain and eventually disintegrate'. Andrew Glyn and Bob 
Rowthorn.1
Thus far we are armed with a model of the corporatist 
political economy in which three unequal actors interact in an 
environment dominated by the economic requirements of capital. 
According to game theory, a collective strategy which maximises 
gains is possible, but we have raised serious questions about its 
feasibility in foul economic weather.
In addition, we hinted that centralisation as a solution may 
have to rely more on persuasion and compulsion than cooperation, 
in foul economic weather. In this chapter we explore the limits 
of centralisation further by making a distinction between the 
interests of high and low pay groups within Labour as an actor. 
The structural conflict between labour and capital, which is 
empirically defined by the rate of excess inequality, increases
1 Andrew Glyn and Bob Rowthorn, 'West European Unemployment: 
Corporatism and Structural Change', The American Economic Review. 
78, 1, 1988, p.199.
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in foul economic weather. This reduces the relative gains of 
cooperation, and further restricts the possibilities of making an 
accurate assessment of the parameters needed to estimate an
equilibrium solution to a constantly changing prisoners' dilemma.
Cooperation among unions in foul economic weather is 
weakened by an imbalance in power between high and low pay
workers. The distribution of high and low pay workers in a
capitalist economy is typically uneven, with high pay workers 
being concentrated in certain industrial sectors.2
The labour economics literature faces a challenge in
explaining why the inter-industry wage structure does not conform 
to expectations generated by laissez-faire competitive theory. In 
other words, why are workers with similar measurable 
characteristics paid different wages in different industries? Why 
does a high pay industry pay basically the same worker more than 
a low pay industry in a competitive labour market?
Interestingly enough, in finding some answers to these 
questions, empirical studies do not support the view that levels 
of unionisation are strongly correlated with industry wages. 
Although some labour economists find a positive correlation 
between union density and industry wages for both union and non­
union employees, Krueger and Summers point out that historical 
evidence shows that high-wage industries tended to pay higher 
wages even before the advent of high levels of unionisation.3
The inter-industry wage structure across countries is 
similar regardless of the strength of unions and the degree of 
collective bargaining. So what does explain this apparent market
2 A.B. Krueger and L.H. Summers, 'Reflections on the Inter­
industry Wage Structure', in K. Lang and J. S. Leonard, 
Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets. Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1987, p.20.
3 A.B. Krueger and L.H. Summers, 'Reflections on the Inter­
industry Wage Structure', p.36.
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failure? Dickens and Katz conclude that three factors have a 
consistent-enough empirical association with the pattern of wages 
across industries to be contenders: first, average years of
education of employees; second, profits in the industry; and 
third, average establishment size and a high capital-to-labour 
ratio.4 In plain language, product market rents are more likely 
to be shared with workers when the establishments are large, 
capital-intensive and profitable, and the workers are "high 
quality” labour.
It seems obvious that unions could potentially thrive in 
such conditions by exploiting the "ability to pay” 
characteristics of such industries. The question we wish to raise 
is what consequences this fact has for corporatist cooperation 
between high and low pay unions in fair and foul economic 
weather. The structural nature of this characteristic income 
inequality in a capitalist economy implies that in the absence of 
norms, traditions and political interventions designed to reduce 
the gap between high and low pay workers, the inequality simply 
widens. While in fair weather both groups may be better off over 
time despite this inequality, in foul weather the game becomes 
more zero-sum.5
2.1. Trade Unions as Economic Actors,
In order to develop our model of the behaviour of high and 
low pay unions in fair and foul economic weather, we first must 
begin with a more general economic account of trade union wages 
strategy. Economic analysis of trade union behaviour using a 
rational-choice approach has been a relatively recent
4 W. T. Dickens and L. F. Katz, 'Inter-Industry Wage 
Differences and Industry Characteristics', in K. Lang and J. S. 
Leonard, Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets. Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp.83-84.
5 Richard Hyman, 'Trade Unions and the Disaggregation of the 
Working Class', in Marino Regini (ed), The Future Of Labour 
Movements. London, Sage, 1992, p.152.
69
2 - Foul Economic Weather And Trade Union Cooperation
development. Dunlop was among the first to treat trade unions as 
rational agents seeking to maximise their utility functions.6 
Most of the recent studies treat wage setting as a function of 
rational and strategic choices on the part of trade unions 
influenced primarily by inflation, employment, tax, and 
government policy. The latter is seen as a problem for economic 
analysis of trade union utility maximising behaviour, as Hersoug 
et al put it:
'If we have to resort to changes in policy reactions to 
explain the actual development [of trade union choice of 
wages and employment], the theory of the utility-maximising 
trade union is somewhat incomplete until one has specified 
criteria for determining when there has been a change in 
policy. Otherwise, everything can be explained by referring 
to policy shifts'.7
6 J.T. Dunlop, Wage Determination Under Trade Unionism. New 
York, Macmillan, 1984. For other examples in this area, see 
Bertil Holmlund, 'Centralised Wage Setting, Wage Drift And 
Stabilisation Policies Under Trade Unionism', Oxford Economic 
Papers. 38, 1986, pp.243-258; J. Pencavel, 'Wages and Employment 
under Trade Unionism: Microeconomic Models and Macroeconomic
Applications', Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2, 1985,
pp.197-225; A.J. Oswald, 'Wage Determination in an Economy With 
Many Trade Unions', Oxford Economic Papers. 31, 1979, pp.369-385; 
A.J. Oswald, 'The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union', 
Economic Journal. 92, 1982, pp.576-595; A.J. Oswald, 'The
Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey',
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 87, 1985, pp.160-193; C. J. 
Parsley, 'Labour Union Effects on Wage Gains. A Survey of Recent 
Literature', Journal of Economic Literature. 18, 1980, pp.1-31; 
J. N. Dertouzos arid J. H. Pencavel. 'Wage and Employment 
Determination under Trade Unionism. The International 
Typographical Union', Journal of Political Economy. 89, 1981, 
pp.1162-1181; Tor Hersoug, Knut N. Kjaer and Asbjorn Rodseth, 
'Wages, Taxes And The Utility-Maximising Trade Union: A
Confrontation With Norwegian Data', Oxford Economic Papers. 38, 
1986, pp.403-423.
7 Tor Hersoug et al, 'Wages, Taxes And The Utility- 
Maximising Trade Union', p.422.
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In our case, we have to address this issue since we assume 
that in corporatist countries trade union wage-setting behaviour 
will indeed be an important function of government policy, 
particularly with respect to public sector employment, industrial 
policy and labour training schemes. The point is that in foul
economic weather the ceiling of public spending will have to
fall, and thus corporatism would have to shift from distributing 
gains to costs.
This corporatist cost distribution might be circumvented by 
actors who wish to maintain their rate of increase at the expense 
of other actors. One of the most interesting developments in 
recent labour economics has been theoretical modelling of 
"insider" power in wage determination. The central idea here is 
that workers and their employers in some industries are in a 
position to share out the economic surplus (over and above 
production costs) which they have extracted from consumers: i.e., 
engage in rent seeking behaviour. This can still occur even when 
there is no trade union organisation, since skilled workers
cannot be easily or cheaply replaced.8
Insider-outsider theory challenges the classical competitive 
model of wage determination, which holds that there is no room 
for bargaining over any rents between insiders at the expense of 
outsiders. In the classical model wages are set by the
8 "Insider-outsider" theory essentially views labour 
turnover costs as an economic rent which insiders tap, generating 
involuntary unemployment for outsiders. These costs range from 
"harassment" to hiring, training and firing costs. See A.
Lindbeck and D. Snower, 'Wage Setting, Unemployment and Insider- 
Outsider Relations', American Economic Review. 76, 1986, pp.235- 
9; A. Lindbeck and D. Snower, 'Cooperation, Harassment and 
Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach', American 
Economic Review. 78, 1988, pp.167-88; A. Lindbeck and D. Snower,
'Wage Rigidity, Union Activity, and Unemployment', in W.
Beckerman (ed), Wage Rigidity and Unemployment. London,
Duckworth, 1986, pp.97-125; A. Lindbeck and D. Snower, 
'Efficiency Wages Versus Insiders and Outsiders', European 
Economic Review Proceedings. 31, 1986, pp.407-16.
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competitive market and insiders and outsiders are equal.9 This 
competitive model has been questioned at least since the 1950s, 
however, because it had often been noted that certain wage 
differentials cannot be explained simply by demand and supply 
conditions for labour.
The last decade or so has seen even greater interest in the 
labour economics of wage determination, largely in an attempt to 
explain persistent unemployment in the face of classical economic 
assumptions. Unemployed workers do not seem to make the wage- 
cutting offers expected of them, which poses problems for 
classical competitive assumptions about the labour market. It 
serves to underline the general limitations of rational choice 
theory.10
In the absence, however, of economic explanations of the 
passivity of outsiders, labour economists have focused on the 
insiders and their bargaining over pay determination. The fact 
that outsiders do not make the most "rational" use of their 
market position gives the insiders an even stronger capacity to 
exploit their own market position. In wage bargaining models, the 
equilibrium wage is positively related to the employer's 
profitability. Thus, if we imagine that a trade union is
9 D. G. Blanchflower, A. J. Oswald and M. D. Garrett, 
'Insider Power in Wage Determination', Economica, 57, 1990, 
pp.143-70.
10 As Robert Solow writes: 'I hasten to confess that I, 
personally, do not find this reluctance to be so great an 
intellectual problem; but that is only because I, personally, do 
not find it hard to imagine that the unemployed do so little 
undercutting of the wage because they think it is an improper or 
undignified thing to do, and because they would not like others 
to do it unto them if roles were reversed, as they might be next 
time. But I realise full well that this is not the way economics 
is supposed to model the world, and so I mention it only as a 
Galilean remark (i.e., something best muttered to oneself)'. 
Robert M. Solow, 'Insiders and Outsiders in Wage Determination', 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 8, 1985, pp.412-13.
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indifferent to employment because of a "layoff-by-seniority” rule 
or because the costs can be passed on to other groups, the 
possibility arises that a fall in employment can produce higher 
wage demands as the insiders who are left share out the available 
rents rather than letting in outsiders.
Most recent writing on the utility functions of trade unions 
assume that the union is concerned with real wages and employment 
in the industry. There are then two related ways to proceed. In 
the first, which Oswald describes as the "monopoly model”, the 
union attempts to maximise a quasi-concave utility function of 
real wages and employment while taking the labour demand curve as 
given.11 The union fixes the wage, and the firm sets employment 
(this approach is somewhat at variance with the facts, since 
unions seldom unilaterally set the wage rate). The union's 
preferred wage rate is then found at the point at which the 
marginal benefit from raising the wage (the increase in utility 
for each worker multiplied by the number of workers) equals the 
marginal cost (the decrease in utility for each worker made 
unemployed multiplied by the number of workers who lose their 
jobs). This model predicts that an increase in variables such as 
unemployment benefit and employment subsidies to firms will raise 
the preferred union wage rate, but changes in the prices of some 
other variables, such as the CPI, can have ambiguous effects.
The second approach is the "efficient bargains” model, which 
views the union and firm as bargaining over their positions on a 
contract curve, and jointly agreeing on wages and employment. 
Efficiency theory holds that the equilibrium reached in the 
monopoly model is inefficient because the outcome reached is 
simply the point at which the union's desired wage rate, 
represented by a tangency curve of indifference points between
11 A. J. Oswald, 'The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An 
Introductory Survey', Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2, 1985, 
pp.160-193.
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wages and employment, touches the firm's labour demand curve. 
Instead, it may be the case that the union maximises its utility 
function in respect of some minimal level of profit, which opens 
up an unlimited number of possible efficient equilibria at points 
of tangency between the union indifference curve and iso-profit 
contours. If the union maximises profits and not just a utility 
function, much more is possible: there are wage-employment points 
at which both actors are better off.12 The locus of such points 
where efficient bargains are possible is the contract curve.
The efficient bargains model is similar to the more general 
model of corporatist cooperation we have outlined so far. Under 
efficient bargaining, the union obviously has to have some say 
over the level of employment, since there is little point in 
bargaining over a variable that the firm will set unilaterally in 
any case. This is the more so because everywhere along the 
contract curve the marginal revenue product of labour is less 
than the supply price of labour; in other words, the union is 
squeezing profits to obtain excessive wages and/or employment. At 
the point at which the contract curve intersects the zero- 
isoprofit curve, the firm has no profits left to squeeze.
In efficient wage theory it seems that employment, more than 
the wage, is susceptible to reduction in a recession or downward 
business cycle. This is because the firm would prefer a lower 
rate of employment at the bargained wage, and in recession this 
employment reduction is rather unavoidable. But for the union to 
accept a lower rate of employment the firm would have to 
compensate by raising the wage for the remaining workers (all 
within the constraint of the iso-profit curve).
Efficient wage theory, then, also provides a possible 
explanation for the downward stickiness of real wages in a
12 For a discussion of efficient bargains, see I. M. McDonald 
and R. M. Solow, 'Wage bargaining and Employment', American 
Economic Review. 71, 1981, pp.896-908.
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recession. In sum, the labour economics literature suggests that 
it may be quite rational for insiders, that is, workers and 
employers, to share the rents skimmed off consumers at the 
expense of unemployment for outsiders.
An important variable with implications for our analysis is 
union membership. If trade unions include in their utility 
function maximisation of membership, this could mitigate somewhat 
any tradeoff between employment and real wages. In most of the 
literature membership is assumed to be exogenously given at a 
fixed level. Kidd and Oswald, however, have recently developed a 
model which is more in accordance with the facts; namely, that 
unions face choices along a intertemporal maximisation curve.13 
In this case, membership is endogenously given, and is dependent 
on employment (an assumption which is supported by both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic evidence) . Unemployed workers are 
assumed to leave the union, and new workers to join it. If the 
union is utilitarian, and cares about membership (because more 
members means more utility), then we have a counterforce 
operating against the implications of insider-outsider theory.
In view of the fact, however, that trade unions face a 
prisoners' dilemma of cost distribution, it seems that maximising 
overall utility through maximising membership at low real wages 
is a strategy that requires precisely the level of inter-union 
cooperation that we are investigating. Why should individual 
members, already employed and hence insiders, prefer to maximise 
some aggregate utility rather than their own? It is by no means 
clear that union members are, in the absence of a highly 
integrated consensus over the distribution of restraint, 
utilitarians in this sense.
Thus insider-outsider theory can be supplemented by a model 
which predicts that in foul weather union members and the union
13 D. P. Kidd and A. J. Oswald, 'A Dynamic Model of Trade 
Union Behaviour', Econometrica. 54, 1986, pp.355-365.
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leadership will face a conflict of interest over not only 
relative wage levels but also membership. In the following 
sections we examine the logic of the prisoners' dilemma at this 
lower level of union interaction and show that there are yet 
further grounds for questioning the capacity of centralisation 
and corporatist arrangements to secure cooperative wage restraint 
in foul economic weather.
2.2. The "New Institutionalism”.
What exactly are the capacities of centralisation, in a game 
theoretical sense, to enforce or achieve cooperation between a 
large number of actors? As Colin Crouch writes:
'There does seem to be a case for taking seriously the 
argument that, once economic actors have become organised, 
the sociopolitical context most likely to be consistent with 
relative freedom from economic distortions will be one that 
encourages coordination of action and centralisation of 
organisation rather than one that tries to reproduce among 
organised interests situations analogous to a free 
market'.14
We have seen that encompassing, centralised actors are more 
likely to cooperate, in a prisoners' dilemma situation, due to 
the "size effect", but centralisation may be a poor predictor of 
corporatist performance because cooperation and consensus between 
low and high pay groups are a necessary condition to prevent 
centralisation relying on compulsion.15
14 Colin Crouch, 'Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint', 
in Leon Lindberg and Charles S. Maier (eds), The Politics of 
Inflation and Economic Stagflation. Theoretical Approaches and 
International Case Studies. Washington DC., The Brookings 
Institution, 1985, p.137.
15 See Matti Pohjola, 'Corporatism and Wage Bargaining', in 
Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn (eds), Social 
Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1992, p.76.
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According to the bargaining theory of trade union 
interaction, corporatist cooperation among a large number of 
actors appears to be difficult to account for and these actors 
must voluntarily accept the centralised plan negotiated by the 
more encompassing organisations which represent unions at the 
peak level. Despite this it remains true that effective 
centralisation represents the institutional "glue" which is 
missing from the more atomistic rational choice approach of 
equilibrium theory. The "new institutionalism" in economic theory 
is concerned with structural features and procedures which 
counter the otherwise instability of decentralised cooperation.16
The emerging theory of "structure-induced equilibria" notes 
how organisational forms of interaction strengthen the capacity 
of rational actors to achieve and sustain cooperative strategies 
in a capitalist distributional-struggle context. These begin with 
the observation that institutions can function to enhance the 
enforcement of agreements. Thus, central organisations can 
function as an "HQ" which punishes free-riders, either by 
expelling them, withholding incentives and/or the benefits of 
cooperation, or by imposing rewards on the remainder of the 
group.17 Another potential stabilising factor is the intervention 
of "leaders" acting as rational agents within institutions
16 For a useful discussion, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, 'Studying 
Institutions. Some Lessons From The Rational Choice Approach', 
Journal of Theoretical Politics. 1, 2, 1989, pp.131-147; J.C.
March and J.P. Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organisational 
Factors in Political Life', American Political Science Review. 
78, 1984, pp.734-49.
17 Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee, 'Institutional 
Structure And The Logic Of Ongoing Collective Action', American 
Political Science Review. 81, 1, 1987, pp.129-154.
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equipped with "trigger strategies and punishments" to enforce 
cooperation.18
Other theorists are suspicious of attempts by rational 
choice theorists to modify their self-interest models by 
incorporating these utility-influencing aspects of institutions 
and stress instead the functional importance of institutions for 
integrative social norms. As Bo Rothstein points out, norms 
modify instrumental rationality within institutions because the 
institutions force actors to confront the moral consequences of 
their strategies.19
The new institutionalism is still undecided as to the 
conditions under which institutions can successfully overcome the 
free rider problem. The literature clearly recognises a number of 
constraints and difficulties with this form of explanation. Thus, 
the use of trigger strategies and punishments requires stringent 
informational and monitoring requirements, the use of punishments 
depends on leadership capabilities and credibilities, leadership 
responses need time for implementation, experimentation and 
maturation, and the approach tends to assume away Michel's "iron 
law of oligarchy".20
18 William T. Bianco and Robert H. Bates, 'Cooperation By 
Design: Leadership, Structure, And Collective Dilemmas'.American 
Political Science Review. 84, 1, 1990, pp.133-147.
19 Bo Rothstein, 'Just Institutions Matter. The Moral Logic 
Of The Universal Welfare State', paper presented at the 1992 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Chicago, September 3-6, 1992.
20 The assumption of perfect information, in particular, 
seems very important, because cheating becomes irrational through 
the welfare loss caused by retaliation, which requires the 
immediate detection of cheating. Alain Haurie and Matti Pohjola, 
'Efficient Equilibria in a Differential Game of Capitalism', 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 11, 1987, p.76. See 
also Wolfgang Streeck, 'On the Institutional Conditions of 
Diversified Quality Production', in Egon Matzner and Wolfgang 
Streeck (eds), Bevond Keynesianism. The Socio-Economics of
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In this thesis we offer the fair weather/foul weather 
distinction as a key part of the puzzle. In most accounts of the 
role of institutions in securing cooperation, it is noted that 
the weaknesses of centralisation are countered by iteration. As 
we saw in Chapter One, the "shadow of the future" is crucial in 
the sense that the actors must not discount the future too 
heavily. Fair economic weather is likely to increase the 
potential gains to be made from cooperation and shorten the 
waiting phase between cooperation and results, enabling a Nash or 
Stackelberg equilibrium to be achieved around a growth-strategy. 
But in foul weather, future gains might recede into the far 
distance, so that gains only become achievable at the cost of 
some other actors.
The gains from cooperation in foul weather, as we have 
argued, must instead be characterised in terms of the collective 
limitation of costs. In this case, the rational choice problems 
of a corporatist cooperation which depends on a growth-strategy 
emerge in a strengthened form and "insider-outsider" theory may 
become much more apposite to wage bargaining behaviour even with 
the presence of integrative institutions.
Michael Wallerstein develops this line of thought by 
making a distinction between unions which are complements in 
production (meaning a wage increase for union A negatively 
affects other workers in union B) and unions which are 
substitutes in production (meaning increases for union A lead to 
increases in employment and/or wages for union B) . He argues that 
centralisation functions to unite unions which are otherwise in 
conflict by internalising the effects of wage increases on all 
union members, but notes that this conflict still poses problems 
for cooperation:
Production and Full Employment. London, Edward Elgar, 1991, p.56.
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'There may be times when union members find the prospect of 
poorer aggregate economic performance less repellant than 
assenting to a wage distribution that they regard as 
unfair' .21
This is precisely the sort of problem that we intend to 
investigate in this chapter by making a distinction between the 
rational interests of the central organisation and high and low 
pay groups in fair and foul economic weather.
The debate over how effective institutions really are 
reflects a central issue in political economy: recognising the 
existence of distributional conflict. Mainstream economic theory 
tends to assume this conflict away, by narrowing the focus to the 
unreality of a market equilibrium which is disturbed by 
"imperfections" which, upon closer examination, are only reduced 
by changing the balance of power in the distributional 
struggle.22 Corporatism, in contrast, emphasises the 
institutional framework for providing societal consensus around 
a collective strategy which maximises gains in such a way that 
distributional conflict is contained. As Michael Kalecki argued 
in the 1940s, in the absence of an institutional framework for 
achieving this societal consensus over income distribution, the 
consequences of rational behaviour by actors under capitalism 
must lead to the political infeasibility of collective outcomes 
which entail full employment.23
21 Michael Wallerstein, 'Centralized Bargaining and Wage 
Restraint', American Journal of Political Science. 34, 4, 1990, 
pp.999.
22 Andrew Henley and Euclid Tsakalotos, 'Corporatism, Profit 
Squeeze and Investment', Cambridge Journal of Economics. 15, 
1991, pp.425-450.
23 Michael Kalecki, 'Political Aspects of Full Employment', 
Political Quarterly. 14, 4, 1943, pp.322-30.
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But, as increasingly becomes apparent, it is not the degree 
of institutional centralisation in the labour market which alone 
determines the degree of cooperation, but instead the degree of 
shared consensus and "political exchange", by which is meant a 
common understanding of how the economy works and shared 
objectives concerning future outcomes.24 The actors in the 
corporatist exchange must, typically, share an understanding of 
the economy which entails the sort of economic modelling we saw 
in Chapter One. That is to say, over iteration they can see that 
the benefits of mutual cooperation outweigh the gains of mutual 
defection. The key element in this equation, by definition in a 
capitalist economy, is the extent to which cooperation or wage 
restraint by wage earners is rewarded with investment, technology 
and aggregate demand conditions regarded as satisfactory 
recompense by wage earners. This, in turn, depends upon a and 0, 
corporate strategy, and the design of government policies.
It is also typical, in a corporatist political economy, for 
these conditions to be most often met under a social democratic 
or Left political incumbency. In fair weather, the virtuous 
circles implied by such an argument imply that growth would 
enable an expanding stable, social democratic administration, 
macroeconomic, microeconomic, fiscal and monetary policies aimed 
at maintaining full employment and maximum competitiveness, and 
thus optimal levels of technology adaptation, efficient 
investment, and real productivity gains.25
24 A. Pizzorno, 'Political Exchange and Collective Identity 
in Industrial Conflict', in C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno (eds), The 
Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968. 
London, Macmillan, 1978, pp.277-98.
25 For a discussion on "virtuous circles of class 
cooperation", see Francis G. Castles, The Social Democratic Image 
of Society. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, pp.124-128.
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But in foul weather, the dependence on growth and investment 
stability would become a weakness. In foul weather, poor growth 
is unavoidable, and full employment requires real costs to be 
distributed and not just gains. Since gains are not available the 
shared consensus enjoyed during the period of fair weather could 
disappear, as the underlying distributive conflict that had been 
smothered by the economic growth reasserted itself.26 Such a 
conclusion appears to negate, in part, the claims made for 
integrative institutions by the corporatist theorists. To the 
game theorist, however, the cooperative solution still remains 
the best long-term strategy over iterations. To sum up, while 
some scholars are beginning to argue that a system of 'flexibly 
coordinated systems' is better suited to international economic 
competition, a sizeable doubt remains as to the capacity for 
actors to cooperate in foul weather, when the question is how to 
distribute not gains but costs.27 In the following sections we 
explore this distributional conflict and its consequences for 
cooperation among trade unions in a corporatist setting.
2.2.1. The Central# Peak Federation.
Among the trade union actors in the corporatist exchange, 
the central, peak trade union confederation is unique in respect 
of the fact that it functions at the interface of representing
26 Note that here most of the examples of declining 
corporatism were given as the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, and 
Italy. Countries such as Austria, Sweden and Norway were thought 
by Gerhard Lehmbruch to have sufficient "structural conditions” 
for success. See Markus M.L. Crepaz, 'Corporatism In Decline? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic 
Performance and Industrial Disputes in 18 Industrialised 
Democracies', Comparative Political Studies. 25, 2, 1992, pp.140- 
41.
27 David Soskice, 'The Institutional Infrastructure for 
International Competitiveness: A Comparative Analysis of the UK 
and Germany', in Anthony B. Atkinson and Renato Brunetta (eds). 
Economics for the New Europe. New York, New York University 
Press, 1991, p.48.
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the material interests of affiliates and their members and
"public” or collective interests at the level of the political 
economy as a whole.
From a rational choice perspective, the pre-eminent interest 
of the central union organisation is to maintain the conditions 
for its reproduction and to increase its "power”28. This latter 
variable can be measured by the organisation in terms of
authority and influence over the trade union movement as a whole, 
and by what Claus Offe calls "the attribution of public status" 
by government.29 Power can be enhanced by a high rate of 
mobilisation, a strong financial position and a wide breadth of 
policy responsibility, particularly in wages strategy. It can be 
increased by the granting of special rights, subsidies and
privileges on the one hand, and reduced by the imposition of 
obligations, expectations and restrictions on the other.
The peak organisation, however, can never usurp the 
fundamental autonomy of its affiliates. Constitutionally and 
normatively, power is likely to be partly decentralised. The peak 
organisation must achieve its aims therefore by representing and 
serving the expressed interests of its affiliates and their 
members. To the extent that it can shape and exert influence over 
the formulation of these interests, its probability of being 
decisive is further enhanced, and this power increases 
automatically in fair economic weather. However, the peak 
organisation depends upon providing certain indispensable
28 The rational choice literature has not developed an 
adequate theory of "power” thus far, preferring to conceptualise 
it in terms of the probability of an outcome being reached 
(usually in a voting situation). Here we use power to refer to 
the probability of an actor achieving its policy goals. Factors 
which enhance the probability of goals being realised are said to 
contribute to the actor's power.
29 C. Offe, "The Attribution of Public Status to Interest 
Groups", in C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism. Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1985, pp.235-6.
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services. If its services are not needed, the peak organisation 
will lose some of its potential sources of influence.
Due to the requirements of coordination among a collection 
of unions which are spatially and functionally dispersed, the 
central organisation has a foundational reason for its 
existence.30 But the key issue for the purpose of our enquiry is 
whether or not the peak organisation shapes, controls or directs 
the process of formulating and bargaining a wages policy. If a 
trade union movement lacks the capacity to coordinate and sustain 
a wages strategy, it is not a viable partner from the point of 
view of government and employers. This capacity depends to a 
large extent on the role of the peak organisation, hence its 
power in this area is crucial.31
Whether this latter service is as indispensable as some of 
the others mentioned, however, depends upon the degree to which
30 The central body provides information, rationalises 
certain functions with economies of scale, supplies a strike 
fund, and employs professionals in numbers which smaller unions 
would be unable to afford. It also plays a political and symbolic 
role of leadership, dealing with the public through the media and 
providing a high-powered delegation of officials to deal with 
government and employers' groups. For a discussion of the 
processes of centralisation (at the national trade union level) 
which result from the interest held by some employers in placing 
a floor under low wages, see L. Ulman, The Rise of the National 
Trade Union: The Development and Significance of its Structure. 
Governing Institutions, and Economic Policies. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1955.
31 According to our rational actor model, we would expect the 
peak organisation to prefer to have maximum influence over the 
direction of wage strategies. This influence could range on a 
continuum from proffering advice and facilitating negotiation 
between affiliates (e.g., no poaching agreements), to actually 
acting as agents for the affiliates and carrying out wage 
negotiations on their behalf with employers and/or government as 
part of the peak federation's service. See Richard A. Sandlant, 
The Political Economy Of Wage Restraint; The Australian Accord 
And Trade Union Strategy In New Zealand, unpublished MA thesis, 
University of Auckland, New Zealand, 1989.
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affiliates and their members perceive that they are unable to 
achieve similar gains on their own. The success of the peak 
organisation, therefore, must depend upon achieving tangible 
results for affiliates, or at least upon their perception that 
the next alternative, namely the affiliates determining 
independent wage strategies in a decentralised environment, would 
lead to a worse outcome.
The central trade union federation, then, is defined in our 
model as having a mixture of rational interests or utilities, 
some of which are given from its position as an encompassing 
actor with responsibilities for the collective outcomes produced 
by the political economy and some of which are much more 
determined by the particular interests of affiliates and their 
members. A useful way to understand the layered nature of the 
strategy choices adopted by the central organisation is the 
"nested games" approach developed by Tsebelis.32
In fair and foul weather, the central organisation is likely 
to prefer at level one a strategy choice which optimises the 
collective interests of its affiliates. But at level two the 
individual interests of powerful affiliates and their members are 
the dominant preference. Corporatism, we argue, can achieve a 
harmonisation of both of these preferences in fair weather, but 
in foul weather the second level predominates. At level two the 
central organisation has a choice between siding with the 
government and employers against the unions, or leading the 
unions in the direction they want to go. Most central 
federations, we might say with little controversy, would choose 
to lead their unions to the best of their ability. Thus in foul 
weather the underlying power of the affiliates over the central 
federation is likely to weaken any capacity of purely centralised
32 George Tsebelis, Nested Games. Rational Choice in 
Comparative Politics. Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1990.
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integrative institutions, leadership, trigger strategies and 
punishment phases, to prevent uncooperative wages distributions.
2.2,2, High Pav Unions.
The rational interests of high pay unions can be modelled as 
those of the leadership counterbalanced by the membership. All 
high pay union members, we can say with little controversy, have 
an interest in maximising their incomes.33 The union leadership 
will measure their success, in large part, in terms of meeting 
this demand for results.
High pay unions, however, are likely to seek to maximise 
their wage share, even at the expense of profits and the wage 
share of other workers. Since high pay unions are typically to be 
found in high profit sectors, this will mean that on average high 
pay unions can achieve a significantly higher rate of wage 
increase than low pay unions. This wage differential will 
therefore increase, in the absence of mechanisms such as a 
solidarity framework, which are designed to keep the relative pay 
rates in line.
The leadership of the high pay unions will be aware that 
this comparative advantage is a major interest of their members. 
Since pay is the currency not only of income but also of power 
and influence for the leadership, union leaders will have a 
strong sense of what their members' "worth” is relative to the 
expected gains of other groups.
High pay unions also have a structural capacity for pursuing 
high rates of pay. The high profit sectors they work in are more 
likely than low profit sectors to be able to pass extra costs on
33 Fishbein cites a study of incomes policies prior to 1970 
in Britain which concluded that trade unions did not cooperate 
because wage restraint "contradicted their fundamental mission" 
to secure the "best possible terms of employment" for their 
members. W.H. Fishbein, Wage Restraint bv Consensus. Britain's 
Search for an Incomes Policy Agreement. 1965-79. Boston, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p.227.
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in the form of higher prices, or to absorb the higher wage share 
through increased productivity. High pay unions may contribute to 
inflation through their labour market strength in sectors of an 
economy, but they also are the best placed group to be able to 
withstand inflationary pressure reducing their real income. 
Labour market strength allows them to index their wages to 
inflation or do better, while their high pay status softens the 
burden of higher prices for the necessities of life.
Pressure from international competition, however, would 
provide a greater restraint than the domestic market, so that 
high pay unions in open and vulnerable sectors would be expected 
to be more conscious of limits to wage growth.34 Also, high pay 
union leaders at some point still face a trade-off between wage 
gains and membership growth. The trend rate of membership growth 
and the degree of importance attached to high membership will be 
a constraint on high pay wage strategies. High pay unions, then, 
would be expected to become more conscious of limits to their 
wages growth in foul economic weather, since in those conditions 
wages growth might threaten future employment and hence 
membership levels. But still, overall, of the three trade union 
actors in our model, high pay unions would be expected to have 
the least interest in a corporatist policy of wage restraint. 
High pay union members' strong labour market position, often a 
function of scarce skills or investment in training, gives them 
greater job security and less concern with reducing unemployment 
in other industries affected by economic rationalisation. High 
pay unions are predicted by rational choice theory to defend 
their wage differentials, to maintain their status and hence to 
preserve autonomy in wage bargaining.
34 Colin Crouch, 'Trade Unions in the Exposed Sector: Their 
Influence on Neo-Corporatist Behaviour', in Renato Brunetta and 
Carlo Dell'Aringa (eds), Labour Relations and Economic 
Performance. London, Macmillan, 1990, pp.68-91.
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In a corporatist system of wage restraint, where the 
objective is, in part, to boost the profit share of national 
income so that investment and production growth follow, high pay 
union members would have to exercise wage restraint in sectors 
which already enjoy high profits. High pay unions will thus also 
be expected to oppose a widening of the gap between wages and 
profits. Such growth would make wage restraint appear unnecessary 
and against the members' interests. High profit firms would 
benefit disproportionately, and high pay members would expect 
their leadership to gain a larger share of the income available.
Several possibilities exist as motivation for high pay 
unions to contribute to a wage restraint strategy. The first is 
that, the alternative would be a complete failure of the trade 
union movement to achieve a corporatist solution, since the low 
pay unions would not cooperate either in such a situation. Thus, 
high pay unions might conclude that the generalised economic 
costs incurred as a result of their wage strategy in the long 
term outweighed their short-term benefit. The second is that 
international market pressure could make high pay unions 
vulnerable to redundancy and unemployment, and threaten 
membership growth rates.35 We argue that the dampening effect of 
foul economic weather on wage growth may be enough to induce some 
voluntary wage restraint, but that it is not likely to be enough 
to induce cooperation by high pay unions with a wider corporatist 
wage restraint strategy. The third is that high pay unions might 
exchange the wage restraint necessary to sustain a corporatist 
strategy for other gains. These can be delivered in a number of 
ways: either through the public sphere via state intervention or
35 Survey evidence indicates that high pay unions might 
support wage restraint if unemployment is high and inflation is 
rising. See K. Armingeon, "The Compatibility of Economic, Social, 
and Political Goals in Incomes Policies", in H. Keman, H. 
Paloheimo and P.F. Whiteley (eds), Coping with the Economic 
Crisis, London, Sage, 1987, p.118.
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through negotiation with employers over fringe benefits, working 
conditions, productivity deals, and so on.
A fourth possibility is to allow the high pay unions 
effective exemption from the policy. This can be achieved by 
creating a second round of wage bargaining for stronger unions 
and/or restricting the pay norm or guideline to a minimal level. 
Evidence of high wage drift (the gap between contractual and 
actual wages) in fair weather corporatist countries would 
indicate that this strategy was being used. High pay unions can 
also be given the right to opt out of compliance with the 
national award, letting potential troublemakers leave without 
taking too many other unions along with them. However, in both 
these cases, it has to be explained how the low pay unions 
cooperate in the face of such uneven advantage, and how the 
policy of wage restraint can have much meaning when high income 
sectors of the trade union movement are not even participating.
Incomes policies should be expected, on the basis of 
rational choice theory, to fly apart at the seams given the 
existence of conflicts of interest among the cooperating parties. 
There are many candidates for destabilising tendencies. The 
timing of the policy, for example, can lead to differentials 
between unions who have already settled high wage deals and those 
whose bargaining strength has to be restrained by adherence to 
the incomes policy. The coverage of the agreement can be so 
narrow that it makes a mockery of the term ”incomes policy”, or 
so broad that strong groups are frustrated by the existence of 
tantalisingly high profits in their sectors. A flat rate element 
in the wage policy might allow low pay groups to improve their 
relative position (such a solidaristic or egalitarian wage rule 
appears to be quite common in corporatist arrangements, 
indicating that it was a necessary element to gain the support of 
the low pay unions). But the question remains, how can high pay 
unions sacrifice their own rational interest, if in fact they do?
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The answer we offer in this thesis is that, in fair economic 
weather, the interests of high pay workers in maintaining both 
real incomes growth and sufficient differentiation in wages from 
low pay workers, can be maintained without threatening the 
collective interest or the competitiveness of the general
political economy. If a is high enough and growing, then
"cooperation” with a wage restraint strategy on the part of high 
pay workers need not entail threatening either of these
interests. In foul economic weather, however, where a wage
restraint strategy designed to maintain output growth and
employment necessitates high pay workers sacrificing their level 
of wages growth and/or narrowing their degree of wage
differentiation, the stability of a corporatist agreement is 
likely to become upset by precisely the factors we have
identified.
2.2.3. Low Pav Unions.
Rational members of low pay unions will have interests in 
maximising their own share of the national income as well. But 
low pay members will also want to close the gap with other 
unions' wages, particularly when other union sectors make great 
gains. This explains the "ratchet effect” of wage growth in 
centralised negotiating systems where an incomes policy does not 
have a restraining effect: high pay unions achieve substantial 
gains which are then "passed on” to weaker unions through legal 
provisions for comparability.
This also indicates that low pay unions will have an 
interest in delegating wage bargaining power to centralised union 
organisations, whenever they calculate that a peak federation 
will promote wage levelling between high and low pay sectors and 
ensure that the gains achieved by high pay unions can be passed 
on. If this is the case, low pay unions should be the greatest 
supporters of a centralised wage fixing system and the greatest
90
2 - Foul Economic Weather And Trade Union Cooperation
opponents of decentralisation and flexibility in wage 
determination.
Centralisation of pay negotiation might also represent a 
conduit for other gains to low pay unions. A corporatist 
arrangement with government, in which the peak trade union 
delivers the wage restraint of high and low pay unions, might 
produce pay-offs such as tax trade-offs which the low pay union 
lacks the power resources to achieve on its own.36 Low pay unions 
will have an interest in marshalling the power resources of other 
social institutions in its favour, principally the peak trade 
union federation, but also government, in order to obtain the 
redistributive benefits of government intervention and 
subsidisation.
Low pay unions will also be aware that the alternative to a 
corporatist system is likely to be a flexible labour market to 
which low pay unions are particularly vulnerable. Since low pay 
unions exist in low profit sectors, unemployment is a greater 
threat than it is for high profit sectors. While there may be 
shortages of labour in some high pay sectors even in the midst of 
a recession, low pay sectors are nearly always open to new labour 
market entrants. Competition is sharper in a slack labour market, 
and union viability is correspondingly weakened.
However, low pay unions might find it extremely difficult, 
at the same time, to participate in a wage restraint strategy. 
Whereas the leadership of low pay unions might see benefits from 
participating in a corporatist system, the members of the union 
might see the concept of wage restraint as another excuse to 
reinforce their low pay status. Low pay members are more likely,
36 On levelling high wages down as a means to reduce the 
pressure on tax and fiscal mechanisms of redistribution, and thus 
as the primary quid pro quo for wage-restraint from low-pay 
unions, see B. Wootton, The Social Foundations of Wage Policy. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1962, pp.189-90.
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therefore, to find the notion of participating in a strategy of 
wage restraint as normatively unacceptable.
This means that low pay unions are more likely to demand of 
a corporatist system that they must bear relatively less of the 
burden of restraint. Their leadership can argue, with the backing 
of normative traditions in the labour movement, that low pay 
members should actually improve their position in the labour 
market.37 Low pay members will feel that they come top of the 
list of union members who need the most protection from 
exploitation by capital. Low pay unions will be expected to drive 
for the burden of wage restraint to fall on high pay unions, 
while the public sphere will be expected to act as a 
redistributive conduit.
Three broad types of incomes policy designed to meet the 
demand by low pay unions for special consideration can be 
identified:
1. Incomes policies which provide for the low pay to be 
excepted from national norms and guidelines.
2. Incomes policies which allow specific increases to 
groups of wage earners, but which include provisions 
favouring the low paid.
3. Incomes policies which primarily make use of flat- 
rate increases, having the effect of reducing 
percentage differentials.38
37 For the view that inclusion of low pay criterion in 
incomes policies is little more than a cynical ”totem”, designed 
to secure low-pay union support for cooperation but with little 
effective impact on comparability, see B. Towers, British Incomes 
Policy. Occasional Papers in Industrial Relations, Universities 
of Leeds and Nottingham, 1978; also R. Hyman and I. Brough, 
Social Values and Industrial Relations: A Study of Fairness and 
Equality. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975.
38 See R. Steele, "Incomes Policies and Low Pay", in J.L. 
Fallick and R.F. Elliott (ed.s), Incomes Policies. Inflation and 
Relative Pav. London, Allen and Unwin, 1981, p.128.
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The leadership of low pay unions are likely to measure their 
success in terms of meeting the expectations of members for 
upward levelling of the wages share, and for diminution of the 
rate of exploitation. Low pay unions will be looking for some 
concrete gains from an incomes policy strategy.39 If the union 
movement appears to be dominated by the interests of the 
stronger, high pay unions, the low pay unions will tend to break 
away and the authority of the central peak federation will suffer 
accordingly.
It is also likely that the union leadership of low pay 
unions will be radicalised by the high rate of exploitation in 
low pay sectors. Low pay union leadership may actually prefer to 
represent their members in an economy characterised by a normal 
state of labour market struggle over the economic pie than in a 
corporatist economy which extracts wage restraint. This is 
because the risk of the wage restraint strategy failing to 
deliver any gains to the trade union movement is greatest from
39 Steele argues that the experience of low-pay trade unions 
in Britain during the incomes policies of the period 1968-1979 
demonstrates that incomes policies did little to improve the 
relative position of the low paid, despite this objective having 
a high profile in the stated aims of the policy. He writes: "On 
balance the 'decade' of incomes policies has hardly even led to 
a maintenance, let alone an improvement, of the relative position 
of low-paid industries; indeed in the aggregate it led to a 
fall". See R. Steele, "Incomes Policies and Low Pay", in J.F. 
Fallick and R.F. Elliott (ed.s), Incomes Policies. Inflation and 
Relative Pav. London, Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp.141-42. Swenson, 
on the other hand, notes that the Swedish "solidaristic wage 
policy", designed to increase the relative rate of low-pay 
earnings while also delivering redistribution through social 
policy, has achieved an "astonishing compression of pay levels 
since the 1950s" and a large welfare state financed by 
progressive taxes. P. Swenson, Fair Shares. Unions. Pav. And 
Politics In Sweden And West Germany. London, Adamantine Press 
Limited, 1989, p.6. See also C. Crouch, "The Drive for Equality: 
Experience of Incomes Policy in Britain", in L. Lindberg et al 
(ed.s), Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism. Lexington, 
Mass., Heath, 1975, pp.223, 229.
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the perspective of low pay union leaders. If they challenge their 
own definition of class interests by cooperating with employers, 
only to find that the collaboration was a failure, their loss of 
credibility is very costly. High pay unions are not as badly hurt 
by the collapse of a wage restraint strategy, since in most cases 
it means they can achieve higher gains than during the policy. 
The failure of an incomes policy would have different 
implications for low pay unions, where it would imply that their 
employers would have an excuse to get "tougher”. In contrast to 
the risks attending participation in a corporatist incomes 
policy, some low pay union leaders will find life under more 
"normal" conditions of class struggle easier. The leadership can 
appeal to the exploitative nature of the system as the cause of 
high unemployment and low wages in their sector, and present 
their own activity as the only defence of low pay workers' 
interests.
The ideal incomes policy from the perspective of the low pay 
union will consist of a slow-down in the growth of higher wages 
or even wage reductions at the higher end of the wages structure. 
Low pay unions would want to see government intervene to provide 
some concrete gains for their members in the form of employment 
growth financed by fiscal expenditures, or tax cuts to low pay 
incomes, or investment in troubled sectors, or the reduction of 
inflation.40
40 The Swedish strategy, which we examine shortly, is often 
viewed as use of wage restraint as a means to achieve wage 
levelling. Supra-industrial bargaining enables the achievement of 
uniform wage rates within industries, with the intention of 
avoiding the conflict that would arise from some groups achieving 
more through "ability to pay" criterion. The result is expected 
to be lower average wage growth and less wage rivalry, both of 
which are supposed to relieve pressure on inflation. See A.M. 
Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy. Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1948, p.48; also, with respect to West Germany and the 
United States, see R.B. Freeman and J.L. Medoff, What Do Unions 
Do?. New York, Basic Books, 1984, pp.61-73. When we examine
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The most interesting question is whether low pay unions can 
be expected to support a corporatist incomes policy when the 
likelihood of absolute sum gains is minimal. The government, for 
example, may face a fiscal crisis which prohibits tax cuts and 
instead requires cut-backs in government expenditure. Is it 
possible that low pay unions might support a wage restraint 
strategy because the outcome would be to minimise cost rather 
than maximise gain?
Our argument is that, in foul economic weather, the low pay 
unions are just as likely, although for their own reasons, to 
challenge any centralised wage restraint guidelines which entail 
a reduction in their status. Since we have seen that high pay 
groups are more likely to "break out" of corporatist wage 
restraint policies in foul weather, this seems to be a real 
possibility. In foul economic weather, the conflict between high 
and low pay groups is likely to be heightened in a way which is 
not apparent in fair economic weather.
2.3. Cooperation in Fair and Foul Weather.
How can we model the foul weather interaction between the 
interests of the low and high pay trade unions, the central 
federation, and employers and government, as an iterated 
prisoners' dilemma? To capture the iterated nature of the game, 
it is necessary to model the interaction of these interests over 
time and to show how the consequences of strategy choices in 
previous encounters influence collective outcomes in future 
encounters.
To understand that the situation is a prisoners' dilemma, it 
is necessary to establish that the game also operates in such a 
way that the low and high pay groups are faced with a situation 
in which non-cooperation is a rational choice whether the other
Sweden we will find that this growth-based strategy depends on 
fair economic weather.
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actors cooperate or not, and that collectively all the actors 
would be better off by cooperating.
The prisoners' dilemma aspect of the game, as we argued in 
Chapter One, is given by the requirements for wage restraint 
given in a capitalist economy in fair and foul economic weather. 
The cooperative solution to the prisoners' dilemma in fair and 
foul economic weather will consist of a wage restraint strategy 
underpinned by a set of policies designed to promote employment 
growth and reduce income inequality. In fair weather, cooperation 
maximises gains, and in foul weather it minimises costs in such 
a way that the prospects for future growth are maximised.
The central, peak federation, and the low and high pay 
groups, must cooperate with capital and the government in a 
complex exchange which maximises gains and minimises costs. In 
fair weather, they achieve this by setting rates of wage increase 
which satisfy two conditions. The first is that they enable 
increasing material well-being (a growing standard of living), 
and the second is that they enable the continuing reduction of 
inequality. Overall growth ensures that cooperation is rewarded 
by the satisfaction of both conditions. But in foul weather, the 
actors may simply not be capable of improving material well-being 
at the collective level without incurring costs at the individual 
level. Instead, in zero-sum fashion, any particular improvements 
must be made at the expense of other groups. The reduction of 
inequality, which we might operationalise as a wages and welfare 
mix coupled with active labour market policies, becomes 
sustainable only at a greater relative cost to the actors. The 
maintenance of full employment, most often achieved through 
public sector employment growth, requires a greater relative 
share of private incomes to be taxed.
Since low pay actors typically demand that the burden of 
restraint be spread in such a way that they improve their 
relative position, the high pay groups are often required to fund
96
2 - Foul Economic Weather And Trade Union Cooperation
the majority of the restraint. This is not easy to achieve when 
it is often the low pay workers who are most vulnerable to 
economic pressures which require wage restraint. The proceeds of 
the high pay groups' wage restraint are then envisaged to fund 
investment in growth-sectors of the economy, leading to an 
increase in employment and an increased capacity to provide for 
fiscal expenditures designed to support labour placement and 
social welfare.
Instead, these proceeds could be used to fund high wages for 
workers in the high pay sectors, where employers often prefer to 
offer high wages as an inducement to attract higher quality 
labour, and without the competitiveness of the high pay sectors 
being adversely affected in the short to medium term. 
Expenditures designed to provide for employment growth and social 
compensation aimed at the low pay actors would then have to be 
funded out of general taxation. In the long term, we argue, the 
relative costs of this taxation would increase for both low and 
high pay trade unions and their employers. The high pay groups, 
and their employers, would then effectively be appropriating a 
larger share of the national product without any appreciable 
benefit to the general economy. During corporatist cooperation in 
fair weather, of course, they would be able to do this without 
causing a loss of competitiveness or requiring low pay actors to 
bear a greater relative burden of taxation or wage restraint. But 
in foul weather, the need for investment in employment-generation 
and capital requires a reduction in the total wages share of 
output commensurate with that funding requirement.
How, then, do these actors cooperate under foul weather 
corporatism, in game-theoretic terms? First, let us consider a 
"game" between government and the peak trade union federation. We 
will assume that government in this case is politically disposed 
to cooperate with the trade union movement, provided it can be
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certain that the risk of embarking upon a corporatist policy and 
losing the cooperation of the trade unions is not too great.
We will assume also that the peak organisation prefers to 
achieve a cooperative agreement which maximises gains and 
minimises costs, but is sensitive to the democratic wishes of its 
affiliates and their members. Table 2.1 presents hypothetical 
payoffs for such a game involving a peak trade union organisation 
and government. Let us imagine that a strategy of cooperation for 
the government
Table 2.1.
Government and the Encompassing Trade Union Actor.
"Left" Government.
Corporatism Non-Corporatism
C D
Wage Restraint C Active Labour Insider-outsider theory;
Market Policy; Unemployment 
Peak Trade welfare;
Union solidarity
No Wage Restraint D  Wage Explosion High Interest Rates;
Distributional Conflict; 
Restriction of Public Sector 
Growth
(corporatism) involves making positive contributions to the 
welfare of trade union members through redistributive policy 
mechanisms. A non-corporatist strategy, by contrast, does not 
involve targeting such selective benefits to trade unions, 
instead it represents a net loss to unions.
The first characteristic to note of such a game is the fact 
that it is iterative: both players are not looking at a one-off 
game. Thus the peak trade union can be sure that a (D,C) strategy 
(offer no wage restraint and receive the benefits of corporatist
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exchange) would be unsustainable and would destroy the 
corporatist bargain. The government would simply change its 
strategy from corporatism to non-corporatism, shifting the 
payoffs to (D,D). This would happen even in fair weather, if the 
costs in terms of unit labour costs became too great, but it is 
neither necessary nor logically coherent in fair weather.
What does this "logical coherence" refer to? Notice that the 
degree of wage restraint is entirely relative. Thus, in the midst 
of fair weather trade unions could be "offering wage restraint" 
which is enough for those economic conditions but which could 
become no longer enough in foul weather. In fair weather, the 
wage-breakout temptation of the (D,C) strategy is less of a 
problem for actors otherwise tempted to free-ride, since within 
the confines of a corporatist "wage-restraint" strategy (the 
(C,C) strategy), high rates of real increases could still be 
achieved without affecting the competitiveness of the wider 
economy.
The central, peak federation would be able to ensure 
continuing cooperation in fair weather much more easily because 
the gains from cooperation over time would be enough to reduce 
the pressure for a wage boom. In foul economic weather, however, 
the incapacity of the economy to support further increases of the 
same magnitude would, if trade unions then struggled to maintain 
their rate of improvement, result in a wages boom virtually by 
definition. Any such failure to achieve "real wage restraint" 
would eventually necessitate a policy response by government and 
employers, which would eventually succeed in squeezing wage- 
restraint out of the unions in any case.
The final outcome of pursuing a (D,C) strategy over iterated 
games in foul weather, for the trade union federation, would be 
a type of (C,D) outcome in which trade unions are forced to offer 
wage restraint (in which they are, effectively, cooperating under 
coercion) under circumstances of high unemployment, legislation
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designed to weaken the power resources of the union movement, and 
increasing pressures for decentralisation and greater sectoral 
autonomy; i.e., the worst outcome for the peak federation, even 
with a Left government.41
In fair weather, a (C,D) outcome is somewhat different and 
is somewhat logically incoherent, because it implies that the 
peak federation cooperates in offering wage restraint while the 
government responds by tightening fiscal and monetary policy, and 
allows unemployment to increase. In fair weather, it does not 
seem likely that such a policy strategy would be necessary or 
even the preferred option of the Left government. But this could 
happen in foul weather, if the government perceives that the wage 
restraint, either offered by the peak federation or achieved 
after wage drift has been taken into account, is not enough, even 
with the unions attempting to avoid a wage boom, and that tougher 
macroeconomic measures are necessitated by the severity of the 
crisis. Employers could similarly be much more interested in 
decentralised strategies of wage determination, enabling greater 
flexibility in labour utilisation.42
In an important sense, the wage boom, the failure of 
government to commit enough resources to employment and 
investment, and the employers' response to labour market 
pressures are two sides of the same coin. In foul weather, the 
shift in the a and 0 parameters changes the relative value of all 
previous strategies by definition. What was previously wage 
restraint becomes a wages boom, prudent macroeconomic management 
becomes restrictive and disinflationary, and efficient management
41 For a discussion of forced consumption and employment 
spreading, see Andrew Glyn, 'Corporatism, Patterns of Employment, 
and Access to Consumption', in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, 
Bob Rowthorn (eds), Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic 
System?, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p.134.
42 See Marino Regini (ed), The Future Of Labour Movements. 
London, Sage, 1992.
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at the firm level requires flexible systems of labour 
utilisation.
Note that in foul weather a (C,D) outcome for government, in 
which wage restraint has been forced out of the labour market 
through policies that involve unemployment, does not represent 
the same gain that a (D,C) outcome holds for the peak trade 
union. The wages boom represents a very temporary victory for 
labour. For government, the (C,D) outcome is likely to be much 
more long lasting. An engineered recession exacts a political 
cost and becomes difficult to disengage from, and any wage 
restraint achieved thereby is in an important sense artificial: 
for quite some time, at least, in any upturn it can be expected 
that the trade union movement will seek to even the score.43
The (D,C) outcome for government is marginally better than 
a (D,D) result for government for the reason that the 
distributive conflict is politically and economically more costly 
than the foul weather non-corporatist equilibrium. The government 
is likely to take decisive steps in a (D,D) crisis, which will 
depend to a large extent on the capacity of the peak federation 
to rein in the wages boom. If it is not possible to return to 
corporatist cooperation the government will shift to a non- 
corporatist strategy. Any (D,D) outcome is likely to be only 
temporary, it will only last as long as it takes for the 
government's strategy to bite.
The main characteristic to note of this game, then, is that 
the pay-offs should really be written as:
43 It is possible that, as a result of a successful 
monetarist strategy, the trade union actors might be reduced to 
a decentralised and disparate set of labour market competitors. 
In this case, there is effectively no peak organisation left, the 
whole game changes, and government achieves a (C,D) outcome 
through market processes which can be expected to be relatively 
impervious to an economic upturn.
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For the Peak Federation
(C, C) > (D, C) = (D, D) = (C, D)
For the Government 
(C, C) > (D, C) = (D, D) = (C, D)
That is, the peak trade union really only has a choice between a
strategy of mutual cooperation and its worst possible outcome:
(C,D). The (D,C) outcome can only represent a temporary gain, the 
(D,D) outcome a temporary loss, to be followed soon by a greater 
loss. If we accept that over time the gains to be achieved from 
mutual cooperation outweigh the sum of gains and losses to be 
achieved from shifting temporarily among the other strategies, 
then we would expect the "shadow of the future" to make a (C,C) 
strategy the dominant strategy for the peak trade union 
organisation.44
Given this payoff ranking, cooperation would also represent 
the dominant strategy for government in both fair and foul 
weather, since we assume that a Left government would prefer a 
successful corporatist policy to a successful non-corporatist 
strategy, especially if the political costs of making the non- 
corporatist strategy work were high enough.45
If life were as simple as this, we would expect corporatism 
to emerge smoothly in periods of Left incumbency. But the problem 
encountered in foul weather is that neither player can expect the 
other to be able to deliver the material benefits of cooperation, 
even if they want to. The capacity of these two encompassing 
actors to cooperate is limited by their dependence on lower level 
actors. Table 2.2 shows a set of outcomes for the low and high
44 In particular, corporatism ensures a role for the peak 
trade union organisation, while the alternative decentralised 
scenario represents a net loss.
45 A Labour government will also know that the problems of 
sustaining a monetarist strategy will give the more-market 
Opposition parties the opportunity to claim that they could "do 
the job" far more efficiently and comprehensively.
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Table 2.2.
The Attraction of Corporatism in Fair Economic Weather.
Corporatism.
Fair Weather Foul Weather
c D
Wage Restraint c Welfare Cost Distribution
Strong Union
No Wage Restraint D Unnecessary Insider Theory
Wage Restraint C Welfare Cost Distribution
Weak Union
No Wage Restraint D Unnecessary Insider Theory
pay trade union actors from the two possible outcomes of a game
between trade unions and the other actors, which include 
employers, government, and the peak federation. In its games with 
individual trade unions, the "success" or "failure” of the 
corporatist system is a measure of the alternative outcomes which 
can be achieved in a game with the two trade union groups in fair 
and foul weather. "Fair weather" represents strong political and 
material support from government, "foul weather" represents 
strong support, and the continuation of measures designed to 
maximise equality in the distribution of costs, but only minimal 
or negative real gains.
Looking at the payoffs in Table 2.2., it can be seen that 
the choice for both high pay and low pay unions in foul weather 
is between offering wage restraint in a context of uncertain and 
unequal costs, "or non-cooperation. Here we have used insider-
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outsider theory as the best way to characterise the temptation to 
opt out of the corporatist strategy. The outcome of the (C,D) 
strategy entails that the distribution of costs is achieved but 
without the payoffs achieved in the fair weather (C,C) strategy. 
The (C, C) outcome is only attainable in fair weather, and is 
preferred to the (D,C) outcome in a centralised system because 
the latter is not necessary to attain real gains. The (D,C) 
outcome is of course the best short-term outcome for both types 
of union, and individual unions might be tempted to free-ride on 
the cooperation of others in order to achieve this double payoff, 
but the unions will have a relatively weaker interest in pushing 
wages growth far enough to destabilise the welfare-generating 
mechanisms of the corporatist system in fair economic weather. 
Unions may also view the game as a chicken situation, and reason 
that the government will be loathe to rely on a non-corporatist 
strategy which involves unemployment. But in fair weather where 
employment growth is strong this is less likely to become a 
difficulty for wage cooperation.46
The payoffs for strong unions can be taken as being 
relatively larger in each of the cells, to represent the higher 
resistance enjoyed by strong unions to conditions of restraint. 
Thus, even when wage restraint is achieved from the strong unions 
(C,D), the loss is not as great as that to weak unions. For both 
types of unions, the outcome (D,D) is preferred to (C,D), which 
implies that the costs are unloaded onto "outsiders”.
For the peak, central federation, the employers and the 
government, the payoffs from (C,C) in fair weather are preferred:
46 It is likely that the central, peak federation will reason 
that governments are more likely to choose strategies which 
entail costs in foul weather, so that the chicken-like aspects of 
the game will weaken at that level. Overall, the (D,C) strategy 
is risky and unnecessary in fair economic weather, and in an 
already functioning corporatist system should not have a high 
probability of occurring.
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for the peak federation, the benefit of increased authority and 
political influence is a major component of the gains which are 
represented by corporatism, employers enjoy high profits and good 
growth, and government can expand services and employment without 
threatening the competitiveness of the economy. The gains from a 
wage boom do not represent a better outcome for the peak 
federation, because they represent in effect the breakout of 
unions from a negotiated wages strategy, diminish the peak 
organisation's authority, and are only likely to be temporary.
The peak trade union is more likely, however, to passively 
support the breakout of insiders in foul weather than in fair 
weather, since in the former case the individual unions will be 
pressing for their traditional rights and the peak federation 
will be unable to promise a return to the payoffs achieved in 
fair weather. If the government shifted from corporatism to non­
corporatism, the peak federation would have a more active 
interest in supporting affiliates who wanted to break away from 
government guidelines, since in that case the union movement is 
effectively resisting, if only temporarily, the government's 
restrictive strategy, while if the peak federation continued to 
support the government against the wishes of its affiliates 
morale will be very low and the peak organisation will be held to 
a certain extent accountable for the state of trade union 
affairs.
In sum, the preferences of the peak trade union remain the 
same as in the game with government represented by Table 2.1., 
but the preferences of the two types of trade unions are far more 
dependent upon the material outcome of the corporatist strategy 
than are the preferences of the peak trade union. The affiliated 
unions do not count the gain of participating in a corporatist 
political economy in the same way that the peak organisation 
does. In fact, if we look at the relative outcomes from the point
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Table 2.3.
Corporatism in Foul Weather.
High Pay Unions.
Wage Restraint No Wage Restraint
Wage Restraint Low Wages; 
Little Improve­
Wage Breakout
Low Pay Unions ment; High Profits
No Wage Restraint Wage Breakout Insider Theory
of view purely of the two types of trade unions in foul weather, 
this becomes even clearer.
It can be seen in Table 2.3. that the dominant strategy 
for low pay unions will be non-cooperation, as long as the 
outcome of (C,C) entails real costs and increasing inequality. 
The best outcome for low pay unions is (D,C) , and they are likely 
to argue that something approximating this is the fairest 
outcome. Centralisation and solidarity mechanisms may help to 
achieve this, but in foul weather the high pay groups are more 
likely to break out. (D,D) is also always to be preferred by low 
pay unions to (C,D) . For high pay unions, it is likely that (D,D) 
will be preferred to (D,C), because the latter outcome will 
entail a narrowing of pay differentials while the former enables 
the high pay unions to make use of their labour market strength. 
High pay unions will know that the (C,D) outcome is unsustainable 
in practice: low pay unions will not supply wage restraint while 
high pay unions are free to push for increases commensurate with 
their strength. For high pay unions, then, the (C,C) outcome has 
to be very high to improve upon the (D,D) outcome, since high pay 
unions are not as threatened by restrictive policies as low pay 
unions (although they may be vulnerable to exchange rate changes 
and international competition). Before high pay unions support
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(D, C), then, they must overcome their aversion to pay levelling 
and accept real cost distribution.
The dilemma here is that, in foul weather corporatism, for 
both types of unions, non-cooperation is preferred on material 
grounds to cooperation, unless the payoffs from (C,C) can be made 
substantial and certain. Low pay unions expect high pay unions to 
bear the burden of restraint, but high pay unions are likely to 
prefer (D,D) to this outcome. One solution to this dilemma could 
be for a third party, namely the government, to step in and add 
to the payoffs which high pay unions and low pay unions can 
expect from cooperation. This will shift the dominant strategy to 
(C,C), making the game an assurance game. But how can government 
offer selective incentives when the reason for the wage-restraint 
in the first place is the need to reduce unit costs of 
production? Government subsidies must be paid for out of general 
taxation or borrowing, both of which exact a cost to the private 
sector and threaten to negate the benefits of achieving wage- 
restraint. Either Government must use negative incentives, or the 
subsidies must be repaid out of economic development generated by 
a successful policy.
In foul economic weather, then, the stability of the (C,C) 
outcome, even over iteration, is weakened by the temptation to 
free-ride by passing the costs of adjustment onto outsiders. 
While the encompassing actors may view this strategy as sub- 
optimal over the medium to long-term, the individual unions are 
more likely to prefer to maintain their position at the expense 
of other actors in the political economy.
What exactly does the temptation to become an "insider” 
consist of, in foul economic weather? Why is it that in the fair 
weather prisoners' dilemma, the collective solution over iterated 
games is to cooperate and this becomes rational given conditional 
cooperation, while in the foul weather prisoners' dilemma, the
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Table 2.4.
The Prisoners' Dilemma of Cost Distribution.
Player A
Co-operate Defect
Co-operate -If -1 ”3, 1
Player B
Defect 1, -3 -2, -2
collective solution is still to cooperate, but conditional 
cooperation is less likely?
The question is whether or not cooperation can be sustained 
when the objective is not to attain some material gains but 
rather to minimise costs. What happens, for example, when 
cooperation cannot guarantee material pay-offs to all the 
participants? Table 2.4. presents some hypothetical payoffs for 
two actors in a game with a prisoners' dilemma configuration. The 
payoffs in this game are arranged in such a way that, not only is 
it better to defect no matter what the other player does, but the 
only positive outcome arises from free-riding. Cooperating simply 
shares the cost equitably. The successful free-rider obtains the 
only gain that is available, at the expense of the other player, 
who must bear all the cost. The sum of gains and losses, however, 
for (C,C) , (C,D) , and (D,C) is exactly the same. Thus, in
aggregate terms, it makes no difference whether both players 
cooperate or one successfully free-rides on the other. Who pays 
the costs doesn't matter. The (D,D) outcome, however, suggests a 
scenario in which the failure of both players to cooperate leads 
to a worse collective outcome.
How can such a model be related to our game-theoretic model 
of corporatism? If we suppose that the two actors in this example
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are trade unions, then we could treat the values here as 
representing real income variables. Cooperation in this context 
means wage-restraint. If both players cooperate, their real 
incomes decline. Obviously, we might ask: why cooperate then? The 
answer, in this case, is that a rejection of wage restraint by 
the two unions leads, sooner or later, to economic damage which 
is of greater (negative) value than the wage restraint. Here we 
could assume two possible cases: first, that the (D,D) cost is 
borne directly by the two unions, and is not passed on to other 
actors who are not participating in this exchange. Thus, perhaps 
the workers belonging to the unions lose their jobs as a direct 
result of unsustainable wage increases, or perhaps the firms 
raise domestic prices in response. In the second case, the costs 
are passed on to outsiders in the form of unemployment and 
reduced social compensation for actors excluded from the labour 
force, but again the outcome (especially over the long term) 
represents a cost for the insiders. This could be so if the 
macroeconomic consequences of the high unemployment rate 
debilitate the general economy through hysteresis effects on 
training, skills, and investment confidence and generate social 
and political conflicts which degrade the context in which future 
gains can be realised.
In the (C,D) and (D,C) cases, one union or group of 
outsiders bears all the restraint, allowing the other to enjoy a 
small positive gain in real income. The overall effect on 
inflation is, however, no better or worse than if the two unions 
had shared the restraint more equitably. The problem such a 
scenario poses for achieving cooperation in a corporatist context 
is, then, that free-riding in this sense is not necessarily going 
to produce a worse overall outcome than mutual cooperation in the 
short term. If it is successful, free-riding can net the only 
positive gain that is available, and not damage the economy. Much
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will then depend on what the likelihood of successfully passing 
on costs is.
Two unions in a situation such as this will only cooperate 
if neither is unable to successfully free-ride on the other or 
pass costs onto other non-union actors. In a one-shot game, both 
would probably attempt to free-ride, with the (D,D) outcome. Over 
iterated games, however, they might decide that the (C,C) 
outcome, although negative, is still better than the (D,D) 
outcome, and conditional cooperation could get started. Ellis and 
Heath have coined a term to describe such a situation in which 
the best choice for an actor is to cooperate, but in which the 
actor is not better off than they were through having cooperated: 
"coerced exchange".47
In fair weather, free riding can be controlled through 
solidarity and institutional mechanisms, but the primary factor, 
we argue, is the iterative nature of the gains that are achieved 
through cooperation. In foul weather, over time cooperation 
simply builds up costs. Free riding and insider behaviour is made 
much more attractive as a result. Individually, then, workers can 
be tempted far more strongly by free riding in foul weather than 
in fair.
Conclusion.
Corporatist cooperation in "foul weather" is a special case 
of coerced exchange which is particularly vulnerable to limited 
free-riding. This implies strongly that we have to examine the 
context in which the corporatist countries have been successful: 
are the corporatist countries as successful in foul weather as in 
fair? Does centralisation and solidarity function as efficiently
47 Adrian Ellis and Anthony Heath, 'Positional Competition, 
Or An Offer You Can't Refuse', in Adrian Ellis and Krishan Kumar 
(ed.s), Dilemmas of Liberal Democracies. Studies in Fred Hirsch's 
'Social Limits to Growth'. London, Tavistock Publications, 1983,
pp.1-22.
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in foul as fair weather? Are there any examples of successful 
corporatism in foul weather?
In foul weather the strategic choices faced by union actors 
change somewhat. The wage restraint required is likely to be 
deeper, the time horizon before wages begin to improve following 
a period of wage restraint is likely to be longer, and the 
temptation to free-ride and reap the only positive gains 
available is likely to be stronger. Workers face strategic 
choices which will depend, in part, on how long their time 
horizon is and on how high their discount rate is. A union actor 
might decide that it is not worth waiting around until h2 in 
”foul weather”. This might be because the likelihood of ever 
reaching h2 without an adverse change in the strategy of one's 
partner(s) is too low. Or it might be because the physical 
environment might change before then and adversely affect the 
expected upward trend in wages at h2. The union actor might 
calculate that the expected benefits at hj outweigh the expected 
benefits at h2 because the cost of waiting is too high and must 
be taken into account.
In foul economic weather, high pay unions are expected to 
bear the brunt of wage restraint, and to allow a narrowing of 
their pay differentials. Yet wage restraint in high-profit 
sectors is very hard to justify to members and pay comparability 
is often strongly defended. Similarly, low pay unions face the 
problem of having a membership which is already suffering from 
relative deprivation, and the leadership are likely to face high 
political costs for the failure of any corporatist incomes policy 
to deliver results. Low pay unions might have an interest in the 
benefits of corporatism, but they depend on the cooperation of 
high pay unions to achieve them. Low pay union leadership is 
likely to be volatile in its allegiance: if the risk of failure 
is too high, they will appeal to their members' antipathy to wage 
restraint.
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In order to secure the cooperation of both groups of trade 
unions, government might be expected to intervene. But what if 
the costs of government intervention and redistribution are 
likely to be greater than the benefits of the corporatist 
strategy in terms of economic outcomes? The theoretical modelling 
we have presented has raised several interesting questions 
concerning the functioning of corporatist cooperation in foul 
weather. The most important point is that cooperation has been 
shown to be still collectively optimal in both fair and foul 
weather: the same game theoretical arguments apply to both cases. 
But the difficulty involved in achieving and sustaining 
cooperation is not the same. In foul weather, corporatism becomes 
susceptible to free riding, and agreements designed for fair 
weather produce unintended equity outcomes, even despite the 
presence of solidarity and institutional mechanisms for resolving 
distributional conflict. In foul weather, the "shadow of the 
future” does not consist of the promise of gains, it consists of 
costs and has the appearance of failure to actors within a system 
that is predicated on a growth-strategy.
In the following chapters we examine empirically the 
evidence for the performance of corporatist systems in fair and 
foul weather, with a view towards (1) demonstrating that 
corporatism is not capable of generating its own fair weather and 
(2) identifying a critical case study of corporatism in foul 
weather. Armed with this case study, we examine whether or not 
the experiences of a corporatist country in foul weather support 
the theoretical analysis we have undertaken.
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CHAPTER THREE.
CORPORATISM AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS.
'Corporatism has always been connected to its ability to 
provide better macroeconomic performance and lower 
industrial disputes than in pluralist countries'. Markus 
M.L. Crepaz
In the late 1970s and 1980s, a growing literature in 
comparative public policy examined the performance of capitalist 
economies, mostly in the 1960s to early 1980s period.2 These
1 Markus M.L. Crepaz, 'Corporatism In Decline? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic 
Performance and Industrial Disputes in 18 Industrialised 
Democracies', Comparative Political Studies. 25, 2, 1992, p.142.
2 Key early examples of work which argued that corporatism 
outperformed other political economies in the 1970s include 
Gerhard Lehmbruch, 'Liberal Corporatism and Party Government', 
Comparative Political Studies. 10. 1977, pp.91-126; Phillippe 
Schmitter, 'Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of 
Societal Change in Western Europe', Comparative Political 
Studies, 10, 1977, pp.7-38; Michael Bruno and Jeffrey D. Sachs, 
Economics of Worldwide Inflation. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985; 
Colin Crouch, 'Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint', in Leon 
Lindberg and Charles S. Maier (eds), The Politics of Inflation 
and Economic Stagnation. Washington, DC., The Brookings 
Institution, 1985, pp.105-39; David Cameron, 'Social Democracy, 
Corporatism, Labour Quiescence, and the Representation of 
Economic Interests in Advanced Capitalist Society', in J.H. 
Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp.143-78; Manfred G. Schmidt, 
'The Role of Parties in Shaping Macroeconomic Policy', in F.G. 
Castles, The Impact of Parties; Politics and Policies in 
Democratic Capitalist States. London, Sage, 1982, pp.97-176.
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studies attempted to distinguish between two generic causes of 
relative poor performance or economic stagnation: those causes 
related to worldwide economic, technological and demographic 
changes, and those causes more specifically located in the 
organisation of each state's political-economic structure.3
One important stimulus for this comparative exercise was the 
fact that during the 1970s to early 1980s period of economic 
stagnation, there was a larger degree of variation among the OECD 
capitalist economies in terms of performance on key economic 
indicators than had been observed previously. A second, 
theoretically-derived stimulus, was to test the hypotheses which 
arose from evolving theoretical work on systems of collective 
action as a key determinant of socio-economic performance. This 
work was based on some of the theory we examined in the previous 
chapters.
Perhaps the most interesting hypothesis to emerge suggested 
that large encompassing interest organisations should be 
expected, if they act rationally, to take into account the wider 
redistributive effects of their economic strategies. If this were 
true, it seemed reasonable to expect that cross-national 
comparison would discover a strong correlation between 
encompassing systems of interest intermediation and superior 
economic performance.
Corporatist theory combined game theory which investigated 
interest group strategy from the perspective of encompassing 
behaviour and the iterative consequences of non-cooperation, and 
institutional theory which linked socio-economic performance to
3 For the generalised causes of economic stagnation after 
1973: i.e., the internationalisation of the world economy, ageing 
of industrial structure, limits to labour supply and raw 
materials, limits relating to productivity gains and export 
capacity, oil shocks, and an increase in distributional conflict, 
see Herman Van Der Wee, Prosperity and Upheaval: The World
Economy 1945-1980. London, Penguin, 1987, pp.330-333.
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the existence of institutional arrangements for comprehensive 
interest intermediation. Together, these two elements predicted 
that economies would perform better when their interest group 
structures were dominated by large encompassing organisations, 
when they encouraged comprehensive interest aggregation and 
provided institutional structures which could inhibit narrow 
distributional strategies on the part of key economic interest 
groups.4
The emphasis was on performing better, hence the cross­
national empirical work was undertaken on the premise that 
corporatist countries should be more successful in comparative 
terms than non-corporatist countries. They would perform better 
because their encompassing groups would be choosing strategies 
that maximised the general welfare, instead of choosing narrow 
distributional strategies that generated harmful economic costs 
and inefficiencies. Virtually the entire literature on 
corporatist performance was testing an underlying hypothesis: 
namely, that corporatism is more "successful” than the next best 
alternative because it represents a pareto-optimal, positive-sum 
outcome of a game-like contest between class-based economic 
actors. According to game theory, rational cooperation produces 
the best collective outcome, hence the hypothesis that 
corporatism should produce the best material outcome.
As we have seen, however, the possibility is raised that 
corporatism need not have to function at maximum efficiency in 
order to achieve many of these "virtuous circle" outcomes. In
4 For example, the hypothesis tested by Franz Lehner in 1988 
was: 'The more organised interest intermediation is
institutionally integrated, the more constrained is the power of 
special interest groups, and the more balanced is interest 
aggregation, the higher is the efficiency of public policy'. F. 
Lehner, 'The Political Economy of Distributive Conflict', in 
Rudolf Wildermann (ed), The Future Of Party Government. Volume 
Three. Managing Mixed Economies. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1988, 
p.74.
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fair economic weather, actors may only have to reach cooperative 
agreements which are characterised by a degree of restraint but 
which nevertheless still ensure constant improvements. In fair 
weather, the "greed of capitalists” may not be punished and yet 
labour may still enjoy growing real gains, whether through 
political means or through constantly growing real wages.5
Rational cooperation theory predicts that corporatism should 
produce superior economic performance as well as low unemployment 
and high welfare spending. As we shall see, in terms of economic 
performance, corporatism did not quite live up to its 
expectations. The question this raises is whether corporatism 
benefitted economic performance at all. Because the effect of 
foul weather variables over time is relatively unpredictable we 
should in fact expect to find that economic performance is 
causally linked more with these sorts of variables than with the 
degree of cooperation, which can never be perfect in any case.6
Corporatism, in other words, should produce a better result 
for a given country than distributional conflict and high 
unemployment (two possible stages of non-cooperation), but this 
does not necessarily mean that it will outperform some other 
country in economic terms. As Paul Whiteley has said, the
5 'If trade unions are to cooperate in making the "national 
cake grow bigger and bigger”, they must have the assurance that 
they possess an agency which can punish the greed of capitalism', 
Francis G. Castles, The Social Democractic Image of Society. 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p.124.
6 Economic outcomes, for various structural-functional 
reasons, are not completely amenable to corporatist strategies. 
See Hans Keman and Paul F. Whiteley, 'Coping with Crisis: 
Divergent Strategies and Outcomes', in H. Keman, H. Paloheimo, 
and P.F. Whiteley (eds), Coping With The Economic Crisis. London, 
Sage, 1987, pp.205-214.
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influence of politics on economic outcomes is significantly 
greater in the long run than in the short run.7
3.1. Identifying a Foul Weather Corporatist Country.
How can we empirically measure corporatism? The theoretical 
interest in encompassing-actor interaction suggested that size 
might be an important variable. As an indicator of 
encompassingness, however, group size and membership density 
alone cannot suffice. As partial illustration of the fact that 
size and membership density are not good predictors of 
corporatism, Czada found only medium-strength correlations among 
a sample set of 18 OECD countries between measures of membership 
density and centralisation of unions and measures of inflation (-
0.57), economic adjustment (0.49) and economic growth (-0.36).8
Czada found that, while union centralisation was negatively 
associated with inflation (i.e., the expected direction), 
indicating a possible relationship between union centralisation, 
encompassing interest group structures, wage restraint and low 
inflation, membership density was positively associated, if only 
weakly (0.26), with inflation. This could imply that membership 
density is not a very good measure of encompassing group 
behaviour and that, in the absence of restraining institutional 
arrangements, strong interest group mobilisation simply tends 
towards free-riding.9
7 P. Whiteley, Political Control of the Macroeconomv; The 
Political Economy of Public Policy Making. London, Sage, 1986, 
p.133.
8 Roland Czada, 'The Impact of Interest Politics on Flexible 
Adjustment Policies', in Hans Keman, Heikki Paloheimo, Paul F. 
Whiteley, (ed.s), Coping With The Economic Crisis. Alternative 
Responses to Economic Recession in Advanced Industrial Societies. 
London, Sage, 1987, p.23.
9 The effect of central coordination, as Colin Crouch 
writes, is to offset the impact of the level of unionisation. 
Colin Crouch, 'Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint', in 
Leon Lindberg and Charles S. Maier (eds), The Politics of
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This weakens any supposition that large group size 
automatically tends toward encompassing interest group behaviour, 
especially when we use membership density as a measure (since it 
hardly measures encompassingness anyway). It underlines the 
importance of institutional factors which mediate between 
encompassing organisations and their political-economic 
strategies.
All in all, the economic strategies adopted by interest 
groups such as unions cannot effectively be predicted from 
variables which measure their membership density and degree of 
centralisation alone. We have to take into account other, 
institutional, political, and economic-structural factors, which 
might mediate between the economic strategies of even highly 
organised and centralised trade unions and economic outcomes. As 
Franz Lehner writes:
'integrative institutions may compensate for the 
deficiencies of pluralist interest structures, while the 
potential advantages of more centralised and integrated 
interest structures may not come into effect within 
fragmented governmental structures'.10 
What indicators are available to measure the degree to which an 
economy makes use of institutional structures which promote 
comprehensive interest aggregation? Rather than group size and 
encompassingness, a better measure is the degree to which
Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington DC., The Brookings 
Institution, 1985, p.139.
10 See Franz Lehner, 'The Political Economy of Distributive 
Conflict', in Rudolf Wildermann (ed), The Future of Party 
Government. Volume Three. Managing Mixed Economies. Walter de 
Gruyter, Berlin, 1988, pp.54-96, and F. Lehner, 'Interest 
Intermediation, Institutional Structures and Public Policy', in 
Hans Keman, Heikki Paloheimo, and Paul F. Whiteley (eds), Coping 
With The Economic Crisis: Alternative Responses to Economic
Recession in Advanced Industrial Societies. London, Sage, 1987, 
pp.54-82.
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economies provide for consensual collective bargaining strategies 
and political exchange between major economic interest groups and 
government. The degree of consensus and political exchange 
determines whether or not iterative encounters, encompassing 
organisation and institutions of intermediation lead to 
corporatist outcomes. Lehner has developed a typology which 
enables us to derive an ordinal scaling of this aspect of 
corporatism by focusing on different degrees of collective 
bargaining, which we reproduce as Table 3.1. and use for the rest 
of the thesis.11
11 Lehner's typology is itself a modification of an earlier 
typology devised by Gerhard Lehmbruch. See G. Lehmbruch, 
'Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks', in J.H. 
Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp.60-80. A literature survey of 
composite measures of corporatism would not be of much usefulness 
here. Compare Lehner's typology to the composite measure based on
12 expert judgements devised by Markus M. L. Crepaz and Arend 
Lijphart: except for Japan and Switzerland, which we treat as a 
unique category, the operationalisation is little different. 
Markus M. L. Crepaz, 'Corporatism In Decline? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Impact of Corporatism on Macroeconomic 
Performance and Industrial Disputes in 18 Industrialised 
Democracies', Comparative Political Studies. 25, 2, 1992, p.149. 
For a comparison of the classifications developed by H. Wilensky, 
P.C. Schmitter, G. Lehmbruch, and M.G. Schmidt, see A. Cawson, 
Corporatism And Political Theory. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986, 
Table 5.2, p.99. Other important classifications are the Calmfors 
and Driffil centralisation index and Tarantelli's measure which 
explicitly takes the degree of consensus into account. See L. 
Calmfors and J. Driffil, 'Bargaining Structure, Corporatism, and 
Macroeconomic Performance', Economic Policy. 6, 1988, pp.14-61 
and E. Tarantelli, 'The Regulation of Inflation and 
Unemployment', Industrial Relations. 25, 1986, pp.1-15. See also 
Sule Ayse Kut, Corporatism And Political-Economic Performance In 
Advanced Capitalist Countries. A Comparative Study, unpublished 
Ph.D thesis, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1986.
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Table 3.1.
A Scale of Corporatism: Encompassingness. Centralisation* 
Political Exchange and Consensus.
Pluralism fragmented and segmented 
interest intermediation
US
Canada
France
Weak
Corporatism
institutionalised partic­
ipation of organised labour 
in certain areas; narrow scope 
of collective bargaining
UK
Italy
Medium
Corporatism
sectoral participation; but 
broad scope of collective 
bargaining
Ireland
Belgium
FRG
Denmark
Finland
Australia
Strong
Corporatism
tri-partite concertation 
with broad scope; compre­
hensive coordination of 
incomes policies
Austria
Sweden
Norway
Nether­
lands
Concor-
cordance
comprehensive coordination 
of the interactions of the 
private and public sectors
Japan 
Switz.
Source: Franz Lehner. ’Interest Intermediation. Institutional Structures and Public Policy’, in Hans Keman. Heikki Paloheimo. and Paul F. Whiteley (eds), 
Cooine With The Economic Crisis. London. Saee. 1985. no. 54-82.
A few points are in order about this typology. First of all, 
it covers the period of the 1970s to the early 1980s, and so, if 
we want to look at the 1980s separately the typology must be 
revised. We present in Table 3.2. an updated typology (with most 
of the countries reexamined individually) for the 1980s. It can 
be seen, interestingly, that Sweden shows clear signs of having 
shifted away from corporatism (from strong corporatism to weak 
corporatism) in the 1980s. Even among the non-corporatist 
countries, only the UK has made such a clear shift in the same 
direction, (from weak corporatism to pluralism). With the 
exception of the Netherlands, other countries, such as Italy and
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Belgium, have if anything strengthened their corporatist systems, 
and the remaining countries remain largely unchanged.
Bearing in mind the changes in Sweden in particular, the 
procedure we will follow in the remaining sections of this 
chapter is to retain Lehner's basic typology, but to use data 
updated to include the 1980s. This will enable us to see whether 
the performance of the capitalist economies in our OECD data set 
in the two time periods (1965-80 and 1980-1989) has changed in 
ways which are consistent with our theoretical assumptions about 
the fair weather/foul weather comparative performance of the 
corporatist countries.
Secondly, Lehner has created a special category for Japan 
and Switzerland, which he ranks as being above "strong 
corporatism” and calls "concordance”. We accept this 
categorisation, for the following reasons. Although Switzerland 
has a pluralist interest group structure, it also makes use of 
consultation and accommodation between key interests, parties and 
local governments. This form of decision-making, which has also 
been described as "consociation", differs from corporatism in 
respect of the fact that it does not make use of formalised 
tripartite bargaining and a high degree of union organisation and 
centralisation to achieve cooperation with strategies designed to 
benefit the wider economy.12 Instead, extensive consultations are
12 Whether or not Switzerland does fit the "consociation" 
model as defined by political scientists such as Arend Lijphart 
is debatable. See the discussion by Brian Barry in: 'Political 
Accommodation And Consociational Democracy', Chapter Four in 
Democracy And Power. Essavs in Political Theory I. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1991, pp.105-116. In any case, Switzerland is 
sufficiently different in the institutional organisation of its 
corporatist cooperation to warrant a separate terminology. 
"Concordance" seems quite sufficient as a concept to make this 
point.
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Table 3.2.
Chance In The Corporatist Tvpolocrv. 1980s.
1. Pluralism.
US No change.
Canada Industrial-sector agreements, statutory wage
restraint in the public sector (1981-2); non­
intervention in private sector, plant and sector 
agreements (1986) , high unemployment in mid-1980s, pay 
restraint, trade union focus on job security and job 
protection. No chance.
France Statutory freeze on wages and prices (1982);
sectoral agreements, increasing firm level agreements; 
'solidarity contracts' allowing early retirements 
(1984); breakdown of national negotiations on 
flexibility, widespread 'industrial conversion 
contracts' (1985). No chance.
2. Weak
Corporatism.
UK Shift to more decentralised wage determination,
increase in local agreements. Shift to Pluralism.
Italy Sectoral agreements; negotiations on wage
restraint at national level (1982-) ; central agreements 
on automatic wage indexing (1983); wage restraint in 
sectoral agreements; breakdown of tripartite consensus 
(1984); sectoral agreement between Institute for 
Industrial Reconstruction and CGIL-CISL-UIL trade union 
federation (1985); discussions on 'political exchange' 
and wage restraint; 'bipolar model' achieved, sectoral 
and plant level bargaining conducted within framework 
of tripartite policy experimentation. Shift to Medium 
Corporatism.
3. Medium 
Corporatism.
Belgium Unprecedented wage indexing, two-year central
statutory agreement (1981); sectoral agreements; 
distributional conflict over austerity program and 
issue of 'wage moderation' (1984); trade unions shift
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Table 3.2, Continued.
priority to employment, wage restraint (1985); Liberal 
Christian-Socialist government policy: work sharing and 
incomes policy (1986) ; unindexed wage increases legally 
restricted (1982-1986); 'Framework Agreement' lays 
guidelines for joint negotiations at sectoral level 
(1986-87); return to free collective bargaining in 
highly centralised national-level framework (1986- 
1989). No Change.
FRG
Denmark
IG Metall accepts wage restraint in engineering 
sector, acts as wage pace setter (1982) ; wage restraint 
(1983); sectoral agreements in banking and finance 
(1983); increasing pressure from public sector and IG 
Metall (1985-89) .  No Chancre.
Basic Agreement between LO and DA (employers) 
(1981); government suspends pay indexation (1982); 
extensive strikes (1985); breakdown of negotiations 
between LO and DA, harsh emergency legislation imposed 
bv Conservative-led coalition (1986). No Chancre.
4. Strong
Corporatism.
Sweden Breakdown of centralised wage determination, 
increase in sectoral agreements and plant bargaining 
(1982-1989); general price freeze (1984); unsuccessful 
attemDt to return.to central baraainina (1989).  Shift 
to Weak Corooratism.
Norway No Chanqe.
Neth. Tripartite agreement between trade unions and 
employers on employment and labour market (1981) ; first 
central agreement in private sector for 10 years, 
agreement to avoid income policy and achieve employment 
and wage restraint through collective bargaining 
(1983); increase in sectoral agreements (1986-89).
No Chancre.
5. Con­
cordance .
Japan No Change.
Switz No Chancre.
Source: ILO. Social and Labour Bulletin. ILO. Geneva, varioua issues 1981-1989.
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designed to maintain consensus at a broad range of policy-making 
levels. Thus concordant decision-making could in fact be thought 
of as a more comprehensive means of integrating the strategies of 
important economic interests than corporatism, which is more 
institutionalised around trade unions as an organisational 
framework to achieve wage restraint and the quid pro cruos 
delivered through public policy.
In the case of Japan, which has been described as 
'corporatism without labour'13, again concertation is a decision­
making process which is not centered around tri-partite 
bargaining between labour, capital, and the government. Incomes 
policy in Japan is, in effect, privatised; it is managed by a 
paternalistic private sector. But again, in Japan, interest group 
strategies and public policy-making are extremely well 
coordinated through structures which achieve as great or even a 
greater rationalisation of the interests of collective actors and 
the wider requirements of the Japanese economy than is the case 
with corporatism.14 Concertation in Japan is designed to enhance 
the general performance of the Japanese economy, and achieving
13 See T.J. Pempel and K. Tsunekawa, 'Corporatism without 
Labour? The Japanese Anomaly', in P. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch, 
Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation. London, Sage, 1979, 
pp. 231-70; Harold L. Wilensky, The "New Corporatism11, 
Centralisation, and the Welfare State. London, Sage, 1976; and 
Will Hutton, 'Why jobs come first in land of the rising sun', The 
Guardian. July 12, 1993, p.11.
14 The "deviant” status of Japan is underlined in a number of 
comparative studies, among which Muller finds that Japan enjoys 
a surprisingly low level of income inequality given its 
decentralised labour unions, intermediate level of union 
membership (35 percent) and absence of socialist incumbency. Such 
a low level of income inequality would certainly facilitate 
cooperation between actors in choosing levels of wage extraction 
(5) compatible with growth in investment and output, but so also 
would fair economic weather. Edward N. Muller, 'Distribution of 
Income in Advanced Capitalist States: Political Parties, Labour 
Unions, and the International Economy', European Journal of 
Political Research. 17, 1989, pp. 377, 393-4.
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wage consensus and low distributive conflict are important 
elements of this system of collective action. Thus, in our view, 
it is quite legitimate to place Switzerland and Japan in this 
"special category”.
The individual examination of countries in our typology 
inevitably raises questions about how accurately corporatism can 
be measured using indicators which inevitably gloss over case- 
specific characteristics. Our definition of corporatism is 
couched in rational choice terms and focuses on institutional 
mechanisms in the sphere of wage bargaining which are designed 
with the intention of achieving an iterative, consensual, 
political exchange solution to a macroeconomic collective action 
problem of cost distribution. Whether this is achieved through 
strong centralised unions and employers engaging in collective 
bargaining, and whether governments play a key role in bargaining 
and negotiation or not, the problem is that there are several 
paths to the same destination. An example is Germany, which lacks 
the requisite centralisation of collective bargaining to be 
classed as "strong corporatist” and yet enjoys a comparatively 
low level of distributive conflict.15 Lehner ranks it in the 
"medium corporatism" category.
German industrial relations are, in fact, geared toward the 
solution of collective action problems in the labour market of 
the type we have been investigating. It is interesting that 
Germany then achieves social partnership without centralised 
institutions of collective bargaining and yet Lehner does not 
consider it has a sufficient degree of consultation and social
15 For other corporatist theorists who also give Germany a 
low ranking in terms of the importance of union confederations in 
collective bargaining, see Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev, 
'Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist 
Societies', British Journal of Sociology. 30, 1979, p. 178, and 
Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality. Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1975.
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partnership to warrant its inclusion in the "concordance" 
category. Although German union organisational structures, 
centralisation and membership density are far from 
"encompassing", the German wage round makes use of a form of 
decision-making known as 'lohnfuhrerschaft', or wage-leadership. 
Key national unions and regional sectors achieve collective 
agreements which are then followed more or less closely by other 
unions and regions.
In the case of Germany, the "glue" which holds this economic 
coordination of interest group strategies together is less given 
by institutional or organisational structures, and more by an 
ideological commitment to social partnership which has its roots 
in the German experience with class conflict in the Weimar 
Republic and the fascist interregnum. In our view the ranking of 
Germany in Lehner's typology should therefore be questioned, but 
for the present we will continue to place it in the "medium 
corporatism" category.
In such a small data set (the largest comparative studies 
use 18 OECD countries including New Zealand, Australia and 
Finland) how corporatism is measured obviously matters very much 
if we rely on correlations and other purely statistical 
indicators. Thus, if we were to identify as "corporatist" a group 
of countries that included Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, 
and Germany then the chances are that the performance of 
"corporatism" would look pretty good in comparison to "non- 
corporatist" countries which might include the UK, Italy, New 
Zealand and Ireland. The former group of countries just happens 
to include most of the economic "success stories" of the past 
four decades, and we have argued that much of this success is due 
to fair economic weather and to factors which are independent of 
the degree to which those countries solved prisoners' dilemmas of 
cooperation through "corporatist" means. For this reason we make 
less use of such a broad comparative approach, hoping to avoid
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this sort of pitfall, and instead look specifically for 
corporatist countries which have had to deal with foul economic 
weather.
We need to find a corporatist country which has large 
centralised actors, organised in the spheres of labour, capital 
and government, which has also experienced sufficiently strong 
foul economic weather as to require a real distribution of costs. 
Germany will not do as such a case, because it is so economically 
strong that the 1970s-1980s economic crisis has been effectively 
met by adjustments in t and K and not yet translated into a cost 
distribution crisis. With the economic ramifications of 
reunification, this has changed, so that Germany could be 
regarded as providing an emergent test case.
Similarly, Japan and Switzerland have also succeeded in 
reducing costs and have been placed well and adapted well to the 
foul weather, but without the necessity of cooperation between 
powerful trade union actors.16 They provide confirmation of the 
expected high performance of encompassing systems of interest 
intermediation, but we cannot learn much from them about the 
prospects of cooperation between trade union actors in foul 
weather.
Sweden fits the bill perfectly because it is a "classical” 
corporatist country with centralised union and employer actors, 
and as a result of a relative deterioration in its comparative 
advantage, it clearly entered a phase of cost distribution from 
the mid-1970s on. Unlike Norway, it is a case study that is not 
affected by North Sea oil incomes, and unlike any of the
16 Japan and Switzerland are, in this respect, less 
collectivist and more "post-liberal", in the sense that their 
institutional structures reduce the number of collective 
decisions which must be taken to secure adequate cost 
distribution. On the subject of post-liberal, or limited 
government, see John Gray, Post-Liberalism. Studies in Political 
Thought, London, Routledge, 1993.
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remaining corporatist countries, it exhibits the clearest 
rankings both in terms of strength of corporatism and indicators 
of foul weather. Sweden, then, is a case which we argue indicates 
strongly the possibility of a corporatist system failing to make 
the shift from fair to foul economic weather and thus raises 
questions about the type of corporatist cooperation actually 
achieved in fair economic weather.
Not all of the 18 potential capitalist economies are used 
consistently in our empirical work, in particular Austria makes 
only sporadic appearances. Austria is a corporatist country that 
shows signs of having to deal with severe economic problems of 
the type we are investigating.17 But it can be argued that 
Austrian corporatism, despite the presence of strong and 
centralised labour market institutions, is a different type of 
corporatism to Sweden, relying less on the cooperation of low and 
high pay groups and more on a conservative "social consensus”.18 
For this reason, and because our intention is less that of making 
some generalisation about the performance of corporatist 
countries as a group and more that of identifying a clear example 
of foul weather corporatism to which our theoretical modelling 
can apply, we focus more on Sweden. The Netherlands is perhaps a
17 The performance of the Austrian nationalised industrial 
sector over the period 1973-1982 has been described as 'an 
example of an important failure of social corporatist 
arrangements'. See Michael Landesmann, 'Industrial Policies and 
Social Corporatism', in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob 
Rowthorn (eds), Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p.274.
18 As Bob Rowthorn points out, the Austrian "historical 
compromise” between labour and capital freezes post-war power 
relationships and inequalities, evidenced by extremely high wage 
dispersion and a large substratum of low pay workers (of whom 
women form a large component) . See Bob Rowthorn, 'Corporatism and 
Labour Market Performance', in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, 
Bob Rowthorn (eds), Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic 
System?, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp.124-125.
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more interesting candidate, but we also pass over the intricacies 
of the Dutch corporatist system, for the similar reason that it 
provides less of a clear-cut example of the sort of corporatist 
cooperation we have modelled in Chapter One than Sweden.19 The 
large variation in institutional form which characterises the 
sort of cooperative mechanisms we are interested in reminds us of 
relying on too mechanical a model, or of expecting a 
deterministic relationship to hold between organisational and 
institutional attributes and economic performance in all cases.
Armed with our typology of corporatism, in this chapter we 
will begin our examination of the comparative performance of the 
corporatist countries in terms of major economic indices. We will 
look at strikes, economic growth, economic output and 
productivity, all of which are indicators of the general economic 
performance of a capitalist economy. We will also devise a 
*'competitiveness index”, which produces a joint measure of 
inflation and current account balances and enables us to identify 
those countries most under pressure to achieve wage restraint.
A common argument in the corporatist literature is that 
corporatism is conducive to good economic performance, on the 
condition that Left parties govern.20 The hypothesis that
19 The Netherlands, despite being ranked with Sweden and 
Norway in the "strong corporatism" category, relies less on 
cooperative wages policies and more on paternalistic welfare 
policies and industrial and labour market policies. Like Belgium, 
which employs a similar strategy, it experienced relatively high 
rates of unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s, largely due to 
reliance on rather restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. See 
R. Czada, 'The Impact of Interest Politics on Flexible Adjustment 
Policies', in Hans Keman, Heikki Paloheimo, Paul F. Whiteley 
(eds), Coping With The Economic Crisis. London, Sage, 1987, 
pp.41-44; R.E. Rowthorn and J.R. Wells, Deindustrialisation and 
Foreign Trade. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 
Appendix 13, pp.374-381.
20 For example, Alexander Hicks, 'Social Democratic 
Corporatism and Economic Growth', Journal of Politics. 50, 1988, 
p.677.
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corporatism generates its own fair weather, we will see, is 
incorrect. The mid-1970s to 1980s period has been one of 
generalised foul weather, and the corporatist countries have not 
escaped the effects of the slowdown in economic and productivity 
growth. According to our theoretical work, corporatism should 
function to adjust the parameters t and K in order to counteract 
the deterioration in the efficiency of investment and maintain 
both output growth and employment growth.
If corporatism functions as we have modelled it, we should, 
then, see evidence of efficient economic performance by 
corporatist countries in fair weather and relative imperviousness 
to foul weather. Foul weather in this case has included two large 
oil price shocks, a generalised slowdown in innovatory and 
productivity growth, and generalised problems caused by 
deindustrialisation. The two primary indicators are inflation and 
unemployment, both of which reflect the distributional conflict 
which arises when growth of national income deteriorates while 
individuals continue to press for increases more commensurate 
with fair weather. Our theoretical work predicts that corporatism 
has to succeed in foul economic weather by distributing costs and 
not gains. Thus, if corporatism of the type we have been 
investigating exists, it should minimise the costs associated 
with the foul weather.
3.2. Corporatism and Distributive Conflict.
Distributive conflict manifested in the form of strikes has 
obvious economic ramifications: it can be regarded as an
indicator of the wastage of productivity due to lost days in 
production and a lack of cooperation and efficiency in the 
workplace. Heikki Paloheimo uses labour dispute activity as a 
proxy measure for the level of economic consensus in decision­
making, and comparing Table 3.3. with Table 3.1., we can see that 
countries ranked by Paloheimo as having a "strong economic 
consensus" are almost exactly the same as those countries Lehner
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Table 3.3,
Corporatism and Strike Activity.
1. Countries Average annual Ibid
with a days lost in 1970- 1980- 1965-
strong econ­ labour disputes 1979 1987 1981
omic consen­ per 1000 workers
sus 1960-1969
Japan 84 85 5 71
Switzerland 3 2 0.5 1
Austria 36 7 2.5 10
Sweden 15 41 185 95
Norway 56 38 102 28
Netherlands 17 36 13 22
FRG 12 46 31 28
Countries
with a medium
economic consensus
Belgium 75 222 --- 156
Denmark 135 212 198 148
France 886 171 — 278
Countries
with a weak
economic consensus
Australia 186 541 217 427
Canada 422 802 549 707
Finland 119 499 --- 358
Ireland 398 544 386 484
Italy 728 1049 1964 849
UK 143 526 326 375
USA 382 457 98 411
Source: Heilcki Paloheimo. ’Distributive Strueele. Corooratist Power Structures And Economic Policv Of The 1970s In Develoned Canitalist Countries’.
in Heikki Paloheimo fed). Politics in the Era of CorDoratism and Planning. Tamoere-Kuraioki. The Finnish Political Science Association. 1984. n .ll :  David
Cameron, ’Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence, and the Representation of Organised Interests in Advanced Capitalist Society’, in J.H.
Goldthoroe fed). Order and Conflict in Contemporary capitalism. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1984. no.143-78: OECD Labour Force Statistics, various
volumes: ILO. Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various volumes.
places in the "strong corporatism” and "concordance” categories.
It certainly seems reasonable and intuitive to expect that 
corporatist countries should be characterised by a comparatively 
low level of distributive conflict.
131
3 - Corporatism And Economic Competitiveness
In Table 3.3. the countries are arrayed in three groups 
according to the average number of days lost annually in labour 
disputes per 1000 workers in three time periods: the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s. The groups are described as countries with a strong, 
medium and weak economic consensus, with the degree of 
distributive struggle (measured by strike activity) determining 
the ranking of each country.21
A comparison of corporatism and strikes reveals that in the 
fair weather period of the 1960s there is indeed a close 
correlation between centralised strategies of collective 
bargaining and low strike levels, and a more general correlation 
between pluralist bargaining strategies and high strike levels.
This supports the hypothesis that corporatism performs 
better in fair weather, but note that Sweden and Norway perform 
considerably worse in the 1980-1987 period than in previous 
periods. Their performance, if we were only to take account of 
this latest period, is bad enough to place them in the second 
category, of countries with a "medium economic consensus”.
In a similar vein, the United States does significantly 
better in the 1980s than might be predicted either from past 
performance or from its ranking as a "pluralist” capitalist 
economy. Moreover, Australia, Canada, Ireland and the U.K. all 
perform better in terms of distributive conflict in the 1980s 
than in earlier periods, but the United States appears to have
21 The most suitable index of overall strike activity is 
volume, which is a measure of frequency x duration x size. The 
advantage of this measure is that it is not affected badly by 
changes in a single dimension of conflict. This is the measure 
used here. Strike volume is a measure of man-days lost per 1000 
non-agricultural civilian workers; frequency is the number of 
strikes per 1000 non-agricultural civilian workers; duration is 
the number of man-days lost per worker involved; and size is the 
number of workers involved per strike. See M. Shalev, "The Uses 
and Abuses of Strike Statistics”, in C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno, 
The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe. London, 
Macmillan, 1978, pp.1-20.
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leapt up two categories to be among those countries with a 
•'strong economic consensus". Why should the non-corporatist 
countries perform better in terms of strikes in the 1980s?
The answer here is probably that very decentralised systems 
in foul economic weather effectively weaken the capacity of 
labour to engage in sustained strike behaviour.22 Whether the 
economy is growing, as in the US, or contracting, as in the UK, 
makes little difference, as in the first case the strike activity 
lacks an organisational basis and is relatively unnecessary and 
in the second case it incurs high costs in terms of unemployment, 
and anti-labour legislation.
Conversely, why do Sweden and Norway perform worse in terms 
of their level of distributive conflict in the 1980s than in the 
previous decade? Is this because the relatively lower strike 
activity of the 1970-1979 period was associated with not only the 
mode of interest intermediation but also the prevalence of "fair 
weather"? Or if the low strike activity in these two countries 
is most strongly associated with the degree of consensual 
interest intermediation, as we have measured it, is it this which 
has weakened in both of these countries during this latter 
period?
In the remainder of the comparative chapters and in our 
individual case study on Sweden we will attempt to answer this 
question. We saw in Table 3.2. that, in the case of Sweden, 
corporatism has indeed weakened and we will also see that Sweden 
has clearly entered a phase of foul economic weather in the 
1980s. At this stage we will simply note that the performance of 
two corporatist countries in the 1980s already raises questions 
about corporatism in foul economic weather, while the UK and the
22 Supporting the celebrated "hump-shaped" relationship 
between economic performance and centralisation. See L. Calmfors 
and J. Driffil, 'Bargaining Structure, Corporatism, and 
Macroeconomic Performance', Economic Policy. 6, 1988, pp.14-61.
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USA perform better in terms of strikes than might be expected 
from our theory concerning encompassing groups and social- 
economic consensus. Otherwise, there is clear evidence that 
corporatism performs better in terms of strike activity than non- 
corporatist countries in fair weather.
3.3. Corporatism and Economic Growth, Output and Productivity.
Economic growth is the most general indicator of 
performance. Table 3.4. presents rankings in terms of two 
measures of economic growth in two time periods: average yearly 
percent changes in GNP and average yearly percent changes in 
manufacturing output in 1965-73 and 1973-87. Low ranks again 
represent the best performance.
In terms of GNP growth, we can see that only three countries 
improved their ranking from the period 1965-73 to 1970-80: 
namely, the USA, the UK, and Sweden. All three, however, were the 
worst performers in the 1965-73 time period and their improvement 
is, in the case of the UK and Sweden, only marginal.The best 
performers are Japan, Canada, France and Italy.
We must be careful when comparing growth rates, because of 
the "catch-up" phenomenon. That is, a country like Sweden may 
already be so wealthy that its economy can only grow at a lower 
rate than a country which is catching up, and hence growing at a 
faster rate but from a lower starting position. Thus the US, 
Sweden and even the UK already had relatively high rates of GDP 
per capita in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, we can see that 
the corporatist countries did not produce higher rates of 
economic growth overall than the non-corporatist countries US and
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Table 3.4.
Corporatism and Economic Growth.
GDP
Ranking
1965-1973
Growth
Ranking
1970-1989
Manufacturing Output 
Ranking Ranking 
1960-1973 1973-1987
1.Pluralism. 
USA 9 (3.8) 6 (2.7) 10 (4.8) 4 (2.2)
Canada 2 (5.6) 2 (3.9) 5 (6.5) 3 (2.3)
France 3 (5.2) 4 (2.9) 3 (7.2) 10 (1.0)
2. Weak
Corporatism.
UK 11 (3.1) 8 (2.3) 12 (3.0) 12 (-0.3)
Italy 3 (5.2) 3 (3.2) 2 (7.3) 2 (2.7)
3. Medium
Corporatism.
Belgium 5 (5.0) 5 (2.8) 4 (6.6) 5 (1.8)
FRG 6 (4.3) 7 (2.5) 8 (5.2) 9 (1.1)
Denmark 7 (4.1) 10 (2.1) 7 (5.3) 6 (1.6)
4. Strong 
Corporatism.
Sweden 10 (3.4) 9 (2.2) 9 (5.1) 8 (1.2)
Norway 7 (4.1) — 11 (4.7) 11 (0.6)
Neth. 4 (5.1) 7 (2.5) 6 (6.0) 7 (1.5)
5. Con­
cordance . 
Japan 1 (9.8) 1 (4.8) 1 (12.8) 1 (5.1)
Switz 8 (3.9) — — ——
Average percent change in brackets.
Source: For growth of GNP 1965-73: Michael Bruno and Jeffrey D. Sacha, Economics of Worldwide Inflation. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985, p.21. For 
growth of GNP 1970-89: Table R 1. ’Growth of real GNP/GDP in the OECD area’, OECD Economic Outlook. 47, Paris, June 1990. For annual percent 
change in manufacturing output 1960-73 and 1973-89: Arthur Neef and James Thomas, ’International Comparisons of Productivity and Unit Labor Cost 
Trends in Manufacturing’, Monthly Labor Review. US Dept, of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 111, 12, 1988, p.29.
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Figure 3.1.
GNP Growth In Fair And Foul Weather.
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Source: OECD, Economic Outlook. Paris, 47, June 1990, p. 181. See Appendix for data.
UK, either in fair or foul weather, and Sweden in particular 
shows signs of deteriorating performance.23
Another way of comparing the performance of these countries 
in fair and foul weather is to look not at the 1970s and 1980s 
separately, but to isolate the years within both decades in which 
foul weather was the strongest. Figure 3.1. defines fair and foul 
weather as follows: fair weather is represented by the years
23 See Bernhard Heitger, 'Corporatism, Technological Gaps and 
Growth in OECD Countries', Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. Band 12, 
1987, pp.463-73.
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1970-1973, 1978-1979, 1984-1989, while foul weather is
represented by the years 1974-1977, 1980-1983 (see Appendix).
This fairly closely models the foul weather impact of the two oil 
shocks. The deterioration in GNP growth performance in foul 
weather can be seen clearly, with again no indication that 
corporatism performs particularly well. Although we lack data on 
Norway and Austria, the performance of Sweden, the FRG, the 
Netherlands and Denmark is not distinguished in any particular 
way. Instead, the UK, Canada, Italy and Japan are the only 
countries that either underperform or overperform relative to the 
others in foul weather.
In terms of manufacturing output, if we return to Table 
3.4., the best performers are again Japan, Canada and Italy, 
while France has contracted severely in the 1980s. Again, the 
corporatist countries, Norway in particular, have not performed 
the best and in fact their performance is not much better than 
that of the UK which is the worst performer with the 12th rank.
Looking at comparative growth and output rates, then, 
provides no evidence of corporatism generating its own fair 
economic weather. There is no evidence here that the corporatist 
countries have overtaken non-corporatist countries in their 
average GDP growth or in manufacturing output. This provides 
support for our argument that corporatism cannot produce a better 
result than that allowed by the existing parameters which 
determine comparative advantage. Corporatism could maximise gains 
and minimises costs within the confines of a space delineated by 
other economic and social variables, but it does not generate its 
own "virtuous circles”. In this respect, corporatist countries 
are unlikely to become "super-performers” unless they enjoy a 
good trading position, are exploiting new innovations, have 
access to raw material deposits, and so on.
Table 3.5. examines another indice of economic performance 
over two time periods: manufacturing productivity. The best
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Table 3.5.
Corporatism and Manufacturing Productivity
Ranking Ranking
1960-1973 1973-1987
1. Pluralism.
USA 10 (3.2) 9 (2.5)
Canada 7 (4.5) 11 (2.1)
France 5 (6.4) 5 (3.7)
2. Weak
Corporatism.
UK 9 (4.2) 6 (3.2)
Italy 2 (7.5) 4 (4.0)
3. Medium
Corporatism.
Belgium 4 (6.9) 1 (5.7)
FRG 6 (5.8) 6 (3.2)
Denmark 5 (6.4) 10 (2.3)
4. Strong
Corporatism.
Sweden 5 (6.4) 7 (2.9)
Norway 8 (4.3) 8 (2.6)
Neth. 3 (7.4) 3 (4.2)
5. Con­
cordance .
Japan 1 (10.3) 2 (5.3)
Switz • • • •
Source: Arthur Neef and James Thomas/International Comparisons of Productivity and Unit Labor Coat Trends in Manufacturing’. Monthly Labor Review.
US Dept, of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 111, 12, 1988, p.28.
performers are Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and
France. The worst performers are Canada, the USA, and Denmark.
Again there is no clear evidence of the corporatist 
countries generating unusually good performances in terms of 
manufacturing productivity. We see that a decline in the rate of 
productivity growth over the two time periods has been a 
generalised economic phenomenon across all the countries, and 
that neither Sweden nor Norway show any signs of coping with the 
crisis any better than non-corporatist countries. Sweden's
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ranking is actually worse in the 1980s and Norway remains in 8th 
rank. Otherwise the distribution of performance bears no 
relationship to the typology of consensual bargaining we have 
adopted.
The fact that corporatism made no appreciative difference in 
the transition from fair to foul economic weather is interesting 
because it contradicts the hypothesis that corporatism generates 
its own fair weather. Corporatism doesn't produce unusually high 
levels of growth in manufacturing productivity. Instead, 
corporatism tends to generate lower overall productivity levels 
in foul weather because it maintains employment spreading in the 
public and sheltered domestic sector - productivity is greatest 
in the export sector. Overall productivity performance is better 
in the high unemployment countries like the Netherlands and 
Belgium, at an obvious cost.24
All corporatism can achieve is a pareto-optimal collective 
maximisation of the trade off between employment and 
productivity, at given levels of a and /3. However efficient that 
collective agreement, the level of productivity growth is not 
necessarily superior to that of non-corporatist countries.
3.4. A Competitiveness Index of Foul Weather.
Table 3.6 shows the ranking of our OECD data set according 
to performance on two additional indices of economic performance:
24 For a discussion, see Nicholas Crafts, 'Productivity 
Growth Reconsidered', Economic Policy. 15, 1992, pp.388-414; S. 
Turner, 'The Swedish Model: What Went Wrong?', in G. Eliasson 
(ed) , The Economics of Institutions and Markets. Stockholm, 
Institute for Economic and Social Research, 1987, pp.57-68; 
Roland Czada, 'The Impact of Interest Politics on Flexible 
Adjustment Policies', in Hans Keman, Heikki Paloheimo, Paul F. 
Whiteley (eds), Cooing With The Economic Crisis. London, Sage, 
1987, p.34; L. Calmfors and H. Horn, 'Employment Policies and 
Centralised Wage-Setting', Economica, 53, 1986, pp.281-302.
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Table 3,6.
Corporatism. Inflation and Current Balance Performance.
Rank Order: Inflation 
75-80 81-89 75-89
Rank Order: Current Balances 
75-80 81-89 75-89 (*)
Pluralism
USA 7 6 6 7 14 10 C
Canada 8 8 8 10 11 10 mid
France 11 11 11 3 9 5 C
Weak Corp­
oratism 
UK 15 9 12 8 7 7 mid
Italy 17 17 17 6 10 8 C
Medium
Corporatism
Ireland 16 14 16 • • • • • • 0
Belgium 5 7 5 9 5 6 0
FRG 2 3 1 3 3 4 mid
Denmark 10 10 10 14 15 15 O
Finland 13 13 14 12 13 14 mid
Australia 14 11 9 • • • • • • mid
4. Strong
Corporatism
Austria 3 5 7 12 7 9 mid
Sweden 12 16 15 10 12 13 mid
Norway 9 15 13 15 6 10 O
Netherlands 4 2 3 3 2 2 0
Concor­
dance
Japan 5 1 3 2 3 2 C
Switzerland 1 4 1 1 1 1 0
Source: Table R 11.. ’Private consumption deflators’, and Table R 21., ’Current balances of OECD countries as a percentage of GNP/GDP’. OECD.
Economic Outlook. June 1990. (*) =  measure of openness of the economy. D. Cameron. ’The Expansion of the Public Economv’. American Political
Science Review. 72. 1978. m>.1243-61.
inflation and the current balance between exports and imports (as 
a percentage of GDP). Low scores indicate that the country 
enjoyed a low rate of inflation or a good balance of payments 
relative to the other OECD capitalist economies. Of course, the
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rankings do not provide us with interval level measures, but they 
do give a reasonable indication of relative performance.
Rankings for "openness of the economy", or "exports and 
imports as a percentage of GDP in 1960", are also given. We can 
see that the corporatist countries are, largely, characterised by 
open economies. Australia substantially liberalised its economy 
in the 1970s to 1980s, and Switzerland is a concordant country. 
Most of the closed economies, bar Japan, are either pluralist or 
weak corporatist. Despite the confirmation of David Cameron's 
link between openness and corporatism, however, the corporatist 
countries have not done noticeably better either in terms of 
inflation or their current balances.25
We can see that those countries with the lowest inflation 
rates relative to their neighbours also tended to perform the 
best in terms of their current account balance. Japan, 
Switzerland, the FRG, and the Netherlands are clearly in this 
group. All countries which performed relatively well with 
inflation tended to do well with their current balances. There 
are some countries which performed worse in terms of inflation 
and better than might be expected in terms of their current 
balance, namely, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. This 
might seem to indicate that a high inflation rate does not 
necessarily impede competitiveness in international markets(!), 
but we believe it is more likely to reflect, given these 
countries, policies which have been designed to limit the damage 
of a high inflation rate by squeezing import growth relative to 
exports.
25 David Cameron, 'The Expansion of the Public Economy: A 
Comparative Analysis', American Political Science Review. 72, 
1978, pp.1243-61. See also Peter Katzenstein, Small States in 
World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1985, and Peter Katzenstein, Corporatism and 
Change: Austria. Switzerland and the Politics of Industry.
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1984.
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There is a third group of countries whose performance is 
neither exceptionally good or exceptionally bad, in terms of 
either inflation or their current balance: the United States, 
Canada, and Belgium. Finally, there is a corporatist group of 
countries whose relative performance on both counts was poor: 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. It seems likely that Ireland 
and Australia would fall into this latter category as well, but 
we lack data on their current balances.
What does relative performance in terms of these two 
variables tell us? We suggest that these variables provide a 
reasonably good index of the degree of "fair” or '•foul" weather 
that an economy is experiencing in terms of international 
competitiveness.
We are interested in ascertaining whether or not corporatist 
countries such as Sweden have come under increased pressure in 
the 1980s due to not only the impact of the oil shocks and the 
generalised economic crisis, but also due to deeper, structural 
problems requiring a large adjustment in wages. One indicator of 
this, it seems to us, is the mix of inflation and trade 
competitiveness. A relatively high inflation rate, combined with 
pressure on the balance of payments, is likely to lead to a high 
degree of pressure to reduce costs of production. The demand for 
wage restraint is likely to be higher in such circumstances. This 
index, then, which we can see more clearly in Table 3.7., 
measures a rather specific aspect of "foul" weather.26
26 If we were to include the rate of unemployment as a 
component of our "foul weather" measure, we would find that the 
corporatist countries appeared to enjoy better weather than is 
the case due to their low relative unemployment rates. Since we 
are looking specifically at likely sources of pressure on wage- 
restraint strategies, our "competitiveness index" seems more 
appropriate.
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Table 3.7.
Comparison of Competitiveness and Strike Rates.
Competitiveness Index Strike Activity
(Combined ranks for Inflation Ranks
and Current 
75/80
Account
81/89
Balances)
75/89 70/79 80/87
Pluralism
USA 5 9 6 10 6
Canada 9 8 9 15 13
France 5 9 6 • • • •
Weak
Corporatism
UK 11 6 10 12 11
Italy 11 14 12 16 14
3.Medium
Corporatism
Ireland • • • • • • 14 12
Belgium 5 5 5 9 • •
FRG 2 4 2 6 5
Denmark 13 12 12 8 9
Finland 15 13 15 11 • •
Australia • • • • • • 13 10
Strong
Corporatism
Austria 8 7 6 2 2
Sweden 10 15 12 5 8
Norway 13 11 11 4 7
Netherlands 3 2 2 3 4
Concor­
dance
Japan 3 1 2 7 3
Switzerland 1 3 1 1 1
Sources: See Table 3.3. and 3.6.
What do Tables 3.6 . and 3.7. tell us about the performance
of Sweden and Norway in the 1980s? We can see that both
countrieshave had high inflation rates and poor current balances, 
relative to their OECD competitors. We can also see that Sweden 
and Norway's performance on both counts has indeed worsened from 
the 1970s to the 1980s. In fact, these two countries have the
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largest fall in ranking on inflation performance from 1975-1980 
to 1981-1989 (only Italy performs worse in the 1980s). Sweden's 
current balance ranking also drops by two places.
This would indeed seem to point to increased pressure on 
Sweden's international competitiveness, and to a comparatively 
severe increase in "foul weather". Since Sweden was already 
performing badly in the 1970s, this increase can only have had 
more impact. Turning to our "competitiveness index", we see that 
Sweden is the worst overall performer in the 1980s and, over the 
decade-and-a-half 1975-1989 is among the bottom four performers. 
Although Sweden's strike activity ranking is not among the worse, 
the large increase in strike volume from 41 (1970-1979) to 185 
(1980-1987) (see Table 3.3.) would appear to be related, in part 
at least, to Sweden's deteriorating performance on our 
"competitiveness index".27
The case of Norway is equally interesting. In terms of 
inflation Norway drops by the largest number of ranks in the 
1980s, to be only two ranks behind Sweden. Its current balance 
was the worst in the 1970, but it actually improves in the 1980s 
to just nudge Norway into the top six performers. This still, 
however, gives Norway a "competitiveness index" rating which is 
among the five worst performers in the 1980s. In terms of 
inflation, Norway definitely ran into "foul weather" in the 
1980s, and its performance on current balance may be masked by 
oil product revenues.28
27 In fact, Sweden's share of the world market supply of 
industrial goods shrank remarkably from 1975, and in the 1980s 
despite two devaluations her export share was only stabilised. 
Lennart Ohlsson, 'Comparative Advantage Strategies for Swedish 
Industry Facing the 1990s', in Lars-Gunnar Mattsson and Bengt 
Stymne (eds), Corporate And Industry Strategies for Europe. 
London, North-Holland, 1991, p.75.
28 For a discussion of the problems in evaluating Norway's 
economic performance as a corporatist country, due to the North 
Sea oil boom, see Don S. Schwerin, 'The Limits of Organisation as
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It seems that Norwegian performance provides some additional 
support for the view that the increase in strike activity in 
these two Scandinavian countries was related to an onset of "foul 
weather". Finally, the degree of correlation between the 
competitiveness ranking (1975-1989) and the strike activity 
ranking (1980-87) is very high (r = 0.62), although the available 
data set is quite small (n = 12).
Conclusion.
These findings are interesting, because they place two 
"classical" corporatist countries into a group of relatively poor 
performers on several rather important indices. The increase in 
strike activity, in particular, as an indication of distributive 
struggle, appears to cast a bad light on the hypothesis that 
consensual structures of interest intermediation and certain 
organisational characteristics such as encompassingness solve 
collective action problems and lead to better performance.
It must be noted that it is the 1980s which are responsible 
for the greatest divergence of performance in the corporatist 
countries from what we might expect. In the case of Sweden in 
particular, corporatism seems to have fared much worse in the 
1980s. But even when we consider their performance in fair 
economic weather, corporatist countries seem to be of only 
average productivity and to generate only average (at best) 
growth in output and economic growth. Corporatist countries also 
tend to produce higher inflation and worse current balances than 
many non-corporatism countries.
In mitigation, Austria and the Netherlands, which form the 
remainder of the "strong corporatist" group, have not done as 
badly as Sweden and Norway. In fact, apart from Austrian
a Response to Wage-Price Problems', in Richard Rose (ed) , 
Challenge To Governance. Studies in Overloaded Polities. London, 
Sage, 1980, pp.73-106; Robert Jackman, 'The Politics of Economic 
Growth in Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', Journal of 
Politics. 48, 1986, pp.242-56.
145
3 - Corporatism And Economic Competitiveness
inflation performance (which falls by two ranks), both countries 
have done better in the 1980s than in the 1970s in terms of our 
competitiveness index. The Netherlands consistently outperforms 
other strong corporatist countries, as can be shown by its 
productivity performance, but even here rankings in terms of 
growth of output and economic growth have slipped with the onset 
of foul weather.
Sweden and Norway, then, appear to provide an interesting 
test case of two corporatist economies which have experienced a 
bout of "foul weather” in the 1980s. Because of Norway's 
dependence on north sea oil, for the remainder of this thesis we 
shall focus most of our attention on Sweden. The question arises 
as to whether or not "foul weather" has made Sweden's corporatist 
mode of finding collective solutions to the strategic problems of 
economic adjustment dysfunctional. In other words, is corporatism 
still alive and well in Sweden? Can it survive in "foul weather"? 
Have the rational actors in the corporatist exchange in Sweden 
been able to cooperate in achieving outcomes which represent a 
collective reduction in costs?
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CHAPTER FOUR.
THE IMPACT OF CORPORATISM ON SOCIETAL WELFARE.
'What is most striking in Sweden especially is that the 
transition to a period of less redistributive growth 
required neither mass unemployment nor major cuts in the 
welfare state to hold back or satisfy pent-up demands for 
faster growth of consumption by workers. In this sense the 
solidarity and collective discipline has not been decisively 
reversed, despite the talk in the early 1980s of the 
"crisis” of the Swedish model'. Andrew Glyn.1
In the first part of this chapter, we will examine the 
performance of our data set in absolute terms with respect to 
inflation and unemployment. Ranking only gives us an indication 
of relative performance, so we must look at the size of the 
differences and the direction of changes. We will examine the 
inflation-unemployment trade-off to see whether the corporatist 
performance is any better than the non-corporatist.
In the second part, we will use a pair of indexes which are 
known as the misery index and the happiness index.2 Both these
1 Andrew Glyn, 'Corporatism, Patterns of Employment, and 
Access to Consumption', in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob 
Rowthorn, Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p.160.
2 See F.G. Castles, 'Neocorporatism and the "Happiness 
Index", Or What the Trade Unions Get for their Cooperation', 
European Journal of Political Research. 15, 1987, pp.381-393. The 
joint indexing techniques used in this chapter are drawn from 
this paper by Castles. Rankings for different indicators are
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indexes are additive, and can be used either to gain an 
impression of the joint impact of two variables or, as Francis G. 
Castles shows, to capture possible trade-offs between two 
variables.
In the third part, we will look at the comparative 
performance of corporatism in terms of more specific indicators 
of public employment and overall welfare spending.
4.1. Unemployment versus Inflation.
Inflation is more an indicator of economic performance, 
perhaps, than economic welfare, since high inflation has 
implications for competitiveness and investment confidence. But 
it also affects economic welfare in two respects, firstly, by 
reducing real income growth in ways that necessitate some 
compensations being targeted to the low pay and by reducing the 
capacity of the economy to make these redistributions without a 
corresponding measure of restraint from high pay groups. 
Secondly, inflation requires a policy response which may impact 
on welfare through its employment effects.
In the short term, Samuel Brittan argues, inflation can be 
tolerated as a conscious policy objective by governments to 
respond to a low-growth dilemma.3 But in the long term the 
implications of inflation for export competitiveness through the 
impact on unit labour costs and public deficit mechanisms require 
restraint or costs to be distributed among the major actors.4 In
added and the new totals are then re-ranked. If two or more 
countries fall on the same rank, then the following country is 
ranked as if the previous countries had each been ranked 
separately.
3 See S. Brittan, 'Inflation and Democracy', in F. Hirsch 
and J.H. Goldthorpe (eds), The Political Economy of Inflation. 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978, pp.161-85.
4 The OECD McCracken Report of the late 1970s concluded that 
the main impediment to economic growth had become inflation 
itself, even if the original causes of the low economic growth
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the absence of cooperation, these costs are likely to be 
distributed with the use of blunter fiscal and monetary tools 
which require increasing unemployment to get the NAIRU down.5
Inflation, then, ironically signals a greater tolerance of 
economic inefficiency with a view to avoiding zero-sum conflicts 
and maintaining low unemployment. As Fred Hirsch writes:
'inflation has served as a vent for distributional strife, 
an escape hatch through which excess demands are 
automatically channelled'.6 
At some point, however, unless the economic pressure eases up, 
this underlying distributional conflict must be either solved by 
consensual interest intermediation which shares the costs in such 
a way to maximise future gains or snuffed out through the 
disempowerment of weaker actors, or outsiders, typically with 
unemployment.7
lay elsewhere. P. McCracken et al, A Report to the OECD by a 
Group of Independent Experts. Towards Full Employment and Price 
Stability, Paris, OECD, June 1977, pp.108, 141.
5 For a discussion on the Non-Inflation-Accelerating-Rate- 
Of- Unemployment (NAIRU) see Jonathan Boston, The Theory And 
Practice Of Voluntary Incomes Policies With Particular Reference 
To The British Labour Government's Social Contract 1974-79. 
unpublished D.Phil Thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford University, 
1983, pp.35-39.
6 F. Hirsch, 'The Ideological Underlay of Inflation', in F. 
Hirsch and J.H. Goldthorpe (eds), The Political Economy of 
Inflation. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1978, 
p.270. See also Brian Barry, 'Does Democracy Cause Inflation? The 
Political Ideas Of Some Economists', in Brian Barry, Democracy 
And Power. Essavs in Political Theory 1. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1991, pp.69, 72; and Colin Crouch, 'Conditions for Trade Union 
Wage Restraint', in Leon Lindberg and Charles S. Maier (eds), The 
Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington DC., 
The Brookings Institution, 1985, p.105.
7 The "cure" for inflation, as envisaged by the McCracken 
Report, involved a "narrow path to growth" in which unemployment 
and engineered disinflation forced restraint from some groups in 
society. R.O. Keohane, 'Economics, Inflation, And The Role Of The
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Table 4.1.
Corporatism and Inflation. Unemployment* 
and Government Outlays,
Inflation 
A B Change 
75/80 81-89 B-A
Unemployment 
A B Change 
75/80 81/89 B-A
Outlavs
A B Change 
74/80 81/88 B-A
Pluralism.
USA 7.9 
Canada 8.6 
France 10.7
4.6
5.7 
6.6
-3.3
-2.9
-4.1
7.1 
7.5
5.2
7.3 
9.5
9.4
0.2
2.0
4.2
32.7 
39.4
43.7
36.2
45.7
50.9
3.5
6.3
7.2
2. Weak 
Corporatism. 
UK 15.5 6.0 -9.5 4.8 10.0 5.2 44.6 46.3 1.7
Italy 16.6 10.3 -6.3 7.1 10.6 3.5 42.7 49.2 6.5
Medium 
Corporatism. 
Ireland 16.4 7.7 -8.7 6.8 15.0 8.2 45.8 54.5 8.7
Belgium 7.1 4.7 -2.4 6.6 11.5 4.9 46.1 53.7 7.6
FRG 4.4 2.6 -1.8 3.0 5.9 2.9 47.5 47.8 0.3
Denmark 10.1 6.3 -3.8 6.2 9.1 2.9 50.1 59.4 9.3
Finland 11.6 6.7 -4.9 4.9 4.9 0.0 36.3 40.3 4.0
Australia 11.9 6.6 “5.3 5.6 7.6 2.0 33.7 37.0 3.3
Strong 
Corporatism. 
Austria 5.8 3.7 -2.1 1.5 3.3 1.8 47.0 51.3 4.3
Sweden 11.2 7.9 -3.3 1.5 2.2 0.7 55.3 63.5 8.2
Norway 8.7 7.8 -0.9 1.8 2.9 1.1 48.4 48.2 -0.2
Netherl'd 6.9 2.3 -4.6 3.5 9.0 5.5 53.4 60.3 6.9
Con­
cordance . 
Japan 7.1 1.7 -5.4 2.0 2.5 0.5 29.0 33.3 4.3
Switz'd 3.2 3.3 +0.1 0.3 0.6 0.3 29.1 30.4 1.3
Source: OECD. Historical Statistics. Paris. 1990.
In Table 4.1., we can compare the average performance of our 
data set in two time periods, 1975-1980 and 1981-1989, as well as
State: Political Implications of the McCracken Report', World 
Politics. 31, 2, 1979, p.117.
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Figure 4.1.
The Fight Against Inflation in the 1980s.
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the difference between these two time periods. Data are given for 
inflation, unemployment, and government outlays. The latter 
variable will be discussed in the following section.
We can see, in terms of performance on inflation, that every 
country except Switzerland has managed to reduce the average 
level of inflation in the 1980s from its average level in the 
second half of the 1970s. This is in sharp contrast to the
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dramatic increase in the rate of change of prices which David 
Cameron shows occurred between 1965-1967 and 1980-1982.®
In the 1980s, over half of the countries experienced a 
decline in inflation of more than 3 percent, and two - the UK and 
Ireland -experienced a reduction in inflation of 9.5 and 8.7 
percent respectively. We can see in Figure 4.1. that those 
countries with the highest rate of inflation in the 1975-80 
period were generally also those with the largest decrease in 
inflation over the 1975/1980 - 1981/1989 period. The correlation 
here is reasonably strong, with a r-sq of 69.3 percent.
This overall reduction in inflation, coupled with the 
association between the degree of change and the rate of 
inflation in the latter 1970s, shows rather clearly that 
inflation has been a key macroeconomic policy target of 
capitalist governments in the 1980s. It also shows that 
governments have succeeded in reducing inflation only partially; 
Figure 4.1. shows that the mean reduction in inflation is about - 
4.0 while the mean inflation rate for the 1975-80 period was 9.6 
percent. This means that the capitalist economies reduced their 
inflation rates, on average, by only about half.
Some countries clearly did better than others, however. It 
is the countries with the very high rates in the 1970s which have 
the biggest reductions: the UK, Ireland and Italy, which are in 
the upper left-hand corner. In the upper right-hand corner, 
Sweden and Norway both have relatively high inflation rates but 
low reductions, which is not unexpected given our previous 
findings. Switzerland, Germany and Austria are clearly the best 
performers here. Japan is not included in this group due to its
8 D. Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour 
Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interest in 
Advanced Capitalist Society', in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed), Order and 
Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1984, pp.148f.
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high rate of inflation in the 1975-80 period, but it does post 
one of the four largest reductions in inflation.
It seems clear that in the 1975-89 period governments have 
used high levels of unemployment to reduce inflation. This fact 
is modelled in economic theory by the "Phillips Curve 
hypothesis". Phillips observed an inverse relationship between 
unemployment and the rate of change of nominal wages.9 This 
observation supported the hypothesis that there was a trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. The logic of the argument ran 
as follows: high unemployment would weaken labour's bargaining 
power in the labour market, and therefore slow the rate of change 
in money wages, and therefore, by a set of mutually reinforcing 
effects upon other key planks of the economy, reduce pressure on 
inflation. Full employment would have the opposite effect, 
generating upward pressure on wages and inflation.
Douglas Hibbs carried out a cross-national comparison for 
the period 1960-1969 which supported the hypothesis by showing 
that there was a strong, inverse relationship (r = -0.45). 
Relatively high unemployment countries such as the United States 
and Canada in that period had relatively low rates of inflation 
compared to the relatively low unemployment countries such as 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway.10 (Even in 
this early period, Sweden and Norway's inflation rates were 
considered relatively high).
David Cameron carried out a similar cross-national 
comparison of the average rate of unemployment between 1965 and 
1982 and the average rate of change in consumer prices between
9 A.W. Phillips, 'The Relationship between Unemployment and 
the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 
1861-1957', Economica. 25, 1958, pp.283-99.
10 D. Hibbs, 'Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy', 
American Political Science Review. 71, 1977, pp.1467-87.
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1965-7 and 1980-2 and found, contrary to Hibbs and Phillips, that 
there was a strong, positive relationship between inflation and 
unemployment (r = 0.70).11 This implied two interesting
conclusions: first, that low unemployment levels did not always 
and everywhere produce the Phillipsian boost in inflation; and 
second, that high rates of unemployment did not always reduce 
inflation as might have been expected.
Cameron found that Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Germany and 
the Netherlands enjoyed both relatively low inflation and low 
unemployment; while Italy, Ireland, Britain, Canada, France and 
the United States had the worst of it on both counts. Norway and 
Sweden did, however, provide some support for the hypothesis. 
They combined low rates of unemployment with relatively high 
inflation rates. Cameron's study, which examined the 
stagflationary years of high inflation and high unemployment, 
seemed to imply that Phillips was wrong. It also implied that the 
corporatist and concordance countries performed better than the 
pluralist countries.12
We have carried out a similar procedure for the 1980s, 
comparing the change in the average rate of inflation in the 
period 1975/80 to 1981/89 with the change in the average rate of 
unemployment in the 1975/80 to 1981/1989 period. Figure 4.2.
11 D. Cameron, 'Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour 
Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in 
Advanced Capitalist Society', in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed), Order and 
Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1984, pp.143-78.
12 See also M.G. Schmidt, 'Does Corporatism Matter? Economic 
Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist 
Democracies in the 1970s', in G. Lehmbruch and P. Schmitter, 
Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. Beverly Hills, Sage, 1982, 
pp.237-58, who found a weak negative relationship between 
inflation and corporatism (defined in terms of labour union 
density and the degree of Left-representation in government).
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Figure 4.2.
The Tradeoff Between Inflation and Unemployment*
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shows that there is some support, contra Cameron and pro Hibbs 
and Phillips, for an inverse relationship between inflation and 
unemployment in the 1980s (r-sq = 32.9 percent).
Two points are in order here: first, we can see that our 
measure of the change in the average rate of price inflation is 
negative, since virtually every country managed to reduce 
inflation from the heights it had reached in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Second, this means that the association between the 
two variables is positive; i.e., the higher the unemployment 
rate, the greater the reduction in inflation.
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We can see that this does not contradict Phillips or Hibbs, 
who found a negative relationship between the rate of inflation 
and the rate of unemployment; i.e., the higher the unemployment 
rate, the lower the inflation rate (and vice-versa) . It indicates 
that the fair weather corporatist countries may have had more 
success in combining low levels of unemployment with low 
inflation in the initial stages of the economic crisis, and that 
the non-corporatist countries were more successful at reducing 
inflation by using high unemployment in the 1980s than they were 
when Cameron made his analysis.
Nevertheless, this result provides only mixed support for 
the Phillips curve hypothesis. The Netherlands, Belgium and 
France have reduced inflation by an average of only -3.7 percent 
and yet their unemployment rates have increased in the same 
period by an average of 4.8 percent. At the same time Finland, 
Japan, the United States, and Sweden have had average 
unemployment levels of 0.3 percent and yet have reduced their 
inflation rates by an reasonably high average of -4.2 percent.
One possible explanation for these findings is that the 
countries with low unemployment growth and large reductions in 
inflation over the two periods had high average inflation rates 
in the 1975-80 period, so that despite the reductions they in 
fact still do have high inflation rates and low unemployment. We 
have to examine these countries individually, since they are too 
small a group to treat in aggregate. We can see that Finland and 
Sweden both have high rankings for inflation in the two periods 
(see Table 4.1.), and that the United States and Japan have 
reasonably high rates in the 1970s but appear to have reduced 
their inflation rate in the 1980s without generating high 
unemployment. Therefore, in Finland and Sweden, two corporatist
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Figure 4.3.
Corporatism and Inflation Performance.
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countries, low unemployment does seem to be associated with high 
inflation, but in the United States and Japan, the Phillips curve 
relationship does not appear supported.13
13 Two conclusions, which might merit a case study, might 
follow from the performance of the US and Japan. First, they 
achieved large inflation reductions without generating 
unemployment because they lacked strong trade unions prepared to 
fight low pay employment spreading. Second, they were so wealthy 
that the low pay groups perceived only gains.
feELC
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Figure 4.4.
Corporatism and Unemployment Performance.
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In the case of the Netherlands, Belgium and France: each has 
relatively high rates of unemployment in the 1980s. This time, we 
would expect that low reductions in inflation over the two 
periods would mask a lower actual rate of inflation. In the case 
of the Netherlands, this is true, since it has the second-lowest 
average rate of inflation in the 1980s after Japan. But in the 
case of Belgium and France, both are close to the mean average 
rate of inflation in the 1980s for the entire group. Therefore,
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in these countries the Phillips curve is also not well 
supported.14
The complex, case-specific interaction between inflation and 
unemployment means that the question we must now ask is how well 
the corporatist countries have done overall in terms of inflation 
and unemployment. In Figures 4.3. and 4.4., we can see the 
comparative performance of our five categories of corporatism in 
terms of inflation and unemployment in the 1980s. What becomes 
apparent from both Figures is that, first, the "pluralist” group 
of countries does better on both inflation and unemployment than 
might be expected. They still do not, on average, do as well as 
the strong corporatist and concordance countries (and Germany), 
but in terms of the remaining middle categories they do well, 
especially the US. Second, the "weak corporatism" group does 
relatively badly on both indices. Italy and the UK have not 
succeeded very well in trading off unemployment and inflation. 
Third, the "medium corporatism" group is very widely spread, but 
Ireland is a consistently poor performer and only Germany 
consistently does well in both categories. Fourth, in the "strong 
corporatism" group
Sweden and Norway have traded high inflation for low unemployment 
while the Netherlands has done the opposite. Austria has kept 
both unemployment and inflation low. Finally, the "concordance" 
group contains the best performers, but Austria and Germany are 
not far behind.
We can see, then, that the foul weather corporatist 
countries perform better overall with unemployment than 
inflation, and that the weakness of the Scandinavian inflation 
performance and the Dutch unemployment performance 
correspondingly weakens any argument for corporatist superiority
14 Providing some persistent support for Cameron's view that 
high unemployment does not always and necessarily lead to low 
inflation.
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over pluralist systems in the 1980s.15 However, our examination 
of the Phillips curve hypothesis for the 1980s showed that 
pluralist governments have succeeded in exploiting the trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation only at a relatively increased 
and substantial cost in unemployment. Therefore, in terms of
welfare, the corporatist performance in maintaining low 
unemployment is better than it may at first appear.
The question is how sustainable this low unemployment is
when the pressures of lost competitiveness build up. A number of
comparative studies have demonstrated that it is a mix of 
interventionist, labour market, and training policies which are 
the strongest causal variables associated with low rates of
unemployment and not merely corporatist wage restraint 
policies.16 In the absence of active labour market policies, and
15 Manfred Schmidt found that, in the 1970s, corporatism was 
associated with not only low inflation, but also low distributive 
conflict (i.e., strikes), and international competitiveness. M.G. 
Schmidt, 'The Role of the Parties in Shaping Macroeconomic 
Policy', in F.G. Castles (ed), The Impact of Parties; Politics 
and Policies in Democratic capitalist States. London, Sage, 1982, 
pp.153-154. We argue that, for the 1980s, this assessment of 
corporatist performance has to be revised with respect in 
particular to Sweden. In a separate paper, he showed that 
unemployment in the corporatist countries was 'too low' after 
allowing for the effects of economic-structural shocks. This 
remains largely true of the 1980s, but may have to be revised for 
the 1990s if the long awaited OECD upturn fails to materialise 
and corporatism fails to adapt to the foul economic weather. See 
M.G. Schmidt, 'The Politics of Labour Market Policy: Structural 
and Political Determinants of Rates of Unemployment in Industrial 
Nations', in Rudolf Wildermann (ed), The Future of Party 
Government Volume 3. Managing Mixed Economies. Berlin, Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988, pp.4-53.
16 See Paul Boreham and Hugh Compston, 'Labour Movement 
Organisation and Political Intervention. The Politics of 
Unemployment in the OECD Countries, 1974-1986', European Journal 
of Political Research. 22, 1992, pp.143-170; Goran Therborn, Whv 
Some Peoples Are More Unemployed Than Others. The Strange Paradox 
of Growth and Unemployment. Verso, the Thetford Press, 1986, 
pp.37-68; Richard Jackman, 'Where Corporatism Works', LSE
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policies designed to provide public employment, the capitalist 
market system will not necessarily produce employment growth in 
the private sector, even in response to successfully implemented 
incomes policies. How sustainable are these policies, in the 
long-term? In fair economic weather relatively high inflation can 
be sustained without adverse consequences for investment, growth 
and competitiveness. In foul weather, however, the funding of 
these policies might need some degree of commensurate restraint 
from high pay groups, in which case the importance of party 
control of government, policy design and institutional structure 
may evaporate away.17
It is true that wage restraint policies, despite their 
economic rationale, are less important in the final instance than 
active interventionary policies for low unemployment. But while 
necessary, such interventionary policies are not sufficient in 
foul economic weather and, in particular, where cooperation 
designed to distribute costs cannot be maintained the economic 
consequences in terms of high government deficits and lost 
competitiveness increasingly lead to pressure to moderate or even 
abandon policies designed to maintain low unemployment.18
Quarterly. 3, 3, 1989, pp.213-235.
17 Foul weather in this case need only be thought of in terms 
of vulnerability to world demand and the degree of fiscal and 
monetary restriction practiced by trading partners for the 
economic consequences in terms of pressure on unemployment to be 
understood. James E. Alt, 'Political Parties, World Demand, and 
Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic
Activity', American Political Science Review. 79, 4, 1975,
pp.1016-1040; S. Nickell, 'The Determinants of Equilibrium 
Unemployment in Britain', Economic Journal. 92, 1982, pp.555-575.
18 For the argument that accommodatory public employment 
policies in combination with centralised bargaining can produce 
a weakening in the responsiveness of wages to unemployment, see 
Lars Calmfors, 'Employment Policy, Wage Formation and Trade Union 
Behaviour in a Small Open Economy', Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics. 84, 1982; T. Gylfason and Assar Lindbeck, 'Endogenous
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There are two reasons for making this argument. The first is 
that while it may be the case that wage restraint policies do not 
necessarily produce low unemployment, it is the case that in the 
absence of wage restraint policies low unemployment becomes 
increasingly difficult to sustain. The second is that, as the 
economic difficulties in sustaining such policies increase the 
political conditions for shifting towards a policy mix which 
allows for an increase in unemployment are relaxed. Actors can 
rationally prefer to shift the costs of making the adjustment 
onto other actors, through mechanisms such as unemployment, 
because they have the option of remaining "insiders” and 
achieving the few gains that are available. Governments can 
survive this process, despite the long-term collective costs, 
because the absence of an alternative policy of cooperative 
restraint validates reliance on a second-best strategy.19
The welfare achievements of the corporatist countries in 
terms of low unemployment, then, might need to be reassessed in 
the light of how effective the implementation of wage restraint 
in response to the economic foul weather has been. The high 
inflation and poor competitiveness ranking of Sweden raises 
serious questions about this.
Unions and Governments: A Game-Theoretic Approach', European
Economic Review. 30, 1986, pp.5-26. For the economic consequences 
of accommodating policy which is not matched by effective 
cooperation in the distribution of costs, see H. Soderstrom and 
S. Viotti, 'Money Wage Disturbances and the Endogeneity of the 
Public Sector in an Open Economy', in Assar Lindbeck (ed) , 
Inflation and Employment in Open Economies. Amsterdam, North- 
Holland, 1978, pp.71-98.
19 Wessel Visser and Rien Wijnhoven, 'Politics Do Matter, But 
Does Unemployment? Party Strategies, Ideological Discourse and 
Enduring Mass Unemployment', European Journal of Political 
Research. 17, 1990, pp.71-96.
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4.2. The “Happiness Index11 and the “Misery Index11.
To develop our examination of the performance of 
corporatism, we turn now to a measure which also makes use of 
inflation and unemployment performance, but specifically examines 
the trade-off aspect: the "Misery/Happiness Index". In Table 4.2. 
we can see rankings for our data set in terms of inflation, 
unemployment and outlays of government as a percentage of GDP. By 
adding these rankings together we can create two indexes, a 
"misery index" which measures joint performance on inflation and 
unemployment, and a "happiness index", which measures joint 
performance in terms of unemployment and government outlays. 
These indexes are displayed in Table 4.3. Again, low numbers 
indicate the best performance and high numbers the worst, 
relative to the other countries.
The rankings in Table 4.3. in terms of "misery", i.e., 
inflation and unemployment performance, allow us to see that the 
group of countries with the overall worst performance lies in the 
pluralist, weak and medium corporatist categories. The 
concordance countries are the best performers. Although the 
strong corporatist countries are the next best performers, Sweden 
and Norway's high rates of inflation and the United States' 
relatively low rates of inflation affect their relative 
performance.
We would expect that countries with both a low level of 
unemployment and a high level of government outlays as a 
percentage of GDP would provide the best environment for trade 
unions in material and strategic terms. Hence, our "happiness 
index" which combines these two rankings. Low unemployment 
implies a strong labour market position for trade unions, with a 
positive effect on labour's bargaining position. High government 
outlays imply security of employment in a large public sector, 
and supportive public policies in the fields of employment,
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Table 4.2.
Rankings; Inflation. Unemployment and Government Outlays.
Inflation 
75/80 81/89
Unemolovment 
75/80 81/89
Govt. Outlavs 
74/80 81/88
Pluralism.
USA 7 6 15 8 15 15
Canada 8 8 17 13 12 12
France 11 11 10 12 10 7
Weak
Corporatism.
UK 15 9 8 14 9 11
Italy 17 17 15 15 11 8
Medium
Corporatism.
Ireland 16 14 14 17 8 4
Belgium 5 7 13 16 7 5
FRG 2 3 6 7 5 10
Denmark 10 10 12 11 3 3
Finland 13 13 9 6 13 13
Australia 14 11 11 9 14 14
Strong
Corporatism.
Austria 3 5 2 5 6 6
Sweden 12 16 2 2 1 1
Norway 9 15 4 4 4 9
Netherlands 4 2 7 10 2 2
Con­
cordance . 
Japan 5 1 5 3 17 16
SwitzerI'd 1 4 1 1 16 17
Source: previous tables.
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Table 4.3.
A Comparison of Performance on Joint Indicators.
Rankinas
"Miserv
••
Index”
Rankinas: 
"Happiness Index"
Inflation + Unemployment 
75/80 81/89
Unemployment + 
75/80
Outlays
81/89
Pluralism.
USA 10 5 17 13
Canada 14 11 16 16
France 9 13 9 8
Weak
Corporatism.
UK 13 13 7 16
Italy 17 17 15 13
Medium
Corporatism.
Ireland 16 16 11 11
Belgium 8 13 9 11
FRG 3 3 5 6
Denmark 10 11 6 5
Finland 10 9 11 8
Australia 14 5 14 13
Strong
Corporatism.
Austria 2 7 2 2
Sweden 7 8 1 1
Norway 6 9 2 4
Netherlands 5 4 4 3
Con­
cordance . 
Japan 4 1 11 8
Switzerland 1 2 7 7
Source: previous table.
training, health and education. Rankings on government outlays as 
a percentage of GDP show, interestingly, that the two concordance 
countries, Japan and Switzerland, have the smallest government 
expenditure as apercentage of GDP in our data set. The countries 
with the highest level of government outlays are, not
165
4 - The Impact Of Corporatism On Societal Welfare
surprisingly, in the strong and medium corporatist countries: 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, and Denmark, Belgium 
and Ireland.
Looking at Table 4.3., we see that the countries with the 
highest ranking on our "happiness index" in the 1980s are: 
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Germany. 
This time, the order is reversed, and it is the strong and medium 
corporatist countries which perform best. The next group of 
countries are: Switzerland, Japan, Finland, and France. The two 
concordance countries do well despite their low rankings on 
government outlays because their employment performance is so 
good. Finland also posts a good ranking due primarily to low 
unemployment. France is the only non-corporatist country to do 
well on this ranking, largely because its level of government 
outlays is the highest among the pluralist and weak corporatist 
countries.
The foul weather corporatist countries, then, do better in 
terms of generating "happiness" than they do in avoiding 
"misery", which is simply to say that they produce inflation as 
a by-product of low unemployment and high government outlays. 
This implies that in Sweden, in foul weather at least, 
corporatism has not yet succeeded in its anti-inflationary goal. 
In turn, this implies that the distributional consequences of the 
foul economic weather are not being managed with enough 
effectiveness to maintain both low unemployment and low 
inflation. Still, comparing Table 4.3. with Table 4.2., where we 
can see ranks for inflation and unemployment separately, it is 
clear that by taking consideration of the trade-off between 
unemployment, inflation, and government outlays, Sweden and 
Norway perform better than when we consider just performance on 
inflation (or unemployment) alone.
Corporatism achieves the best performance in terms of what 
may be characterised as "socialist" goals: low unemployment and
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high public spending, rather than in terms of the more narrowly 
economic measures of performance we have been considering thus 
far. The economic achievements of corporatism are in a sense 
hidden from immediate view. The question is whether these 
outlays, and the inflation they produce, can be sustained in foul 
economic weather. Certainly the increase in distributive conflict 
and the poor "competitiveness index” rankings for Sweden indicate 
that these welfare payoffs were becoming costly relative to the 
degree of growth and productivity produced in the economy.
4.3. Public Employment.
Public employment and general employment growth can be 
regarded as two crucial components of performance in terms of 
economic welfare. The former is more directly influenced by 
government spending, but the latter will also be subject to 
outlays on retraining, relocation, and various other public 
subsidies affecting the labour market. We can see in Table 4.4. 
data presented in four categories: "government employment as a 
percentage of total employment", "government employment percent 
change", "government wages as a percentage of total spending", 
and "general employment percent change".
If we look at the total ranking column, we see that Sweden, 
Canada and Denmark were the best performers. The worst performers 
are France, Belgium and the UK. This provides some evidence that 
Sweden achieved a higher degree of public compensation in terms 
of employment growth in the public and private sector than the 
non-corporatist countries with the exception of Canada in the 
first instance. But this is weakened by the fact that the 
pluralist country Canada and the strong corporatist country the 
Netherlands do better and worse, respectively, than would be 
expected. Canada performs well in all categories, while the 
Netherlands had only a small increase in public employment (which 
nevertheless received a large proportion of total government 
spending in wages). Although we lack data for Japan on one
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Table 4.4.
Rankings: Public Employment and Employment Growth.
l.Govt. Empl.(i) 2.Govt. Empl.(ii)
3.Govt. Wage. 4.Empl. Growth.
1 • 2. 3 • 4. Total
1. Pluralism.
USA 7 (16.1) 10 (1-1) 6 (13.4) 2 (2.2) 25
Canada 4 (19.7) 3 (2.4) 4 (10.6) 1 (2.4) 12
France 5 (18.5) 7 (1.8) 10 (16.0) 7 (0.3) 29
Weak
Corporatism.
UK 3 (20.8) 11 (0.9) 7 (14.3) 7 (0.3) 28
Italy 9 (14.4) 4 (2.2) 5 (12.2) 6 (0.5) 24
Medium
Corporatism.
Belgium 6 (17.8) 6 (1.9) 9 (15.9) 8 (0.2) 29
FRG 10 (14.3) 5 (2.0) 2 (9.5) 8 (0.2) 25
Denmark 2 (26.1) 1 (3.9) 8 (15.6) 5 (0.6) 16
Strong
Corporatism.
Sweden 1 (28.5) 2 (3.3) 1 (7.5) 4 (0.8) 8
Norway — — -■ —
Netherlands 8 (14.5) 8 (1.4) 3 (10.0) 8 (0.2) 27
Con­
cordance .
Japan 11 (6.4) 9 (1.2) — 3 (0.9) —
Switz —■ — — —
Source: 1. Average Yearly Government Employment u a Percentage of Total Employment, 1970-89, OECD Economic Outlook. Historical Statistics. 1960-
82, Paris 1991.
2. Average Yearly Government Employment Percent Change, 1970-89, ibid.
3. Avenge Yearly Central Government Current Expenditure on Wages and Salaries as a Percentage of Total Expenditure and Lending Minus Repayments,
1972-87. International Monetary Fund. Government Financial Statistics Yearbook. IMF. 1988.
4. Average Yearly Percent Chanse in Emolovmcat. 1970-89. OECD. Economic Outlook. Paris. June 1990.
category, its performance in terms of general employment growth 
is very good while public employment is characteristically small.
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4,4. Societal Welfare.
Public employment and employment growth are two key 
components of general welfare, but this wider category also 
encompasses spending on education, health and social services. 
When we consider the performance of corporatism in terms of 
social welfare, we have to control for a number of complementary 
and competing hypotheses. These include: the political or
electoral cycle thesis, public choice theories of bureaucratic 
budget expansion, incrementalist theory, "politics matters" 
hypotheses, welfare-warfare tradeoff theories, hypotheses 
concerning the mode of tax collection and the degree of state 
centralisation, "protest politics" theories, and structural- 
functionalist theories of demographic need and economic 
development.20
20 For 'political' and 'electoral cycle' theses, see E. 
Tufte, Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1978; on public choice theory, see R. Rose and 
B.G. Peters, Can Governments Go Bankrupt?. New York, Basic Books, 
1978; on incrementalism, see A. Wildavsky, Budgeting: A
Comparative Theory of the Budgetary Process. Boston, Little 
Brown, 1975; on 'politics matters', see F.G. Castles and R.D. 
McKinlay, 'Does Politics Matter: An Analysis of the Public
Welfare Commitment in Advanced Democratic States', European 
Journal of Political Science. 7, 1979, and F.G. Castles, 'How 
Does Politics Matter? Structure or Agency in the Determination of 
Public Policy Outcomes', European Journal of Political Research. 
9, 1981, pp.119-32; on welfare-warfare, see B.M. Russett, What 
Price Vigilance?. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970; on tax 
and centralisation, see D. Cameron, 'The Expansion of the Public 
Economy: A Comparative Analysis', American Political Science
Review. 72, 1978, pp.1243-61, and F.G. Castles (ed), The Impact 
of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist
States, London, Sage, 1982; on structural functionalism, see H. 
Wilensky, The Welfare State and Egualitv. Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1975, and A. Wagner, 'The Nature of the Fiscal 
Economy', in R.A. Musgrave and A.R. Peacock (eds), Classics in 
the Study of Public Finance. London, Macmillan, 1958, pp.1-8; and 
on protest politics, see F.F. Piven and R. Cloward, Regulating 
The Poor. New York, Vintage, 1971.
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As this literature is already extensive, we will only 
schematically refer to it when necessary. The "corporatist 
hypothesis", for want of a better term, has usually been 
operationalised in similar ways to those we have been using: 
using either indexes of unionisation and centralisation or 
indexes of neo-corporatist institutional and social arrangements. 
The hypothesis generally takes the following form: highly
unionised work forces and centralised union structures provide 
statistical indicators of class-based, political mobilisation on 
the part of the labour movement. This mobilisation leads to 
increased spending on welfare in two ways: through Left-party 
governmental hegemony and through the redistribution of economic 
wealth generated by cooperation and encompassing group 
behaviour.21
This latter argument, that the public spending is financed 
by the economic growth which arises from encompassing group 
behaviour, is what we question in this thesis. In foul economic 
weather encompassing group behaviour does not produce gains, it 
minimises costs. Hence to sustain the rate of growth in public 
spending, taxes would have to grow. As can be seen in Figure 
4.5., in Sweden the tax rate is near-legendary. Moreover, public 
employment creates a third actor: the public sector, which
complicates the game.
Table 4.5. provides some support for the hypothesis that the 
corporatist countries spend more on welfare, operationalised here
21 Walter Korpi argues strongly for a Mpower-resources,f 
explanation for low unemployment performance which stresses the 
intentionality of strategies and the strength of the Left, and 
which views institutions as intervening variables. He also 
accepts that economic factors place constraints on policy making, 
but does not explore these constraints in the same way as we do 
here. W. Korpi, 'Political and Economic Explanations for 
Unemployment: A Cross-National and Long-Term Analysis', British 
Journal of Political Science. 21, 1991, p.346.
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Ficrure 4.5.
Taxation as a Percentage of GDP.
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Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics Of OECD Member Countries. 1965-1989. Paris, 1990, p.71.
as the percentage of GDP spent on education, health, and social 
security. The best performers here are France (1983) and the 
Netherlands (1984), followed by Belgium (1985), Germany (1883) 
and Norway (1985), followed by Sweden (1984), Denmark (1984), 
Italy (1986) and the UK (1985), and lastly, Canada (1983) and the 
USA (1986). The influence of corporatist arrangements is most 
clearly visible in the middle strata of this range, suggesting 
that corporatism does produce increased welfare spending but that 
other factors are also important.
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Table 4.5.
Mid-1980s Expenditure on Welfare.
1 . Education 2. :Health 3. Social Security
Total
1. Pluralism.
USA
Canada
France
12
9
1
(1.7)
(3.6)
(8.1)
11
8
6
(11.5) 
(6.3)
(14.5)
5
9
2
(28.4)
(35.6)
(43.9)
28
26
9
2. Weak
Corporatism.
UK 9 (2.1) 10 (12.5) 4 (28.5) 23
Italy 9 (7.2) 7 (10.0) 8 (29.0) 24
3. Medium
Corporatism.
Belgium 5 (12.9) 1 (1.7) 10 (39.3) 16
FRG 2 (0.8) 12 (18.6) 1 (50.0) 15
Denmark 8 (9.6) 3 (1.1) 12 (37.1) 23
4. Strong
Corporatism.
Sweden 6 (10.0) 4 (1.3) 11 (46.7) 21
Norway 7 (8.8) 5 (10.5) 7 (35.1) 19
Neth. 2 (10.7) 2 (11.0) 6 (37.4) 10
5. Con­
cordance . 
Japan • • • i•
Switz 2 (3.1) 9 (13.1) 3 (49.9) 14
Source: Rose Schumacher. Gail K. Stevens, Timothy S. O’Donnell. Lee Torrance. Kate Carnov feds). World Economic Data. Clio Press. 1989.
Size and openness are variables which have been associated 
with compensatory public spending, and have been linked to 
corporatism. As an example, Cameron argues that small, open 
economies will tend to produce industrial concentration, which in 
turn lends itself towards high unionisation and encompassing 
forms of interest intermediation and wage determination. These in 
turn, by generating a strong and centralised labour movement, 
provide the political foundation for strong Left-dominated
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government, and hence, comparatively large increases in welfare 
spending.22
Swank and Hicks point out that capital has a structural- 
functional interest in socialising the costs of maintaining 
industrial peace and legitimising capitalism, which explains why 
some non-corporatist countries spend more on welfare than might 
be expected. But they also present statistical evidence which 
supports the proposition that high levels of union organisation, 
through the mechanism of class-based political mobilisation, lead 
to increased "income transfer” spending. The "politics matters" 
hypothesis that trade union and Left-party political mobilisation 
generates increased welfare spending remains the strongest in 
their view.23 Borg and Castles showed, in addition, that the 
strength of the Right was itself an independent explanatory 
variable, since the Netherlands was a country which combined very 
high levels of welfare spending, despite a very low degree of 
electoral success for Left-parties, because it had a divided 
Right.24
The bottom line, however, is that the degree of economic 
surplus available to distribute determines whether or not 
institutional mechanisms of consensual wage distribution have to 
distribute gains or costs. This is the problem that foul weather 
corporatism must deal with. There are several economic-structural
22 D. Cameron, 'The Expansion of the Public Economy: A 
Comparative Analysis', American Political Science Review. 72, 
1978, pp.1243-61.
23 Duane H. Swank and Alexander Hicks, 'The Determinants and 
Redistributive Impacts of State Welfare Spending in the Advanced 
Capitalist Democracies, 1960-1980', in Norman J. Vig and Steven 
E. Schier, Political Economy In Western Democracies. London, 
Holmes and Meier, 1985, pp.128-130.
24 S.G. Borg and F.G. Castles, 'The Influence Of The 
Political Right On Public Income Maintenance And Equality', 
Political Studies. 29, 4, 1981, pp.604-21.
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hypotheses, which focus on the degree of economic productivity of 
the country and level of development in relation to welfare, in 
particular, before the onset of economic foul weather. In his 
latter work, Castles showed that economic growth determinants 
indeed acted as a limiting-factor beyond which outcomes could be 
determined by the interaction of political and institutional 
variables.25
The corporatism hypothesis is essentially a hypothesis 
concerning the degree to which the wage determination system 
solves prisoners' dilemmas of cost distribution, enabling fair 
and efficient welfare distribution and employment distribution 
outcomes to be sustained. The complicating factor in this 
hypothesis is that high welfare spending is shown in a number of 
studies to be statistically associated with the extent of union 
mobilisation and Left party dominance. Thus welfare is influenced 
by trade unions in two ways: through their ability to solve
prisoners' dilemmas and produce "collective gains”, and through 
their political mobilisation and impact upon the dominant Left- 
party. Trade unions, the major constituency of Left-parties, 
obviously have a material interest in income transfer programs 
and social policies.26 Left-parties in government will face 
electoral pressure to meet the expectations of their voters. 
Considered in isolation, this causal mechanism has got nothing to 
do with corporatism at all.
But in terms of solving prisoners' dilemmas, strong 
centralised trade unions and powerful Left parties are two key
25 F.G. Castles, 'Economics, Politics And Needs: Towards a 
Balanced View of Contemporary Welfare State Development', paper 
presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association 
Conference, Sydney, 1986.
26 A. Hicks and D. Swank, 'On the Political Economy of 
Welfare Expansion: A Comparative Analysis of 18 Advanced
Capitalist Democracies, 1960-1971', Comparative Political 
Studies. 17, 1984, pp.81-119.
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conditions for the development of concertation between trade 
unions, employers, and government. This concertation is in turn 
conducive to encompassing group behaviour, which as we have seen 
is a crucial variable in the case made for corporatism. The role 
of the Left-party in relation to welfare is thus intimately 
connected with the corporatist model. Any collective gains 
produced by cooperation and wage restraint have to be partly 
redistributed through the state and any costs associated with 
economic adjustment have to be cushioned by redistributive 
policies. Trade unions will act rationally, as far as possible, 
to ensure that the outcomes of corporatism are distributed in a 
socially "responsible" manner.27 As Lange and Garrett argue, 
Left-government is crucial to successful corporatism because the 
state can affect the degree of risk attached to wage restraint by 
improving trade union expectations that the gains produced by 
restraint will eventually be redistributed to workers.28
Conclusion.
Corporatism in fair weather, it seems reasonable to say, 
produces "virtuous circles" consisting of positive sum gains, low
27 As Goldthorpe writes: 'unions engaging in political 
bargaining in the context of stagflation may be expected to take 
as their first objective that of 'equality of sacrifice' - or, in 
other words, that of ensuring that governments do not deflect on 
to labour an excessive part of the costs involved in the 
adaptation of national economies to less favourable conditions'. 
J.H. Goldthorpe, 'The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist 
Tendencies in Modern Western Societies', in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed) , 
Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1984, p.337.
28 Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: 
Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced 
Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', Journal of Politics. 47, 
1985, p.797. See also Motoshi Suzuki, 'Domestic Political 
Determinants of Inflation', European Journal of Political 
Research. 23, 1992, pp.245-259, who argues that trade unions
exchange non-inflationary wages for state welfare and political 
influence.
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distributive conflict, economic growth, and the twin outcomes of 
full employment and enhanced welfare provision.29 This was the 
argument which was put forward quite strongly in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. But with the damage suffered by corporatism in 
countries like Sweden, and increasing impotence of Left- 
governments and corporatist mechanisms to sustain growth in the 
public sector, growth in employment and maintain international 
competitiveness, many of the voices fell silent. In foul weather, 
it appears, corporatist countries such as even Sweden have found 
it difficult to rediscover the virtuous circle.
There were always some reservations in the literature as to 
whether or not corporatism could succeed in producing the 
economic performance necessary to redistribute income via the 
state and welfare spending.30 If any doubts still remain, we have 
shown that the corporatist countries were not necessarily any 
more economically successful than the non-corporatist countries 
even before the 1980s. In terms of reducing inflation and
29 Francis G. Castles, The Social Democratic Image of 
Society. London, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1978, p.128.
30 By the late 1980s, theorists had come to recognise the 
constraints imposed by the economic crisis on corporatism 
producing absolute and not relative gains (and hence, performing 
better than non-corporatist countries), but there remained no 
discussion of the fact that even negative outcomes would still 
remain positive sum. For example, Manfred Schmidt wrote in 1989 
of the weakness of the 'political hypothesis': 'Its major
weakness consists of disregarding the impact that constraints and 
structurally-given imperatives have on political decision-making 
processes... Even perfect autonomy on the part of decision makers 
does not count much as long as the decision makers do not have 
material resources at their disposal!'. M.G. Schmidt, 'Social 
Policy in Rich and Poor Countries: Socioeconomic Trends and
Political-Institutional Determinants', European Journal of 
Political Research. 17, 1989, p.644.
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improving international competitiveness, corporatism was 
apparently no more successful than other countries.31
This underlines the fact that corporatism is a mechanism 
which primarily functions to distribute gains and losses, its 
impact upon the capacity of an economy to produce gains is 
limited by other, structural factors. The manifest failure of the 
corporatist countries to generate unusually good economic 
performance rather clearly undermines the thesis that corporatism 
generates its own fair economic weather. Nevertheless, the fact 
that corporatism was not a Golden Goose should not obscure the 
fact that it was successful, at least in fair economic weather. 
First of all, why should we expect cooperation between economic 
interest groups to produce outstanding economic growth, output, 
and productivity? These variables depend far more on 
technological and system variables which are egually available to 
non-corporatist systems. Secondly, the achievement of low levels 
of strike activity, low unemployment and high welfare spending in 
combination must be regarded as somewhat extraordinary. These 
achievements are, moreover, most clearly collective gains.
31 See also Gary W. Marks, ' State-Economy Linkages in 
Advanced Industrialised Societies', in Norman J. Vig and Steven 
E. Schier (eds), Political Economy In Western Democracies. 
London, Holmes and Meier, 1985, pp.53, 54-55.
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CHAPTER FIVE.
EVOLVING THEORETICAL MODELS OF SWEDISH
CORPORATISM.
'There is no policy of redistribution without economic
growth'. Swedish Proverb.1
As a case study of corporatism, Sweden has earned a 
deservedly famous reputation for its "Swedish Model". However, 
there seem to be almost as many different interpretations of what 
this model is as there are observers (and certainly most Swedes 
will confess to not knowing exactly what it is).2
In this chapter we focus primarily on the evolution of 
cooperation in the labour market between trade unions and 
employers. This means we make an analytical distinction between 
the Swedish Model, understood in the broad sense as a mix of 
Welfare policies, Keynesianism, and social democratic policies 
designed to aid economic restructuring and maintain 
competitiveness, and corporatism, with our usage of the latter 
term referring more specifically to a cooperative strategy of
1 Bernt Schiller, 'The Swedish Model Reconstituted', in M. 
Donald Hancock, John Logue and Bernt Schiller, Managing Modern 
Capitalism. Industrial Renewal and Workplace Democracy in the 
United States and Western Europe. London, Greenwood Press, 1991, 
p.150.
2 See J.-E. Lane, Understanding the Swedish Model. London, 
Frank Cass, 1991; John Madeley, 'Death and Taxes: The Waning of 
Swedish Social Democracy', Review Article, Government and 
Opposition. 28, 1, 1993, pp.118-125.
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maximising collective gains and minimising collective costs 
through cooperation in the determination of wages (and hence, 
prices, productivity, competitiveness, and so on).
5.1. The Swedish Model as a Growth-Stratecrv.
The term "Swedish Model", in its broadest interpretation, 
would refer to the various components of Sweden's political- 
economic profile, as a package.3 Individually, these elements are 
not totally unique to Sweden, but in combination, they amount to 
what can justifiably be described as a socialist-corporatist 
strategy. Swedish economic commentator Per-Martin Meyerson 
describes it as a hybrid system, combining competitive markets 
and cooperative distribution of the proceeds:
'The Swedish model may be described as an attempt to 
synthesise capitalism and socialism. The aim is to reap the 
harvest of a market-controlled and internationally oriented 
production system, while at the same time distributing 
profits on the basis of indigenous objectives of solidarity 
and justice which are relatively advanced in comparison with 
other countries'.4
Most of the academic interest in the Swedish Model in past 
decades has been inspired by the fact that it appeared to work so 
well in the 1950s and 1960s.5 Low unemployment, strong economic
3 Hans Goran Myrdal, 'The Swedish Model - Will It Survive?', 
British Journal of Industrial Relations. 25, 1, 1980, pp.57-69.
4 Per-Martin Meyerson, Eurosclerosis: The Case Of Sweden. A 
Critical Examination of Some Central Problems in the Swedish 
Economy and in Swedish Politics. Federation of Swedish 
Industries, Caslon Press AB, 1985. This and Swedish Economy at 
the Cross Roads. Federation of Swedish Industries, Caslon Press 
AB, 1979, were produced with the support of employers. Meyerson, 
as the title of his publication indicates, uses Mancur Olson's 
theory of economic-social sclerosis in his arguments.
5 As Erik Lundberg writes, the Swedish Model is sometimes 
viewed as coterminous with the performance of the Swedish economy 
around the middle of the 1960s: full employment (with
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growth, an extensive welfare system and so on, almost guaranteed 
the attention of foreign observers. It was also of particular 
interest because the model was clearly socialist in its strategic 
objectives. The Swedish Social Democratic Party 
(Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti, SAP) maintained a comfortable 
hegemony in government, the trade unions were among the most 
powerful in the world, and income distribution was clearly shaped 
by the socialist goals of equality and welfare.6 Sweden could be 
comfortably described as an archetype of a corporatist social 
democratic political economy. Because it was so far advanced, in 
fact, we would go even further and argue that Sweden can be said
unemployment varying between 1.5 to 2.5 percent); relatively low 
inflation (around 3 percent); cyclical stability; good balance of 
payments; rapid rise in the public sector; no visible structural 
imbalances; good growth of total output (about 4 percent). Erik 
Lundberg, 'The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model', Journal of 
Economic Literature. 23, March 1985, p.3. Lundberg, in passing, 
is by no means a supporter of the Swedish Model, e.g.: '[T]he
disturbances and shocks to the economy [from the 1970s] put an 
end to praise of the Swedish Model. And rightly so', (emphasis 
added), p. 2. Even critics of the Swedish Model appear to 
recognise its achievements. For example, Samuel Brittan and Peter 
Li1ley, The Delusion of Incomes Policy. London, Temple Smith, 
1977, p.124.
6 Leading to the 'labour movement theory' approach to Social 
Democratic policies in Sweden, which stresses the activism of 
labour in shaping the corporatist political economy rather than 
emphasising the 11 subjugation” of labour in a system designed to 
moderate socialist tendencies and support capitalist 
institutions. There is a large literature on this debate which we 
do not examine here, since it is somewhat peripheral to our main 
concerns. See, for example, James Fulcher, 'Labour Movement 
Theory Versus Corporatism: Social Democracy In Sweden',
Sociology. 21, 2, 1987, pp.231-52, for a discussion. The main 
authors include: Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle. 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978; John Stephens, The 
Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. London, Macmillan, 1979; 
Gosta Esping-Andersen, Politics Against Markets. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1985; Frank Parkin, Class Inegualitv 
and Political Order. London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1971; and Leo 
Panitch, 'The Limits of Corporatism', New Left Review. 125, 1981, 
pp.21-43.
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to occupy the role of a test case for the functional efficiency 
of political-economic cooperation in a socialist-democratic 
country.
Sweden for a long time occupied the role of illustrating 
what corporatism, understood as cooperation between labour and 
capital in the determination of wages, might achieve if all the 
conditions necessary for sustaining cooperation in the labour 
market existed. With its highly centralised peak organisations of 
labour and capital, and its highly centralised system of wage 
determination, it was virtually the preeminent example of a 
corporatist political economy.7 Its economic success, moreover, 
came to be seen as strong evidence for the superiority of the 
corporatist system (often not distinguished from the Swedish 
Model) over more market-orientated systems.8 A host of 
comparative studies in the 1970s and early 1980s showed that 
corporatist systems did indeed seem to perform better in a range 
of economic indicators (the most important of which was full 
employment).9 This empirical evidence was further supported by
7 Certainly, it has been widely described as the country 
which comes closest to realising corporatism in practice. See, 
for example, C. Crouch (ed), State and Economy in Contemporary 
Capitalism. London, Croom Helm, 1979; G. Lehmbruch, 'Neo- 
Corporatism in Comparative Perspective', in P.C. Schmitter and G. 
Lehmbruch (eds), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. 
London, Sage, 1979, pp.1-28; and P.C. Schmitter, 'Still the 
Century of Corporatism?', Review of Politics. 36, 1984, pp.85- 
131.
8 Even the Swedes were not immune, as Lundberg writes: 
'[T]he relative success of Swedish economic and social 
performance, beginning in the 1930s, sometimes created among 
Swedes a kind of national hubris, built on a myth of political 
and economic superiority'. Erik Lundberg, 'The Rise and Fall of 
the Swedish Model', Journal of Economic Literature. 23, 1985, 
p. 4.
9 Grouped together: Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs, 
Economics of Worldwide Stagflation. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1985; Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The
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theoretical work which showed that corporatism was a political 
economy which solved prisoners' dilemmas in key economic sectors 
such as the labour market.10
In implying causality between corporatism and good economic 
performance, however, a rather neat logical syllogism was 
generated: since economic success seemed so important to the
perceived success of the Swedish Model, and the success of the 
Swedish Model in turn contributed much to the perceived 
functional efficiency of corporatist cooperation, economic 
success became a crucial variable in the case generally made for 
corporatism. As a result of assuming that successful corporatism 
should produce "economic success", an economic crisis in a 
corporatist country would have negative implications for any 
assessment of the performance of corporatism.
The Swedish Model, particularly in its corporatist guise, 
bears a strong similarity, in form and function, to the design of 
the iterative, conditional-cooperation solution to the prisoners'
Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic
Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-80', 
Journal of Politics. 47, 1985, pp.792-827; Alexander Hicks,
'Social Democratic Corporatism and Economic Growth', Journal of 
Politics. 50, 1988, pp.677-704; David R. Cameron, 'Social
Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence and the Representation 
of Economic Interests in Advanced Capitalist Society', in John H. 
Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp.143-78; Frank G. Castles, 
'Neocorporatism and the "Happiness Index", Or What the Trade 
Unions get for their Cooperation', European Journal of Political 
Research. 15, 1987, pp.381-93; Manfred G. Schmidt, 'The Welfare 
State and the Economy in Periods of Economic Crisis: A
Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations', in N.J. Vig and 
S.E. Schier, Political Economy in Western Democracies. New York, 
Holmes and Meier, 1985, pp.140-70.
10 See the theoretical chapters. A good example is Jonathan 
Boston, 'Corporatist Incomes Policies, the Free-Rider Problem and 
the British Labour Government's Social Contract', in Alan Cawson 
(ed) , Organised Interests and the State. London, Sage, 1985, 
pp.65-84.
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dilemma. The assumption in the corporatist literature that we 
alluded to appears to be that, by cooperating and avoiding the 
prisoners' dilemma, the actors exercise restraint and 
paradoxically the economic well-being of the economy is improved 
to the maximum extent. If we accept the logic of the prisoners' 
dilemma, it is true that cooperation and the best possible 
economic outcome can be said to be logically equivalent, while 
rational self-interested behaviour in a strongly organised labour 
market (such as Sweden's) should produce a collectively 
suboptimal outcome. The paradox appears in the fact that by 
exercising restraint the actors are apparently better off: how 
can this be?
In fact, there is no paradox, because the collective 
wellbeing of an economy is maximised in relative terms, and not 
necessarily in absolute terms. In fair economic weather, it might 
appear as if the cooperation produces the economic success, but 
this, we argue, misses the point. In fact, the cooperation 
maximises the collective gain which is largely already determined 
by other, independent economic variables (it is these variables 
which can be more directly influenced by economic strategies such 
as those characterised by the Swedish Model). Cooperation 
produces efficiencies, maximises employment and maintains 
competitiveness, but beyond that other factors become more 
significant in determining productivity growth and output growth.
In foul economic weather, cooperation maximises collective 
gain through a cooperative reduction in income shares, or to put 
it another way, through the cooperative distribution of costs, 
which reduces distributional conflict during the process of 
adjusting to the economic contraction, and maximises the 
underlying sustainable growth of the economy. The outcome of the 
cooperation is not in foul weather that the actors are better off 
(necessarily) in absolute terms, but rather that they are better 
off in relative terms, i.e., better off than they would have been
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if they had not cooperated. They may in fact be worse off through 
having cooperated and exercised restraint, but this may still be 
"the best possible economic outcome". All other collective 
alternatives may simply be worse.
Thus corporatism may still produce "economic success" in 
foul weather by solving the prisoners' dilemma, but this success 
will not be the same as that produced in fair weather. To some 
observers, it may not look like success at all. We argue in this 
thesis that in the earlier comparative literature on corporatism 
the implications of this line of analysis had not been adequately 
explored. It had been left unclear as to whether cooperation 
produces gain in an absolute or a relative sense, and under what 
conditions.
Even the "authors" of the Swedish Model believed that, by 
solving the prisoners' dilemma in the labour market, using 
effective fiscal and monetary policy, and promoting economic 
restructuring, they could maximise their collective well-being in 
the form of growing shares of a growing economic surplus. The 
Swedish Model was a corporatist growth-strategy, consciously 
designed to boost the productivity of the economy and supply 
collective gains to all the actors through economic growth. As 
Walter Korpi writes:
'The historical compromise implied that the parties 
should work together to increase economic growth. They 
were to help each other to make the cake bigger so 
there would be more to share'.11 
This emphasis on growth, as we shall see, was not unrealistic as
11 Walter Korpi, 'The Historical Compromise and its 
Dissolution', in Bengt Ryden and Villy Bergstrom, Sweden: Choices 
for Economic and Social Policy in the 1980s. London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1982, p.133.
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an expectation during the Golden Age of the 1950s and 1960s. As 
Rudolf Meidner writes:
'The labour movement felt that its policy was justified 
by its results. Economic growth through higher 
efficiency was the goal which few dared to call into 
question.,n
With Sweden's undeniable economic success in the 1950s and 1960s, 
it seemed that the Swedes had successfully solved the prisoners' 
dilemma and that the Swedish Model was working. "Collective well­
being", i.e., economic growth, seemed to support this because 
Sweden was so wealthy.
But from the 1970s on, the "Swedish Miracle" was superceded 
by poor performance in a huge range of economic indicators such 
as productivity, exports, inflation, output, investment, and 
deficits in the public and current accounts. It seemed that the 
Swedish Model and with it, corporatism, had failed to produce the 
high performance it promised, and that therefore both the Model 
and the corporatist strategy had been somewhat discredited.13 
From a comparative perspective, it seemed that corporatism 
increasingly looked like failing in a country previously thought 
a clear example of corporatist success, which further seemed to 
underline its political irrelevance in the Anglo-Saxon world 
(excluding Australia). The economic crisis coincided with the 
progressive breakdown of the centralised system of wage 
bargaining, failure to achieve cooperative reductions in incomes
12 Rudolf Meidner, 'Swedish Union Strategies Towards 
Structural Change', Economic and Industrial Democracy. 7, 1986, 
p.87-88.
13 As Lundberg writes: 'From [the point of view of earlier 
assumptions about Swedish exceptionalism] the deterioration of 
the model in the 1970s came as a psychological shock, especially 
to the earlier strong believers'. Erik Lundberg, 'The Rise and 
Fall of the Swedish Model', Journal of Economic Literature. 23, 
1985, p.4.
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through wage restraint, and the reemergence of prisoners' dilemma 
outcomes.
The apparent failure of corporatism to continue to produce 
growth in income shares, output and employment contributed to a 
crisis of confidence in the system. But as we have just argued, 
corporatism should be considered more as a distributional system, 
in the sense that it maximises collective values through the 
distribution of gains and/or costs in such a way that costly 
prisoners' dilemmas are minimised, and not a production system, 
which might be expected to produce economic success understood 
narrowly as constant improvements in income shares and economic 
output. Therefore there is actually no logical reason why 
corporatism should not still be seen to be maximising the 
potential well-being of the economy even when the economy in 
question is contracting. It is thus a mistake to assume that a 
corporatist system must be failing if it is not producing 
"economic success" in the narrow sense.
This raises several questions which are closely linked and 
must be separated: first, did corporatism really fail in Sweden, 
or did the actors perceive that it failed, given the economic 
crisis, and abandon it? Second, did corporatism ever really 
successfully function, in terms of minimising prisoners' dilemma 
outcomes, before the economic crisis, or was it sustained and 
"cushioned” by other factors which independently produced 
"economic success”? Third, if Swedish corporatism in economic 
foul weather did fail to produce the best collective outcome, was 
this because of the loss of centralisation or because of the foul 
economic weather? Did Sweden never really have cooperation except 
in terms of distributing gains?
In the following sections we examine the evolution of 
corporatism in Sweden with the help of our game-theoretical 
understanding of cooperation in fair and foul economic weather. 
We will keep in mind throughout that we should not logically
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expect success defined in terms of growing shares of economic 
output in a functioning corporatist system, and therefore in 
Sweden, simply because it is the only country to attempt such a 
sophisticated version of what is a radical and challenging policy 
experiment. Growth in economic output may not really be so 
amenable to social-economic cooperation as had been supposed. 
Instead, we will provide answers to the three questions above, 
assessing the impact of the economic crisis on the actors' own 
perceptions of the corporatist model, assessing the efficiency of 
the overall system in fair weather, and assessing the breakdown 
of the centralised system in foul weather in the light of the 
problems for corporatist cooperation in foul economic weather we 
investigated.
Can the evolution of the Swedish Model and its corporatist 
component can be understood in terms of the concepts and ideas we 
have developed? That is, was the system designed to maximise 
collective gains through conditional cooperation between actors 
whose strategies were encompassing? Did the actors regard 
themselves as being in a prisoners' dilemma, and how important 
was centralisation, iterated encounters, and the "shadow of the 
future" in determining the cooperative nature of the process? 
More to the point, how important was the role played by the 
distribution of gains in the strategy and how compatible was this 
dependence with the distribution of costs in foul weather and the 
problems associated with the high pay-low pay conflict?
5.1.1. A Strong Starting Position.
By the end of the 19th century, Sweden had a comparatively 
well organised agricultural sector and a nascent industrial 
sector which made use of a ready supply of raw materials such as 
iron ore and wood. By about 1900, half of Sweden's exports were 
textiles, pulp and paper and engineering products, and the other 
half were raw materials such as iron, grain, metal ores and
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timber.14 Although Sweden at this time, by comparison with many 
other industrialised countries, was relatively backward in terms 
of industrial development, it enjoyed a strong potential for 
future growth.15
Much of this growth potential came from the emergence (in 
the period 1860 to 1914) of more than ten Swedish companies that 
later became the backbone of international competitiveness and 
domestic production: AGA, Alfa-Lavel, ASEA, Atlas, Copco, Bofors, 
Electrolux, L.M. Ericsson, Husqvarna, Saab-Scania, Sandviken, 
SKF, Stora Kopparberg, the Swedish Match Company, Uddeholm, and 
Volvo.16 Moreover, in those 50 years, Sweden had the third 
highest per capita growth of GDP in the world (after the USA and 
Japan), and by the 1980s, was still estimated to have one of the 
highest levels of per capita GNP of the advanced capitalist 
countries.17
14 Stig Hadenius, Swedish Politics Purina the 20th Century, 
the Swedish Institute, Centraltryckeriet AB Boras, 1990, p.9.
15 Despite industrialising late, Sweden achieved a lot in 
just three generations. Guy De Faramond, Michael Harrington and 
Andrew Martin, 'Sweden Seen from the Outside', in Bengt Ryden and 
Villy Bergstrom, Sweden: Choices for Economic and Social Policy 
in the 1980s. London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, p.16; Erik Lundberg, 
'The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model', Journal of Economic 
Literature. 23, 1985, p.l; Stig Hadenius, Swedish Politics During 
the 20th Century, p.8.
16 Swedish industrial development is also associated with a 
number of successful inventions such as dynamite (Nobel 
Industries), the cream separator (Alfa-Laval), the ball bearing 
(SKF) and the automatic lighthouse (AGA). Other important 
industries grew from the application of technological innovation 
to new products such as steam engines (Copco), the telephone 
(Ericsson), motor vehicles (Volvo and, later, Saab-Scania) and 
Portland cement (Skanska) . See Stig Hadenius and Ann Lindgren, On 
Sweden, The Swedish Institute, Helsingborg, Schmidts Boktryckeri 
AB, 1990, pp.42-43.
17 Gustavson, for example, estimates that in 1981 it had the 
highest level of per capita GNP. The figure for 1981, in American 
dollars, is $13,327. See Carl G. Gustavson, The Small Giant.
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This early productivity, it must be stated, absolutely 
cannot be attributed to the Swedish Model and the corporatist 
system because it simply did not exist at that time. Instead, it 
has to be attributed to other factors, some of which are 
undoubtedly Sweden's access to iron ore and timber, its level of 
technological development, and its proximity to European 
markets.18 The underlying determinants of growth are linked to 
what might be called fundamental conditions such as relative 
location, technological development and resources. These 
conditions are in turn limited in their impact on growth by 
global tendencies in the world economy.
With the establishment of its industrial base, Sweden was 
well placed on a useful launching pad, ready to exploit the 
enormous growth potential of the world economy during the 
twentieth century. The application of the Swedish Model and the 
corporatist system to the development of the Swedish economy in 
these favourable conditions, which we have called fair economic 
weather, was to prove a very successful marriage.
A key contributory factor in the development of the Swedish 
Model was the early adoption of Keynesian macroeconomic policies 
designed to achieve full employment. The Swedish anti-depression 
program has been long-identified as one of the earliest instances 
of Keynesianism, and owed much to Ernst Wigforss, the Minister of
Sweden Enters the Industrial Era. Ohio, Ohio University Press, 
Athens, 1986. Other sources, however, give Sweden a slightly 
lower ranking. For example, Lehner ranks Sweden third after 
Switzerland and Germany for 1980. Franz Lehner, 'The Political 
Economy of Distributive Conflict', in Rudolf Wildenmann (ed), The 
Future of Party Government. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1988, 
p.86. Fulcher notes that Sweden ranked second after the United 
States in the 1960s. James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers 
and the State. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p.202.
18 Lars Nabseth and Jan Wallender, 'Can Sweden Remain a 
Leading Industrial Nation?', in Bengt Ryden and Villy Bergstrom, 
Sweden: Choices for Economic and Social Policy in the 1980s.
London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp.75-79.
189
5 - Evolving Theoretical Models Of Swedish Corporatism
Finance in the Social Democratic Labour Party (Socialdemokratiska 
Arbeta.repa.rti, SAP) government. It employed elements of demand 
stimulation and deficit financing.19
This development of government economic stabilisation policy 
coupled with a growing social welfare concept was not linked 
explicitly with the development of corporatist approaches to wage 
determination, but it was to have a crucial bearing on the later 
capacity of the government to compensate for shocks in the wage 
determination process. Social welfare policy was derived from a 
strong collective policy tradition, and was aided in its 
implementation by economic growth and SAP political incumbency.20 
Key elements of later policy innovations were present even at 
this early period, such as support for more active programs to 
deal with unemployment, by offering the unemployed work (such as 
road-building projects) and wages (at market rates) . The costs of 
these policies were covered by higher progressive taxes on 
income, inheritances and wealth.21
These Keynesian and welfare components, in combination with 
Sweden's strong starting position, were rewarded by a series of 
fortuitous economic conditions. Global economic growth nurtured 
the Swedish Model in its early development virtually from the end 
of the Great Depression, when the export of pulp and paper, light
19 Wigforss also did much to popularise the concept of the 
folkhemmet - the "Peoples' Home”.
20 As Weir and Skocpol argue, Sweden was uniquely placed 
among those states that adopted Keynesian policies in the 1930s 
because it had bv far the most powerful central administration 
and governmental direction. M. Weir and T. Skocpol, 'State 
Structure and the Possibilities for Keynesian Response to the 
Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States', in 
P. Evans et al (eds), Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.107-63.
21 Significantly, corporate taxation was kept low: the SAP 
was a socialist government, but it had a good understanding of 
the need to support industry.
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engineering products and iron ore expanded. In the 1930s there 
was further expansion in sectors oriented to domestic markets.22 
Wartime cooperation between the political parties during WWII, 
and the policy of neutrality, contributed further to the economic 
basis of the developing Swedish Model. Sweden was able to ship 
exports despite the conflict, and it even exported ball bearings 
to Nazi Germany. At the close of the war, Sweden enjoyed an 
enviable position: political and social stability and an intact 
production system. GDP growth from 1946-1950 averaged 4.5 percent 
annually.23
In the 1944 Social Democratic Party programme, full 
employment policy topped a list of 27 points for change. Full 
employment was a necessary condition in obtaining the continued 
cooperation of the trade unions, as well as being an 
ideologically central plank in the policy platform of the SAP. In 
1948 a new Labour Market Board was created, the 
Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen (AMS), and active labour market policy 
ideas began to be more fully worked out. Job creation was aided 
by two manpower boards. which eventually drew on some 2 to 3 
percent of GDP from public funds.24
22 See Per Martin Meyer son, Swedish Economy at the Cross 
Roads, Stockholm, Federation of Swedish Industries, 1979, p.16. 
For a discussion of the 1930s, see Erik Lundberg, 'The Rise and 
Fall of the Swedish Model', Journal of Economic Literature. 23, 
1985, pp.5-12.
23 Stig Hadenius, Swedish Politics Purina the 20th Century, 
the Swedish Institute, Centraltryckeriet AB Boras, 1990, p.58.
24 For further information, see Malcolm MacLennan, Murray 
Forsyth and Geoffrey Denton, Economic Planning and Policies in 
Britain. France, and Germany. New York, Praeger, 1968, pp.286-88; 
OECD, Regional Problems and Policies in OECD Countries, vol. 1, 
Paris, 1976, pp.91-104; OECD, Selected Industrial Policy 
Instruments: Objectives and Scope. Paris 1978, pp.14-15; Harold 
G. Jones, Planning and Productivity in Sweden. London, Croom
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At the start of the 1950s, the Swedish labour movement 
initially expected a post-war depression and had intended 
interventionary policies designed to kick-start production. 
Instead, a boom in production and output among the developed 
countries ensued, external demand grew and capital was invested 
by employers, which allowed the unions to continue to deliver 
their cooperation.25 The economic growth meant, of course, that 
wage restraint was never severe enough to challenge the 
cooperation of the high pay groups. In the 1960s, for example, 
productivity increases were large enough so that unit labour 
costs only rose by an average of 2 percent while real hourly wage 
increases were at an average annual rate of nearly 5.5 percent.26 
As Rune Aberg, a Swedish professor of Sociology, writes:
'even if the higher paid workers lost in relative 
terms, they nevertheless earned more than they had
Helm, 1976, pp.202-203; Kenneth Hanf, Benny Hjern, and David O. 
Porter, Networks of Implementation and Administration for 
Manpower Policies at the local level in the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Sweden. Berlin, International Institute of 
Management, 1977, pp.77-16; OECD, The Industrial Policies of 14 
Member Countries. Paris, 1971.
25 Anna Hedborg and Rudolf Meidner, 'The Swedish Welfare 
State Model', in Gregg M. Olsen, ed., Industrial Change and 
Labour Adjustment in Sweden and Canada. Toronto, Garamond Press, 
1988, pp.62.
26 See Robert J. Flanagan, David W. Soskice and Lloyd Ulman, 
Unionism. Economic Stabilisation. and Incomes Policies. 
Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1983, p.308. Of 
course, a part of the high productivity rates in the 1960s was 
due not only to fair economic weather but to the shut down of 
inefficient plants as a result of the application of the Rehn 
model policies. See Erik Lundberg, 'The Rise and Fall of the 
Swedish Model', Journal of Economic Literature. 23, 1985, p.20.
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before and therefore distributional conflicts were not 
as serious as they would become in the 1980s'.27 
In the 1950s and 1960s, on average, wages growth did not 
outstrip improvements in competitiveness, so that the balance of 
payments on current account did not get seriously out of 
equilibrium. If wages growth did put pressure on the balance of 
payments, the Social Democratic government countered this with 
Keynesian stabilisation policy the following year. Profit margins 
were squeezed by "employer taxes”, wages and indirect tax during 
the 1950s and 1960s, but the effects were not appreciated due to 
the very advantageous starting position. During the 1960s, 
industrial productivity had a 7 to 8 percent annual increase.28 
As Lundberg writes:
'The growth rate, although a little below the OECD 
average, was satisfactory, having regard to the fact 
that Sweden's GNP per capita already was on a 
relatively high level at the start of the post-war 
period because of its neutrality in two world wars and 
because it had relatively high growth rates during the 
Twenties and Thirties'.29 
Profits were further boosted to an historically high level due to 
devaluations of the Krona in 1949 and the Korean War boom.
The Swedish Model was expensive to run. Pensions, sick pay 
and child allowance systems were shifted from means testing to
27 Rune Aberg, 'Economic Work Incentives and Labour Market 
Efficiency in Sweden', in Greg M. Olsen (ed), Industrial Change 
and Labour Adjustment in Sweden and Canada. Toronto, Garamond 
Press, 1988, pp.70-86.
28 Per-Martin Meyerson, Eurosclerosis: The Case Of Sweden. 
Federation of Swedish Industries, Caslon Press AB, 1985, p.59.
29 Erik Lundberg, 'The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model', 
Journal of Economic Literature. 23, 1985, p.3.
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general availability. By 1965 social welfare expenditure amounted 
to almost 30 percent of the central government budget, and by the 
end of the 1960s total public expenditure accounted for 40 
percent of GNP - the highest in the OECD area. But then GDP was 
increasing by an annual average of 3.5 percent in the 1950s and 
5 percent in the first half of the 1960s. High public 
expenditures on labour market programs, the generous universal 
health, pensions and compensations schemes, and most of all, the 
full employment, made sure that in Sweden restraint on the part 
of labour was never defined in real negative terms. This was even 
despite taxes which grew to 40.5 percent of GNP by 1970 (and 
reached 53.4 percent by 1977) .30
Wage restraint was thus always accompanied by an expanding 
collective compensation, and the values always summed in the 
positive direction. The costs of the Rehn strategy of economic 
restructuring were borne by the active labour market policy and 
the expansion of public employment. The restraint was always 
relative and not absolute. If we drew a game theoretical matrix 
for Sweden in the period up until 1965, we would find that the 
outcomes of cooperation between blue collar unions and capital in 
the competitive sector were always real improvements in economic 
well-being. This does not, we note, turn the situation into an 
assurance game, since successful free-riding would still remain 
the preferred strategy in a one-shot game, but it did lessen the 
relative attraction of free riding over repeated plays. Moreover, 
the low pay groups were kept cooperating by the wage policy of 
solidarity and the high pay groups by the strategy of minimising 
wage drift through squeezing profits.
All of this was made possible, we argue, by largely 
exogenous economic conditions, in combination with Sweden's
30 For these figures, see Robert J. Flanagan et al, Unionism. 
Economic Stabilisation, and Incomes Policies. Washington, D.C., 
The Brookings Institution, 1983, p.316.
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strong starting position. In this context, the Swedish Model and 
the corporatist system did function successfully, and we accept 
the argument that they contributed towards much of Sweden's 
particularly outstanding achievements in terms of employment, 
welfare and restructuring.31 But the Swedish Model and the 
corporatist system functioned well in part because they operated 
in the context of fair economic weather, and were in fact, 
functional in their contemporaneous design only in that context. 
As Fulcher writes, 'Economic growth was both a condition and a 
consequence of a corporatism that worked'.32 In the context of 
the remarkable growth of the world economy during that time, in 
which countries both corporatist and non-corporatist prospered 
alike, it seems reasonable to attribute the more fundamental 
sources of this growth to what we term economic fair weather. 
Sweden's brand of socialism, then, functioned more to make an 
already strongly situated economy more equitable and responsive 
to change, than to produce or generate its prosperity in the 
first place.
5.1.2. Earlv Developments.
In the 1930s, in what was, at that time, a very favourable 
economic climate, the blue collar Swedish Confederation of Labour 
(Landsorganisationen i Sverige: LO) and the Swedish Employers'
31 As Fulcher writes: 'While Sweden's favourable post-war 
situation provided a good launching pad, continued and steady 
growth depended on structural change and growth in productivity.' 
James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers. And The State. 
Conflict and Cooperation in Britain and Sweden. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1991, p.202. See also Olson's argument that Sweden's 
relative economic success was largely produced by its low levels 
of protectionism, its high level of economic understanding, its 
"encompassing" organisations, and its "explicit" redistribution 
system. Mancur Olson, How Bright are the Northern Lights? Some 
Questions about Sweden. Institute of Economic Research, Lund 
University Press, 1990, p.86.
32 James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers. And The State. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p.203.
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Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen: SAF) decided to 
work together to improve the efficiency of the wage determination 
system. After the shock of the most damaging labour conflict to 
date in Swedish history, in the 1920s and early 1930s, the 
Swedes' tendency to react by seeking consensus prevailed.33
The earliest origins of centralised bargaining as a means to 
manage the wage determination process can be traced back to the 
1906 "December Compromise" between SAF and the Social Democratic 
Party, recognising freedom of association, but giving employers 
the right to engage and dismiss workers freely. This agreement 
gave an impetus to the development of collective agreements at 
the national level. From the point of view of SAF, which later 
took the lead in pushing for a more centralised system, it was 
preferable to recognise the unions and seek stability in the wage 
determination system, in the process avoiding government 
interference, than to continue with a system which had shown a 
propensity towards industrial and distributional conflict.34
Industrial militancy was linked to the existence of high pay 
and low pay conflicts in the 1930s, with the construction unions
33 This "consensus" element is one of those apparently 
unquantifiable cultural variables, which often serves as a cover­
all for rational choices and processes that we do not as yet 
understand. As Hadenius puts it: 'The good economic situation 
naturally helped create a favourable negotiating climate, but 
this hardly sufficed to explain the spirit of compromise that 
emerged in Sweden'. Stig Hadenius, Swedish Politics During the 
20th Century. 1990, the Swedish Institute, Centraltryckeriet AB 
Boras, p.42. Also, as Czada argues, LO's decision to cooperate 
could not have been a result of high levels of organisational 
centralisation and unionisation since both of these were 
relatively low in the 1930s. Roland Czada, 'The Impact of 
Interest Politics on Flexible Adjustment Policies', in Hans 
Keman, Heikki Paloheimo and Paul F. Whiteley (eds), Cooing With 
The Economic Crisis. London, Sage, 1987, pp.34-35.
34 Robert J. Flanagan, David W. Soskice and Lloyd Ulman, 
Unionism. Economic Stabilisation. and Incomes Policies. 
Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1983, p.303.
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and the metal unions competing for high pay status. The solution 
was to press for greater centralisation, but the cooperation of 
the construction workers was also facilitated by the compensation 
of government spending on public housing projects (for the 
building industry).35 It constitutes an early example of the 
linkage between economic growth and centrally agreed wages.
The negotiations during the 1930s reached a key juncture 
with the Saltsjobaden agreement of 1938, which set rules for 
disputes negotiations, limited third party disputes, specified 
the procedure for layoffs, and appointed a Labour Market Council, 
to include LO and SAF representatives, to function as a national 
negotiating body. It set the scene for later collaboration at the 
centralised level.36
The combination of a push by SAF for national agreements, 
the support of LO, and the Social Democrats and Agrarian Party, 
and the attraction of a full employment growth strategy, set the 
Swedish labour market actors on an historic path which had the 
effect of strengthening LO as a central actor and creating an 
organisational basis for further developments in centralised 
bargaining.37 National agreements themselves contributed much to
35 Peter Swenson, 'Labour and the Limits of the Welfare 
State. The Politics of Intraclass Conflict and Cross-Class 
Alliances in Sweden and West Germany', Comparative Politics. 23, 
1991, pp.383-387.
36 See International Research Group, Industrial Relations in 
Europe, IIM Paper, /79-12, May 1979.
37 It is, simply, not easy to account for just why LO should 
have later become quite so strong. As Anna Hedborg, a Senior 
Economist in LO, and Rudolf Meidner, put it: '[The] phenomenon 
itself lacks a really convincing explanation. The general Swedish 
tendency to organise all the various social areas (for example, 
employers, tenants, etc.) has been put forward as a hypothesis. 
So also has the long traditional collaboration between the trade 
union movement (LO) and the Social Democratic Party. Finally, the 
Swedish trade union structure - i.e., the organisation of trade 
unions in accordance with the industrial principle without
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the development of LO. The blue-collar confederation's role as an 
organisation for developing economic and wage strategies in 
conjunction with SAP economic and social policy would later 
enable progress in the direction of expanding strategic focus 
beyond narrow labour market conflicts and toward a broader model 
of trade union involvement in Sweden's political economy.
5.2. The Rehn-Meidner Model,
The Swedish Model first began to be explicitly developed as 
a distinctive approach to the organisation of the Swedish 
political economy through the work of Gosta Rehn and Rudolf 
Meidner, who together developed a theoretical rationalisation of 
evolving policy components such as the wage policy of solidarity, 
the emphasis on economic restructuring, use of fiscal policy, and 
the active labour market policy. These elements, we argue, became 
inseparably linked with the centralised and cooperative mode of 
wage determination, which had developed as a result of 
initiatives by SAF and LO in a context of employment and output 
growth, and they were also dependent upon the active 
interventionist policy stance of the Social Democratic 
government.
Since the ”Rehn model”, as we refer to it, was based around 
a distribution of responsibilities and policies shared between 
LO, SAF and the Swedish left-government, we will examine it from 
a game-theoretical perspective, i.e., we will treat each of these 
"actors" as a homogenous entity and examine in turn their
confessional, language or political division - has been pointed 
out as an important element'. See Anna Hedborg and Rudolf 
Meidner, 'The Swedish Welfare State Model', in Gregg M. Olsen, 
ed., Industrial Change and Labour Adjustment in Sweden and 
Canada, Toronto, Garamond Press, 1988, p.61. See also Michael 
Wallerstein, 'Union Organisation in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies', American Political Science Review. 83, 2, June
1989, pp.481-501, and John Stephens, The Transition from 
Capitalism to Socialism. London, Macmillan, 1979.
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interests, preferences and subsequent roles in the developing 
Swedish Model.
The Swedish Model is sometimes characterised as a bipartite 
model of corporatist cooperation between labour and capital, that 
is to say, LO and SAF, with government playing a non­
intervent ionary role in the wage determination sphere.38 As 
Andrew Martin writes, the public budget was to be used:
'to shape the environment in which production decisions are 
made, while leaving the decisions themselves to managers 
whose authority and criteria for decision-making continued 
to be those derived from capitalist institutions'39 
This unique division of labour is certainly one of the key 
defining aspects of the Swedish Model. Government's role was 
conceived to be primarily supportive of employment, income, 
public works and investment; its intervention in labour disputes 
was not appreciated.40
But despite the "hands off" approach of government to wage 
fixing, the model was always tripartite in the sense that 
government played a crucial role through policy choices in 
supporting the conditions under which cooperation by LO and SAF 
could be sustained. These policy choices were in turn enabled by 
a strong underlying rate of growth. Firstly, government was given 
the task of managing fiscal policy in such a way as to counter
38 Walter Korpi, 'The Historical Compromise and its 
Dissolution', in Bengt Ryden and Villy Bergstrom (eds), Sweden: 
Choices for Economic and Social Policy in the 1980s. London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1982, p.133.
39 Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic 
Responses to Change and Crisis', in Peter Gourevitch, Andrew 
Martin, George Ross, Christopher Allen, Stephen Bornstein, Andrei 
Markovits, Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain. West Germany and 
Sweden, London, Allen and Unwin, 1984, p.199-200.
40 Lei Delsen and Tom van Veen, 'The Swedish Model: Relevant 
for Other European Countries?', British Journal of Industrial 
Relations. 30, 1, 1992, p.85.
199
5 - Evolving Theoretical Models Of Swedish Corporatism
demand fluctuations by boosting demand to bridge over small 
downturns and restricting it at the right time to cool down 
overheating.41 Any mistiming in fiscal policy, however, would 
tend to exacerbate the effect of the shock and pass on most of 
the responsibility for dealing with the excess cost to wages and 
monetary policy. But despite the risk of this occurring, the 
centralised wage determination process was by and large dependent 
upon government getting its policy mix "almost right". The two 
labour market actors tended to base their bargaining strategies 
on the simplifying expectation that the government would be able 
to execute a successful stabilisation policy.
The underlying assumption was that government would help to 
sustain economic growth, thus ensuring the success of the Rehn 
model and ensuring that cooperation could be sustained in the 
corporatist sphere. The strategy came to rely heavily on the 
state budget, as government became expected to provide a labour 
retraining and relocation service, to provide the bulk of funds 
for investment in the private sector, and to maintain high levels 
of growth in public employment. The best way to characterise 
these aspects of the role of government in the Swedish Model is 
in terms of pay-offs for the cooperation of the labour market 
actors. As Lange and Garrett argue, the supply of compensatory 
payoffs by government is crucial to the continued cooperation of 
trade unions and employers in a corporatist wage determination 
system.42 The success of Keynesianism, which achieved full
41 For a discussion of the effect on wage bargaining of 
economic stabilisation policy see Lars Calmfors, 'Stabilisation 
Policy and Wage Formation in Economies with Strong Trade Unions', 
in Micheal Emerson (ed), Europe's Stagflation. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1984, pp.89-122.
42 Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics of Growth: 
Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced 
Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980', Journal of Politics. 47, 
1985, pp.792-827; Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, 'The Politics 
of Growth Reconsidered'.Journal of Politics. 49, 1987, pp.257-74;
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employment and welfare expansion, was based on a historic 
compatibility between demand-expansion and capitalist expansion 
during the post-war period.43 This historic compatibility was a 
function of the predominance of fair economic weather.
In terms of our distinction between fair and foul economic 
weather, the nature of compensatory payoffs is clearly very 
important. In fair economic weather, it will be possible for 
government to redistribute its share of the growing economic pie 
in ways that compensate workers for temporary unemployment and 
ensure sufficient investment for future growth in incomes. The 
restraint of the labour market actors will then be buttressed by 
the expectation that any short term costs will be translated in 
the medium to long term into real gains. In foul weather, of 
course, this dependence upon the compensation of restraint with 
gains will become a severe weakness. Our own argument is that, in 
foul weather, the compensation will be in terms of reduced costs, 
but it remains to be seen whether this outcome is sufficient to 
ensure the continued cooperation of the labour market actors.
A clear impetus for the development of fully centralised 
wage bargaining in the 1950s came from government and, in 
particular, SAF pressure on LO to deliver wage restraint. During
Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, 'Government Partisanship and 
Economic Performance: When and How Does "Who Governs" Matter?', 
Journal of Politics. 51, 1989, pp.676-78; R. Michael Alvarez, 
Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, 'Government Partisanship, Labor 
Organisation, And Macroeconomic Performance', American Political 
Science Review. 85, 2, 1991, pp.539-56; see also Robert Jackman, 
'The Politics of Economic Growth in the Industrial Democracies, 
1974-1980', Journal of Politics. 49, 1987, pp.242-56; and Robert 
Jackman, "The Politics of Growth, Once Again', Journal of 
Politics. 51, 1989, pp.646-61.
43 As Przeworski writes: 'Keynesianism was not only a theory 
that justified socialist participation in government but, even 
more fortuitously from the social democractic point of view, it 
was a theory that suddenly granted a universalistic status to the 
interests of workers'. Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social 
Democracy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.36-37.
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the Second World War, the highest ever degree of government 
influence over wages was established, which contributed towards 
the growing use of LO as an instrument of restraint. Underlying 
the wartime centralised structure, however, distributional 
struggle over available gains continued and the encompassing 
actors, including LO, pushed for a centralised resolution of 
income distribution. By the beginning of the 1950s, as James 
Fulcher writes, SAF was 'seeking central negotiations in order to 
use the LO's central authority to press wage restraint on the 
unions, halt leap-frogging wage demands, and prevent weak 
employers conceding large increases'
A fact which underlines the fundamental limits of 
centralisation in sustaining cooperation was that, from LO's 
point of view, it remained unenforceable. The 
institutionalisation of central bargaining did not increase LO's 
formal authority, and LO never gained the power to impose 
settlements on its members unions. The unions were free to remain 
outside the central framework, if they wished, and did not need 
to submit any claims to LO for approval. Instead, the most 
important consequence of centralisation was within the LO unions 
themselves, where wage policy management became more professional 
and less directed from the shop floor.45 Of course LO supported 
centralisation, both because as an encompassing organisation it 
was in a position to have an interest in wage outcomes which did 
not damage overall growth and employment prospects for the
44 James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers. And The 
State. Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 191-92. Fulcher writes that in 
the course of the 1950s, the Swedish trade unions in the LO-area 
were by and large forced to accept central bargaining because SAF 
could credibly threaten lockouts and ensure through control over 
its own members that industry-level negotiations were made less 
attractive.
45 James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers and the State. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p.188-89.
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Swedish economy and because it enhanced LO's power resources. But 
ultimately cooperation had to flow from the support of high and 
low pay unions for centralisation, and for this reason LO 
required a growth-strategy that met union interests.
LO used the opportunity given by SAF's pressure to develop 
a set of policies which exploited the possibilities offered from 
centralised bargaining and cooperation with capital. The strategy 
was grounded in the high and low pay unions' aversion to 
government-sponsored incomes policy and their desire to pursue a 
more egalitarian wages policy.46 LO essentially traded a 
"solidaristic" wages policy, coupled with SAP public policy 
support, in exchange for capital getting centralised coordination 
of wages, some degree of wage restraint, and keeping managerial 
prerogatives.
The wage solidarity strategy, which is at the heart of the 
"Rehn Model"47, was a masterful blend of fair economic weather
46 Robert J. Flanagan et al, Unionism. Economic 
Stabilisation. and Incomes Policy. Washington, D.C., The 
Brookings Institution, 1983, p.305.
47 In this thesis, we focus on Rehn's model rather than 
Rudolf Meidner's collective capital formation plan of the mid- 
1970s, which is really a separate, and related issue. The Meidner 
plan intended to allocate a percentage of profits to employee 
investment funds. LO economists were attempting to force 
investment out of a recalcitrant private sector, but the policy 
proposals only succeeded in stirring debate and raising the 
political temperature. See P. Aimer, 'The Strategy of Gradualism 
and the Swedish Wage-Earner Funds', West European Politics. 8, 3, 
1985. Similarly, rank and file pressure for industrial democracy, 
which resulted in the 1976 Codetermination law and the 1982 
Development Agreements, is a separate issue that will not be 
discussed here. It reflected in part a growing frustration with 
centralisation and the power of the large confederations. 
Kristina Ahlen, 'Swedish Collective Bargaining Under Pressure: 
Inter-Union Rivalry and Incomes Policies', British Journal of 
Industrial Relations. 17, 1989, pp.330-346; Olaf Ruin,
'Participatory Democracy and Corporativism', Scandinavian 
Political Studies. 9, 1974; Mario Regini and Gosta Esping-
Andersen, 'Trade Union Strategies and Social Policy in Italy and
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and growth-based restraint. LO specifically rejected wage 
restraint in isolation as a means to reduce inflation on the 
grounds that wage drift would undermine it and that unions would 
be forced to respond to increasing differentials by performing
their basic function: namely, defending members' relative income.
As Rehn writes, the problem was:
'[H]ow to keep investment in equipment and plants high
enough for full employment to be obtained without profits
being kept so high that it is impossible for trade unions to 
support non-inflationary wage demands'.48 
Rehn believed that it would be infeasible for the Swedish labour 
market actors to exercise sufficient restraint in such 
conditions, a point which draws attention to the fact that, in 
the Rehn model, the prospects for unions delivering wage 
restraint in the absence of compensatory gains were seen to be 
very slim. This view was quite realistic, since LO had no 
intentions of offering its services in achieving unconditional 
restraint. As LO stated:
[T]he trade union, movement should make it perfectly clear 
that it cannot and should not accept any ...unconditional 
responsibility for the preservation of national economic 
stability' ,49
Gosta Rehn's alternative was built upon achieving wage 
restraint through a policy which distributed gains and which 
operated within a broader context of active labour market
Sweden', West European Politics. 3, 2, 1980, p.111.
48 See Gosta Rehn, 'State, Economic Policy and Industrial 
Relations in the 1980s: Problems and Trends', Economic and
Industrial Democracy. 8, 1987, p.65.
49 LO, Trade Unions and Full Employment. Stockholm, LO, 1953, 
p.87, cited in Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions In Sweden: Strategic 
Responses To Change and Crisis', in Peter Gourevitch et al, 
Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain. West Germany and Sweden. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1984, p.204.
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policies, restrictive fiscal policy, and, most importantly, the 
"wage policy of solidarity", a term coined by LO's editor, Albin 
Lind. When the LO-Congress discussed wage solidarity for the 
first time in 1936, the early arguments focused on equitability 
and income distribution rather than the growth-based 
restructuring element, no doubt because many of the employment 
consequences of restructuring were still regarded as a critical 
issue by unions.50 In Rehn's formulation, however, solidarity was 
designed to achieve both equitability and restructuring.
The essence of the wage policy of solidarity was "equal pay 
for equal work", not payment according to profitability. The 
solidaristic policy thus implied that low pay workers would have 
their differentials upgraded faster than high pay groups. 
Unproductive labour would become too expensive to sustain. This 
meant, importantly, that only the most efficient industries would 
survive and develop. In practice, since it was so difficult to 
measure what constituted equal work, solidarity came to mean 
simply the improvement of the low pay groups relative to the high 
pay groups. But the consequences of the egalitarian policy 
remained the same: the elimination of cheap and unproductive 
industries. Solidarity was designed to guarantee the labour force 
a decent job and strengthen the trading position of Sweden (by 
guiding it with the help of market competition to a point where 
the highest possible number of Swedish industries were high pay, 
high-profit).
50 Ake Dahlberg, 'Sweden's Labour Market Policies: Programmes 
and Costs', in Gregg M. Olsen (ed), Industrial Change and Labour 
Adjustment in Sweden and Canada. Toronto, Garamond Press, 1988, 
p.97. It should be noted that it was not the wage policy of 
solidarity which led LO to adopt centralised bargaining in the 
1950s, although centralised wage negotiations certainly became a 
means to implement that policy. James Fulcher, Labour Movements. 
Employers and the State. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p.190.
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In terms of performance in reducing wage differentials, the 
solidaristic wage policy has had a mixed success. Compression of 
the wage structure has been most noticeable for blue collar 
workers since the 1960s. Although white collar workers never 
adopted the policy, their wage dispersion was in fact not much 
greater, a phenomenon which also occurred in other countries 
which lacked an explicit policy such as this. Between 1964 and 
1982, about two-thirds of the objective sought by the wage policy 
of solidarity was undone by wage drift.51 According to some 
authors, in Sweden there has been no marked change in income 
distribution since 1948: the number of workers with 40 percent or 
less of mean income has reportedly increased considerably, while 
those with "normal" incomes decreased. The proportion of workers 
with high incomes has still increased.52
The "wage policy of solidarity", then, did not perform quite 
as well in practice as in theory. But it did function in a key 
role as a highly visible means of securing and justifying higher 
wages growth in low pay sectors, whether or not it was successful 
in reducing wage differentials after wage drift in high pay
51 Robert J. Flanagan, 'Efficiency and Equality in Swedish 
Labour Markets', in Barry P. Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin (eds), 
The Swedish Economy. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 
1987, pp.131-40.
52 See L. Panitch, 'The Development of Corporatism in Liberal 
Democracies', in P.C. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (eds), Trends 
Towards Corporatist Intermediation. London, Sage, 1979, pp.119- 
46; and R. Scase, Social Democracy in Capitalist Society: Working 
Class Politics in Britain and Sweden. London, Croom Helm, 1977, 
p. 162. For a more positive review of the solidaristic policy, see 
Gosta Rehn and Birger Viklund, 'Changes in the Swedish Model', in 
Guido Baglioni and Colin Crouch (eds), European Industrial 
Relations. The Challenge of Flexibility. London, Sage, 1990, 
pp.304-5. Also, Anne Hedborg and Rudolf Meidner estimate that the 
gap between average wages for the low and high pay groups fell 
from 29.6 percent in 1959 to 12.7 percent in 1982. See James 
Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers and the State. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1991, p.190, footnote 3.
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sectors had occurred. Success in the final instance hinged more 
upon the policy achieving two separate aims: to minimise wage 
drift as much as possible, particularly in the high pay sector, 
and to secure the compliance of the low pay actors with general 
LO wages policy strategy. To minimise wage drift in the high pay 
sector, the wage policy of solidarity in fact had to allow high 
pay wages to squeeze profits sufficiently, a fact which was 
hardly conducive to allowing low pay wages to catch up.
Profits were thus to be squeezed from below, through the 
solidaristic wage, and from above, through the application of 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, in such a way that 
'employers effectively resist the inflationary wage demands'.53 
The employers themselves were thus expected to play as important 
a role in achieving wage restraint as the unions. The squeeze on 
profits in unproductive sectors would in turn generate economic 
restructuring, which would be facilitated by active labour market 
policies and government-supplied capital formation to ensure 
economic growth and full employment.
The profit-squeeze envisaged structural change and the 
generation of increased output and income from the hugely 
profitable competitive sector. This was the optimistic half of 
the Rehn model, since it rested on the somewhat unproven 
assumption that by forcing structural change increased output 
could always be produced. The restructuring element was designed 
to provide a self-generating stimulus to growth within the model. 
Wages would squeeze profits, but they would also be restrained by 
the centralised nature of the wage determination system. The 
payoff for the trade union actors, or to put it another way, 
their compensation for exercising restraint and remaining within 
the centralised framework, would be supplied precisely by this
53 Gosta Rehn, 'State, Economic Policy and Industrial 
Relations in the 1980s: Problems and Trends', Economic and
Industrial Democracy. 8, 1987, p.68.
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restructuring element and its growth-generating properties. 
Active labour market policies would serve to facilitate the 
structural adjustment and generate new employment. It is this 
growth-based aspect of the Rehn model which we wish to 
analytically distinguish from the corporatist model.
The argument for centralisation as a mechanism for achieving 
cooperation in the distribution of restraint was that centralised 
wage determination would minimise wage-drift price shocks. This 
was the corporatist element of the Rehn model which 
operationalised cooperation in the labour market to minimise 
prisoners' dilemmas.
Figure 5.1.
The Rehn Model.
GOVERNMENT
X
SAVINGS/INVESTMENT
Employment Policy i «- Fiscal Policy
............4-................................................
Economic
Solidaristic wages Growth
policy 
I t
no wage drift = wage restraint
t
CENTRALISED BARGAINING
t
TRADE UNIONS
The control and management of "wage drift" (i.e., distributional 
conflict), is precisely the gain that corporatism achieves 
(fully centralised wage determination really only began in Sweden 
in 1956).
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Figure 5.1. presents a diagrammatic representation of the 
Rehn Model. In order for the Swedish economy to benefit from 
coordinated wage determination (i.e., wage restraint and 
relatively low wage drift), the centralised bargaining system had 
to be buttressed by the solidaristic wage policy, which in turn 
required the support of an active employment policy. Together, 
the Rehn model and the corporatist system were expected to 
produce continuing high levels of economic growth, which was a 
necessary condition for the stability of the model.
The Rehn model was devised, as we shall see, in a period of 
economic fair weather, in which external demand was very 
favourable. It was expected that high profits and continued 
productivity growth would be produced in stronger sectors of the 
economy. The only way, under these conditions, to reduce wage 
drift among affiliates in high-profit sectors would be to squeeze 
profits hard enough to secure the compliance of the local trade 
unions with centrally-determined contractual increases. Thus, 
paradoxically, the only way to restrain wage drift was to allow 
wages to be high enough to make it less attractive.54
Thus the Swedish Model was an economic strategy designed for 
fair economic weather, when there was little problem in finding 
investment funds. The public sector, in fact, became the 
principal source for investment finance, mostly through the 
national pension system, replacing the private sector whose 
profit was to be squeezed with collective savings. Capital 
retained control over its own investment decisions, however. The
54 For a brief summary of the Rehn Model, see George Ross and 
Peter Gourevitch, 'Conclusion', in Peter Gourevitch et al, Unions 
and Economic Crisis: Britain. West Germany and Sweden. London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1984, p.369.
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growing state as a source of collective savings and employment 
was an integral part of Rehn's overall socialist strategy.55
We can summarise the Rehn model by listing the conditions 
required for its successful operation:
(i) successful structural change producing growth in output 
employment, and incomes;
(ii) solidaristic wages squeezing profits;
(iii) device of central negotiations to restrain wage drift; 
(iv) fiscal policy squeezing profits and producing budget 
surpluses;
(v) government providing investment funds;
(vi) government subsidising employment and active labour 
market policy;
(vii) employer rights and prerogatives protected;
(viii) employers resisting inflationary wage demands.
In all, the model can be seen to depend foremost on the 
first condition - structural change generating growth in output 
and income shares - which is inherently problematic, since 
structural change does not always and necessarily produce growth 
in output and incomes, and without growth the solidaristic wage 
policy would begin to squeeze investment as well as profits. 
Moreover, if the economy contracted then the state would no 
longer be able to supply high levels of investment funds, run a 
budget surplus and subsidise employment. Finally, the device of 
centralised wage determination had to encompass all the key 
labour market actors, and the LO/SAF system ignored white-collar 
and public sector workers. This is a point we will return to in 
the next chapter.
55 See Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic 
Responses to Change and Crisis', in Peter Gourevitch et al, 
Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain. West Germany and Sweden. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1984, p.207.
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5.3. The EFO and FOS Models.
The evolution of the Rehn Model was accompanied by a 
parallel development of cooperation in the determination of 
wages. In this process, which involved chief economists from the 
major peak federations collaborating on an econometric model and 
the implementation of their strategy through the existing 
mechanisms of wage negotiation, iteration was clearly important. 
At each stage the strategy was refined and elaborated 
theoretically, with the organisations relying on the promise of 
gains achieved through iterated outcomes as a motivation to 
sustain conditional cooperation. Perhaps the earliest example of 
this type of cooperation occurred in 1967, when SAF proposed a 
structured negotiation procedure designed to achieve the twin 
goals of greater centralised coordination of wage determination 
and an agreed ceiling on the sustainable room for wage increases. 
The Proposal had 5 stages:
Stage 1: experts calculate 'room for wage increase'. 
Stage 2: the scope for contractual increases is 
calculated by deducting wage drift and 
increased labour costs from the 'room for wage 
increase'.
Stages 3,4,5: Industry level negotiations distribute the
available room for increase among the unions.
The employers sought to provide for a means to determine 
what the solidaristic wage should be. SAF suggested a “group of 
economic experts" to determine the available room for wage 
increases, and to deduct extra costs, so that what was left was 
a truly "sustainable wage". But LO made an objection to this 
plan, on the grounds that it turned the union confederation into 
a 'government office for the determination of wages', with no 
recognition of its basic function as an organisation which fought
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for 'the greatest possible share of the real gross national 
product'.56
From an early stage, LO's policy was to accept that there 
was a cooperative equilibrium, but that it could vary among 
different combinations of wages and profits. The trade union 
actors refused to cede the determination of wages to an 
econometric model or to a group of experts, and defended their 
right to increase their relative share. It can be seen that the 
solidarity model and SAF's plan focused respectively on each 
side's very different requirements for a centralised wage 
determination system. The unions would only agree to centralised 
bargaining if the solidaristic wage policy squeezed profits so 
that wage drift could be minimised and benefitted the low pay 
actors. Otherwise, LO saw no way to retain the support for 
centralised bargaining it needed from low and high pay union 
affiliates. The SAF proposal would only agree to centralised 
bargaining if a ceiling was placed on the amount of profit that 
could be squeezed.
In sum, these two uncompromising positions came to provide 
a basis for the development of a theoretical framework for wage 
determination practices and macroeconomic policy in the 1960s and 
early 1970s (and later in the 1990s) which we will distinguish as 
the corporatist "half” of the Swedish Model. The distinction is 
a little artificial, however, since as well as being an economic 
method of reaching collectively optimal wage outcomes, this new 
elaboration of corporatist practice produced an interpretation of 
centralised wage determination in a way which complemented the 
growth-oriented nature of the Rehn model. This becomes 
particularly apparent in the FOS model. But essentially the
56 See Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic
Responses to Change and Crisis', in Peter Gourevitch et al, 
Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain. West Germany and Sweden. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1984, pp.241-246. The quotes are from 
Odhner, LO's research director.
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EFO/FOS models can be viewed as being firmly planted in the 
corporatist sphere of the evolving Swedish Model.
The original EFO model was elaborated and published as a 
book, Lonebildnina och samhallsekonomi (Wage Formation and the 
Economy) in 1970, by three confederation economists, Gosta 
Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxen and Claus-Erik Odhner, who worked 
respectively for TCO (the white collar confederation), SAF, and 
LO.57 It was recently updated (as the FOS model) with Roland 
Spant taking the place of Odhner in Lonebildnincren i 90-talets 
samhallsekonomi (Wage Formation And The Economy In The Nineties). 
published in 1988.58
Roland Spant describes the EFO model as an 'enormous 
intellectual revelation', comparable to Keynes.59 The main 
innovative idea was that the EFO model borrowed a two-sector 
model of the economy from the Norwegian Aukrust report of 1966. 
The economy was divided into the competitive (C) sector, and the 
sheltered (S) sector. The competitive sector was designated the 
wage leader because it was the "engine of growth” for the Swedish 
economy. The EFO model thus recognised that future improvements 
in output and incomes would be dependent upon the competitive 
sector remaining internationally competitive and generating 
growth.60
57 The English translation is: Gosta Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxen, 
Clas-Erik Odhner, Wage Formation and the Economy. London, Allen 
and Unwin, 1973.
58 Karl-Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner, Roland Spant, 
Lonebildninaen i 90-talets Samhallsekonomi. Stockholm, Raben and 
Sjogren, 1988. At time of writing, the only English translation 
available is a monograph which summarises the main sections.
59 Roland Spant, TCO Economist, interview, Stockholm, 9 June
1992.
60 At this point, it is important to note a fact which is 
well known, namely that the Swedish economy is a very "open" 
economy. This means that the economy has a large proportion of
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According to the EFO model, to achieve profitability in the 
export-oriented competitive sector (in relation to the 
internationally-determined return on capital), and to sustain a 
favourable trend in the balance of trade and the balance of 
payments on current account, the level of wages growth had to be 
within a certain "corridor”. This corridor was defined, in 
practical terms, as the gap between contractual increases that 
left too much room for drift (i.e., too low), and increases that 
left too little room for investment out of profit (i.e., too 
high).61 In strictly economic terms, however, the authors of the
exports and imports to GDP and makes it particularly dependent on 
achieving a high degree of competitiveness. This "openness" has 
been argued by some authors to explain the high degree of 
consensus and cooperation in Sweden, since the sense of economic 
vulnerability is said to be highly conducive to the actors 
achieving cooperative outcomes. In game-theoretical terms, it 
increases the incentives for conditional cooperation. Other 
authors have also argued that the "openness" is conducive to 
promoting innovation and growth because it reduces the costly 
payment of inefficient subsidies to narrow distributional 
coalitions. See P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change. Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1984; P. Katzenstein, Small States in 
World Markets. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985; M. Olson, 
The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, Con., Yale University 
Press, 1982; and M. Olson, How bright are the Northern Lights? 
Some Questions about Sweden. Institute of Economic Research, Lund 
University Press, 1990.
61 The concept of such "corridors" was an innovative and 
crucial component in both the EFO and FOS models. It is a key 
aspect of the EFO and FOS models that they reject classical 
economic assumptions of an "equilibrium" outcome for prices and 
wages which could be strictly determined. Instead, following J. 
von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behaviour, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944, in their 
assumption of oligopolistic competition and use of game theory, 
the authors argue that only the limits of the areas of 
negotiation, or the corridor walls, can be determined using 
deductive methods. In general terms, the authors prefer a dynamic 
rather than an equilibrium model of economic outcomes. See Karl- 
Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner, Roland Spant, 'Wage Formation and 
the Economy in the Nineties', English translation monograph, 
pp.13, 23-24, 30.
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EFO model showed how macroeconomic factors determined the 
position of the corridors' walls, between which lay "areas of 
negotiation" within which price and wage formation would remain 
theoretically undetermined. It was of course a crucial assumption 
of this model that the practical requirement that the corridor 
included enough room for real wage increases did not contradict 
the economic requirement that the corridor define the room for 
available wage increases (which may not in fact satisfy the trade 
union preference for increases to be high enough to restrain wage 
drift), a point we will return to in the following section.
Between the two walls of the corridor, labour and capital 
could remain free to pursue their distributional struggle without 
damaging the overall competitiveness of Sweden's export sector. 
This was an important and innovative aspect of the model, and 
essentially outlined a compromise between SAF's requirement for 
a rigid sustainable wage and LO's requirement for the unions to 
perform their basic function and fight for a larger share of 
profits. The corridor defined the sustainable level of wages, or 
the "main course", as . the EFO and FOS authors put it, which 
consisted in wages growth being at most equal to the increase in 
productivity growth within the competitive sector plus changes in 
world market prices at given currency exchange rates.62
62 To give the full economic requirement of the corridor, the 
FOS authors write: 'The "main course" of the Aukrust and EFO
models may be interpreted as the wage and price trend compatible 
with a macroeconomic development which fulfills the requirement 
for full employment, a balanced current account and a 
relationship between the wage and profit components of value 
added which allows both investment and consumption demand to be 
kept large enough to jointly maintain a strong pressure of demand 
and satisfactory capital stock growth,' p.11. For a useful 
discussion of the EFO model, see Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. 
Lawrence, 'Adjusting to Slower Economic Growth: The Domestic 
Economy', in Barry P. Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin, The Swedish 
Economy. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1987, 
pp.41-44.
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The EFO model was thus somewhat dependent upon assuming 
stable currency exchange rates in order to calculate the room for 
wages growth in the competitive sector. It provided, however, a 
basis for making macroeconomic calculations of the "warrented" or 
"sustainable” wage. It was clearly the product of an encompassing 
perspective and depended on centralisation, but it also somewhat 
modified the problems of achieving conditional cooperation by 
allowing the actors room to bargain within a corridor that was 
expected to be wide enough, given economic growth, to minimise 
distributional conflict. The EFO model also recognised that wages 
in the Sheltered sector would tend to follow wages in the 
Competitive sector; the differential in productivity gains 
between the two sectors would produce an overall increase in 
inflation. Thus the EFO model, as developed by the three 
economists, envisaged the use of fiscal and monetary policy to 
promote price stability.
The FOS model, written during 1987, updated and amended the 
EFO model by taking into consideration the consequences of 
structural changes in the labour market and the dynamic effects 
of the economic crises in both international and domestic markets 
from the mid-1970s onward. Since it is the more recent and 
systematic treatment of the Swedish corporatist model, we will 
examine its main arguments and conclusions.
First of all, the FOS authors amend the EFO model from a 
two-sector to a three-sector model:
'The structure of the Swedish economy has changed 
dramatically since the EFO report. The competing sector now 
constitutes 20 percent of the economy, the private sheltered 
sector 50 percent and the public sector 30 percent. For this 
reason we have replaced the earlier two sector model with a
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three sector model, the C-sector, the PrS-sector [Private
Sheltered] and the PuS-sector [Public Sheltered]. '63 
The FOS authors note that the development of the PuS-sector can 
become a burden upon the C-sector if the wage development in the 
public sector outstrips the private sector, in which case the 
private sector will face an increased tax ratio and inflationary 
pressure will be increased.64 The same effect is generated if 
employment trends, measured in terms of hours worked, do not show 
a parallel trend between the public and private sectors.65 In the 
FOS model it is still the sector exposed to foreign competition, 
either by exporting or competing with foreign imports, which 
determines the margin for pay and profit increases in the 
economy.
The second key amendment the FOS authors make concerns the 
environment in which the "main course" must now be followed. The 
"main course", recall, is simply 'the pay and profit trend which 
is compatible with a macro-economically balanced sequence of 
events'.66 In the original EFO model it was assumed that the 
development of investments, productivity, real wages and 
profitability would all tend to remain in the "main course" 
because continued economic and productivity growth would enable 
the joint application of wage policy and market forces to be
63 Karl-Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner, Roland Spant, 'Wage 
Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', English translation 
monograph, p.l.
64 As Faxen views the situation, the central actors must find 
a way to counteract the 'rampant growth of the public sector'. 
Karl-Olof Faxen, 'Wages, Prices and Taxes in the 1980s', in Bengt 
Ryden and Villy Bergstrom (eds), Sweden: Choices for Economic and 
Social Policy in the 1980s. London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, p.192.
65 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.66-67.
66 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.4.
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relatively unproblemmatic.67 The process was thought to be 
virtually self-reinforcing, given the active responses of labour 
market actors and the government to any deviations within a 
context of fair economic weather.68 In other words, the 
deviations were expected to be small and productivity and 
economic growth constant, in which case the “main course” would 
be an easy highway. It can be seen, then, that the EFO model made 
a similar assumption about the prospects for a continually 
growing pie as the Rehn model, with the difference that whereas 
the Rehn model placed its faith in the growth-generating 
properties of economic restructuring, the EFO model assumed that 
economic growth would continue and that conditions would remain 
amenable to adjustment through wage policy and market forces.
We argue, however, that the main reason for the previous 
capacity of the actors to remain in the main course was fair 
economic weather, which in economic terms meant high levels of 
productivity growth:
'The EFO model was based on the assumption that productivity 
growth would be constantly stable and kept at a high level 
by technological development and economic expansion...This 
assumption held true until the first oil price shock, but
thereafter the rate of growth slowed down dramatically and
instability increased sharply'.69 
Since the scope for an increase in real income in both the EFO
and FOS models is held to depend on an improvement in
67 The EFO authors wrote, for example, that: 'We have found 
no justification for predicting that the productivity growth of 
the competing sector or movements in international prices in the 
next few years will deviate systematically from the tendencies 
which we have been able to determine for the period 1960-8'. G. 
Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner, Wage Formation and the 
Economy, London, Allen and Unwin, 1973, p.25.
68 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.10.
69 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.14.
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productivity 70, a large portion of the FOS material is 
consequently devoted to examining the causes of the general 
decline in productivity growth in the industrialised economies 
since the 1970s.
The third key amendment in the FOS model thus concerns the 
authors' argument for reversing the decline in productivity 
growth. Reliance on corrective wage policy measures and market 
forces is no longer considered to be enough to address the 
problem. Interestingly, there is little discussion of the 
possible gains to be made by forcing restructuring, which is one 
reason why it is important to distinguish between this model and 
the Rehn model. Essentially the FOS authors recommend building 
into the model a neo-Keynesian approach to generating economic 
demand and growth. The FOS authors argue that over the long term 
the best explanation of stagnating productivity trends is low 
demand pressure and low capital stock growth, both of which are 
related to policies of economic restraint and unemployment 
pursued by the larger economies to reduce inflation:
'The improvement of work performance through better 
education and training, organisation and motivation is a 
social process, which takes place more rapidly when there is 
strong pressure of demand and high capacity utilisation.'71 
The FOS authors develop their argument from Verdoorn's law, which 
posits a positive relationship between production levels and 
productivity growth:
'The higher the pressure of demand that can be maintained 
without leading to an inflation rate which will cause the
70 'Productivity growth is the only possible foundation for 
a continuing rise in real incomes', p.14.
71 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', pp.23- 
24, 27.
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government to introduce measures of restraint, the stronger 
the productivity growth that can be expected.'72 
The FOS model certainly does not discount the impact on 
productivity growth of factors related to the energy crisis of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, such as the increased turbulence and 
fluctuations in exchange rates, oil prices, inflation and 
interest rates. Nor does it discount the fact that improvements 
in technology and work-place organisation have, in terms of their 
contribution to productivity growth, flattened out. It simply 
argues that when an economy is closer to full-capacity 
utilisation, the flow-on effects actually increase productivity. 
This implies, as Roland Spant puts it, that:
'The best shelter for productivity is the full employment 
goal...Why should managers ask for price stability? They 
should ask for full employment. It is short-sighted.'73 
The FOS model, then, makes the case for an economy based not 
on restrictive policies to cut costs in foul economic weather, 
which necessarily reduces capacity utilisation, but for 
expansionary policies.74 The government, the authors write:
'must create confidence that its policy will lead to 
sustained high pressure of demand and satisfactory growth...
72 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.15. 
Elsewhere, the authors write: 'If stagflation is to be completely 
mastered productivity must thus again be brought to increase at 
a faster rate. We believe that economic policy has an essential 
task in this', p.13.
73 Roland Spant, TCO Economist, interview, Stockholm, 9 June
1992.
74 The authors write: 'We mean by an expansive economic 
policy a monetary and fiscal policy which by means of the level 
of interest rates and the tax structure stimulates a high rate of 
growth and at the same time makes it financially possible. By a 
restrictive policy we mean a policy which does not create enough 
incentive nor sufficient scope for investments in business. In 
this sense monetary and fiscal policy within the OECD area was 
restrictive after 1974', p.71.
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Economic policy has here an important contribution to make 
by simultaneously creating incentives and financing 
opportunities in order to give a high investment level, by 
means of strong demand pressure, ample credits and low 
interest rates' ,75 
The FOS authors argue that policies of restraint designed to 
reduce inflation have unfortunate consequences for production 
which could be avoided by a more expansionary and cooperative 
strategy. For example, shut-downs produce relative increases in 
productivity, but at a cost in decreased industrial production, 
and the harsh regime of a restrictive economic policy encourages 
management to shift the use of capacity away from production and 
marketing to financial transactions.76
The fourth key element in the FOS model follows logically 
from this neo-Keynesian stance. Of necessity, such a strategy 
requires the cooperation of actors in the labour market to 
distribute incomes in such a way as to sustain full capacity 
utilisation and full employment without the economy overheating 
and producing inflation and lost competitiveness. The FOS authors 
are then, not surprisingly, advocates of corporatist coordination 
and cooperation between "strong” labour market actors in the 
determination of wages:
'Strong labour market organisations can alter the Phillips 
relationship for the purpose of maintaining high employment 
and simultaneously affecting strong economic growth and 
satisfactory real income increases. In a labour market whose
75 'Economic policy has here an important contribution to 
make by simultaneously creating incentives and financing
opportunities in order to give a high investment level, by means 
of strong demand pressure, ample credits and low interest rates', 
p. 27.
76 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', pp.29,
33.
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organisation is weak or non-existent no such possibility 
exists' .77
In other words, wage and price restraint through cooperation and 
coordination on the part of the labour market actors enables the 
economy to run at higher levels of demand and growth than would 
otherwise be possible without generating inflationary pressure. 
The demand in turn boosts productivity, which in turn supplies 
real income gains, making the restraint in the long-term 
collective interest of all the labour market actors. The "shadow 
of the future" is a crucial element in the EFO/FOS models.
Instead of using the term "wage restraint", the FOS authors 
prefer to speak of "inflexibility in wage and price formation", 
but it remains clear that this aspect of their model is 
absolutely crucial to the successful operation of their neo- 
Keynesian demand expansion strategy:
'It is the degree of inflexibility in wage and price 
formation which determines how strong the pressure of demand 
will be and how high a rate of growth the economy can stand 
without the demand pressure leading to inflation. Organised 
wage formation can augment the inflexibility and thus make 
a higher growth rate possible'.78 
The key to full employment, growth, and growth in productivity 
and real income, the FOS authors argue, lies in the capacity of 
the wage determination system to deliver cooperative, coordinated 
restraint. Thus the authors state clearly: 'Regardless of the
form of negotiation the overall margin [of wage developments] 
must be centrally determined'.79 Moreover, the FOS authors accept 
that the degree of inflexibility required in wage and price 
formation is governed not just by the need for the C-sector to
77 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.52.
78 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.68.
79 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.5.
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avoid wage explosions but may also in certain circumstances be 
governed by unfavourable exogenous changes in international unit 
labour costs:
'Such a policy means that the unit costs within the Swedish 
C-sector are not to be allowed to grow faster than the 
average unit costs in competitor countries. This is the 
requirement if we are to stay in the "benign circle” of 
growth, expansion and competitiveness'.80
To sum up, then, the FOS authors in effect make as strong a 
case as they can for an alternative economic policy to the 
general reliance on restrictive policies in the OECD area. Their 
alternative is a modified form of neo-Keynesian growth 
corporatism, which depends crucially on wage restraint. The FOS 
model does not, fundamentally, differ from previous neo-Keynesian 
corporatist growth strategies, with the exception that the 
authors argue strongly that full employment and high levels of 
demand generate growth in productivity and hence, real income. 
The FOS model, then, is very similar to the Rehn model in that 
both models require some growth-generating process, whether 
sustained by restructuring or high levels of demand. In both 
models it is only possible to achieve restraint if compensatory 
pay-offs are generated by some growth process. We will argue that 
this reliance on growth can, in certain situations, be both 
unfeasible and unnecessary. Moreover, we will argue that failure 
to achieve this growth has the consequence of making the 
corporatist rationalisation of the wage determination system 
appear also a failure, when it need not be so.
The Rehn model and the EFO/FOS models, then, are excellent 
examples of the type of neo-Keynesian corporatist models which 
this thesis argues have been designed fundamentally, if not 
intentionally, for only fair economic weather. In foul economic
80 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.78.
223
5 - Evolving Theoretical Models Of Swedish Corporatism
weather, failure to produce the necessary levels of growth and 
payoffs has the consequence of discrediting the corporatist 
aspect of the models, which we argue should work equally 
efficiently in distributing costs, if properly implemented. In 
the following section we outline a game-theoretical critique of 
these models based on our conception of cooperation in fair and 
foul economic weather.
5.4. Swedish Corporatism and Foul Weather.
If we accept that Keynesian demand expansion does boost 
productivity, on the basis of Verdoorn's law, does this mean that 
the corporatist model as elaborated in Sweden should produce 
constant gains? It seems that much hinges on how relative these 
constant gains are. Cooperation to put out a house fire produces 
constant gains but the building may still be relatively damaged. 
In the case of the house fire, j3 has increased by a large order 
of magnitude, but the actors are still likely to reason that 
collective action is necessary to minimise the destruction.
The problem with a growth-strategy is the built-in 
assumption that such policies can produce future increases of 
production and output sufficient to provide compensatory gains 
for all participating actors. The same criticism applies to the 
Rehn model, namely, that while we agree that restructuring 
pressure can maximise the productive potential of the Swedish 
economy, we doubt that in foul economic weather this will mean 
growth levels similar to the post-war golden age. If we allow for 
the possibility that, in foul economic weather, the outcome of 
such Keynesian expansion supported by corporatist cooperation in 
the labour market will simply be the minimisation of costs and 
not the production of new gains, then we have to also accept that 
the cooperation of the labour market actors will be contingent 
upon them accepting not restraint compensated with payoffs, but 
real restraint. It is this which neither model seems prepared to 
countenance.
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The FOS authors themselves recognise that 'even the 
relationship between demand and productivity growth at each given 
demand level seems to have been more unfavourable during the most 
recent years'81 If this is so, then the gains in terms of
productivity growth might plausibly be "swamped” by the
cumulative costs of a host of other foul economic weather
tendencies. Similarly, the FOS authors accept that the prognosis 
for the immediate future, given unchanged economic policies by 
the large economies, is one of slow-growing export markets.
Further:
'[I]t is unknown what strains any new oil price rises and 
other international price rises, protectionist tendencies in 
world trade, European integration or an even weaker economic 
development in the industrialized countries may give rise 
to'.82
Finally, the FOS authors note that even the typically "minimum” 
real income increase currently expected by Swedish trade unions 
today is too much, particularly in combination with wage drift:
' [A] lready within manufacturing this is clearly in excess of 
the present growth in productivity. When these pay increases 
are then transferred to the service sectors, where two 
thirds of the work force are at present to be found, and 
where productivity growth is close to 0, considerable cost 
and inflation effects cannot be avoided'.83 
In sum, the FOS authors note, in passing, a number of 
intractable problems for any policy that depends on distributing 
gains without appearing to assess the capacity of neo-Keynesian 
demand-expansion policies to surmount them all. They appear to
81 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.34.
82 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', pp.77-
78.
83 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', p.16.
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regard the prospect of foul economic weather as so horrendous 
that it must be avoided, without questioning whether in fact it 
can be avoided:
'The sharp fall in productivity growth is a problem which we 
regard as extremely serious. It threatens the premises on 
which are based the continuing increase in living standards 
which we have become accustomed to in the industrialised 
countries for more than a century and around which we have 
built many of our norms, customs and institutions'.84 
Yet this prospect, we argue, may be precisely the one that faces 
us, and in any case, even if it were not, such a prospect is at 
least theoretically possible.
Let us assume, hypothetically, for instance, that 
technological innovation, workplace reorganisation, labour 
training, discovery of new raw materials and so on do not in the 
short and medium term produce large growth in productivity and 
hence in output and income. This is a classic case of economic 
foul weather, in which there is effectively a smaller economic 
pie to be distributed among rising expectations. Further, let us 
assume the worst in terms of a requirement for massive 
restructuring in the competitive sector, support of extensive 
labour market policies and welfare policies to minimise 
unemployment and sustain living standards, a large trade deficit 
and high government debt. In this case, policies which boost 
demand will produce inflation and distributional conflict to the 
extent to which the boost in demand fails to produce a 
concomitant boost in productivity sufficient to cover the costs 
of the restructuring, the expensive public policies, the trade 
gap and the debt. Further, of course, the policy will depend on 
the capacity of the labour market actors to cooperate in their 
distribution of the available gains, if there are any. Most
84 'Wage Formation and the Economy in the Nineties', pp.21-
22.
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importantly, it seems to us, the policy will depend on the labour 
market actors, and in fact all the actors in the political 
economy, cooperating in distributing the burden of costs in such 
a way that the productive potential of the economy is maximised.
In sum, it seems that it is entirely plausible that a 
situation might arise where the demand expansion policies can 
only be expected to minimise costs rather than to produce new 
gains. It is in this circumstance that we are interested in the 
operation of such a corporatist strategy, since it seems that 
such a strategy remains worthy of investigation but will not 
necessarily produce the sort of gains of the neo-Keynesian, 
corporatist growth strategies of the post-war golden age.
The only weakness of the EFO and FOS models, we argue, is 
that they characterise the "room for available wage increases" as 
a positive "corridor". This is entirely understandable, since we 
have seen that the support of the trade unions for cooperation in 
the wage determination sphere was historically conditional upon 
receiving "payoffs" which can only be generated by growth. We 
have also seen that LO had no intention of acting during a period 
of economic growth to unconditionally restrain wages in a context 
of high profits. And we have seen that wage restraint in Sweden 
during the period of fair economic weather was always within the 
positive corridor. Given the performance of the Swedish economy 
in the 1950s and 1960s, and the assumption that productivity 
growth would remain at the high levels sustained during those two 
decades, the trade union position is entirely rational. The 
problem for the wage determination system then was how to 
distribute the gains of a growing economy in such a way that 
competitiveness and full employment could be maintained.
But in foul economic weather, we argue, it becomes 
nonsensical to expect actors to cooperate on the condition of 
receiving payoffs and gains when these may not be available. In 
this situation it becomes important to face reality. If the union
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actors want to fight for their share of available income within 
a corridor, this still remains possible even if the corridor has 
collapsed. Thus we argue that the operation of corporatist 
cooperation in the wage determination sphere in Sweden has become 
hostage to the expected success of the Swedish Model, i.e., the 
growth-generating elements we have distinguished. The corporatist 
idea was that, through centralised coordination of wages, the 
costly side-effects of unrestrained distributional conflict (such 
as wage-drift, strikes and lockouts, and investment being 
squeezed in the C sector), could be minimised. This strategic 
conception has become equated, during the process of its 
development, with another, entirely different idea, derived from 
expectations about growth; namely, that cooperation would have to 
be accompanied with compensatory gain. This would be in the form 
of high wages for workers throughout the economy, growing public 
subsidisation and employment, and investment in the C sector. As 
Andrew Martin writes of the Swedish Model, the actors believed 
that:
'there was a common interest in managing conflict [between 
labour and capital] in such a way as to maximise the 
material outcome for both by facilitating economic recovery 
and growth - in other words, as Korpi puts it, to turn the 
conflict into a "positive sum game"'.85 
In fact, however, it was the restructuring and Keynesian aspects 
of the Swedish Model which produced the economic growth, and this 
only in the context of fair economic weather. In the absence of 
this growth, the "positive sum game" would have to operate in a
85 Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic
Responses to Change and Crisis', in Peter Gourevitch et al, 
Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain. West Germany and Sweden. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1984, p.200.
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context of distributing costs, and the "wage corridor” would 
collapse.86
Conclusion.
In game-theoretical terms, the problem facing the three 
actors in the FOS model in foul economic weather is essentially 
a prisoners' dilemma: the actors are in a zero-sum relationship 
to each other because we have assumed total income growth be 
either slow-growing or negative. One actor can only get more by 
forcing a loss onto one or both of the others: if they each
attempt to gain a larger share for themselves the others will 
cease cooperating. The result will be a costly distributional 
struggle. As LO states it:
'In the long term we cannot raise wages more than the 
economy can accommodate. If we do it results in inflation 
and unemployment. The purpose of wage negotiations and wage 
rises should be to distribute the margin for improvements in 
the standard of living created by means of increased output. 
If there has been no increase in output then there will be 
nothing to distribute and any pay rise awarded to one group
86 Of course, if all the actors are better off by 
cooperating, a positive sum game still operates, even in a 
context of cost-distribution. With respect to the wage corridor 
collapsing, a better metaphor is perhaps to think of a ceiling 
which falls below the floor. In this case, the ceiling is the 
upper limit on sustainable wages, and the floor is the lower 
limit of union demands. According to the EFO/FOS models, the 
floor must be determined in relationship to the position of the 
ceiling, hence it is the floor which must adjust and not vice- 
versa. According to the EFO model: 'The negotiators have long ago 
become aware of the existence of a point beyond which no claims 
should be pushed lest it impairs the prospects for future wage 
increases'. Gosta Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner, Wage 
Formation and the Economy. London, Allen and Unwin, 1973, pp.222- 
223.
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which gives an improvement in real terms will be at the
expense of some other group'.87
If the rate of growth of income remains stable or increases, 
it is relatively easy to achieve cooperation, since each group 
can continue to enjoy some real level of increase despite the 
restraint they exercise by cooperating. But if the rate of growth 
contracts, or total net income declines, then the groups must all 
agree on a level of restraint which is absolute and real. By
cooperating in foul weather, they will still be better off
relative to the outcome of unrestrained distributional conflict, 
but in real terms they may actually be worse off than they were.
We have argued in this chapter that the Rehn and FOS models 
cannot succeed in producing the levels of growth enjoyed during 
the golden age today, in a period of sustained economic foul 
weather. But we have not argued that these political-economic 
strategies are not worth pursuing. On the contrary, according to 
game-theory, proper implementation of such strategies should 
still produce maximum gains. These gains, moreover, will still be 
positive sum. It is simply that they will consist of the other 
side of the coin: that is, they will appear as costs that have 
been most effectively minimised. Is such a "least-cost” 
collective outcome really a gain? We argue that indeed it is.
An expansionary strategy can still be said to be producing 
expansion even when an economy is contracting. The apparent 
paradox dissolves when we consider that, in the absence of the 
expansionary strategy, the economy would contract still further. 
Similarly, collective wage restraint can still be said to be 
producing collective gain, even when growth of output and income 
is contracting. It may simply be that in the absence of the 
restraint, given the consequences of distributive conflict and
87 LO, Wage Policy for the Future. Summary of a report to the 
1991 LO Congress. 1991, p.8.
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the measures governments have available to enforce wage 
reductions, the contraction will be worse.
It may seem that, in arguing the case for cooperative 
restraint and distribution of costs, we are in effect arguing for 
a contraction. That is, it may seem that the restraint will cause 
further contraction, and so on in a downward spiral. This might 
be so, if a wholesale expansion of demand (achieved by giving a 
boost to spending power) could succeed in producing, through 
"multiplier effects", growth in productivity, output and incomes. 
But we argue that such an expansion of demand can only produce 
growth when the utilisation of technology, resources and labour 
is far below potential capacity. At full employment, and this is 
the case for Sweden, the ceiling will be closely approached, if 
not reached.
Any profligate expansion of demand, in Sweden, would result 
in inflation (or in higher consumption of foreign imports that 
are cheaper to buy), rather than fair weather output growth. Yet 
despite all of this, our argument is not that expansionary 
policies should be avoided. On the contrary, in the context of a 
corporatist adjustment to slower rates of growth, fiscal and 
monetary policy should, in our view, have more opportunities to 
be expansionary. We have to, then, determine whether or not the 
historical dependence of corporatist cooperation in Sweden upon 
distributing continuing high levels of income and output growth 
is carved into stone. Could the Swedish actors ever cooperate in 
distributing costs?
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CHAPTER SIX.
WHY CORPORATISM IN SWEDEN HAD 
TO CHANGE.
'The policy for which we have drawn up guidelines may 
seem to be so difficult to implement as to be 
unrealistic. Nevertheless, if it should prove to be 
impossible we believe there only remains stagnation and 
growing unemployment'. Karl-Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik 
Odhner, Roland Spant.1
As a growth-based strategy designed primarily for fair 
economic weather, the Swedish Model and the corporatist EFO/FOS 
models worked remarkably well. We have seen that Sweden enjoyed 
full employment and a relatively egalitarian distribution of 
societal welfare and we know that Sweden was already-a relatively 
rich country, even among OECD nations. The contribution of 
rational cooperation to this performance is difficult to measure, 
but we can be certain that it did not produce all of it.
Similarly, we can be equally certain that rational 
cooperation would not be able to forestall an increase in 0. In 
this chapter a number of foul weather shocks are examined and 
shown to have dramatically changed the conditions supporting the 
growth-based Swedish strategy. In addition, the following 
sections outline changes in the bargaining environment which, in
1 Karl-Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner, Roland Spant, Wage 
Formation and the Economy in the Nineties. English Language 
Monograph, p.6.
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combination with the intermittent occurrence of the foul weather 
prisoners' dilemma, made the old centralised system inadequate as 
a means to coordinate an economy-wide wages strategy. The 
difficulties experienced even within the LO-SAF field of 
negotiation reveal the weaknesses of relying purely on 
centralised institutional mechanisms for achieving rational 
cooperation.
For the Swedish Model to cut costs effectively through the 
wage determination system, enough of the key actors in the labour 
market would have to agree on some "available room for restraint" 
through a bargaining process designed to incorporate an iterative 
and encompassing viewpoint. But the model had been constructed in 
an economy dominated by the blue collar competitive sector, and 
by the time foul weather appeared so also had two new labour 
market actors of increasing significance: white collar workers 
and public sector employees.
While these labour market changes undoubtedly rendered the 
LO/SAF area of negotiation of decreasing importance as a 
determinant of overall wage outcomes, the question remains as to 
whether the rise of the new actors obscures other important 
problems associated with attempting to reach a cooperative 
solution in foul weather. Given the nature of the prisoners' 
dilemma in foul weather, there are powerful reasons to 
hypothesise that the temptation to free-ride, or pursue "insider" 
strategies, is much stronger. The automatic wage boom 
consequences of a foul weather shift in 0 requires centralised 
agreements to restrain both wage drift and contractual increases.
This implies that, despite the rational choice arguments 
made for the expected relative success of encompassing groups and 
centralised agreements, foul weather requires this cooperation to 
be in fact more decentralised. High and low pay groups must 
themselves actively accept the wage strategy identified by the 
encompassing, centralised actors as the "main course". In foul
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weather, the central actors can no longer simply pass down wage 
guidelines which are guaranteed to result in a real and 
substantial improvement. A more deeply institutionalised system 
for reaching collective agreements is dictated by the 
circumstances.
These requirements are highly stringent and do not apply in 
fair economic weather. Foul weather corporatism is a much more 
daunting challenge for systems of institutionalised bargaining 
designed to overcome prisoners' dilemmas. Such a depth of 
institutionalisation may well be an infeasible political project 
given the number of actors required to participate in the post­
industrial era.2
6.1. Foul Economic Weather in Sweden.
There are three shocks which we characterise as variables 
which raised 0: first, the coming to an end of the golden age 
"long wave” of output growth, which can be thought of as an 
underlying bedrock of growth possibilities; second, the OPEC "oil 
crises" which contributed towards a generalised slowdown in 
economic growth within the OECD region; and third, developments 
in the international distribution of production which evaporated 
much of Sweden's earlier comparative advantage.
6.1.1. External Shocks.
Perhaps the most insidious external shock was the slowdown 
in growth of output. The modern economic period is characterised 
by a generalised decline in the expansion of total industrial 
output. The annual average growth of industrial output in Sweden 
slowed from 3.3 percent in the period 1963-74 to 1.3 percent in 
1974-84. Economists argue that this is due to a uniform,
2 For a discussion of "post-industrial politics" in Sweden, 
see Goran Therborn, 'Swedish Social Democracy and the Transition 
from Industrial to Postindustrial Politics', in Frances Fox Piven 
(ed) , Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies. Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1991, pp.101-23; Marino Regini (ed), The Future of 
Labour Movements. London, Sage, 1992.
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international slowdown in total factor productivity, i.e., 
assuming stable rates of labour force expansion, productivity 
gains have slowed. The most likely cause of slower productivity 
gains, according to economists, is a downward trend change in the 
underlying rate of technological change.3
This element in the generalised slowdown of output growth 
has little to do with political-economic strategies designed to 
deal with economic crisis. Policies designed around expansion, 
restructuring, and corporatist wage coordination can only slowly 
improve the bedrock-like nature of the underlying rate of output 
growth. They can maximise gains and minimise costs within the 
constraints that are given, but these constraints are themselves 
far less amenable to policy manipulation.
We argue that the slowdown in output growth can best be 
understood by referring to long-wave economic theories of 
technological change and productivity development. According to 
long-wave theory, the modern period is characterised by a slump 
in the development of dynamic capital innovation which leads, in 
plain language, to industry running out of steam. In response, 
industry moves into a phase of deaccelerated accumulation: 
'Clearly, if the new capital goods are relatively 
labour-displacing, then their application, without the 
counterbalancing formation of new capital in the 
capital goods sector, will lead to unemployment in
3 Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence, 'Adjusting to 
Slower Economic Growth: The Domestic Economy', in Barry P. 
Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin (eds), The Swedish Economy. 
Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1987, p.28. 
According to figures cited by Flanagan et al, yearly growth of 
output per man-hour in manufacturing in Sweden declined from 7.3% 
in 1960-70 to 1.3 percent in 1973-77. At the same time, growth in 
productivity in 1973-77 was lower than every other OECD country 
except Britain, and this was partly because employment growth was 
not matched by output growth. Robert J. Flanagan et al, Unionism. 
Economic Stabilisation, and Incomes Policy. Washington, D.C., The 
Brookings Institution, 1983, pp.320, 322.
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aggregate, without changes in the distribution of 
wealth, thus compounding a slow-down in economic 
growth'.4
Sweden was also a country which had at an early stage completed 
its own development of technological innovations and application 
of advanced production techniques from abroad.5
In general economic terms, the "golden age" of post-war 
growth in the OECD area can fundamentally be attributable to the 
large increase in average labour productivity, which in turn is 
best understood in terms of Schumpeterian innovation. Production 
innovation leads to reduced unit costs, or surplus profits, which 
enables investment and further innovation. If the innovation in 
the production process generates an increased market share, this 
in turn leads to a series of complementary innovations (for 
example, the use of synthetic fibres in the post-war period).6 
According to long-wave theory, the innovative boost to economic 
growth begins to be exhausted when surplus profits are reduced as
4 Phil Blackburn, Rod Coombs and Kenneth Green, Technology. 
Economic Growth And The Labour Process. New York, St. Martin's 
Press, 1985, p.67.
5 See James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers and the 
State. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p.202-203.
6 See D. J. Frantzen, Growth and Crisis in Post-war 
Capitalism. Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 1990, 
p.17. Modern neo-Schumpeterians who have developed long-wave and 
innovation theory in the field of political economy include C. 
Freeman, 'Technical Innovations and Long Waves in World Economic 
Development', Futures, 13, 4 and 5, 1981; C. Freeman, The
Economics of Industrial Innovation. 3rd ed., London, Francis 
Pinter, 1982; C. Freeman, J. Clarke, L. Soete, Unemployment and 
Technical Innovation; A Study of Long Waves and Economic 
Development. London, Frances Pinter, 1982; G. Mensch, Stalemate 
in Technology; Innovations Overcome the Depression. Cambridge, 
Ballinger, 1979; J. Clarke et al, 'Long Waves, Inventions and 
Innovations', Futures, 13, 4, 1981, pp.308-22. Freeman, Clarke 
and Soete refer to 'swarming effects' with respect to integrated 
and complementary production innovations.
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other competitors copy and adopt the innovative technologies. 
Supply then begins increasingly to exceed demand, leading to 
increased downward pressure on prices and profitability.
Moving on to the second externally-derived shock, the impact 
of the oil shocks is so well known we will only briefly describe 
it here, but the effect was enormous on the capacity of the 
developed economies to continue to sustain previously high levels 
of improvement in income. The oil price rise meant a 
redistribution of income from the industrialised countries to the 
oil-producing countries and, at the same time, a sudden increase 
in the cost of using and producing oil-based products. The 
increase in the relative cost of production generated a 
distributional conflict among those economic actors who continued 
to demand income improvements at previous levels.
Finally, concerning the third of our series of external 
shocks, a study by the Industrial Institute of Economic and 
Social Research (founded by the Employers' Confederation and the 
Federation of Swedish Industries), showed in 1979 that "sunset" 
Swedish industries in the competitive sector were not yet being 
replaced by new, expanding industries. Technical skills and raw 
materials had formed the basis for Sweden's prosperity since 
1870, but by 1970 other countries had begun to exploit faster 
growing forests and more accessible high quality ores. In 
addition, Sweden's technological edge had fallen away in large 
scale installations such as the iron and steel industry, and in 
ship building.7
A Boston consulting group engaged by the Swedish Department 
of Industry in 1978 showed that industries in iron and steel, 
timber, paper and products, ship building and textiles - all of
7 Per Martin Meyerson, Swedish Economy at the Cross Roads. 
Federation of Swedish Industries, Caslon Press AB, 1979, pp.16- 
18.
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which had formed the backbone of prosperity - were being out- 
competed by newly developing countries. Sweden would have to 
radically restructure into mechanical engineering, electrical 
engineering, chemical and pharmaceuticals, and transport 
equipment, but even here other countries were also expanding or 
planning to expand.8
Together, these externally-generated shocks constitute a 
classic example of what we call economic foul weather, to which 
a political economic system must adapt. In the period 1973-1982, 
for example, the growth in total volume of Swedish exports was, 
on average, half the size of the preceding ten years and was 
borne by Sweden's four most important export sectors.9 The slow­
down was indisputably linked to these shocks: the slowdown in 
output growth, the relative increase in the costs of production 
due to the oil shocks, and the loss of comparative advantage in 
key sectors of production. Each also combined to produce a 
reduction in external demand for Swedish exports, since Sweden's 
trading partners simultaneously had less income to spend, more 
distributional conflict over less output, and cheaper competitors 
to choose from.
Importantly, these adverse developments were not caused by 
any fundamental dysfunction in the corporatist wage determination 
system, which had functioned sufficiently well in fair weather. 
They were caused rather by exogenous factors: foul weather. But 
the wage determination system did, certainly, take time to 
respond and adapt to the foul weather shocks. A large part of the 
problem was that its operation was predicated on the delivery of
8 Boston Consultancy Group, A Framework for Swedish 
Industrial Policy. Stockholm, Liber Forlag, 1979.
9 Edward E. Palmer, Goran Schubert and Anette Nilsson, 
Swedish Commodity Exports and Imports: Models and Empirical 
Evidence. A Study of the Period 1963-1982. Occasional Paper 13, 
National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, 1985, p.13.
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constant gains. As the authors of the Brookings Institute study 
put it:
'The slowdown in Swedish economic growth since 1973 has 
primarily been the result of exogenous factors 
affecting all industrial countries, and it cannot be 
attributed to domestic economic policies. Sweden does 
stand out, however, in the extent of its failure to 
adjust to the slowdown... Rapid growth had become 
crucial to a political and economic system that 
basically resolved conflicts by promising more to 
everyone. When growth slowed, the system lacked the 
mechanisms to scale back national consumption to 
conform to much slower increases in incomes'.10 
The foul weather shocks provide an excellent test of the 
capacity of institutionalised rational cooperation to withstand 
the increased temptation for actors to adopt insider strategies. 
The dependence of the system on producing growth would have to be 
revised. The only course of action would be to agree on a short­
term distribution of costs and make an efficient adjustment to 
the structure of the economy in order to counter the increase in 
/3 and perhaps even produce an improvement in the a coefficient. 
As Landesmann and Vartiainen write, 'Sweden has high labour costs 
and relies on technologically advanced industry. Corporatism 
therefore relies on technological progress and socialisation of 
the costs of readjustment'.11
10 Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence, 'Adjusting to 
Slower Economic Growth: The Domestic Economy', in Barry P. 
Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin, (ed.s), The Swedish Economy. 
Washington DC., The Brookings Institution, 1987, pp.22-54; A.B. 
Rivlin (ed). The Brookings Report on Sweden. Washington DC., The 
Brookings Institution, 1987.
11 Michael Landesmann and Juhana Vartiainen, 'Social 
Corporatism and Long-Term Economic Performance', in Jukka 
Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn (eds), Social 
Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. Oxford, Clarendon
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6.1.2. Internal Shocks.
Sweden also faced a domestic "modernisation shock” in 
production technology and rationalisation which contributed to a 
decline in manufacturing employment of about 20,000 workers a 
year from 1976-1983. That this structural shock is a generalised 
foul weather phenomenon is shown by the fact that Sweden's 
percentile decrease was -1.8 percent, compared to a similar -1.7 
percent for Germany, -1.9 percent for Japan, -1.3 percent for 
Britain and -1.3 percent for France.12 Increased rationalisation 
and technological modernisation produced a reduced demand for 
labour in sectors of manufacturing, which then compounded with 
the effect of the external slowdown in demand for Swedish 
manufactured exports and the underlying reduction in the rate of 
growth of output, and contributed towards a growing, latent 
employment crisis.13
Loss of output growth has important consequences for 
manufacturing employment. Less workers were already needed due to 
advanced production techniques. The slowdown in output growth 
further squeezed the ability of the private sector to supply new 
employment. That growth of output is so important can be shown by 
considering that high productivity gains would have compensated 
for the effects of the other shocks: the oil price rise, the 
cheaper foreign competitors, and the fall in manufacturing
Press, 1992, p.210.
12 Jan Odhnoff, 'Crisis in Labour Market Policy', in John Fry 
(ed) , Towards A Democratic Rationality. Making the Case for 
Swedish Labour. Aldershot, Gower Publishing Company Ltd, 1986, 
p.74.
13 Such employment changes constitute a mammoth problem for 
the full employment policy objective. The ratio of part time to 
full time jobs created in the US, for example, is currently near 
two-thirds. Martin Woollacott, 'Nightmare proposition of a world 
that doesn't share', The Guardian. August 11, 1993, p.16.
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employment.14 But instead, the output slowdown in conjuncture 
with these other factors produced a prisoners' dilemma of cost 
distribution. A slowdown in the rate of growth of output implies 
that there is no longer sufficient output to supply income to 
cover current levels of wage demands. Expectations that were 
nurtured in the golden age, of future growth in output, income 
and consumption, would no longer be able to be met. The level of 
growth of output would no longer sustain rapidly rising and 
unrealistic expectations of income shares.
We can see this gap between expectations and reality by
\
considering income and consumption data in Sweden, which show 
that from 1973-1982 national disposable income increased by just 
0.2 percent (and was negative after 1976), compared to an annual 
increase of 3.8 percent in 1963-1973 (national income would have 
been 38 percent higher if the trend line for income growth from 
the previous decade had continued). Real national consumption, on 
the other hand, increased in relative terms by 18 percent. It 
would be wrong to conclude from these percentages, however, that 
the Swedish consumption rate remained unaffected by the crisis, 
since in real terms, consumption spending actually declined from 
an annual average of 3.5 percent in 1963-73 to 1.8 percent in 
1973-82. The Swedes, then, did achieve a decline in their rate of 
growth of consumption, but in reality this was only half the 
decline of the growth in their national disposable income.15
14 Of course, it would be tautological to point out that high 
productivity gains would have compensated for the slowdown in the 
rate of growth of output, since they are effectively different 
ways of expressing the same phenomenon. In passing, we can note 
that productivity growth was still not high enough, despite the 
fact that loss of manufacturing employment has the effect of 
improving productivity figures.
15 Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence, 'Adjusting to 
Slower Economic Growth: The Domestic Economy', in Barry P. 
Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin (eds), The Swedish Economy. 
Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1987, pp.25, 31.
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The real nub of the impact of failing to adjust costs can be 
seen in the effect on investment and savings. In Sweden the net 
national saving rate fell from an average of 16.3 percent of GNP 
in 1963-73 to a figure of 2.7 percent in 1982. Most of this large 
fall resulted from the fact that the public budget went from a 
large average surplus of 10.2 percent in 1963-73 to a deficit of 
-4.4 percent in 1982. Most of Sweden's private sector capital 
accumulation had, in the past, been supplied by government 
saving: namely, social insurance funds. After central government 
began running deficits in 1973, private capital formation dropped 
by 50 percent and foreign borrowing for investment rose to 75 
percent of total domestic investment. From 1973-1982 Sweden was 
a net borrower, spending more on imports than it earned from 
exports.16
6.1.3. Employment Consequences.
In the absence of rational cooperation in adjusting income 
levels, the effect of the combined foul weather shocks would be 
to increase unemployment. In 1982, Sweden, compared to Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, the USA, the UK, Germany and France, had the 
highest percentage of adult males aged 16-64 employed in the open 
labour market, in labour market policy programs, and the lowest 
(bar Norway) in unemployment.17 In terms of the number of men and 
women employed as a percentage of the population in the
16 Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence, 'Adjusting to 
Slower Economic Growth: The Domestic Economy', in Barry P. 
Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin, The Swedish Economy. Washington, 
D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1987, pp.31-32.
17 See Jan Odhnoff, 'Crisis in Labour Market Policy', in John 
Fry (ed), Towards A Democratic Rationality. Making the case for 
Swedish Labour. Aldershot, Gower Publishing Company Ltd, 1986, 
p.73.
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economically active age groups (the activity rate), Sweden was in 
the top three with Denmark and Norway.18
This high activity rate is largely explained by the very 
high rate of employment of women. At the end of the 1980s, the 
rate of participation of women aged 16-64 in the Swedish labour 
market was the highest in the OECD area: 82.1 percent.19 Sweden's 
low rate of unemployment is also explained by the fact that 
virtually all of the employment growth in the 1970s and 1980s was 
in part-time work, and by 1985 38 percent of all Swedes were 
public employees.20
From 1973-1982 economic growth fell by a third, and 
government estimates were suggesting an annual average industry 
employment loss of about 5 percent. The Swedish labour economist 
Rudolf Meidner has argued that the main cause of this employment 
loss is productivity gains, which implies that output remains at 
a rate sufficient to support compensatory public employment. He 
argues that the wage for education, health, child care, and care 
for the elderly, is not substantially greater than that for 
unemployment insurance,, and that such forms of public employment 
are much preferable to open unemployment.21
18 SAF, The Dynamic 90s. Work and the Labour Market in 
Sweden, SAF Doc No 1092, January 1990, section 5.
19 Eugenia Kazamaki, Firm Search. Sectoral Shifts, and 
Unemployment. Studies in Labour Market Adjustment in Sweden. 
Swedish Institute for Social research, 17, Almqvist & Wicksell 
International, Stockholm, 1991, p.18.
20 Robert J. Flanagan, 'Efficiency and Equality in Swedish 
Labour Markets', in Barry P. Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin (eds), 
The Swedish Economy. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 
1987, p.127.
21 Rudolf Meidner, 'Labour Market Policy in the Welfare 
State', in John Fry fed). Towards a Democratic Rationality. 
Making the Case for Swedish Labour. Aldershot, Gower Publishing 
Company Ltd, 1986, pp.68. He argues that, when you consider that 
the public employee also pays tax, the actual cost of the public
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Table 6.1.
GDP Growth Per Employee. 1960-1989 (Percent Per Year).
Sweden
1960-73
3.6
1973-80
0.5
1980-85
1.1
1985-89
1.1
Denmark 3.3 1.3 1.9 0.2
Norway 3.6 2.9 2.2 3.4
Finland 4.4 2.5 2.0 3.6
Germany 4.2 2.5 1.8 2.0
United Kingdom 2.8 0.9 2.5 1.8
France 4.7 2.3 1.9 2.2
Belgium 4.1 2.6 1.5 2.1
Netherlands 3.7 2.5 1.9 1.0
Austria 5.0 2.6 1.5 1.9
Source: Lars Bergman, Ulf Jakobssou, Mats Perssoo, Hans Tson Soderstrom, The Swedish Economy at the Turning Point. Stockholm, SNS Economic 
Policy Group, Occasional Paper, No.26, May 1991, p.24.
Meidner is right, but leaves open the question of how to 
distribute available income when it is actually decreasing. The 
level of productivity growth in manufacturing has resulted in a 
reduction in the share of employment in manufacturing while the 
share of output of manufacturing to GDP has remained constant, 
but at the same time the rate of growth of productivity has 
slowed and so has output growth.22 This means, as can be seen in
employment of one person is not much greater than that of 
unemployment insurance and other social subsidies.
22 A study conducted in the late 1980s showed that while the 
share of manufacturing employment to total employment has 
declined since World War Two in the Western economies, 
manufacturing's total output share of GDP had remained constant, 
due to the fact that labour productivity in manufacturing 
increased faster than the productivity of the general economy. 
This might seem to support Meidner's argument, since it implies 
that there are fewer workers in manufacturing who nevertheless 
earn more pay and could therefore be taxed to support public 
sector employment and income transfers. But note that it is the 
share of GDP which has remained constant, while the rate of 
growth of the output itself has slowed. This implies that there 
will still be a problem because the share of manufacturing income 
demanded by the public sector will be increasing at the same time
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Table 6.1., that the rate of growth of real income has also 
slowed, so that private sector demand for income growth is 
increasingly in conflict with public sector demand for income 
growth.
For the private sector to support compensatory public 
employment at a wage only a little higher than unemployment 
compensation the level of wages in the private sector would, in 
plain language, have to be determined by what then remained 
available. But the overall cost of this "public wage” is in part 
determined by size, and public sector employment grew by about 
50,000 employees per year from 1976 until 1983. In percentage 
terms, it increased from 14 percent of the workforce in 1963 to 
34 percent in 1984. Some 350,000 full-time jobs disappeared in 
the private sector between 1965 and 1982, but low unemployment 
was maintained through public sector growth and employment 
policy.23
In fact, as well as the 1.8 million people working in the 
public sector in the 1980s, there was another (approximately) 2.4 
million people who were not employed or studying full time. This 
meant 4.2 million people, half the population of Sweden, were 
dependent on taxes and transfer payments.24 At the same time,
as the total growth rate of output in manufacturing is 
decreasing. See Randall W. Eberts and John R. Swinton, 'Has 
Manufacturing's Presence in the Economy Diminished?', Economic 
Commentary. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, January 1, 1988, 
pp.1-4.
23 Per-Martin Meyerson, Eurosclerosis. The Case of Sweden. 
Federation of Swedish Industries, Caslon Press AB, 1985, pp.58- 
59.
24 SAF, The Dynamic 90s. Work and the labour market in 
Sweden. SAF Doc No 1092, January 1990, section 4.
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since the productivity growth rate in manufacturing declined 25, 
the relative contribution of the private sector to income also 
declined. This implies a greater relative taxation burden upon 
the general economy.
In addition, the large public sector hid a huge measure of 
fiscal support for employment in the form of relief work or 
state-promoted employment. The key area focused on was training, 
since there still remained an imbalance in the labour market in 
the form of demand and shortages for well-educated labour. 
Odhnoff writes that if you consider Swedish unemployment to 
include this massive amount of people on publicly-funded 
employment, the level of unemployment would have been in excess 
of 10 percent in the period 1976-1986.26
Meidner's argument about the ability of the private sector 
to support public employment crucially hinges on two 
requirements: the first is that private sector wage negotiators 
must agree on a level of wages growth low enough to maintain 
competitiveness while at the same time allowing the necessary 
level of taxation to support a public sector wage only a little 
greater than unemployment insurance. The second is for the 
growing numbers of public employees to agree to this wage and to 
distribute it among themselves. Obviously, in foul economic 
weather this will become increasingly difficult to achieve, since 
if the rate of growth of output has slowed while the expected
25 See, for example, Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. 
Lawrence, 'Adjusting to Slower Economic Growth: The Domestic 
Economy', in Barry P. Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin (eds), The 
Swedish Economy. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 
1987, p.29.
26 Odhnoff notes that comparable data is lacking on other 
countries, but we might "hazard” a guess that Sweden ranks highly 
on a scale of such support. Jan Ordnoff, 'Crisis in Labour Market 
Policy' in John Fry (ed), Towards A Democratic Rationality. 
Making the Case for Swedish Labour. Aldershot, Gower Publishing 
Company Ltd, 1986, pp.72 and 75.
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rate of increase of wages remains high (in either or both of the 
public and private sectors), a zero-sum distributional struggle 
will ensue.
6.2. The Rise of the New Actors.
In foul economic weather the pursuit of full employment, 
given relatively unchanged private sector wages, contributes 
towards massive growth in public sector employment. This in turn 
generates an increasing sectoral cleavage in the labour market. 
One of the most important changes in Sweden has been the shift in 
employment from a dominant industrial sector which required 
relatively little training to increasingly education-intensive 
public and private services. Even in the industrial sector, the 
use of new technologies has led to changes in job requirements 
which have widened the scope for potential conflict between low 
and high pay groups and eroded the boundaries between manual and 
non-manual work.
These developments have transformed rational cooperation in 
Sweden from what was predominately a two-actor interaction into 
a much more complicated n-actor interaction. In combination with 
changes in the payoff matrix given by the foul weather and the 
need to distribute costs, the changes mean that rational 
cooperation in Sweden faced a major challenge in adapting to the 
new environment. The following sections examine the new actors 
and their bargaining positions with a view towards making a first 
step in establishing to what degree cooperation has broken down 
due to such structural changes and, conversely, how much 
cooperation has been sustained despite the theorised impact of 
foul weather.
6.2.1. The Public Sector.
From 1980, public sector employees actually outnumbered 
private sector employees among Swedish union members, and public 
sector employees accounted for nearly 40 percent of all employees
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in the labour market (see Table 6.2) .27 Stark evidence of the 
rapid growth in importance of public sector unions can be seen in 
the fact that at the same time as LO's share of the organised 
labour force in 1960-1980 declined from over 75 percent to about 
62 percent, the Local Government Workers' Union (SKAF) passed the 
Metalworkers' Union (Metall) as the largest union affiliate in 
LO.28
Table 6.2.
Trade Union Federations as a Percentage of the Labour Force.
Percent of Labour Force
1960 1987
LO
LO-public sector
40.6
7.8 (19.3)
51.6
19.7 (38.2)
TCO
TCO-public sector
10.7
4.8 (45.2)
28.3
14.3 (50.5)
SACO-SR 
SACO^SR-pub1ic 
sector
1.6 + 0.4
1.0 + 0.4 (62.5 + 100)
6.8
4.0 (58.8)
Note: The figures in parenthesis refer to the percentage of the organisation's members who are public sector employees. Figures are also given separately 
for SACO and SR in 1960, which was before their merger.
Source: Lars Calmfort and Anders Forshmd, ’Wage Formation m Sweden’, in Lars Calmfors fedl. Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Policy in the 
Nordic Countries. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1990. n.80.
The growth of SKAF, as a low pay union (with a largely 
female membership), generated new strains within LO. As the 
economy worsened, SKAF and Metall (the quintessential high pay 
union with a mostly male membership) developed a growing conflict
27 Per-Martin Meyerson, Eurosclerosis. The Case of Sweden. 
Federation of Swedish Industries, Caslon Press AB, 1985, p.65.
28 For these figures, see R. Kent Weaver, 'Political 
Foundations of Swedish Economic Policy', in Barry P. Bosworth and 
Alice M. Rivlin (eds), The Swedish Economy. Washington, D.C., The 
Brookings Institution, 1987, p.306.
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of interest with respect to centralised wage bargaining and the 
wage policy of solidarity.29 Essentially, Metall wanted more 
freedom to take advantage of high profits in the engineering 
sector, while SKAF claimed extra compensation for the low-paid. 
The formation of the "gang of four" bargaining cartel of public 
sector unions in the late 1970s (see further), which comprised 
central and local government LO and TCO unions, also indicated 
that the growth of the public sector had created a large, 
growing, amorphous low pay actor, with membership that spanned 
both blue and white collar union federations.30
These conflicts can be viewed as evidence of the sort of 
free-riding dilemmas shown in Chapter Two to be particularly 
problematic for overly centralised, growth-based corporatist 
systems. The fact that the conflicts occurred in the LO-SAF- 
Government area of wage negotiation weakens any supposition that 
the problems of cooperation can be traced solely to the 
independence of the newer trade union actors. But how do these 
conflicts measure up when placed in the wider picture of wage 
restraint and the response of the Swedish actors to foul economic 
weather?
6.2.2. The White Collar Unions: TCO, SACO-SR. PTK.
As well as the public/private cleavage, the manual/non­
manual cleavage was also increasingly creating problems for 
centralised wage determination. From 1950 to 1970, white collar 
unions grew by 250 percent, compared to only 14 percent for LO 
unions. In the same period, their share of total union membership
29 See Scott Lash, 'The End of Neo-Corporatism? The Breakdown 
of Centralised Bargaining in Sweden', British Journal of 
Industrial Relations. 23, 1985, pp.215-38.
30 James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers and the State. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp.212-214.
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grew from just under one fifth to just under one third.31 Most of 
this increase in white collar membership was in unions affiliated 
to TCO (Tjanstemannens Centralorganisationen), the Central 
Organisation of Salaried Employees. TCO was formed in 1944 
following a merger of two white collar federations representing 
private and public sector employees, and unlike LO never 
developed any particular links with a political party. At its 
inception in 1944, TCO had 157,000 members and represented 30-40 
percent of the white collar workforce. By the end of the 1980s, 
with an annual growth rate of nearly 2 percent, it had grown to 
1.3 million members, with 20 affiliated unions representing 80-85 
percent of white collar and professional workers.32
Of the remaining white collar employees, 6-7 percent 
belonged to SACO (Sveriges Akademikers Central Organisation) , the 
Central Organisation of Professional Employees. SACO is a high 
pay group comprised almost entirely of university degree holders, 
with a strong anti-egalitarian bias and a faster growth rate than 
either LO or TCO. In 1970, it merged with SR (Statstjanstemannens 
Riksforbund) , an organisation of state employees comprising about 
1 percent of union membership, to form SACO-SR.33
As TCO describes itself: 'We are the offspring of the new 
industrial, social and economic configuration that is taking form 
in Sweden'.34 TCO affiliated unions tend to represent workers who
31 Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic 
Responses to Change and Crisis', in Peter Gourevitch et al, 
Unions and Economic- Crisis: Britain. West Germany and Sweden. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1984, pp. 215, 238.
32 TCO, TCO - The Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Employees, undated booklet, p.7.
33 Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic 
Responses to Change and Crisis', pp. 215, 238.
34 TCO, TCO - The Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Employees, undated booklet, , p.7.
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are educated and professional (almost 60 percent of TCO members 
are female), which translates into high expectations for income 
growth and improvements in living standards. TCO does not act as 
a bargaining agent for its affiliates. Instead, it sees its 
primary role as being to influence the economic conditions under 
which bargaining takes place by attempting to shape public 
policy. Until recently, one of its key forums of activity has 
been through membership on the large number of quasi-official 
administrative boards and authorities in Sweden, such as the 
National Labour Market Board (AMS), the National Board of 
Occupational Safety and Health, the Labour Court, the National 
Social Welfare Board, the National Board of Education, and the 
Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) .35
But although it does not bargain, TCO does have a general 
pay policy. This is based on three principles: first, the Rehn- 
Meidner concept of wage solidarity (equal pay for equal work), 
which reflects the enormous influence of this principle in 
Swedish unionism; second, pay differentials based on job 
requirements and performance, which is a principle reflecting 
both recognition that the labour market needs flexibility to 
change pay rates in line with changing job requirements and that 
many of TCO's members consider themselves to be deserving of high 
wages; and three, special measures for the low pay. This last 
principle is, of course, a stalwart of trade unionism in general. 
It can be seen that together these principles imply first, 
fairness; second, high pay for the deserving; and third, a floor 
for the low pay. In order to determine at what levels of pay 
increase these policy goals are realised, TCO pay policy 
recognises and accepts the fundamentals of EFO model:
'Our model in developing wage demands takes account of 
national economic needs, and takes as its starting
35 For a discussion of recent developments concerning 
employer and trade union membership on these boards, see further.
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point the economic scope for pay improvements as 
defined by international price movements and 
productivity growth'.36
In terms of stated pay policy, then, TCO is a typical 
encompassing trade union actor which, if it did bargain over 
wages, should be expected to offer conditional cooperation to LO 
and SAF in coordinating wage determination. The EFO/FOS models 
represent, in essence, a recognition of the prisoners' dilemma 
relationship facing unions and employers. But in foul weather 
cooperation would require greater vertical integration of 
institutional mechanisms for affiliate bargaining in order to 
secure their cooperation. The TCO policy of support for high wage 
differentials and low pay protection suggests that the interests 
of high and low pay groups may not be so easily reconciled. But 
in any case, TCO is not in a position to bargain for its 
affiliates, and while the centrally-located TCO economists are 
well aware of the prisoners' dilemma, as TCO economist Roland 
Spant puts it: 'The wage earners -they don't know about the
prisoners' dilemma. They have no history of solving such 
dilemmas ' ,37
TCO union affiliates are represented in the public and 
private sectors, and are organised into three separate bargaining 
cartels. At the national government level, the cartel TCO-S (the 
TCO Section for State Employees) bargains with SAV (the Swedish 
National Agency for Government Employers). At local government 
level, the cartel KTK (the Federation of Salaried Local 
Government Employees) bargains with LF (the Swedish Association 
of Local Authorities). Finally, in the private sector, the 
industrial white collar unions have formed their own various
36 TCO, TCO - The Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Employees. p.10.
37 Roland Spant, TCO Economist, interview, Stockholm, 9 June
1992.
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negotiating cartels, culminating in the formation of PTK 
(Privattj anstemannans Kartellen), the Federation of Salaried 
Employees in Industry and Services, in 1973.
The fact that the TCO affiliates have never ceded their 
bargaining rights to TCO means that the capacity of TCO to 
minimise uncooperative behaviour through centralised wage 
pronouncements in foul weather is vastly limited. The absence of 
this option reduces any incentive for TCO to explore EFO/FOS- 
derived cooperative agreements with LO. In fact, the forums for 
consultation between LO and TCO are mostly informal with no 
regular meetings between key actors in each organisation. 
Underlining the importance of the affiliates, as actors, most of 
the contacts between TCO and LO are between separate unions 
affiliated to each organisation. For example, SIF (The Swedish 
Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry), which is 
TCO's largest member, has close contacts with LO's metalworkers' 
union (Metall). In the public sector, there is a greater degree 
of coordination, with TCO/LO central and local government unions 
discovering that their common interest as public employees has 
drawn them together despite their differences as blue and white 
collar employees.
The year 1956 was the first and the last time TCO ever 
participated in centralised negotiations with LO and SAF. From 
that time, the TCO affiliates made their own arrangements. In the 
old corporatist model, the fast-growing, low pay, white collar 
unions in the private and public sectors were virtually ignored. 
For its part, TCO demonstrated neutrality over the pensions 
controversy so vital to LO's Rehn Model of publicly-funded 
investment, despite the energetic political support mobilised by 
LO and the SAP.
The unique historical conditions that enabled LO to adopt 
the role as a bargaining agency for its affiliates simply did not 
apply to TCO. There was no effective leverage applied by the
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employers as in the 1950s, and no comparable degree of 
ideological cohesion between the interests of the affiliates and 
the central federation or the Social Democratic party. The white 
collar unions in the private and public sector emerged with 
relative suddenness in a political and economic context that was 
very different to that of LO's origins, where the blue collar 
trade union movement and the political wing of the labour 
movement were virtually indistinguishable.
The new trade unions were more apolitical, and by comparison 
with LO were more devoted to "economistic” objectives. A 
corporatist strategy of cooperation in wage determination 
involves a strategy of aggregating collective interests rather 
than pursuing purely individualistic objectives. While the point 
of corporatist cooperation is actually to achieve the best 
outcome for individual actors, through avoiding the prisoners' 
dilemma, it also requires that collective interests are 
maximised. Free-riding activity in foul weather achieves 
individual gains at a growing collective cost, by passing those 
costs on to other actors. Protected by sustained gains, the 
successful free-rider can remain unconcerned about the 
consequences for the wider economy and for other actors. In the 
initial stages of such a crisis, moreover, the number of 
successful insiders is large and relative costs of forcing costs 
onto other groups small. The white collar unions appear to have 
been in a position, as a result of their growing strength, to 
play the role of insiders. They had no iterative history of 
solving prisoners' dilemmas and only a weak institutional link to 
an encompassing viewpoint. They seem, on the basis of the model 
we have developed, to be particularly susceptible to collective 
action dilemmas.
TCO presidents typically had no expertise with wage 
negotiations. In 1983 a new president was elected who had 20 
years experience of wage negotiations with SKTF (the Swedish
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Union of Local Government Officers), but this did not signify any 
increasing powers at the central level. The TCO affiliates used 
his expertise in wage negotiations with the government employers' 
organisations. Concerning TCO as an possible actor in the game- 
theoretical model of the Swedish wage determination system we 
have developed, Roland Spant has a brief reply: 'Sometimes when 
you really want to insult LO you say you will become a TCO'.38
Even more than TCO, PTK (Federation of Salaried Employees) 
could be characterised as an "economistic" federation, devoted 
purely to achieving the maximum gains for its members with little 
consideration for collective economic well-being. Unlike the more 
centralised blue collar federation, the white collar affiliates 
enjoyed the dominant position with respect to the central body, 
which acted as a cartel for their interests. PTK might even be 
argued to represent a type of centralisation which does not 
embody an encompassing viewpoint. But this is to make the 
argument too strongly. PTK at the central level still managed to 
impart a degree of encompassing criteria to collective wage 
outcomes.
As can be seen from Table 6.3., during the course of the 
1980s LO found that the relative size of the PTK bargaining area 
grew to the point where in 1987 it was only 4 percentage points 
(of the labour force) smaller than LO's own bargaining area. In 
addition, the various union cartels in the public sector 
bargaining with SAV, LF and SFO encompassed over 30 percent of
38 Roland Spant, TCO Economist, interview, Stockholm, 9 June
1992.
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Table 6.3.
The Wage Bargaining Areas,
Employer Employee Percentage of Labour Force
Organisation Organisation 1980 1987
SAF LO 18.0 16.1
PTK 12.4 12.0
SAV SF 3.2 2.4
TCO-S 6.1 5.9
SACO-SR-S 1.8 2.5
LF SKAF 5.2 4.8
KTK 3.0 2.8
SACO-SR-K --- 0.9
KF SKAF 6.0 6.6
KTK 2.7 3.4
SACO-SR-K 0.5 0.6
SFO LO 1.6 1.6
PTK 0.9 1.0
KFO LO 1.4 1.1
PTK 0.7 0.7
TA LO 0.6 0.6
PTK 0.3 0.5
BAO BM 0.9 1.2
Abbreviations; SAF =  central organisation for private-see tor employees; LO = central organisation for blue-collar workers; PTK = central bargaining 
organisation for private-sec tor white collar workers including as members unions from TCO, SACO-SR and SALF; SAV = central government bargaining 
unit; SF =  the union for central government blue-collar workers; TCO-S = bargaining organisation for central government white-collar workers; SACO- 
SR-S = bargaining organisation for central government employees with university training; LF =  central organisation for regional government employers 
(mainly health care and public transport); SKAF — central organisation for regional and local blue-collar workers; KTK —  bargaining cartel for regional 
and local government white-collar workers; SACO-SR-K = bargaining organisation for regional and local employees with university training; KF = central 
organisation for local government employers; SFO = central employer organisation for publicly-owned companies; KFO —  central organisation for 
cooperative employers; TA = central employer organisation for the press; BAO -  central employer organisation for die banks; BM = die union for bank 
employees.
Source: Lara Calmfon and Anders Forslund, ’Wage Formation in Sweden’, in Lars Cahnfora (ed), Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Policy in die 
Nordic Countries. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1990, p.81.
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the labour force by 1987. In practice, the wage bargaining on the 
public sector side has been highly coordinated on both the 
employer and union side, but cooperation with the private sector 
negotiating groups has been minimal. This is because, on the 
employer side, there has been a conflict of interest between the 
Swedish governmental tiers and SAF policy on public employment, 
and on the union side conflict over public sector compensation 
for private sector wage drift.39
To sum up so far, the old LO/SAF bargaining area, which had 
nurtured the development of fair weather corporatism, had been 
superceded by a new and more complex environment in which LO 
faced growing internal divisions between its low and high pay 
groups, such as SF (the union for central government blue collar 
workers), SKAF (the central organisation for regional and local 
blue-collar workers), and Metall, and also rubbed shoulders 
increasingly with newer, and less centralised bargaining cartels 
such as PTK, TCO-S, SACO-SR-S, SACO-SR-K, and KTK.
Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s PTK was, next to LO, 
the main union bargaining cartel in the private sector. By the 
1980s it had 22 white-collar union affiliates and some 525,000 
members. Eight of them, including the largest, SIF (the Swedish 
Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry), belonged 
to TCO and the remaining fourteen to SACO-SR. PTK had its 
beginnings in the late 1960s when SIF, SALF (the Swedish Union of 
Foremen and Supervisors), and CF (the Association of Graduate 
Engineers, affiliated to SACO) reached a collaborative 
negotiating position and achieved a five-year agreement (1969- 
1974, for 7 percent) with SAF. There was also some cooperation 
between SIF and HTF (the Swedish Union of Commercial Salaried
39 Lars Calmfors and Anders Forslund, 'Wage Formation in 
Sweden', in Lars Calmfors (ed), Wage Formation and Macroeconomic 
Policy in the Nordic Countries. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1990, p.80.
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Employees). This watershed agreement was actually reached before 
LO and SAF had finished bargaining, and was designed 
strategically to both improve the relative position of the non- 
manual workers and stabilise relationships between the white 
collar unions over the five year period, so that PTK could be 
formed without a bargaining round to disagree over. The founders 
of PTK were SIF, HTF, SALF, and CF.40
The PTK cartel primarily negotiated with SAF, but also dealt 
with SFO (the Collective Bargaining Board for State-Owned 
Enterprises), KFO (the central organisation for cooperative 
employers), and other smaller employer organisations. Up until 
1988, PTK had a statute which made union affiliate membership 
conditional upon all the unions having to join the bargaining 
round for the year. After that year, the affiliates were free to 
leave the bargaining round entirely if they wished. Despite this 
statute, PTK never had any legal right to make binding contracts 
for its affiliates in respect of salaries and terms of 
employment, or agreements on the basis of the Codetermination 
Act.
Its negotiated settlements consisted of recommendations to 
the individual unions, which then concluded their own collective 
agreements. If an affiliated union did not want to approve an 
agreement recommended by PTK, it retained the sovereign right to 
continue its own negotiations with the employer. Negotiations 
became, therefore, three-tiered, with the first tier consisting 
of the PTK Board, which negotiated with SAF, and a larger 
delegation consisting of 50 members appointed from the bargaining 
area which had to approve the central agreement. The second tier 
consisted of the branch negotiations, and the third tier local 
adjustments to the agreement. These factors severely restricted
40 PTK, PTK. Gust Osterbergs Tryckeri AB, 1986, p.2.; Lars 
Wiklund, PTK Information Officer, interview, Stockholm, 12 June 
1992.
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any degree of centralisation that PTK could be said to have 
provided for white collar wage determination.
Like TCO, PTK had virtually no meetings with LO to discuss 
wages strategy. It might be concluded, then, that PTK was a 
rational opportunist, a classic insider or free-rider. But the 
question must be raised as to whether the purely economistic 
picture is warrented. There were examples of wage coordination in 
the 1977, 1978/79 and 1986/87 wage agreements, when LO and PTK 
presented common pay demands. In other areas of union activity 
there was also cooperation: in 1974 a joint agreement on security 
insurance, in 1977 a joint agreement on the working environment, 
in 1979 a codetermination agreement in the SFO and KFO sector, 
and in 1983 a SAF-LO/PTK development agreement. In respect of 
codetermination, joint councils have been set up by LO and PTK 
centrally, at the union level and locally, and SAF, LO and PTK 
together formed a joint policy body, the Council for Development 
Issues.41
Dialogue with respect to wages between the two central wage 
bargaining actors, with the exception of 1977, 1978/79, and
1986/87, also took place, albeit largely through newspapers, 
magazines, radio, television and occasional memos. It would not 
be possible for PTK, from the point of view of its affiliates, to 
look as if it were coordinating wages with LO. The differences 
between the two organisations over wage levels and wage drift for 
their affiliates are simply too great for agreement to be reached 
without the affiliates believing their interests have been 
sacrificed by the central organisation.
In practice, though, during the 1980s PTK and LO managed to 
minimise the degree of inflationary competition in their wage 
rounds by bargaining at the same time with SAF, and not one 
before the other. This was not an official policy of
41 PTK, PTK. Gust Osterbergs Tryckeri AB, 1986.
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coordination, and only the timing of the wage rounds was 
coordinated, but each side also knew approximately, through 
unofficial contacts as well as public channels of communication, 
what the other was going to do. Neither actor wanted to be the 
first (the "Stackelberg leader”) to reach a settlement and then 
allow the other to reach a higher one in such a way that it 
looked as if the central negotiators had blundered by ceding the 
advantage. Even though the wage settlements may still have 
differed, by making them at roughly the same time the two 
organisations avoided the charge that they had given their 
opponents the option to do better.42
In sum then, we have to conclude that a certain degree of 
coordination was practiced between the new actors and the old 
actors, even without the institutional mechanisms usually 
associated with such cooperation. The picture, perhaps not 
surprisingly, is more complicated than the new actors simply 
being rational opportunists. But this is not to say that there 
was no conflict between high and low pay groups, and between 
white collar and blue, collar, and private and public sector 
groups. There is evidence, as we shall see, of insiders 
attempting to free-ride and pass costs on to other groups, but 
the point is that this process varied over time and was tempered 
by coordination at many levels.
6.3. Wage Drift.
Many of the problems of rational cooperation in Sweden can 
be argued to revolve around wage drift: local, unofficial wage 
increases negotiated in addition to contractual agreements 
reached by the central negotiating bodies. Sectoral conflicts had 
never previously caused great difficulty for the corporatist 
system, but this certainly changed with the advent of foul 
weather and the new actors. The mechanism by which stronger
42 Lars Wiklund, PTK Information Officer, interview, 
Stockholm, 12 June 1992.
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actors sought to improve their position, effectively as insiders, 
was wage drift. While they could, the outsiders attempted to seek 
redress through the wage determination system.
In the period 1956-1966, the golden age of the Swedish Model 
and the corporatist system, SAF and LO enjoyed a priority rule 
which enabled then to negotiate first. Local, unauthorised wage 
increases in the private sector typically followed, but the 
public sector was not able to do the same. This meant that the 
competitive blue collar unions were the wage leaders, setting the 
rates that other groups could follow. Overall, public sector 
wages simply followed the negotiated rate, and were unable to 
catch up with blue collar wage drift. This was reinforced by the 
fact that public employees had virtually no negotiating rights 
under their state wage management rules. It was only in 1966 that 
white collar workers employed by the state and local authorities 
were given the right to strike and negotiate.43
Not surprisingly, when the public sector workers attained 
the right to bargain over wages, they attempted to catch up with 
their blue collar counterparts. Both white collar workers in the 
private sector and white and blue collar workers in the public 
sector had several reasons to develop an aggressive wage 
bargaining strategy: firstly, private sector salaried workers pay 
more tax than their blue collar counterparts: in the 1980s, their 
marginal income tax rates were as high as 80 percent, compared to 
65 percent for most wage earners.44 Secondly, public sector 
workers enjoyed lifetime job protection, but faced a much more 
compressed wage structure than the private sector. Thirdly, the
43 Anders S. Olsson, The Swedish Wage Negotiation System. 
Uppsala, Uppsala University, 1990, pp. 26-27, 29.
44 Robert J. Flanagan, 'Efficiency and Equality in Swedish 
Labour Markets', in Barry P. Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin (eds), 
The Swedish Economy. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 
1987, pp.127-128.
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white collar workers and the public sector workers enjoyed 
substantially less wage drift than the blue collar workers. In an 
average year, wage drift accounted for between 40 and 50 percent 
of the growth in hourly earnings for blue collar workers (see 
Table 6.4) , compared to 20 to 50 percent for private sector white 
collar workers and 10 to 15 percent for public sector 
employees.45 In sum, these factors made the white collar and 
public sector workers unwilling to accept contractual increases 
that did not contain a measure of compensation for blue collar 
wage drift, and in fact made it very difficult for them to 
agree on salary relationships between themselves (e.g., between 
private sector and public sector white collar workers).
Table 6.4.
Wage Increases and Wage Drifts A Comparison 
of the LO/SAF and PTK/SAF Areas.
Year Wage Agreements Wage Drift
LO/SAF PTK/SAF LO/SAF PTK/SAF
1970-
1973
5.2 6.8 4.5 1.2
1974-
1977
7.5 10.2 5.6 1.6
1978-
1981
4.8 5.1 3.2 1.6
1982-
1985
4.6 4.1 2.7 2.3
Source: Figurea are calculated from Diagram 4:3, in Karl-Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik Odhner and Roland Spant, Lonebildningen i 90-taleta samhallgekonomi. 
Stockholm, Raben and Sjogren, 1988, p.232.
45 Robert J. Flanagan, 'Efficiency and Equality in Swedish 
Labour Markets', pp. 166-67. From the mid-1960s until the mid- 
1970s, average annual wage drift was 4.78 percent compared to 
salary drift of 1.58 percent. See Robert J. Flanagan et al, 
Unionism. Economic Stabilisation, and Incomes Policy. Washington, 
D.C. , The Brookings Institution, 1983, p.337.
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The 1969-70 round of wage negotiations, in retrospect, can 
perhaps be seen as the first encounter between the LO group of 
unions and the newcomers. As well as marking the moment when PTK 
began to emerge, it represented the first clear expression of the 
modern conflict between manual and non-manual groups in the 
Swedish labour market. Effectively, LO was determined to maintain 
its relative position and the PTK group of unions, SIF, SALF and 
CF, were determined to break it. The consequence was that overall 
wages were bid upwards, the central negotiations became much more 
complex and protracted, and SAF began to lose its remaining 
incentives to retain the centralised system.46
The Swedish corporatist system had been designed, in part, 
to reduce the cost entailed when other groups successfully 
compensated for wage drift, but in the original formulation these 
"other groups" were all blue collar unions. The blue collar 
workers in the high profit, competitive sectors were historically 
the high pay actor, and this was later reinforced by the 
solidaristic wage policy. When the public sector and the white 
collar sector became powerful enough to challenge this unequal 
relationship, largely through increase in union membership, they 
did so to the point of almost entirely reversing it. By the 1970s 
and 1980s, for example, low pay workers in the blue collar sector 
typically received less than low pay workers in the public 
sector, largely because the latter were able to compensate for 
high pay, blue collar wage drift.47
Thus in the 1970s and 1980s, LO's blue collar workers 
received smaller negotiated increases than public employees, 
while the public employees compensated for blue collar wage drift 
by including the drift in their negotiated increase. Between 1975
46 James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers and the State. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp.207-208.
47 Robert J. Flanagan, 'Efficiency and Equality in Swedish 
Labour Markets', p.163.
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and 1981 blue collar workers also received less than industrial 
white collar workers for the same reason. LO argued that the 
public sector and white collar workers should not receive wage 
drift compensation for high pay, blue collar achievements, since 
those increases were justified in the industrial sector, 
according to the EFO model, by high profits, productivity gains, 
technological rationalisation, and so on, whereas no similar 
productivity increases could justify them in the public and white 
collar sectors. The public sector cartels and PTK argued in turn 
that the wage achievements of the competitive sector had to be 
matched in their own sectors. From the point of view of PTK, this 
wasn't a wage policy of solidarity so much as a question of 
compensation and fairness.
Despite the intention of centralised bargaining in the 
LO/SAF area to minimise wage drift, association level and local 
bargaining was always beyond the influence and control of the 
central federations. In fair weather, where the central 
negotiations distributed gains anyway, this affiliate 
independence was never pressed. Foul weather awakened the low pay 
and high pay distributional conflict, even within LO. New actors 
such as PTK, which lacked any practical motivation to determine 
wage increases by the EFO model, were required by their 
affiliates to compensate for LO high pay, blue collar gains. Wage 
drift then, became the most important factor undermining any 
serious application of the EFO model to the wider economy. 
Becausd of the complexity of measuring wage drift and the 
unreliability of estimates, it was virtually impossible for PTK 
and LO to agree over the amount of wage drift in the blue collar 
sector. PTK, almost inevitably, would argue that wage drift was 
higher than LO would admit to.
In PTK's own wage determination process during the 1970s and 
1980s no decision was made to calculate what the wage rates
264
6 - Why Corporatism In Sweden Had To Change
necessary to maintain competitiveness would be and to follow 
them. As a PTK spokesman puts it:
'The question - "where's the money to pay the 
salaries?" At that time, we didn't ask that question.
There was no reason at all to ask that question, at 
that time. Today [in the 1990s], we have to ask it, and 
answer that question'48 
There were too many other factors involved which had to be 
addressed before the EFO model could be considered, if at all. 
The depth of the economic foul weather was not fully appreciated 
until the 1980s. PTK bargainers were more preoccupied with 
positional and strategic questions, given the complex game-like 
environment that characterised wage bargaining with such a large 
number of new bargaining cartels. For example: how would SAF 
respond? How would LO, or the government respond? Pragmatism and 
experience, and not an economic model such as the EFO model, were 
used to determine wages growth. In this situation, as Lars 
Wiklund, a PTK spokesman, puts it, the wage bargainer would just 
'test the wind'49. In terms of the complex reality of jostling 
with several independent actors, and given the absence of 
agreement over wage drift, the EFO model as a means of 
determining the corridor of available gains and costs became 
simply an academic exercise.
Since neither TCO nor SACO-SR had the ability to restrain 
their affiliates in their wage bargaining, the result was that 
wage drift in the blue collar sector was transferred into higher 
negotiated increases in the public and white collar sector, which 
then transferred back to LO in the form of considerations of
48 Lars Wiklund, PTK Information Officer, interview,
Stockholm, 12 June 1992.
49 Lars Wiklund, PTK Information Officer, interview,
Stockholm, 12 June 1992.
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equality with negotiated increases in the public sector and 
salaried industrial sector.
The institutional mechanism which helped this inflationary 
spiral to function was known as "wage development guarantees". 
Before 1966, groups who wanted compensation for wage drift 
attempted to negotiate separately and ahead of the main 
bargaining rounds, but this quickly became far too complex and 
difficult to manage. In 1966 LO and SAF agreed to implement wage 
development guarantees as an instrument for managing the response 
of unions to wage drift: any company that did not allow wage 
drift would have to compensate its workers the following year 
anyway due to the legally-binding guarantees. The white collar 
and public sector employees were also given wage development 
guarantees that linked their negotiated increases to blue collar 
wage drift.50
Given these guarantees and the strength of the high pay 
actors, two factors merit attention with respect to wage drift in 
the Swedish labour market. The first is that, given the focus of 
the corporatist system on restricting wage drift, the amount that 
actually occurred is remarkably high. As Bosworth and Lawrence 
write:
'In general, the formal spring negotiations account for 
a surprisingly small proportion of the year-to-year 
variations in the wage rate - hardly the situation one 
would expect for an economy dominated by large 
centralised unions'.51
50 Anders S. Olsson, The Swedish Wage Negotiation System. 
Uppsala, Uppsala University, 1990, p.64.
51 Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence, 'Adjusting to 
Slower Economic Growth: The Domestic Economy', in Barry P. 
Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin (eds), The Swedish Economy. 
Washington DC., The Brookings Institution, 1987, p.41.
266
6 - Why Corporatism In Sweden Had To Change
Moreover, in Table 6.5, we can see that in the LO/SAF area, which 
is the area of principle operation of the corporatist model, wage 
drift in the 1960s was not significantly lower than that in the 
1970s and 1980s. The centralised system of wage determination 
always produced wage drift in the LO/SAF area, which in fact is 
what we should expect given the requirement of the LO unions that 
their cooperation depended conditionally upon wage increases 
being high enough that there was an incentive for high pay unions 
to remain in the corporatist system. The corporatist system, 
then, did not "break down" because it suddenly started producing 
higher absolute levels of wage drift in the 1970s and 1980s, 
insofar as the LO/SAF area considered alone is concerned. On the 
contrary, the corporatist system in the golden age succeeded 
largely because it allowed so much wage drift.
This brings us to our second point, which is that the 
earlier success of the corporatist system, given such high levels 
of wage drift, was only made possible by fortuitous domestic and 
international economic conditions: i.e., fair economic weather. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, wage drift in the LO/SAF area is not 
significantly higher than it was in the golden age, but in 
relative terms it had become unsustainable. This is because, 
given the changes in Sweden's economic fortunes, the amount of 
"sustainable wage" allowed was becoming exceedingly small. From 
1964-1973, average productivity growth was 6.9 percent, which 
after subtracting employment taxes, relative price deterioration, 
and deterioration in the terms of trade, summed to a total of 4 
percent sustainable wage increase. This is, of course, according 
to the EFO model. From 1973-1984, this figure declined by an 
average of 3 percent so that blue collar, white collar, and
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Table 6.5.
Wage Increases in the LO/SAF Areax 
Contractual Increases and Wage Drift.
Year Increase Contractual Other
1961 8.2 3.9 4.3
1962 9.3 6.7 2.6
1963 7.6 3.6 4.0
1964 7.3 2.4 4.9
1965 8.7 4.2 4.5
1966 8.4 5.3 3.1
1967 8.0 4.0 4.0
1968 7.3 3.9 3.4
1969 8.8 4.6 4.2
1970 10.5 3.2 7.3
1971 9.2 5.7 3.5
1972 11.5 4.5 7.0
1973 8.1 3.8 4.3
1974 10.9 5.4 5.5
1975 18.4 11.7 6.7
1976 10.9 7.4 3.5
1977 9.4 6.2 3.2
1978 5.9 2.8 3.1
1979 7.9 4.2 3.7
1980 10.8 6.0 4.8
1981 9.1 3.2 5.9
1982 5.9 4.1 1.8
1983 6.2 4.5 1.7
1984 9.7 6.7 3.0
1985 7.1 4.1 3.0
1986 7.2 5.0 2.2
1987 6.9 4.0 2.9
1988 7.8 3.4 4.4
1989 10.8 6.6 4.2
1990 9.8 3.7 6.1
1991 6.3 3.0 3.3
Note: The contractual increase shown here is not the central LO/SAF agreement but the bargaining result obtained from die respective collective agreements. 
According to Bengt Blomqvist, the LO statistician who supplied these figures (originally for Mr Tony Worthington, Selwyn College, Cambridge), die frame 
agreement between LO and SAP is generally not exceeded in the collective agreements. The column ’other increases’ include* not only wage drift but also 
die effect of reduced working hours and die abolishment of special wages for women. Weekly working hours were reduced, with full wage compensation, 
from 48 to 45 hours during 1957-60, to 42.5 hours during 1966-68, and to 40 hours from 1971-73. Source: Bengt Blomqvist, LO statistician, Stockholm.
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public sector wages had a corridor of about 1 percent.52 
Moreover, while in the golden age LO/SAF wage drift had little 
secondary impact on the Swedish economy through the compensatory 
activities of white collar and public sector workers, in the 
1970s and the 1980s this increasingly became no longer the case.
Thus public and private sector wages compensation for blue 
collar wage drift was not economically sustainable so long as the 
blue collar insiders continued to sustain their previous levels 
of wage increase. Through rational cooperation, both wage drift 
and compensation for wage drift might be curtailed in a way which 
all actors considered pareto-optimal, but this form of foul 
weather corporatism would have to surmount the lack of 
institutional mechanisms for rational cooperation between the new 
actors, monitoring difficulties and insufficient past encounters 
upon which to base judgements about the gains over time from 
cooperation. Rational cooperation between the blue collar and 
public/white collar sectors in determining the sustainable 
corridor of wage increases plus wage drift in each area had never 
been achieved before, let alone in foul weather.
The Swedish economy might have supported wage drift in the 
competitive sector alone, if this was supported by productivity 
gains, but it could not support similar levels of income 
increases in the public and white collar sectors. A cooperative 
redistribution of the available gains would have maximised the 
potential growth rate of those gains, but instead competitive 
distributional conflict threatened further reductions in the 
underlying growth rate. The insiders apparently got more, but in 
reality were achieving less than they might have.
52 Barry P. Bosworth and Robert Z. Lawrence, 'Adjusting to 
Slower Economic Growth: The Domestic Economy', pp.42-43. The 
authors performed regression calculations which showed that only 
0.5 percent of wage increases could be passed on to prices, 
without profit margins being squeezed.
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It might appear as if the new actors alone are responsible 
for such failures to adjust costs to the economic shocks, but 
wage drift created problems not only for the relationship between 
blue collar and white collar/public sector actors, but also for 
the determination of low and high pay wages in the LO/SAF area of 
negotiation. From the early 1960s, the low pay groups in LO 
protested strongly at the high levels of wage drift enjoyed by 
the high pay groups, leading to special increases for the low pay 
in 1966 and 1969. A wave of strikes, including the LKAB iron- 
miners strike of 1969-70, and strikes in 1970, 1974-75 and 1979, 
reflected in part a growing challenge on the part of both low and 
high pay groups to the wage policy of solidarity, which had, 
depending on your point of view, either been failing to erode 
differentials or succeeding too much.53
In conclusion, the problem of wage drift in the Swedish 
context does provide evidence for the sort of foul weather 
dilemmas of cooperation we have hypothesised. In fair weather, 
wage drift was less of a problem not only because the rate of 
productivity growth was high but also because the bargaining 
environment was simpler. But the growth of and lack of 
centralisation of the new actors also to an extent obscures the 
degree to which affiliates even in LO tended in foul weather to 
pursue rational strategies which resulted in a costly collective 
outcome.
6.4. Decentralisation.
It seems that, in the 1980s at least, the sheer momentum of 
over 30 years of centralised bargaining continued to keep the 
Swedish system from decentralising into truly association-level 
and local bargaining. But there had, nevertheless, been major 
changes and by the beginning of the 1990s these had begun to add 
up to momentous proportions.
53 James Fulcher, Labour Movements. Employers and the State. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp.205, 206.
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Most obviously, SAF, which had led the way in pushing for
the centralised model in the 1950s, had again taken the
initiative and during the course of the 1980s adopted full 
decentralisation of pay bargaining as a policy goal. It is 
possible to argue that VF and employers in the engineering sector 
exerted disproportionate influence in this respect, since as a 
central organisation SAF would be expected to have an interest in 
maintaining its central role in pay negotiations and would oppose 
the resultant diminution of its power. Certainly, VF, as an 
association representing almost half of Swedish exporters, exerts 
more influence than employers in sectors such as sales, hotel and
restaurants, clothing, grocery stores and so on, who have
continued to support central negotiations.54 But against this is 
also the reality that centralised bargaining was becoming 
increasingly impossible, with unmanageable agreements consisting 
of hundreds of pages, a profusion of competitive and 
uncoordinated negotiating cartels, and little success in relating 
wage outcomes to productivity.
Progress in formalising SAF's new pay bargaining stance was 
made at the 1987 Congress, where SAF announced a new policy which 
defined wages as an instrument for supervisors to encourage and 
reward good work, and not as an instrument of macroeconomic 
planning.55 This was aimed more at ruling out central 
negotiations between SAF and LO as a means of achieving 
macroeconomic goals than at relinquishing any role for SAF as a 
coordinator of bargaining among its associates. As we shall see, 
neither SAF nor LO want to see wage explosions occur through 
associate level bargaining. SAF's main objective was to remove
54 Kristina Ahlen, 'Swedish Collective Bargaining Under 
Pressure: Inter-Union Rivalry and Incomes Policies', British 
Journal of Industrial Relations. 27, 3, 1989, p.335.
55 Kristina Ahlen, 'Swedish Collective Bargaining Under 
Pressure: Inter-Union Rivalry and Incomes Policies', p.336.
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the central level of negotiations (which would hopefully also 
reduce the strength of LO as a force on the political scene as 
well as in the industrial arena), since wage increases at that 
level were always added to by yet further bargaining at associate 
and local levels. The policy was also designed to encourage the 
employer associates to take up more bargaining responsibilities, 
and dovetailed neatly with a long-standing SAF policy with 
respect to the wage policy of solidarity, which held that:
'Pay is the reward for labour, not an instrument of 
distribution policy'.56
Recently, in a formal decision in February 1990, SAF 
announced it would henceforth take no more part in centralised 
negotiations, leaving pay bargaining entirely to its affiliated 
employer associations. This left the two-year period of the 
Rehnberg agreement (see following chapter) as an opportunity for 
all the labour market organisations to prepare for March 1993, 
from when there would be association-level and local bargaining 
only. For the first time, SAF also made a programme outlining its 
goals for the 1990s, which entailed the objective of eventually 
shifting pay bargaining to the enterprise level. Its new role in 
wage negotiations, which is in the process of evolving, will be 
primarily as a coordinating body for employers and their 
associations, providing information and statistics, although in 
the near future SAF will continue to negotiate at branch level 
for some of the associations because they lack the personnel and 
resources to do it for themselves.
In line with these policies, SAF has also taken other 
measures to redefine its role in the wider policy environment. An 
important example of this has been its announcement in January 
1991 of withdrawal from the vast number of corporatist policy-
56 SAF, Swedish Employers' Confederation. Stockholm, Thor and 
Co, 1991, p.15.
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implementation authorities and boards in Sweden.37 Representation 
on these boards, of which the most important perhaps is the 
National Labour Market Board (AMS), had been shared by trade 
unions and employers as well as political parties, the civil 
service, and other interest groups. Effectively, however, 
employer proponents of a more free-market approach were a 
minority on boards such as the AMS, which had always been a 
rather powerful instrument in the hands of the Swedish labour 
movement. On the AMS, for example, the trade unions had seven 
members and the employers six members on a directorate of sixteen 
representatives.58
Since decisions were consensual, and not by majority voting, 
SAF found itself in the invidious position of accepting policies 
on the board which it would then have to protest against, 
sometimes with the same individual, in another forum. As a SAF 
spokesman relates: 'In a way we had to work for the government
57 The use of the term "corporatist" here is somewhat 
different to that which we have been using. Here it refers to 
what Offe calls "the attribution of public status to interest 
groups". See Claus Offe (John Keane, editor), Disorganised 
Capitalism. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985. These boards played a 
uniquely important and independent role in Sweden's policy
implementation. As Bo Rothstein writes: 'Sweden's civil service 
is not organised as large ministries with a minister at the top. 
Instead, the ministries are rather small units and function not 
as implementation agencies but more as policy organisations. The 
task of implementing government policy is given to semi­
independent directorates, National Boards and Agencies, of which 
there are about 170, which have their own boards and director-
generals. The individual ministries have no formal rights to
issue specific orders to NBAs'. Bo Rothstein, 'State and Capital 
in Sweden: The Importance of Corporatist Arrangements', The Study 
of Power and Democracy in Sweden. Report No. 18, March 1988, p.2. 
Cited in a draft paper by Goran Ahrne and Wallace Clement, 'A New 
Regime?: Class Representation Within the Swedish State', 24
February 1992, p.14.
58 Bo Rothstein, 'State and Capital in Sweden: The Importance 
of Corporatist Arrangements', passim.
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more than for our members'.59 Consequently, SAF argued, the 
boards were undemocratic. In June 1992 the new Liberal government 
supported this move by deciding to remove LO and TCO members as 
well from the boards, leaving the membership open only to 
"experts”, civil servants and MPs.60
SAF's redefined role is thus evolving into a form of 
lobbying organisation, although SAF is quick to point out that 
Swedish-style lobbying is not like the United States where "pork 
barrel" politics has an infamous reputation. SAF envisages 
working through "open channels", writing reports, publishing 
books and supplying information. It argues that as an 
organisation it can be more effective using other ways to 
influence policy than representation on boards such as the AMS, 
and that it will be free to say what it really wants to say.
LO has also reviewed its own future strategy, and prepared 
a response to the new employer initiatives. From the point of 
view of LO, the bargaining environment has irretrievably changed. 
With the increase in the white collar and public sector 
bargaining areas, the. LO agreement with SAF is much less 
important to the total wage sum in the Swedish economy. This 
means it is harder than ever to standardise the wage norm across 
the wage bargaining field. In this context, LO finds it 
surprising that SAF continues a policy strategy designed to 
weaken centralised control of trade unions, both through 
decentralisation of pay bargaining and the removal of trade union 
and employer representation on the boards of corporatist 
institutions such as the AMS.
As LO views the situation, the impact of the newly 
liberalised capital markets in conjunction with the threat of
59 Lars-Goran Redbrandt, SAF Bitr Director, interview, 
Stockholm, 11 June 1992.
60 See European Industrial Relations Review. 218, March 1992, 
p.11, and 221, June 1992, pp.12-13.
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unemployment has had the effect of shifting power away from the 
trade unions and towards the employers. These harsh conditions 
are having the effect of forcing union pay bargainers to accept 
virtual market solutions, even without decentralisation. 
According to LO, the employer argument that there is a power 
asymmetry in the Swedish labour market caused by too much 
centralisation is simply no longer true. As a LO economist put 
it:
'They don't understand they are winners. And therefore 
they are very dangerous to us. If they were wise they 
would just try to stabilise the situation'.61 
SAF is aware of the employers' market strength in the current 
economic climate, and appears to be using the opportunity created 
by this strength to weaken the Swedish blue collar trade union 
movement, traditionally the power-base of the Social Democratic 
movement in the political arena.
To LO, it is somewhat ironic that the employer strategy is 
apparently forcing the Swedish trade unions to become more 
opportunistic, more militant, and more "English-like". The 
question is, however, whether or not in the Swedish context 
decentralisation implies the development of a wage determination 
system that is similar to Anglo-Saxon models. LO appears 
determined that it should not mean this:
'People are saying that LO's strengths are being 
depleted. What they don't see is that we still make 
very important decisions, and are building up a totally 
new organisation within the confederation for 
coordinating branch unions' negotiations... The new
61 Dan Andersson, LO Economist, interview, Stockholm, 11 June
1992.
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situation is that we have totally changed the way we 
are organised and work'.62 
The "new LO" (at the time of writing in development), envisages 
the central federation still functioning to coordinate wage 
bargaining between affiliates, which are being asked to negotiate 
in a way which minimises prisoners' dilemmas. Each branch will 
negotiate directly with its employer counterpart but the overall 
strategy will be coordinated, so that the other trade union 
branches are, in fact, informed and aware of the sustainable 
level of wage increases.
From the point of view of LO, this form of 
"decentralisation" is actually a more cooperative, and 
rationalised, form of centralisation. Whereas in the past 
centralised pay bargaining meant just two or three people from LO 
were involved in negotiating with SAF, the new "decentralised 
process" means creating a larger, more representative general 
staff, as well as new guidelines and strategies that have been 
arrived at through a longer process of consultation and 
coordination among branch unions.63 The general staff is expected 
to comprise at least eight to ten persons with interlocking sub­
groups and the time frame envisaged for the negotiation process 
has grown from the previous practice of two to three months of 
consultation (capped off by two to four weeks of intensive 
negotiations between the leaders of LO and SAF) to a one and a 
half year time frame.
This new process, which is summarised in Figure 6.1, is 
viewed by LO as being much more democratic and open, and 
involving a much greater amount of "internal diplomacy" than in
62 Dan Andersson, LO Economist, interview, Stockholm, 11 June
1992.
63 For a discussion of previous central bargaining practices 
between LO and SAF, see James Fulcher, Labour Movements. 
Employers. And The State. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p.198.
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Figure 6.1.
The Decentralised LO Bargaining Strategy.
NEGOTIATING CONFERENCES.
(3,000 to 10,000 meetings)
I
FORMAL INSTITUTE: CENTRAL 
NEGOTIATION CONFERENCE.
i
NEGOTIATION GROUP.
(10-15 of strongest negotiators).
the past. Individual affiliates are expected to work on a forward 
plan for the year ahead, receiving information from LO about the 
bargaining environment and the activities of other labour market 
actors. At some stage they will have their own conferences, at 
which their plans and strategy for the upcoming year will be 
finalised. These plans will then be forwarded to a centralised 
conference which will make some final recommendations while the 
affiliates elect a negotiating group from their strongest local 
leaders. LO will not be directing this process, instead it is 
expected that the members of LO will be able to coordinate 
themselves. As Dan Andersson, an LO senior economist, puts it: 
'We do not say "do this" Jbut instead provide a table 
for people to understand the prisoners' dilemma'.64 
As such, the new bargaining strategy constitutes a radical 
change in the style of organisation and bargaining practice 
within LO. Interestingly, SAF are also rationalising their own 
small branch sectors into eight large negotiating groups. As 
Andersson views these changes:
64 Dan Andersson, LO Economist, interview, Stockholm, 11 June
1992.
277
6 - Why Corporatism In Sweden Had To Change
'So now we are enormously much stronger, and much more 
rationalised, and professional. And SAF is doing the 
same thing. So from the outside we see that the Swedish 
system is breaking down but if you look closer you will 
find that it will survive in another form'.65 
The significance of these changes must be viewed in the 
wider context. The LO/SAF bargaining area is no longer the 
preeminent field of wage determination in the Swedish labour 
market, and while PTK has indicated that it is likely to adopt a 
similar mode of organisation and pay bargaining, much still 
hinges on the capacity of the labour market to produce wage 
outcomes that are coordinated not just within negotiating cartels 
but also between them. The underlying problem which has, in a 
sense, forced the wage bargaining actors to modify their mode of 
operation remains the problem of how to distribute costs in foul 
economic weather. It may be that the exigencies of the present 
economic situation, in particular the pressure of growing 
unemployment, may force wage outcomes to more closely model 
market-driven outcomes, in which case the new coordinated 
bargaining system may succeed in achieving the requisite degree 
of cost-cutting without counterproductive outbreaks of 
distributional conflict. But the market will still decree that, 
for certain groups at particular times, the costs demanded from 
them will be quite high, and, for other groups, the gains 
disproportionately high, and it remains to be seen whether the 
coordination achieved through these new bargaining frameworks 
will be able to deal*successfully with such pressures.66
65 Dan Andersson, LO Economist, interview, Stockholm, 11 June
1992.
66 Lei Delsen and Tom van Veen, 'The Swedish Model: Relevant 
for Other European Countries?', British Journal of Industrial 
Relations. 30, 1, 1992, p.101.
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In any case, LO and the blue collar unions must operate for 
the moment in a political context which has changed from one of 
support and payoffs from a SAP government to a context where a 
liberal government is embarking on policies of cost-cutting which 
depend to no great extent on the cooperation of labour market 
actors. The opposition Moderate and Liberal parties united for 
the 1991 election with a joint economic program which promised to 
reduce taxes by 10 percent of public income, and reduce public 
spending which amounted to over 60 percent of GNP.67 In September 
1991, they won the election, and Carl Bildt, the new conservative 
Prime Minister stated that:
'the doctrines of collectivism and socialism have been 
thrown on the scrapheap of history'.68
Conclusion.
In this chapter we have seen a combination of forces acting 
against rational cooperation in Sweden. Chief among these, the 
thesis argues, is the impact of foul economic weather. The 
mixture of external and internal shocks we examined has produced 
in Sweden conditions which closely resemble our model of cost 
distribution. It makes sense to say that 0 has increased.
The problem for rational cooperation in Sweden is focused in 
many ways on the employment consequences of such a series of foul 
weather shocks. We have seen that, given the slowdown in output 
and productivity growth, and given the increase in public sector 
employment, a classic confrontation has developed between 
insiders in the private sector and potential outsiders employed 
in the public sector. With the rise of the other "new actors",
67 Robert Taylor, 'The Economic Policies of Sweden's 
Political Parties', Current Sweden. Svenska Institutet, 383, June 
1991, passim.
68 Tony Samstag, 'Sweden seeks new niche in Europe', The 
Times, November 29, 1991, p.12.
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this underlying conflict has been complicated in immeasurable 
ways.
Thus, in addition to the public sector unions the Swedish 
centralised system had to deal with private sector unions and 
their central federations and cartels such as TCO and PTK. None 
of these actors were encompassing organisations understood in the 
usual sense of the term. Conditional cooperation was limited to 
unofficial coordination, with little history of iterations to 
provide for much institutional memory of the relationship between 
previous strategy choices and current outcomes.
Given these ingredients, it is not surprising that wage 
drift became the most visible indicator of the apparent failure 
of the system to achieve rational cooperation in the distribution 
of costs. The actors' wage drift demands had not fundamentally 
changed from the period of fair economic weather, but the 
economic capacity of the system to support those claims had 
changed. The actors' strategy choices lagged behind these changes 
in the bargaining environment.
Finally, the most recent events in Sweden point towards an 
increasing decentralisation in wage bargaining. It seems, on the 
basis of the information presented in this chapter, that 
corporatism in Sweden did break down, both because of the impact 
of foul weather on gains-based cooperation and because of the 
impact of the rise of the new actors. But there were also signs 
that the picture may not be quite so simple: the decentralisation 
of LO is taking place in what we can only describe as an 
encompassing framework. LO is trying to get the actors around a 
table to discuss rational cooperation. Similarly, despite the 
foul weather shock and the implications for employment, we must 
remember that unemployment in Sweden has been low throughout this 
period. We have not, as yet, said very much about how well 
corporatism performed in Sweden in terms of outcomes. It is time, 
therefore, to take an empirical look at how well the Swedish
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system coped with the combination of changes we have studied 
here.
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CHAPTER SEVEN.
SWEDISH WAGE RESTRAINT: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE.
'Wage restraint is by now a classical economic argument for
corporatism'. Jukka Pekkarinen.1
It seems only intuitive to accept that an economic crisis 
should impair cooperation, but the very meaning of cooperation, 
at least in a game-theoretical sense, entails choosing the best 
strategy in the long-term, from a collective perspective.
Cooperation should still be collectively preferable to non­
cooperation, even in foul economic weather. From this
perspective, the notion that cooperation should become more
Irrational in foul economic weather is actually suspicious.
This chapter argues that corporatist cooperation was in fact 
still working relatively well in Sweden in foul weather, at least 
in its own terms, even if in real terms the Swedish economy faced 
such constraints that the system did not fully distribute enough 
costs. Thus, although there were wage booms from the mid-1970s 
and centralised bargaining broke down in the 1980s, compared to 
other OECD countries Sweden overall still has a low real wage 
rate.
1 Jukka Pekkarinen, 'Corporatism and Economic Performance in 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland', in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, 
Bob Rowthorn, Social Corporatism; A Superior Economic System?. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p.314.
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This, however, was achieved at the cost of high inflation: 
Sweden's average nominal wage rate is unexpectedly high if we 
assume that a corporatist country with centralised wage 
bargaining should function to limit an increase in unit labour 
costs. It was high in a context, moreover, in which the Swedes 
enjoyed an already high standard of living, and yet real 
increases were quite small. High nominal wages were, then, a 
means of achieving an increasing share of an available income 
potential which was declining, not only because it was already 
pushing the frontiers of possible income growth, but because it 
was actually beginning to decline as a result of a massive 
structural shift in the Swedish economy.
The Swedish Model, as we saw in Chapter Five, was in fact a 
fair weather, growth-based corporatist system, with a restrictive 
fiscal policy, a wage solidarity policy that ruled out low wages, 
and consequently, produced high inflation. Corporatist 
cooperation in Sweden was predicated on distributing gains. 
Whether it could have made the transition to centralised cost 
distribution in foul weather is something of a moot point, since 
the breakup of centralised bargaining was achieved anyway by the 
disruptive arrival of the new, independent central federations 
which represented thousands of workers in the services and public 
sectors. But it might still make a transition to a more 
decentralised and encompassing cost distribution. What evidence 
is there that the foul weather produced non-cooperative outcomes, 
insider behaviour, and low pay-high pay conflicts even within the 
sphere of institutionalised corporatism in Sweden? And what 
evidence is there that the actors managed to achieve, despite all 
their problems, cooperative outcomes?
We begin in this chapter with a outline of the performance 
of the corporatist system and the actors in the 1970s and 1980s 
and then go on to an empirical examination of comparative wages 
performance and of Swedish data in isolation. We shall be
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concentrating on the manufacturing sector as our primary data 
source, largely because comparable data on public and service 
sector employment and wages has not been systematically collected 
by the major statistical publishing bodies such as the OECD, the 
IMF, the World Bank and the UN.2 Manufacturing nonetheless 
provides us with a workable proxy with which to draw conclusions 
about the structure of wage restraint and cost-cutting in our 
data set. The bulk of this section examines the comparative 
performance of several representative industries over the period 
1970-1989 for five OECD economies: the US, the UK, Germany,
Sweden and Japan. We take a close look at the 1980s wage 
performance and examine the implications our findings have, so 
far, for the rational choice hypotheses developed in Chapters One 
and Two about cooperation between low and high pay groups in fair 
and foul economic weather.
7.1. How Effective was the Swedish Response?
Given the depth of the economic challenge, and the seemingly 
intractable complications of the new bargaining environment and 
relative increases in wage drift, it might be expected that 
Swedish corporatism would fail to achieve any sort of outcome 
that we could characterise as rational cooperation. The academic 
community seems to be divided among those who focus on the 
disorganisation of the system and those economic conjunctures
2 There is data on public sector employment, but little on 
wages in that sector. With public sector employment, a large part 
of the difficulty is that legal and institutional definitions of 
what constitutes a public sector job differ. Traditional national 
statistics obscure this. Newer definitions look at the function 
of the job and the source of employment authority rather than the 
legal definition or relying on national administrative 
convention, but generating comparable data on this subject is a 
large research project on its own. See Miceal Ross, Employment In 
The Public Domain In Recent Decades. Dublin, The Economic And 
Social Research Institute, 1986; B. Guy Peters, Public Employment 
In The U.S.: Growth And Change. Number 63, Centre for the Study 
of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1980.
284
7 - Swedish Wage Restraint: A Comparative Perspective
during which performance appears to be poor and those who stress 
the degree to which the system has actually made impressive 
adjustments. The following sections trace briefly the variation 
in performance of Swedish corporatism in the past two decades, 
showing that while rational cooperation seems theoretically to be 
extremely unlikely in foul weather there is paradoxical evidence 
that the actors responded to the crisis by cooperating more.
7.1.1. The 1970s.
When the first shock waves of the world recession began to 
hit Sweden in the early 1970s the SAP Government struggled to use 
fiscal policy as an effective counterbalancing instrument. The 
government attempted to "bridge over" the loss of external 
demand, but mistimed the policy implementation so that the 
macroeconomic intervention generated a boom which coincided with 
a temporary upturn and produced a profits boom. When the 
recession really did hit following the oil price shocks of 1973 
and 1974, the wage determination system was producing high levels 
of wage drift in response to the previous year's profit boom.
An occasional failure in fiscal management such as this has 
to be regarded as unavoidable given the difficulty of predicting 
international economic trends. In terms of rational cooperation 
this probability adds yet another measure of difficulty to an 
already strained apparatus. In Sweden, the particularly 
unfortunate timing of this mistake contributed greatly to the 
strength of the initial shock wave by generating a surge in unit 
labour costs relative to OECD competitors at precisely the wrong 
time. Given what was to come, the huge wage explosion of 1975- 
1976 can be seen retrospectively as a last grasp (although at the 
time the negotiators probably did not realise it) , by the blue 
collar, white collar and public sector workers of the declining
285
7 - Swedish Wage Restraint: A Comparative Perspective
growth in the economic pie. In total, including payroll taxes and 
social charges, hourly labour costs rose by 39.2 percent.3
Such a combination of external shock and policy 
mismanagement made the EFO model practically obsolete even before 
it had really got started. The EFO model determined the frame for 
wage increases on the basis of expected wage and price increases 
abroad, as well as expected productivity improvements in Sweden, 
but the expectations on both counts proved to be wrong. The EFO 
model literally had to deliver high pay increases which, with the 
addition of wage drift and the increasing power of the white 
collar and public sector unions, proved to be completely 
unsustainable.
How did Swedish corporatism respond? As the economic crisis 
unfolded, the Swedish government responded to the decline of 
industrial sectors such as steel and ship-building by expanding 
active and passive industrial policy. The SAP government 
subsidised a large proportion of those industries in the 
competitive sector which were hardest-hit by the international 
market changes. It also injected massive amounts into programs 
designed to aid restructuring.4 Expenditure on industrial policy 
programmes, in particular company-specific subsidies, grew from 
SKr 2.3 billion in 1970 to 15.4 billion in 1979 (1.3 and 4.9
percent of GDP, respectively). For the 1970s as a whole,
3 Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic 
Responses to Change and Crisis', in Peter Gourevitch et al, 
Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain. West Germany and Sweden. 
London, Allen and Unwin, 1984, pp.388-294. See also Robert J. 
Flanagan et al, Unionism. Economic Stabilisation, and Incomes 
Policies. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1983, 
p. 322, who cite that in the period 1973-77 unit labour costs rose 
by an annual average of more than 15 percent.
4 Roger Henning, 'Industrial Policy or Employment Policy? 
Sweden's Response to Unemployment', in Jeremy Richardson and 
Roger Henning (eds), Unemployment. Policy Responses of Western 
Democracies. London, Sage, 1984, pp.193-216.
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industrial policy programmes amounted to some SKr 75 billion, 
compared to 50 billion for labour market and employment policy. 
After 1982, industrial policy support shifted towards the 
promotion of high-technology sectors in electrical engineering, 
transport, pharmaceutical, chemicals and mechanical engineering.5
The massive public expenditure was expanded during the 
incumbency of four different non-socialist coalition governments 
during the period 1976-82. The strategy has been regarded as a 
paradigm case of successful macroeconomic policy, and even the 
OECD has admitted it was wrong in making pessimistic forecasts.6 
Shipbuilding endured closures of yards such as Kockums and 
Uddevalla in the mid-1980s leading to massive reductions in 
productive capacity and manpower. Similarly, the labour force was
5 In this period industrial subsidies were primarily firm- 
specific rescue operations, three-quarters of which went to the 
ship building and steel industries. In 1978 and 1979 the ship 
building subsidies actually exceeded the value-added produced in 
that industry. Michael Landesmann, 'Industrial Policies and 
Social Corporatism', in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob 
Rowthorn (eds), Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp.263-265. See also Bo Carlsson, 
'Industrial Subsidies in Sweden: Macroeconomic Effects and an 
International Comparison', Journal of Industrial Economics. 32, 
1983, pp.1-23; Per-Martin Meyerson, Eurosclerosis: The Case of 
Sweden, Federation of Swedish Industries, Caslon Press AB, 1985, 
pp.60-61; Robert J. Flanagan et al, Unionism. Economic 
Stabilisation. and Incomes Policies. Washington, DC., The 
Brookings Institution, 1983, pp.319-20.
6 Jim Tomlinson, 'Macroeconomic Management and Industrial 
Policy', in Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, Reversing Industrial 
Decline? Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and Her 
Competitors. Oxford, Berg, 1989, p.256; OECD, Country Study: 
Sweden. Paris, 1985, 1987; Bob Rowthorn and Andrew Glyn, 'The
Diversity of Unemployment Experience Since 1973', in Stephen A. 
Marglin and Juliet B. Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism. 
Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience. Oxford, Clarendon, 1990, 
pp.252-53; Jukka Pekkarinen, 'Corporatism and Economic 
Performance in Sweden, Norway, and Finland', in Jukka Pekkarinen, 
Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthron, Social Corporatism: A Superior
Economic System?. Oxford, Clarendon, 1992, p.311.
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shrinking in the steel sector, which eventually merged into just 
two stainless steel companies: Avesta and Sandvik. The forestry 
sector was second only to engineering in terms of supplying 
exports (Sweden was the world's third largest producer of pulp 
and paper, after the USA and Canada, and was the leading Nordic 
producer). Rationalisation of the industry from the 1960s halved 
the number of pulp mills while leaving capacity and production 
levels high.7
Full employment was maintained through active labour market 
policy.8 The government actor pinned much of its strategy for 
reducing costs on a series of devaluations of the Swedish Krona. 
Devaluations improved the competitiveness of the export-oriented 
competitive sector by lowering the prices of Swedish exports, but 
depended on the capacity of the domestic wage determination 
system to absorb the relative increase in import prices by not 
fully compensating for the resultant inflationary surge. Three 
devaluations adding to more than 15 percent were made in the late 
1970s. The coalition also increased VAT to restrain domestic 
demand for imports and pay for the costly anti-unemployment 
expenditure programs. Increased relative taxation provided a 
mechanism to secure the measure of wage restraint sought after, 
with the foregone wages used to pay for active and passive policy 
measures designed to achieve economic restructuring at maximum 
employment. To help to restrain wages, the government implemented
7 Lloyds Bank, Sweden Economic Report. 1986.
8 In 1982, Sweden's share of spending on active measures as 
a proportion of total labour market policy expenditure was 73.9 
percent, compared to 35.2 percent for France and 34.1 percent for 
the FRG. Gunther Schmidt and Bernd Reissert, 'On the 
Institutional Conditions of Effective Labour Market Policies', in 
Egon Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck (eds) , Bevond Keynesianism. The 
Socio-Economics of Production and Full Employment. London, Edward 
Elgar, 1991, p.94.
288
7 - Swedish Wage Restraint: A Comparative Perspective
price restrictions, and to increase profits it eliminated payroll 
tax.
The trade unions responded to the devaluations by a 
traditional recourse to "price development guarantees". Price
Table 7.1.
1977: Decrease in Unit Labour Costs.
Wages 5.4% Inflation Rate 16.3%
Wage Drift 3.3%
Subtotal 8.7% VAT + Devaluation 3.5%
General Payroll Tax 4.0%
Social Charges and
Hourly Wage Cost 2.3%
TOTAL 10.5% CPI 12.8%
RELATIVE UNIT
LABOUR COSTS: -2.3%
Source: Andrew Martin. ’Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic Resnonses to Chance and Crisis’, in Peter Gourevitch el al. 
Britain. West Germany and Sweden. London. Allen and Unwin. 1984. no. 300-303.
Unions and Economic Crisis:
indexation in Sweden was a practice which predated central wage 
negotiations. Price development guarantees were applied to the 
negotiation of contractual wages in 1952, 1957, and 1977-83.9 It 
might be expected, then, given all the problems we have discussed 
that the trade union actors would have engaged in classic insider 
behaviour. But in fact, looking at Table 7.1, we can see that 
relative unit labour costs were actually reduced by 2.3 percent 
in 1977-78. The main explanation for this, despite all of the 
changes and difficulties we have discussed, was rational 
cooperation achieved through the wage determination system.
9 Anders S. Olsson, The Swedish Wage Negotiation System. 
Uppsala, Uppsala University, 1990, p.63.
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Centralised bargaining facilitated the outcome it was designed to 
achieve: a macroeconomic wage adjustment.10
What produced the cooperation of the affiliates? The best 
explanation would appear to be that the active industrial
policies, public sector employment and the centralised framework 
facilitated a collective response by the affiliates to the
evident severity of the wage boom. As indirect support for such 
an interpretation, the affiliates succeeded only in adjusting 
wages for the impact of the 1975-76 wage boom, and still had 
further to go in making adjustments for the deeper, more
permanent structural crisis which was afflicting Sweden.11 But 
the system clearly did make an adjustment to the foul economic 
weather, and in cooperating the affiliates were not simply 
following orders from above. In Sweden the severity of the foul 
weather shock prompted the actors to respond by cooperating more.
In sum, over the period 1977-1979, average real hourly 
earnings declined by 7.8 percent, which was just over two thirds 
of the 11.5 percent increase in real wages produced by the 1975- 
76 wage boom. The average annual growth of real wages in this 
period was about 0.75 percent. Part of the improvement was due to
10 B. Ryden and V. Bergstrom, 'Sweden in the 1980s: How
Gloomy Are The Prospects?', in Bengt Ryden and Villy Bergstrom 
(eds), Sweden: Choices for Economic and Social Policy in the
1980s, London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, p.8. Rehn and Viklund 
suggest that one explantion for the success of this partial 
adjustment was that the higher consumption enabled by the 1976 
wage boom appeared rather suddenly and evaporated equally quickly 
due to inflation, so that wage earners had little time to 
accustom themselves to the higher rate. Gosta Rehn and Birgir 
Viklund, 'Changes in the Swedish Model', in Guido Baglioni and 
Colin Crouch (eds), European Industrial Relations. The Challenge 
of Flexibility. London, Sage, 1990, p.300.
11 Evidence for this could be seen in the fact that, in 1979, 
the central government budget deficit was blowing out at 10.5 
percent and the balance of current payments was in deficit by 2.2 
percent of GDP. See Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: 
Strategic Responses to Change and Crisis', p.311.
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a one-off reduction in general payroll tax by the bourgeois 
government, which was made just after the unions had finished 
signing contracts using the old figures.12
The response to the wage shock was, however, only short­
lived. Despite the evidence for rational cooperation the system 
was unable to sustain a hold over all of the actors and 
particularly unable to sustain such foul weather cooperation 
beyond the short-term response. The “gang of four” public sector 
cartel administered the coup de grace to the old system in 1979- 
80 by presenting joint demands for 11-13 percent wage increases 
before LO and SAF had come to any agreement. The LO and TCO 
public sector unions argued that public sector union members were 
entitled to at least the same percentage increase in wages that 
the LO high pay unions were bargaining for, regardless of the 
fact that these groups based their bargaining on the available 
room for wage increases in the competitive sector, while 
productivity gains in the public sector could not justify such an 
increase. The principle cited was that of fairness and equality. 
The gang of four also argued that there was no need for the 
public sector to wait until LO and SAF had finished bargaining 
before determining their share. SAF, in vain, argued in turn that 
a real income cut of 2-3 percent was necessary. In fact, SAF 
argued that growth of public expenditure was one of Sweden's 
biggest costs, thereby making an outsider of the public sector 
and enticing private sector unions with the idea of insider wages 
growth achieved at the expense of public sector growth.
Since the gang of four had preempted the bargaining round 
with a figure, LO could hardly offer its members any less, 
especially given the fact that SKAF was by then larger in size 
than the blue collar Metalworkers. With the union actors all 
demanding about 11 percent while SAF argued that a real cut of 2
12 Andrew Martin, 'Trade Unions in Sweden: Strategic 
Responses to Change and Crisis', pp. 300-303.
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to 3 percent was required, the system disintegrated into 
widespread strikes and lockouts. As Bo Carlsson, a SAF Senior 
Economist relates: 'After this public sector agreement was
signed, there was not much to be done. They had broken the 
ceiling in the private sector'.13
This failure of Swedish corporatism to adjust the corridor 
of sustainable wage increases in 1979 severely weakened the 
credibility of centralised wage determination as an instrument of 
economic adjustment in Sweden. The standoff in the labour markets 
produced a deadlocked bargaining round, to which the trade union 
actors responded with escalating industrial action. This grew 
into a historic strike and lockout in 1980 which affected over 20 
percent of the labour force, to which the government capitulated 
by making an agreement with the public sector unions. SAF had in 
the end to accept 7.3 percent in the private sector and 6.8 
percent in the public sector.
7.1.2. The 1980s.
The Swedish Model had suffered some reverses, but it also 
had made several important adjustments. The question is how badly 
the reverses outweighed the gains from those periods in which 
economic restructuring and wage restraint took place. The public 
sector had played its hand, so to speak, so that the next decade 
saw high pay unions in the private sector establishing their 
independence from centralised bargaining and de facto allowing 
the public sector to redistribute what was left over.
It was Sweden's large export companies which took the 
initiative to break the ratchet-like linkages between the 
competitive sector and the public sector by pushing for greater 
decentralisation. In this process Verkstadsforeningen (VF), the
13 Bo Carlsson, SAF Deputy Director, Senior Economist,
interview, Stockholm, 11 June 1992.
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Swedish Engineering Employers' Association, one of SAF's four 
largest affiliate associations, played the vital role.14
VF's member companies, such as Volvo, Saab-Scania, 
Electrolux, LM Eriksson and Asea, enjoyed good profits throughout 
most of the 1980s, but faced labour shortages and problems in 
maintaining productivity growth and competitiveness. Ironically, 
then, the solution for them was to offer higher wages and greater 
wage differentiation in order to encourage better performance. 
SAF responded to pressure from VF by changing its statutes in 
1982 to allow large companies in the engineering branch to 
achieve branch level agreements, which then paved the way for 
local agreements.15
In 1983, VF enticed away from PTK the white collar cartel's 
three founding members in the engineering industry: SIF (the
Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry) , SALF (the 
Swedish Union of Foremen and Supervisors), and CF (the 
Association of Graduate Engineers) . From LO it took away the 
heartland of blue collar unionism in Sweden: Metall. These unions 
did not adopt the central frame agreement negotiated between 
LO/PTK and SAF for that year.
The metalworkers and the three white collar unions broke 
away from the central bargaining frame, fundamentally, in order 
to pursue their own private rivalry, and to weaken the public 
sector unions' claims for wage drift guarantees. In 1986 and 1987 
public sector automatic wage drift compensation was finally
14 For a useful discussion, see Scott Lash, 'The End of Neo- 
Corporatism?: The Breakdown of Centralised Bargaining in Sweden', 
British Journal of Industrial Relations. 23, 2, 1985, pp.215-239.
15 SAF had always been more centralised than LO in the sense 
that it had the right to approve its members' collective 
agreements (although it could not impose them). The 1982 changes 
removed this requirement. James Fulcher, Labour Movements. 
Employers and the State. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp.74, 
189, 217-218.
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ended.16 The white collar workers, highly trained and having 
never adopted the wage policy of solidarity, were simply 
continuing to improve their relative position by exploiting the 
evolving structural importance to the modern production process 
of skilled white collar work. The metalworkers, who had seen even 
low paid white collar workers overtake them during the past 
decade, but who were now themselves increasingly highly trained 
and skilled, were determined to maintain their relative position 
and break the public sector connection with pay in the private 
sector. In addition, Metall faced the problem of losing high pay 
membership to SIF as technological changes created new job 
definitions. In 1985-86, largely for these reasons, Metall and 
the Factory Workers' Union formally renounced the wage solidarity 
principle, and in 1987 LO revised its wage policy to allow for 
more wage compensation for the 'wrongly paid'.17
The engineering sector, where about half of Sweden's 10 
biggest companies can be found in areas such as automotive 
engineering, aerospace, electrical engineering and mechanical 
engineering, enjoyed the best profits in the mid 1980s. Workers 
in these plants made the most of high demand for training and 
expertise. The highly export-orientated chemical sector was also 
profitable, but employed only about 43,000 people (and produced 
8 percent of total manufactured output) in 1985.
The consequences of the initiative by the employers and 
unions in the engineering sector was of quite some significance
16 Peter Swenson, 'Labor and the Limits of the Welfare 
State', Comparative Politics. 23, 1991, p.386.
17 Kristina Ahlen, 'Swedish Collective Bargaining Under 
Pressure: Inter-Union Rivalry and Incomes Policies', British
Journal of Industrial Relations. 27, 3, 1989, p.338. Metall's
view of the public sector unions in 1986 is illustrated by Metall 
chairman Leif Blomberg: 'We have a gang of cuckoo chicks in the 
nest. Now that we've fed them, they're eating up the mother too'. 
Peter Swenson, 'Labor and the Limits of the Welfare State', 
Comparative Politics. 23, 1991, cited p.383.
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for the distribution of incomes in the Swedish political economy 
as a whole. The high pay groups were insiders, able to charge a 
premium for their skill and thus shift the burden of the costs 
associated with the economic crisis to public sector wages. In 
this strategy VF, Metall and the government shared a common 
interest in restraining the public sector. Low pay private sector 
actors in LO were also, to some extent, able to take the role of 
insiders in relation to the public sector, since one payoff for 
LO dispensing with pay drift guarantees was SAF support for extra 
increases for low pay unions. The actors designated as suitable 
for bearing the brunt of the cost distribution consisted largely 
of nurses, nurses' aides, daycare and preschool teachers, and 
social workers.18
The individual rationality of such a successful free-rider 
strategy constitutes a classic example of the foul weather 
prisoners' dilemma, which was clearly operating in Sweden with 
respect to the distribution of costs. Increased wage 
differentiation, even in the public sector, allowed stronger 
actors to continue to enjoy gains at the expense of weaker 
actors. The real question is, however, to what extent this 
process of unloading costs onto the public sector actually 
succeeded in making a sufficient adjustment.
Here again the picture of Swedish performance appears to be 
mixed. Throughout the 1980s, Swedish governments (both bourgeois 
and SAP) grappled with the mounting series of economic problems. 
The early devaluation in October 1982, by 16 percent, encouraged 
profits in the competitive sector, but also encouraged wage drift 
in an already uncertain environment of high labour costs.19 The 
budget deficit climbed to 12 percent of GDP in 1984, and a
18 Peter Swenson, 'Labor and the Limits of the Welfare 
State', Comparative Politics. 23, 1991, p.386.
19 OECD, Economic Outlook. 33, July 1983, pp.123-24.
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general price-freeze which lasted until 1987 was implemented to 
attempt to halt inflation and wage drift.20 Swedish foreign debt 
in 1984 reached 25 percent of GDP with economic policy shifting 
towards combatting the accumulation of foreign debt and restoring 
the external balance.21 In the 1985 and 1988 elections, the SAP 
lost seats in the Riksdag, but stayed in government thanks to the 
Left Party Communists. In October 1990, however, the economic 
situation had become so serious that the Minister of Finance 
ruled out any further devaluations and introduced an economic 
crisis package which placed inflation at the top of the list, 
overturning decades of commitment to full employment. The Finance 
Minister stated that Sweden's taxation, the highest in the world 
at 56 percent, would have to be reduced in stages. The austerity 
program included cuts of 15,000 million SKr in government 
spending to be spread over three years, a 10 percent reduction in 
public sector employment, reductions in sickness benefits, and 
partial privatisation.22
The wage determination system was in a state of flux in the 
1980s. In 1984, for the first time since 1956, there was no 
central frame agreement and wages were determined at the industry 
level throughout the bargaining area. The metalworkers union 
again concluded its own 13-month agreement (for a 6.7 percent 
nominal wage increase),73 From 1985 to 1990, different methods of
20 OECD, Economic Outlook. 35, July 1984, p.123.
21 Katri Kosonen, 'Saving and Economic Growth from a Nordic 
Perspective', in Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn 
(eds), Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1992, p.187.
22 Europa World Yearbook. 1991, p.2493.
23 ILO, Social and Labour Bulletin. 1982, ILO Geneva. This 
was actually less than the 8.9 percent nominal increase agreed 
between the unions in the food sector affiliated to LO and the 
Employers' Association of Swedish Food Producers, and the 11.7 
percent increase in the chemical sector, one of the biggest LO
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wage negotiation were tested with a one-year central frame 
agreement in 1985, a two-year central frame agreement in 1986-87, 
no central agreement in 1986, and a two-year central frame 
agreement which excluded VF in 1989-90.24 In 1985, fiscal and 
monetary policy were tight and LO and TCO agreed to aim at a 
target of 3 percent inflation. This proved impossible to achieve, 
however, with wage increases clearly above official guidelines 
and also above increases in Sweden's main competitors.25 A wage 
hike in 1986 of about 7 percent in the private sector, and more 
in the public sector, was luckily cushioned by a fall in the 
effective exchange rate, but the situation did not improve as 
Sweden entered the downturn of the late 1980s. In mid-1987 the 
price freeze was relaxed and firms rushed to compensate for their 
high costs while wages remained above competitive levels.
The mid-1980s were characterised by a brief lull between 
the effects of the first wave of the economic shock and the 
effects of the most recent wave, which began towards the end of 
the 1980s. The average growth in GDP from 1981-1985 was 1.7 
percent, a figure small enough to provoke distributional conflict 
but still large enough to allow some groups to enjoy rising 
incomes at the expense of others. In 1985, to choose an example 
of a year in which the actors made a central agreement, this 1-2 
percent GDP growth was produced mostly by the white collar and 
public sector (sharing 53.7 percent between them), blue collar 
workers in manufacturing and mining contributed 24.9 percent, and
fields of agreement. Of course, the percentage increases may be 
higher while the actual wage rates are lower. These percentages 
are calculated from figures supplied by Bengt Blomqvist, an LO 
statistician.
24 The 1985 agreement was a classical frame agreement similar 
to those negotiated during the 1952-1982 period. Richard B. 
Peterson, 'Swedish Collective Bargaining - A Changing Scene', 
British Journal of Industrial Relations. 25, 1, 1987, p.39.
25 OECD, Economic Outlook. 39, May 1986, p.141.
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the rest was divided among construction, various small groups, 
and agriculture.26
The size of the services share as a proportion of GDP growth 
compared to manufacturing shows that export income was 
constituting a falling share of total GDP demand. In 1985, 
exports produced 35.3 percent of GDP demand, with private 
consumption making up the bulk at 50.9 percent. Of those exports, 
34.1 percent was contributed by manufactured goods, 25.9 percent 
by machinery, 24.9 percent by raw materials, and 15.8 percent by 
transport equipment.27
During the second half of the 1980s, neither a fully 
centralised nor a fully decentralised wage determination system 
could be said to be operating in Sweden. The central agreements 
which took place were primarily the result of LO always coming to 
the bargaining table, and with LO able to rely on the SAP 
government to strongly support the model there was substantial 
pressure on SAF to take part. But the 1985 central agreement was 
only a recommendation, and the 1986 one was settled in the 
context of the murder of Prime Minister Olaf Palme, which brought 
a greater than usual degree of calm to the negotiations.28
Despite the appearance of a progressive breakdown in 
rational cooperation, however, even in the years where there was 
no central agreement, wage determination was still a rather 
centralised process (with the exception of the engineering 
sector). On the whole, the activities of negotiating groups in 
each area were coordinated and everybody knew what everybody else 
did. The employers, for example, considered it important that
26 Lloyds Bank, Sweden Economic Report. 1986.
27 Lloyds Bank, Sweden Economic Report. 1986.
28 Kristina Ahlen, 'Swedish Collective Bargaining Under 
Pressure: Inter-Union Rivalry and Incomes Policies', British
Journal of Industrial Relations. 27, 3, 1989, p.334.
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there was cooperation between branches to determine what was 
acceptable, and agreements at branch level consequently in many 
cases weren't that much different to the central agreements. 
Moreover, although there had always been bargaining at the local 
level, the local employers still did not stray far from the 
agreements that were reached by their associations with the 
unions. Finally, incidents such as in 1984 when BKA, the Swedish 
Bakery and Confectionary Employers' Association, reached an 
agreement which was higher than SAF could accept demonstrated 
that there still remained a real need for coordination to prevent 
isolated wage explosions.29
In sum, then, it would be a mistake to characterise the 
periods in 1985-1990 where central frame agreements were not 
consistently reached as periods of uncooperative bargaining and 
in fact, as we saw in the previous chapter, some care should be 
taken when one uses the term "decentralisation" to describe 
possible future bargaining systems between employer and trade 
union associations as non-cooperative.
As evidence that rational cooperation had not broken down 
completely in foul weather, the beginning of the 1990s saw the 
achievement of the most advanced agreement ever in the Swedish 
labour market, the Rehnberg agreement, which was a unique two- 
year incomes policy for 1991-92. The agreement was named after 
Bertil Rehnberg, a former head of the AMS, (the National Labour 
Board (1973-80)), aged in his 70's, who headed the commission but 
was not himself a member. The idea was instigated by Alan 
Larsson, at the time the SAP Finance Minister but also a former 
head of the AMS. Rehnberg selected four "experts", including 
former LO chief negotiator H. Fjallstrom and former SAF chief 
negotiator L.G. Albage, who began by circulating a discussion 
paper and generating consensus around the search for a special,
29 Bo Carlsson, SAF Deputy Director, Senior Economist,
interview, Stockholm, 11 June 1992.
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one-off incomes policy which could give the Swedish economy a 
boost.
The process was thus typically "Swedish style”, with the 
group submitting its recommendations at the beginning of 1991. 
The commission proposed a flat rate, nominal wage increase across 
the entire labour market of 1 percent in the first year and 3 
percent in the second, with those who exceeded the 1 percent in 
the first year having the difference subtracted from the 3 
percent in the second. In addition, the government was to reduce 
income tax so that real income (after tax) increased by a small 
margin despite the small nominal wage increases.30
Negotiations with the affiliate-level trade unions proceeded 
through 1991 with both LO and TCO supporting the proposal. The 
main reason for their uncharacteristic and somewhat reluctant 
support for such an incomes policy was the threat of 
unemployment. In the case of LO, some of its affiliated trade 
unions faced up to 15 percent unemployment. It was thus regarded 
as a necessity by LO that the next wage rounds did not exacerbate 
the situation. The Rehnberg agreement was also made more 
palatable because it was strongly supported by the SAP 
government, while the commission itself was not a government 
body. TCO, which had stated clearly: "No to a State incomes
policy" in its most recent 1990-1993 Programme, made an exception 
in the case of the Rehnberg proposal because of an economic 
forecast it made in 1989-90, about the time when the commission 
was developing its proposal. The forecast predicted, correctly, 
the slowdown in export growth and the world recession following 
the Gulf War, and estimated that TCO unions would lose thousands 
of jobs in the next few years.
30 Lois Recascino Wise, 'Whither Solidarity? Transitions in 
Swedish Public-Sector Pay Policy', British Journal of Industrial 
Relations. 31, 1, 1993, pp.81-82.
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Since it normally takes a long time before market forces and 
unemployment press down wages, LO and TCO accepted the Rehnberg 
proposal because it enabled them to get the adjustment in wages 
at one time and in a much shorter period. PTK and SACO-SR had 
little influence over their affiliates and publicly opposed the 
idea. PTK, for example, had no discussion at all with the 
commission, and was consequently castigated publicly by the 
Swedish media and politicians. The public sector unions came 
under strong political pressure to go along with the government. 
SAF reluctantly accepted the extra two years of centralisation, 
under heavy political pressure, but only as an extraordinary and 
one-off measure. All the SAF associations accepted the 
commission's proposals.
The process of gaining the cooperation of the individual 
Swedish unions in the private sector was long and laborious and 
would make an interesting case study. Some unions were virtually 
directed to agree, others only agreed after long negotiations. 
With the added weight of SAP political pressure, a large number 
(approximately 100) of individual agreements were organised by 
about 15 to 20 major trade union affiliates. The negotiations 
continued throughout most of 1991 with only a small number of 
agreements failing to be reached. Within the white collar sector, 
for example, SIF (the clerical workers), HTF (the commercial 
salaried employees) and CF (the graduate engineers) could not 
accept the limitation of their bargaining rights, and in the blue 
collar area the transport unions also stayed out.
The Rehnberg agreement was a hybrid of decentralisation and 
centralisation. Once it had been accepted by the organisations in 
the Swedish labour market there was no need for LO and SAF to sit 
down and negotiate, it was then up to the lower level actors to 
implement it. The outcome was, surprisingly to some commentators 
who had predicted failure, a success. Nominal wage increases in 
1991 came down from 10 percent to a little over 5 percent, with
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3 percent expected for 1992. The real increases were estimated at 
2.5 percent in 1991 and 1 percent in 1992, which was an even 
better performance than that recommended by the commission. But 
although there was a temptation on the part of the central trade 
union actors to ascribe the success of this incomes policy to the 
system of central bargaining, the reality was more that the 
deteriorating labour market situation was so bad, in Swedish 
terms, that wage increases would have been low anyway. As a SAF 
economist put it:
'I don't doubt that this Rehnberg agreement had 
importance and contributed to this development, but the 
fact that facilitated this change was of course the 
changed labour market situation'.31 
And as a TCO economist put it:
'Maybe they [the economists] were right: unemployment 
and labour market conditions would have brought wages 
growth down anyway'.32
The Rehnberg agreement was a unique expression of the foul 
weather corporatist strategy of coordinating wages growth through 
a mixture of encompassing strategy and decentralised 
implementation. Unlike the 1950s and 1960s, agreement was reached 
through a comprehensive bargaining process that closely involved 
affiliates. It was designed to give everybody the same nominal 
increase, thus avoiding the prisoners' dilemma of inflationary 
leap-frogging in wage settlements, but clearly it would be 
impossible to continue such an artificial, flat-rate 
standardisation of nominal wages for more than a short period. 
The Rehnberg agreement was a one-off solution based around a
31 Bo Carlsson, SAF Senior Economist, interview, Stockholm, 
11 June 1992.
32 Roland Spant, TCO Senior Economist, interview, Stockholm, 
10 June 1992.
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simplified across-the-board increase, but it did indicate that 
the actors were interested in finding a cooperative solution.
To sum up the discussion of Swedish corporatism in the 1970s 
and 1980s in foul weather, we can see a somewhat mixed picture. 
On the one hand, over the period 1977-1984 Swedish workers 
accepted wage restraint which amounted to more than 10 percent, 
largely through increased direct taxation designed to maintain 
job preservation in the public sector.33 On the other hand, the 
relative costs of maintaining employment spreading and achieving 
wage restraint appear to have increased, with the breakout of 
blue collar workers in the engineering sector in particular 
illustrating the sort of problems that we have hypothesised. In 
an important sense, corporatism in Sweden has performed well but 
not well enough given the depth of the foul economic weather, 
which is an indirect result of the dependence of the system on 
distributing gains and not real costs. The actors have shown a 
greater propensity to respond with restraint to immediate, short­
term shocks such as the wage boom in the mid-1970s and the 
Rehnberg response to the threat of unemployment in the 1990s, 
than they have to the more long term problems of responding to 
the foul weather.
7.2. Cross-National Comparison of Wage Restraint.
The remainder of this chapter consists of an empirical 
comparison of Swedish performance in relation to four countries 
representing each of Lehner's categorisations of the degree of 
corporatism. These are the US (Pluralism), the UK (Weak 
Corporatism), the FRG (Medium Corporatism) and Japan
33 Andrew Glyn and Bob Rowthorn, 'West European Unemployment: 
Corporatism and Structural Change', The American Economic Review. 
78, 1, 1988, p.198; see also Jukka Pekkarinen, 'Corporatism and 
Economic Performance in Sweden, Norway and Finland', in Jukka 
Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola and Bob Rowthorn, Social Corporatism: 
A Superior Economic System?. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 
p.314.
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(Concordance). In addition, where data is available a number of 
other countries are included for comparison.
The research design aims to answer the following questions: 
first, how efficient is nominal and real wage performance in 
comparative terms? Second, how significant is the problem of wage 
drift? Third, how significant is the problem of the new actors? 
Fourth, how efficient is employment performance in comparative 
terms?
In order to attempt to answer these questions, we examine 
wages trends in two manufacturing sectors representative of low 
and high pay groups respectively: the Swedish Clothing and Steel 
sectors, and examine inflation, unemployment and wages trends 
using a larger group of countries with the Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco industry (henceforth referred to as FBT), and the 
Chemical industry.34 Most of the data covers the 1970s and the 
1980s which models a period of foul weather.
It might be thought that by using the FBT and Chemical 
industries as proxies for low and high-pay groups respectively 
across different countries, and by using measures of average 
wages, we are in grave danger of making unsustainable assumptions 
about comparability. In actual fact, as Krueger and Summers 
write:
'The pattern of inter-industry wage differentials appears 
to be one of the most pervasive regularities generated by 
capitalist economies... The wage structure is amazingly 
parallel in looking at data for different countries or 
different eras, and it appears very similar for workers of
34 In looking at wage restraint time series in two 
manufacturing industries, especially in relation to unemployment, 
we have to be cognizant of the fact that manufacturing itself has 
been in a process of deindustrialisation in virtually all of our 
data set since the 1960s. See R.E. Rowthorn and J.R. Wells, 
Deindustrialisation and Foreign Trade, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987; R. Martin and R.E. Rowthorn, The 
Geography of De-Industrialisation. London, Macmillan, 1986.
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different ages, sex, degrees of skill, and in different
occupations' .3S
Our methodological approach will be, of necessity, limited 
by the data we have at our disposal. The main source is OECD 
Industrial Structure Statistics, various volumes, which give us 
data on employment, and wages and salaries, in these two 
industries, and OECD Historical Statistics, various volumes (for 
data and further information, see the Appendix). For Sweden we 
use wage data provided by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation 
(LO) .
There are unavoidable difficulties associated with using pay 
data. Pay surveys are almost always based on a sampling method, 
which means that the representativeness of the sample individuals 
and periods can be a problem. This probably affects our data to 
a certain extent. If we were trying to compare the average 
earnings for two similar individuals in each industry, we would 
run up against the difficulty of not knowing to what extent their 
income in the sample period was affected by overtime or bonus 
work. We would also need to know occupational grade, age, length 
of service and the size of the establishment in question.36 We 
won't do this precisely because of these requirements.
Instead, we will look at differences in average earnings 
within the two industries taken as a whole. Such differences in 
average earnings between the FBT and Chemical industries will 
reflect in part the fact that more young workers, women and
35 Alan B. Krueger and Lawrence H. Summers, 'Reflections on 
the Inter-Industry Wage Structure', in K. Lang and J. S. Leonard, 
Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets. Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1987, p.17.
36 See David Marsden and Lydia Redlbacher, Eurostat: A cruide 
To Current Sources Of Wage Statistics In The European Community. 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1984.
305
7 - Swedish Wage Restraint: A Comparative Perspective
unskilled workers are employed in the FBT than in the Chemical 
industry. They will also reflect differences in establishment 
size, profits and capital-intensity. This could be a problem if 
we were trying to compare the earnings of a similarly qualified 
person in the two industries, but we are not. We are precisely 
interested in the fact that the FBT workers are, on the whole, 
young, female, unskilled and hence are paid less than their 
older, skilled male co-workers in the Chemical industry.
7.2.1. Nominal and Real Wages,
How has foul economic weather influenced Swedish wages 
outcomes in the low pay and high pay sectors? While the "real 
wage gap" (the gap between growth of labour costs and growth of 
labour productivity) rose following the first oil shock, it 
actually decreased in most capitalist economies, including 
Sweden, after 1979.37
According to our theoretical work, the cooperative, gains- 
based strategy undertaken in corporatist countries such as Sweden 
would be expected to come under severe pressure in foul economic 
weather. High and low pay groups would become tempted to free- 
ride and pass costs on. Two empirical questions are raised here: 
first, if the FBT industry is indeed a low-pay industry, does it 
bear more of the brunt of wage restraint in non-corporatist 
countries (UK, USA) than it does in the corporatist countries 
(FRG, Sweden, Japan)? Second, is there evidence to suggest that 
the low pay actors in Sweden, our example of a foul weather 
corporatist country, have faced increasing non-cooperation by 
high pay actors determined to maintain real gains?
In Figure 7.1 we can see the nominal average hourly 
manufacturing wage for the US, the UK, the FRG, Sweden and Japan
37 Wouter van Ginneken, 'Wage Policies in Industrialised 
Market Economies from 1971 to 1986. Between Controls and Free 
Bargaining', International Labour Review. 126. 4, 1987, pp.380- 
81.
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with the addition of several control countries. We can see that 
Sweden's nominal wage was not at all unusually low, being higher 
than the US, the FRG and the Netherlands in both fair and foul 
economic weather. Yet in Figure 7.2 Sweden's average real wage
FIGURE 7.1.
Nominal Manufacturing Wage in Fair and Foul Weather.
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manufacturing is seen to be the lowest of all the countries in 
foul economic weather. We know, given Sweden's nominal wage 
performance, that high inflation is the cause of this low real 
wage growth but it still remains intriguing that the Swedish 
corporatist model succeeded in restraining real wage growth in
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FIGURE 7.2.
Real Manufacturing Wage in Fair and Foul Weather.
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this way. At this level of achievement, the corporatist system 
stands unique in the entire data set.
The hidden weakness of such a high nominal rate is that it 
is passed on to prices and has the effect of increasing unit 
labour costs. In Figure 7.3 we can see that Sweden is clearly not
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FIGURE 7.3.
Unit Labour Costs in Fair and Foul Weather.
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among the best performers in either fair or foul economic 
weather. Only the FRG succeeds in holding unit labour costs low, 
every other country suffers an increase in foul weather and 
Sweden is no exception.
What evidence is there that low and high pay groups in 
manufacturing in Sweden found it more difficult to maintain 
cooperation in the distribution of costs in foul economic 
weather? Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show that, for the FBT and Chemical 
industries, both nominal wages growth and real wages growth show 
only the slightest sign of departing from the diagonal line of
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FIGURE 7.4.
Nominal Wages Growth: FBT and Chemical Industries,
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equality between the two groups. In both cases Sweden is moreover 
among the best performers in our data set. The performance of the 
US, UK and Canada support our expectation that in the non- 
corporatist countries the low pay groups bear relatively more of 
the burden of wage restraint. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show that in 
the transition to foul weather both the FBT and Chemical workers 
in Sweden exercised a similar degree of real wage restraint. A 
look at the real wage percent change for the Swedish Clothing and
310
7 - Swedish Wage Restraint: A Comparative Perspective
FIGURE 7.5.
Real Wages Growth: FBT and Chemical Industries.
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FIGURE 7.6.
FBT Industry Wages in Fair and Foul Weather.
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FIGURE 7.7.
Chemical Industry Wages in Fair and Foul Weather.
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FIGURE 7.8.
Real Wages In Sweden: Steel and Clothing Industries.
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Steel industries in Figure 7.8. reveals if anything greater 
restraint on the part of the Steel Works industry.
What we have to remember with these figures is that they 
refer to percent changes and not absolute figures. We know that 
the clothing industry is a low pay union and the steel industry 
is a high pay union, therefore we can assume that the two similar 
sized percent values served to maintain wage differentiation at 
a growing rate. A flat-rate increase would lead to a narrowing of 
differentials over time, but percentage increases inevitably 
favour the high pay groups.
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7,2,2. Wage Drift and Contractual Increases.
One clear indication that high pay groups were breaking away 
from cooperation in an effort to sustain some sort of real 
increase given Sweden's high inflation rate would be the level of 
wage drift, or local increases negotiated outside of and in 
addition to centrally bargained agreements.
FIGURE 7.9.
Wage Drift in Sweden: Steel and Clothing Industries.
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Figure 7.9 shows that wage drift was on the whole greater 
for the Steel Industry than for the Clothing Industry in Sweden 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Figure 7.10 is interesting because it 
shows the relation between wage drift and contractual increases 
for Chemical Industry wages. We would expect to see high wage
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FIGURE 7,10.
Wage Drift and Contractual Increases: Chemical Industry.
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drift associated with low contractual increases and vice-versa. 
The picture at first looks a little more complicated than that.
To help understand the significance of these values Table 
7.2 provides a yearly breakdown and scaling of ”the effectiveness 
of centralised cooperation”. This is a composite measure which is 
based on the data itself, which makes it wholly inadequate as a 
measure of centralisation viewed alone, since this individually 
is not highly correlated with wages growth rates, but which
316
7 - Swedish Wage Restraint: A Comparative Perspective
Table 7.2.
Swedish Wages Performance.
Year Scale Heuristic Interoretation
1970 1 strikes
1971-1973 0 centralised system operating 
11 as normal”
1974-1976 1 wage blowout, strikes
1977 0 restraint, price-development 
guarantees, reduction in unit- 
labour costs
1978-1979 1.5 high inflation and low real 
increases
1980 1 large strike,
1981 1 "Gang of Four”
1982 0 devaluation
1983 1.5 VF entices away TCO, LO,
1984 1.5 no central agreement (estimated)
1985 0 central frame agreement
1986 2 no central frame agreement
1987 1 price freeze
1988 1 price freeze (estimated)
1989 2 weak central frame agreement 
(excluding VF)
NOTE: The scale eivea here correlate! stronelv with real waee oerceot changes over the same oeriod. and nrovidea an indirect measure of the streueth
of rational cooperation. The interpretations on the right hand side are events which are suggested to have a causal influence on these outcomes.
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certainly reflects the data.38 The fact that the composite 
measure reflects the data raises the possibility of providing a 
heuristic explanation, which we offer on the right-hand side of 
Table 7.2.
Returning now to Figure 7.10, we can see that in 1972 and 
1985, when two central agreements were in place, contractual 
increases were relatively high, while wage drift was kept the 
lowest. As time progresses, it seems that a higher contractual 
increase is necessary to hold down wage drift. It appears that 
inflation and the wage blowout of the mid-1970s shifted this 
curve outwards. The key years here appear to be 1975 (wage 
blowout), 1980 (large strike), 1986, 1987 and 1989 (no central 
frame agreement) . In all of these years both contractual and wage 
drift increases were relatively high, taking time into account.
In 1970, 1971 and 1973, contractual increases seem low and 
wage drift high compared to 1972, which provides some support for 
the view that the system was not "functioning" well but we must 
remember that this was at a lower rate of inflation. Overall, the 
years that seem most impressive are 1985, in terms of low wage 
drift, and 1982.
38 It is extremely difficult to make a meaningful comparative 
measure of central bargaining since in some cases even 
enterprise-level bargaining can be construed (e.g., Japan) as 
being geared towards achieving collective wage outcomes with the 
same intentionality as central bargaining. In other cases, the 
existence of central negotiations in any given year does not 
necessarily indicate the intentionality of the negotiations to 
achieve their expected effect. A hypothesis that simply links the 
existence of central bargaining with the achievement of 
collective cooperation or wage restraint misses the point. As van 
Ginneken writes: 'The critical issue is, therefore, probably not 
so much the existence or absence of central negotiations or 
consultations, but the way they are carried out'. Wouter van 
Ginneken, 'Wage Policies in Industrialised Market Economies from 
1971 to 1986. Between Controls and Free Bargaining', 
International Labour Review. 126, 4, 1987, p.399.
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Reviewing the evidence so far, it seems that contractual, 
centralised agreements succeeded in reducing wage drift at a 
cost: namely by allowing the wage drift element to be
incorporated into the contractual agreement. This worked in fair 
weather, when the contractual increases plus wage drift found a 
low enough equilibrium. But in foul weather the pressure on the 
contractual element increased and with it wage drift increased to 
the point where competitive pressures on the Swedish economy were 
no longer being effectively managed by the corporatist system of 
cooperation.
7.2.3. Wage Breakouts.
Can we say that this pressure increased solely because of 
the addition of the new actors? Our argument is that, given 
enough fair economic weather, such a development may not have 
been catastrophic, and that, given foul weather, even without the 
new additions and their influence on the bargaining table, the 
blowouts would be equally as likely to occur.
The clearest support for this lies in the fact that it was 
the high pay groups in LO which had been the traditional high pay 
actors and who eventually led the way in breaking out, as they 
became caught up to and in cases overtaken by the white collar 
unions in the engineering and service sectors and the public 
sector.39 In the period 1970 to 1976, private sector wages were 
higher (98 percent) than in the public sector (75 percent). This 
was reversed in the period 1976 to 1979, when public sector wages 
increased by 39 percent and private sector wages by 31 percent.
39 During the period 1970-76 wage increases were higher in 
the private sector (98 percent) than in the public sector (75 
percent). In the following three years the public sector reversed 
this relationship, with a 39 percent increase compared to a 31 
percent increase in the private sector. From 1979 the private 
sector has regained a "slight relative advantage”. Wouter van 
Ginneken, 'Wage Policies in Industrialised Market Economies from 
1971 to 1986', International Labour Review. 126, 4, 1987, p.396.
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Table 7.3.
Comparative Wages Performance in Sweden.
Steel and PTK Steel and Clothina
1970 S E
1971 S E
1972 S E
1973 S E
1974 S S
1975 E E
1976 S S
1977 NA E
1978 S C
1979 S S
1980 E c
1981 E E
1982 S S
1983 PTK E
1984 S S
1985 E E
1986 PTK C
1987 S S
1988 E c
1989 E s
S = Steel Industry 
C — Clothing Industry 
PTK = White Collar workers 
E =  Equality
Letter displayed indicates whether percentage increase for that year was equal for both groups or which group had the largest increase. 
Source: Data supplied by Bengt Blomqvist, LO Research Statistician. See Appendix.
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After 1979, the private sector again gained a slight advantage.40 
We can illustrate these trends by looking at data for the Steel, 
Clothing, and PTK/SAF wage percent changes. Table 7.3 arrays the 
performance for these groups and identifies three possible 
types: E for Equality (where the percentage increase is roughly 
equal), PTK as an indicator of the greater performance of a new 
actor (for the white collar federation PTK), C for the greater 
performance of the Clothing workers and S for the Steel workers 
in LO.
Table 7.3 indicates, at least, that prior to the advent of 
PTK as a serious bargaining force in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
the Steel Industry workers were a high pay group that also 
enjoyed the highest real increases. The 1975 blowout and the 
1980/1981 "Gang of Four" episodes imply strenuous efforts by PTK 
to catch up, at least by matching the real wage increases of the 
Steel workers. From 1982 to 1987 PTK and Steel appear to 
alternate in terms of having the largest real percent increase 
with greater frequency, with PTK establishing a more competitive 
real wage rate. Similarly, with respect to the low and high pay 
groups Clothing and Steel, equality is broken by Steel alone 
during the period 1970 to 1977. In 1975, both the low and high 
pay groups take part in the blowout with equality. Only in 1978, 
1980 and 1986 does Clothing outperform Steel. Overall, it seems 
that the high pay group was fighting to maintain some sort of 
differential in real wage increases and the low pay group 
responded by fighting for equality or better. This 
interpretation, however, should be backed up by a more in-depth 
case-study of these Swedish industries.
In sum, however, looking at this data alone the evidence is 
so far rather weak for the breakout by high pay groups in a 
corporatist country in foul weather. Wage differentiation between
40 ILO, World Labour Report. Incomes from Work: Between
Eauitv and Efficiency. Geneva, ILO, 1987, p.144.
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low and high pay groups in Sweden is comparatively low and real 
wage restraint comparatively high. Drawing strong conclusions on 
the basis of the yearly percentage wage increase achieved by the 
Steel industry in relation to the Clothing industry and PTK is 
not warrented, since the percentage differences in any case are 
quite small. Another possibility exists, however, which is that 
the insiders in this case are not so much the high pay groups 
alone as the entire private sector. The costs would then be 
passed onto the public sector in the form of an increased share 
in the responsibility for maintaining employment growth. We have 
already seen the Sweden is very highly taxed and has a very large 
public sector and public sector employment component. The 
competitiveness index performance moreover suggests that changes 
in a and 0 may have been rendering the private sector wages 
performance relatively less efficient by definition.
From this perspective, it may be that the data do indeed 
indicate a relative breakout of the type that our theoretical 
model predicts. The next step, therefore, is to look more closely 
at wages performance and employment performance, in order to 
determine to what degree costs are being passed on to outsiders 
even in a corporatist context.
7.2.4. Wages and Employment.
Figure 7.11. shows us inflation and general unemployment 
performance as well as the percent change in the average hourly 
wage rate for the FBT and Chemical industries in Sweden. This 
wage rate has been corrected for inflation, so that it represents 
the real wage change for these two industries. Unemployment shows 
little change and seems not to be affected by wages developments 
at all. Unemployment is, of course, subject to a unique public 
policy strategy in Sweden, so that we should expect workers 
forced out of firms which could not sustain costs to be employed 
in either the public sector or employment/training programmes.
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Ficrure 7.11.
Sweden: Wages, Inflation, Unemployment, 1970-1989.
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Thus the consequences in terms of low and high pay groups failing 
to achieve an efficient equilibrium, or the consequences of 
relatively higher values for t and K given changes in a and /?, 
would be seen not only in an increased tendency for high pay 
groups to break out but also in mounting difficulties for Sweden 
in maintaining such low unemployment. Overall, the picture is of 
cyclical behaviour: continued restraint marked by occasional
breakouts, but not enough restraint to lead to a marked reduction 
in inflation.
Running some simple Pearson correlations in Table 7.4. shows 
that it is the USA and Sweden which have the closest
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Table 7.4. The Relationship Between Nominal and Real Wages in the FBT and 
Chemical Sectors, and Inflation and Unemployment, 1970-1989, in Five
Countries.
1. 2. 3• 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10
USA
Corr. Coef. 0.93 0.81 0.71 0.83 -0.09 -0.34 0.03 0.35 0.04 0.47
Stand. Err. 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.17
1-Tail Test. .000 .000 .000 .000 .350 .074 .448 .063 .428 .063
UK
Corr. Coef. 0.80 0.86 0.68 0.59 -0.20 -0.10 -0.52 -0.54 -0.05 -0.21
Stand. Err. 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.17
1-Tail Test. .000 .000 .000 .003 .197 .341 .010 .007 .419 .185
FR6
Corr. Coef. 0.84 0.72 0.46 0.82 0.13 -0.04 -0.91 -0.76 -0.62 -0.45
Stand. Err. 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.18
1-Tail Test. .000 .000 .021 .000 .292 .434 .000 .000 .002 .024
SWE
Corr. Coef. 0.91 0.13 0.09 0.94 -0.51 -0.57 -0.41 -0.40 -0.34 -0.32
Stand. Err. 0.04 0.22 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
1-Tail Test. .000 .290 .346 .000 .011 .004 .037 .038 .072 .088
JAP
Corr. Coef. 0.89 0.90 0.85 0.62 0.46 0.32 l o • 09 to -0.83 -0.70 -0.64
Stand. Err. 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.13
1-Tail Test. .000 .000 .000 .002 .021 .081 .000 .000 .000 .001
1. = FBT NOMINAL WAGE and CHEMICAL NOMINAL WAGE
2. = FBT NOMINAL WAGE and INFLATION
3. = CHEMICAL NOMINAL WAGE and INFLATION
4. = FBT REAL WAGE and CHEMICAL REAL WAGE
5. = FBT REAL WAGE and INFLATION
6. = CHEMICAL REAL WAGE and INFLATION
7. = FBT NOMINAL WAGE and UNEMPLOYMENT
8. = CHEMICAL NOMINAL WAGE and UNEMPLOYMENT
9. = FBT REAL WAGE and UNEMPLOYMENT
10. = CHEMICAL REAL WAGE and UNEMPLOYMENT
NOTES: FBT = Food Beverages and Tobacco Industry 
CHEMICAL - Chemical Industry
Significance Test: at 5 Percent Level = 0.45 
N = 20 at 1 Percent Level = 0.56
Source: OECD, Industrial Structure Statistics. Paris, various volumes. 
OECD, Historical Statistics. Paris, various volumes.
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relationship, (0.93) and (0.91) respectively, between changes in 
low and high-pay nominal hourly wage rates in our sample of 
countries. In terms of the real wage the strongest correlation is 
Sweden with (-0.51). Since Sweden has also the weakest 
correlation for the nominal wage and inflation in both 
industries, (0.13) and (0.09) respectively, and the strongest 
correlation between real wages and inflation in both industries, 
(-0.51) and (-0.57) respectively, this indicates that the Swedish 
trade unions' exceptionally low responsiveness to its high 
inflation rate is largely responsible for the negative 
correlation with the real wage.
In Sweden, unemployment has had little influence on real 
wages growth because it has remained virtually constant at low 
levels. To check further the influence of unemployment on wage 
changes, regressions were run for Sweden using lagged 
unemployment measures (in view of the fact that wages may respond 
more to the previous year's unemployment), and using measures of 
employment growth. No relation of any significance was visible.
Although both real and nominal wages are only weakly and 
negatively correlated with unemployment in Sweden, we must bear 
in mind that unemployment in Sweden has not risen significantly. 
It is therefore not possible to draw any general conclusion about 
the corporatist cost distribution in foul weather, in Sweden, 
from the relationship between wages and general unemployment. On 
the whole, Swedish data show what we would expect from a 
corporatist country. On the face of it, Sweden still outperforms 
the other countries in terms of its low real wage rate and low 
unemployment, but we know that the first masks relatively high 
unit labour costs and inflation and the second is masked by the 
influence of a high level of taxation and public spending. In 
foul economic weather, both these factors cannot be ignored for 
very long before the difficulties in sustaining such low 
unemployment reach a critical level.
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Figure 7.12.
Real Wages and Employment in The Swedish Chemical Industry.
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Perhaps employment changes in a particular industry are more 
closely correlated with wage developments than are general 
employment trends. To test this, we can see in Figure 7.12. a 
graph showing the average employment percent change in the period 
1980-1987 for the Chemical industry, and the average real wage 
percent change (minus inflation) per employed person in that 
industry.41
41 The measures used here for average wages and employment 
were calculated using OECD, Industrial Structure Statistics, 
various volumes. The average wage for each employed person 
(hence, average wage "corrected" for employment) is derived by
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There are two rival hypotheses concerning employment changes 
in an industry and wage changes: first, it might be the case that 
a loss of employment equals a reduction in union bargaining 
strength, in which case we would expect to see employment loss 
being associated with wage restraint; second, it might be the 
case that a loss of employment simply allows those workers 
remaining employed to sustain wage increases not otherwise 
possible. We should, in that case, expect to be able to see 
whether or not loss of employment in the Chemical industry has 
been traded for higher real wages.
What we see in fact is evidence for the second hypothesis, 
but not in the case of Sweden. The UK, Norway and Austria all 
shed labour in the chemical industry over the 1980s and yet they 
still had a increase in real wages. In the FRG, Japan, the 
Netherlands and Denmark, we see the best of both worlds: an
increase in employment in the Chemical industry and positive 
changes in real wages. Italy is the only country in which a loss 
of employment is associated with a reduction in real wages, but 
since Italy's real wage is so largely determined by a huge 
inflation rate, we have to treat this result carefully. Sweden is 
the only country in which there is an employment gain and wage 
restraint, which weakly supports the generalisation that more 
jobs have been traded for less wages in that country.
We can test these interpretations further by looking at the 
relationship between the total wage percent change minus 
inflation for the Chemical industry and employment changes. 
Figure 7.13. shows the expected relationship: the more people 
employed in the industry the larger the total real wage. The two 
countries which are outliers are Sweden and Italy. Only Sweden 
posted an increase in employment while showing a fall in the 
total wage, a possible indication of jobs traded for wages.
dividing the total wage by total employment in each industry for 
each year.
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Figure 7.13.
Total Wages and Employment in the Swedish Chemical Industry.
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Interestingly, there is no country in the upper left corner of 
the graph: that is, no country clearly traded jobs for an 
increase in the total real wage. Yet we have seen that several 
countries have traded jobs for an increase in the average real 
wage. What this implies is that the loss of employment has made 
the industry better able to sustain higher average real wages 
precisely because the employment loss has been enough, despite 
the increase in average real wages, to enable a fall in the total 
real wage.
Those countries which shed jobs in the Chemical industry 
managed to reduce their total real wage bill, so that if output
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Figure 7.14.
Nominal Wages and Employment in the Swedish Chemical Industry.
Chemical Indus.try 
U&gM and Eaployaant (Percent. Changes)
13
12 -
16 -
UK B
-3 -1
Overage Caploynent 1980s
Source: OECD, Industrial Structure Statistics. Paris, various volumes. See Appendix.
and productivity remained the same or improved those workers 
remaining employed were able to sustain an increase in their 
average real wage. In Figure 7.14., we can see a reasonably clear 
relationship between the nominal wage and employment in the 
chemical industry. Looking at the graphs in this way enables us 
to interpret correlation coefficients for the FBT and Chemical 
industries and employment changes in each industry respectively. 
Table 7.5. shows that the country which posts the strongest 
negative correlation between wages and employment is Japan. 
Examination of the data shows that the correlation is heavily
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Table 7»5. The Relationship Between Nominal and Real Wages {Corrected for 
Employment) in Three Sectors, and Inflation and Sectoral Employment. 1981-
l. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1• 8.
USA
Corr. Coef. -0.46 -0.60 -0.25 0.46 0.24 0.63 0.76 0.42 0.18
Stand. Err. 0.30 0.24 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.23 0.16 0.31 0.37
1-Tail Test. .027 .022 .262 .015 .005 .422 .242 .277 .262
UK
Corr. Coef. -0.89 -0.89 -0.52 0.46 0.53 0.87 0.59 0.61 0.91
Stand. Err. 0.09 0.08 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.10 0.27 0.25 0.08
1-Tail Test. .006 .008 .031 .011 .003 .009 .011 .017 .031
FR6
Corr. Coef. -0.69 -0.53 0.47 0.75 0.79 0.64 0.61 0.88 -0.14
Stand. Err. 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.24 0.09 0.37
1-Tail Test. .011 .027 .045 .012 .001 .102 .130 .026 .045
SWE
Corr. Coef. -0.43 -0.16 -0.02 0.58 0.56 0.61 0.21 0.38 0.43
Stand. Err. 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.36 0.32 0.31
1-Tail Test. .244 .241 .016 .233 .189 .032 .015 .016 .016
JAP
Corr. Coef. -0.95 -0.89 -0.89 -0.90 -0.86 -0.82 0.25 0.58 0.26
Stand. Err. 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.38 0.27 0.38
1-Tail Test. .082 .085 .012 .096 .247 .042 .082 .013 .012
9.
1. = FBT WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and FBT EMPLOYMENT
2. = CHEMICAL WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT
3. = FMP WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and FMP EMPLOYMENT
4. = FBT REAL WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and FBT EMPLOYMENT
5. = CHEMICAL REAL WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and CHEMICAL EMPLOYMENT
6. = FMP WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and FMP EMPLOYMENT
7. = FBT WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and INFLATION
8. = CHEMICAL WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and INFLATION
9. = FMP WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and INFLATION
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Table 7.5. {Continued) The Relationship Between Nominal and Real Wages 
(Corrected for Employment) in Three Sectors, and Inflation and Sectoral 
Unemployment. 1981-1989, in Five Countries.
10. 11. 12
USA
Corr. Coef. -0.33 -0.72 -0.71
Stand. Err. 0.34 0.18 0.18
1-Tail Test. .276 .409 .422
UK
Corr. Coef. -0.85 -0.62 -0.42
Stand. Err. 0.11 0.25 0.34
1-Tail Test. .028 .009 .009
FRG
Corr. Coef. -0.73 -0.73 0.89
Stand. Err. 0.17 0.18 0.08
1-Tail Test. .042 .128 .102
SWE
Corr. Coef. -0.81 -0.76 -0.93
Stamd. Err. 0.13 0.16 0.05
1-Tail Test. .017 .025 .032
JAP
Corr. Coef. 0.11 0.36 0.09
Stand. Err. 0.40 0.36 0.40
1-Tail Test. .014 .073 .042
10. = FBT REAL WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and INFLATION
11. = CHEMICAL REAL WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and INFLATION
12. = FMP WAGE CORRECTED for EMPLOYMENT and INFLATION
NOTES: N = 7 (US, FRG, SWE) 
N = 6 (UK, JAP)
FBT = Food, Beverages and Tobacco Industry
CHEMICAL = Chemical Industry
FMP = Fabricated Metal Products Industry
Significance Test: at 5 Percent Level = 0.94 (US, FRG, SWE)
1.02 (UK, JAP)
at 1 Percent Level = 0.76 (US, FRG, SWE)
0.82 (UK, JAP)
Source: OECD, Industrial Structure Statistics. Paris, various volumes. 
OECD, Historical Statistics. Paris, various volumes.
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influenced by two outliers: 1983, in which a negative change in 
wages was associated with a positive change in employment, and 
1984, in which big gains in wages appear to be at the expense of 
a large loss of employment. The UK, which is the country in which 
employment fell the most in all three sectors, also posts some 
strong correlations. The reason for this is because wage 
increases occurred at the same time as large employment loss. If 
we take sectoral employment changes to be a proxy for membership 
changes, this seems to strengthen the view that in non- 
corporatist Britain, insiders are maximising wages at the expense 
of outsiders.
In Sweden, employment loss had actually been converted into 
growth by the middle of the 1980s in both industries, and we see 
again a positive correlation between the improvement in the real 
wage from its quite deep restraint in the early 1980s, and 
employment. In summary, we see a strong relationship between wage 
restraint and employment growth or sustainability in our three 
examples of corporatist wage determination: the FRG, Sweden and 
Japan. In the USA and the UK we see more evidence, particularly 
in the UK, of employment loss being exploited to sustain real 
wage improvements.
The correlations between nominal and real wages and 
inflation support, broadly, the results we obtained from the 
other data set. Sweden's nominal wage responsiveness to inflation 
does not seem strong, and its real wage responsiveness to 
inflation seems to be high in comparison to the other countries. 
If anything, the Steel workers in the FMP (Fabricated Metal 
products) sector appears to have posted the highest negative 
correlation between the real wage and inflation. The correlations 
confirm the general picture: Sweden is a country that has been 
characterised in the 1980s by a comparatively high level of wage 
restraint and employment protection.
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Conclusion.
This chapter has attempted to assess the recent performance 
of Swedish corporatism in the light of our hypothesis that 
rational cooperation breaks down in foul weather. It must be 
concluded that there is both evidence and counter-evidence for 
this proposition. The evidence consists in the behaviour of the 
traditional high pay groups or insiders, such as the unions in 
the engineering sector, in relation to the outsiders who are 
typically the public sector workers. Despite the complication of 
the rise of the new actors it seems warrented to conclude that 
foul weather does indeed undermine rational cooperation by 
rendering previously sustainable strategies incapable of being 
maintained without an adjustment of costs.
But the counter-evidence consists of all those examples of 
restraint and cooperation, both through formal agreement and 
through informal and unofficial coordination, which enabled the 
Swedish actors to make adjustments to short-term foul weather 
shocks. The process of decentralisation also masks a possible 
deepening of rational cooperation. In sum it seems impossible to 
predict from either trend which one would overcome the other, and 
certainly impossible to make any prediction about the likely 
impact of foul weather on a corporatist country beyond the 
observation that it complicates proceedings immensely and either 
forces the system to go through several difficult and time- 
consuming processes before an adequate response can be 
implemented or leads to an eventual breakdown of cooperation.
Might Swedish corporatism be in yet another process of 
evolution? Or are we making too much of the instances of 
cooperation we have identified and not enough of the failures of 
the system to respond quickly and effectively enough? To answer 
this question we required some means of empirically assessing the 
overall performance of the Swedish corporatist system. The 
results we have seen in this chapter provide some empirical
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evidence for insider-outsider theories in labour economics, but 
most strongly in the non-corporatist economies.42
In Sweden in particular, the evidence is more that
employment has been spread in these sectors through the
achievement of wage restraint. The evidence for high pay and low 
pay distributional struggle in corporatist Sweden is mixed. On 
the one hand, there is evidence that it is the high pay groups
who lead the way out of strict equality, yet on the other hand,
there is evidence that the Swedish low and high-pay workers 
delivered real wage restraint. Sweden clearly has narrow wage 
differentials, at least in terms of yearly percentage change. In 
both Sweden and Germany wages growth in the FBT and Chemical 
industries was much closer than in Japan, the USA and the UK. 
There is also a tendency in these countries for the Chemical 
industry to take a larger share of the burden in periods of high 
inflation. In the USA and the UK, on the contrary, differentials 
were wider and widened even further in periods of fair weather. 
Japan is unusual in respect of the fact that restraint is visible 
on the part of both low and high-pay groups without the narrow 
wage differentials characteristic of cooperation in Sweden and 
Germany.
We have seen that low and high pay groups have cooperated in 
adjusting real wages growth in the FBT and Chemical industries in 
Sweden, Germany and Japan, largely by exercising restraint 
following foul weather shocks when inflation was high and the 
threat of unemployment clear-cut. In the UK wages in both 
industries have tended more to follow inflation, which tends to 
account in part for why in that country inflation is the ”number 
one” economic enemy. In the USA, restraint has been achieved more
42 See Carl M. Campbell III, 'Sectoral Wage Rigidity In The 
Canadian And French Economies', European Economic Review. 33, 
1989, pp.1727-1749.
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because of low nominal wage responsiveness than rational 
cooperation.
This chapter paints a picture of highly impressive 
corporatist wages performance in Sweden and does not immediately 
appear to support our hypotheses concerning the tendency of high 
pay and low pay groups to break out of corporatist arrangements 
in foul weather. It suggests that, compared to other OECD 
countries, the Swedish system was producing high levels of real 
wage restraint and employment spreading in combination with high 
public sector employment compensation. How do we account for 
this?
Part of this puzzle is resolved when we take into 
consideration a number of the performance indices we have 
considered in this and the previous two chapters. Thus, in terms 
of variables such as inflation, unit labour costs, the growing 
cost of maintaining low unemployment, the current balance, 
international competitiveness, and so on, we know that the 
Swedish economic performance has been characterised by 
comparatively severe foul weather. This casts the Swedish wages 
performance in a different light. It might be the case that what 
we are witnessing is a wages performance that is inadequate, if 
the severity of the foul weather is strong enough to render even 
this performance insufficient over the long term. It might be the 
case that, while the Swedish system has performed comparatively 
well, in terms of the foul weather it has performed 
insufficiently well. Foul weather has, effectively, rendered the 
system outcomes dysfunctional because the distribution of costs 
has not been deep enough despite the comparatively good 
performance.
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CONCLUSION.
'When the weather gets rough, it is natural to assume
you are on the wrong tack'. Richard Layard.1
The scholars who study corporatism are aware that "something 
important" is at stake here, and a large part of the explanation 
for this value judgement must be because corporatist theory makes 
certain provocative claims. The philosophers may still ask 
whether corporatism is a better solution than the alternatives, 
but the point is that corporatism claims in some sense that it is 
a solution.
This thesis has attempted to test one of the central 
arguments for corporatism, namely that it solves prisoners' 
dilemmas through collective action and, hence, through the 
organisation of individuals into bargaining groups. Against cries 
of "it doesn't work" the corporatist countries apparently proved 
the opposite, but the economic travails of the past two decades 
have apparently begun to change all that.
The thesis asks whether the success of corporatism is 
dependent upon the distribution of gains, and upon fair weather. 
It suggests that many of the arguments made for encompassing 
organisations, centralisation, and institutional forms of one 
sort or another with respect to collective action might need to 
be revised, and would at the very least be usefully served by an 
reevaluation of the consequences of a shift from the distribution 
of gains to the distribution of costs.
1 Richard Layard, Whv Abandon the Swedish Model?. Stockholm, 
FIEF, 1991, p.l.
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But in making this argument the notion of the corporatist 
solution itself is not rebutted, at least in its ideal-typical 
form. It is simply that the difficulty of actors agreeing to 
distribute gains pales somewhat into significance when they are 
actually required to distribute costs. It is only fair, then, 
that we attempt some sort of weighing up of the evidence, and do 
not avoid the question of whether or not the empirical material, 
both cross-national and case-specific, supports the view that 
corporatism breaks down in foul weather.
1. The Corporatist and Liberal Alternatives.
It is important to assess whether or not corporatism can 
survive in foul weather for two important reasons: first, because 
there certainly is evidence that it could survive, and prosper, 
in fair economic weather. The cross-national work showed that the 
corporatist countries, while not necessarily outstanding economic 
performers, nevertheless achieved an outstanding performance in 
terms of employment and welfare. From this wider perspective, 
corporatism does indeed appear to outperform alternative 
political-economic systems.
Secondly, and largely for this reason, corporatism has often 
been presented as an alternative, if not an antithesis, to the 
purely liberal solution to collective action problems and 
economic crisis. In the liberal strategy, free markets backed up 
by a minimal state provide a mechanism for self interest to 
produce collective maximisation, via the "invisible hand" of 
decentralised rational decision-making.
In Chapter Two we saw that under conditions of contraction, 
it may be equally possible for the well-being of the economy to 
be maximised by a more liberal regime of cost-cutting. This is 
essentially a crucial weakness in the stability of the 
corporatist model: in foul weather it may be supplanted by a
liberal system even though there is no logical reason why the 
model should not function equally or even more efficiently. We
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saw in Chapter Two that our game-theoretical model postulates a 
possible situation where the outcomes of mutual cooperation and 
mutual defection are exactly the same in overall terms. This is 
because, in the short term at least, the liberal system can 
succeed equally well in cutting costs, and perhaps even better.2
In a more liberal system, mutual defection does not imply an 
equitable sharing of cost, but rather an inequitable 
distribution. One actor can force the costs to be borne by 
another, weaker, actor. The overall outcome, however, is no worse 
in terms of the efficiency of cost-cutting than that which would 
be achieved by cooperation. Over the long term, however, we would 
expect that the more expansionary policies of the corporatist 
political economy would build up a more tenable economy, since 
the transition to the restrictive policies of the liberal 
alternative would produce costly hysteresis effects such as 
distributional struggle and unemployment and the liberal system 
would be less efficient to the extent that it is prone to 
generating costly prisoners' dilemmas.3
2 See Erik Lundberg, 'Perspectives on the Future of the 
Swedish Economy - Two Extreme Alternatives', in Bengt Ryden and 
Villy Bergstrom (eds), Sweden; Choices for Economic and Social 
Policy in the 1980s. London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp.217-233. 
Proponents of the liberal solution argue that open unemployment 
is more efficient than sheltering and subsidising policies 
(backed up by corporatist wages strategies) as a means to achieve 
restructuring. Corporatist theorists reply that the hysteresis 
effects of unemployment and deflationary policies outweigh any 
such benefits, but much of the argument hinges on the practical 
effectiveness of the corporatist component in making the 
adjustment. The deeper the foul weather, the more difficult this 
is to achieve. Jukka Pekkarinen, 'Corporatism and Economic 
Performance in Sweden, Norway, and Finland', in Jukka Pekkarinen, 
Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn (eds), Social Corporatism; A Superior 
Economic System?. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992.
3 The latent conflict between the employed and the 
unemployed can reach an equilibrium through public employment, 
Blanchard and Summers argue, because the output of the public 
sector provides increasing returns. The living standard of the
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Corporatism challenges liberalism as a mode of societal 
organisation on four counts: with respect to inequality, the role 
of the state, the role of free markets, and the possibility for 
steerage through collective action.
(1) Corporatist theory argues that free markets produce 
inequality, which breeds distributional conflict in foul weather 
and produces inefficiency. This is an argument which depends both 
on the prisoners' dilemma and on the indirect consequences of a 
shift to foul weather. In fair weather, the operation of free 
markets still produces inequality, but within the context of a 
generally improving social wellbeing. In foul weather, unless 
actors act to compensate for the shock and undertake 
redistributions, the consequences of unchanged strategy vectors 
lead to greater excess inequality, which is economically 
inefficient.
Corporatism also stresses equality because it is a necessary 
condition in securing the cooperation of actors. In a sense, 
corporatism implies that the degree of equality necessary to 
achieve cooperation is most conducive to economic efficiency over 
the long term. In terms of a political philosophy, corporatism is 
more closely related to socialism than liberalism: it implies a 
political agenda for the transformation of economic and social 
outcomes. The corporatist historical compromise prescribes a 
consciously fair distribution of employment and income within 
society, an "equality of sacrifice”, and a sharing of the 
proceeds of growth.
(2) The role of the state in corporatism is anything but 
minimal. This can be seen most clearly in the role of the Swedish 
public sector as a welfare guarantor. Through public employment,
employed actors improves despite the taxation levels for public 
sector employment. Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence H. Summers, 
'Fiscal Increasing Returns, Hysteresis, Real Wages And 
Unemployment', European Economic Review. 31, 1987, pp.543-66.
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active labour market policies, training and relocation, 
industrial subsidies, generous welfare and so on, the Swedish 
state attempted to balance distributional shocks to the Swedish 
economy with redistributions designed to maintain maximum 
efficiency.
The importance of a sympathetic and actively engaged 
governmental agency for the continuation of wages cooperation is 
shown by the Swedish Model, which clearly played a large part in 
underpinning the more narrowly focused EFO and FOS models of 
class cooperation. Corporatism may be, at heart, all about wage 
restraint, but wage restraint does not operate successfully in 
isolation from other mechanisms designed to spread employment, 
limit unemployment and promote efficient economic restructuring. 
In the absence of an economic strategy which actually addresses 
the central problems for economic competitiveness, in the longer 
term, a cooperative strategy of wage restraint is simply treading 
water and getting nowhere fast.
(3) Corporatism challenges the liberal claim that free 
markets alone produce collective maximisation, on the grounds 
that prisoners' dilemmas produce "market failures". However, this 
claim might have to be qualified. The possibility of there being 
two ideal-typical solutions, Corporatist and Liberal, is 
strengthened by the Calmfors-Driffil thesis, which suggests that 
perhaps purely decentralised rational decision-making solves 
prisoners' dilemmas after all, and that it is only in societies 
where actors are organised enough to achieve sub-optimal insider 
distributions but ‘ not enough to adopt an encompassing 
perspective, that distributive conflict produces economic 
inefficiency.
The idea of a continuum fits in neatly with Mancur Olson's 
distinction between "free markets", "distributional coalitions" 
and "encompassing organisations". The first consists of free 
decentralised labour markets, the second suggests greater levels
340
Conclusion
of unionisation, and the third indicates conscious steerage 
through collective organisation. The qualified corporatist claim 
for the advantages of associative action over reliance on purely 
free markets would rest on the fact that, in most countries, free 
markets do not exist. This means that actors face a choice 
between choosing to go in one direction or the other.
(3) Corporatism challenges the liberal idea that the 
possibility of steerage through collective organisation and 
associative action is a wild fight of fancy. It rejects reliance 
on the market mechanism alone as akin to blind adherence to 
dogma. On the other hand, it does not ditch the market mechanism. 
Corporatist practice in Sweden demonstrates rather clearly that 
the EFO and FOS models and the Swedish Model were compatible with 
free markets understood as rules establishing capitalist rights 
and prerogatives, a shared acceptance of market rules, and a 
shared understanding of what economic competitiveness required.
In sum, we are left with the statement that corporatism is 
a possible alternative political economy. The strongest part of 
the argument consists of saying that, in most countries, given 
the absence of purely free labour markets, corporatism is the one 
option for improvement which does not involve the use of blunt 
instruments to force costs to be borne. Thus the argument hinges 
on the claim that corporatism could be a least cost transition to 
a more optimal political economy. Further liberalisation would 
require a period of transition in which distributive conflict 
would produce severe inefficiencies. But this notion of the least 
cost is the weakest chain in the link, since the foul weather 
travails of Swedish corporatism have led many observers to the 
conclusion that corporatism is no longer a viable policy option, 
either for trade unions, employers or the government. At heart, 
corporatism is weakened by its dependence in practice and theory 
on producing growth.
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2. The Future of Corporatism.
Does corporatism break down in foul weather, and what future 
does it have? To answer these questions, we can summarise the 
thesis and its findings. We first of all examined the Corporatist 
Model in Chapter One, applied the collective action problem to it 
and came up in Chapter Two with the apparent dependence of trade 
union cooperation on achieving gains in foul weather, which means 
indeed that corporatism should be expected to break down.
Most of the literature appears to accept the game 
theoretical basis for corporatism and focuses instead on 
historical and particularistic factors which undermine the sorts 
of corporatist historical compromises reached in the 1950s and 
1960s. We take these factors somewhat for granted, accepting 
readily that the rise of new actors, generalised sociological 
changes, and the necessity for increased decentralisation and 
flexibility, even within the parameters of a corporatist strategy 
that depends on an encompassing viewpoint, poses substantial and 
real challenges for corporatist arrangements.4
4 Most explanations of the decline of corporatism and social 
democracy focus on factors such as the decline of blue collar 
workers, the decline of mass production, the weakening of class 
consciousness and the rise of new social movements, the increase 
in capital mobility and the internationalisation of production, 
the creation of the single market within the European Community, 
and so on. See Claus Offe, 'The Future of the Labour Market', in 
Claus Offe (John Keane, ed) , Disorganised Capitalism. 
Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics. Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1985, pp.52-79; Claus Offe, 'Interest Diversity and 
Trade Union Unity', in Disorganised Capitalism, pp.151-69; John 
Keane and John Owens, After Full Employment. London, Hutchinson, 
1988; W. Mueller-Jentsch, 'Labour Conflicts and Class Struggles', 
in Otto Jacobi et al (eds), Technological Change. 
Rationalisation, and Industrial Relations. London, Croom Helm, 
1986, pp.238-60; Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein, 'The 
Decline of Social Democracy', paper presented at the 1992 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Palmer 
House Hilton, September 3-6, 1992.
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It may be that for these reasons alone, corporatism is a 
dead issue, and liberalisation is a much more attractive choice 
for countries experiencing "institutional sclerosis". There is no 
doubt that in Sweden the complicating factor of a huge public 
sector and an independent white collar sector overloaded any 
capacity of the old corporatist system to deal with the crisis. 
If corporatism does break down in Sweden, we may simply never 
know if the centralised solution to the prisoners' dilemma is 
fatally flawed in foul weather. But this thesis has attempted to 
distinguish between these two destabilising factors and it is 
necessary to review the evidence and try to come up with some 
conclusions.
We thus looked for a case study, and from here Sweden enters 
the picture. We saw in Chapter Three that the country is in foul 
weather, evidenced by increasing distributive conflict,
decreasing growth, output and productivity, and a worsening 
competitiveness index. This shows, inductively at least, that 
corporatism in foul weather does not succeed in producing 
continuing gains. We also saw in Chapter Four, however, that in
terms of societal welfare (and remember, Sweden is a relatively
rich country) this case study performs very well.
The comparative data provides strong evidence of cooperation 
both in terms of societal welfare and employment performance but 
also clear signs of increasing unsustainability. The question is, 
are the gains made from the observed cooperation enough to
strengthen a and/or overcome the increase in 0? Or are insiders 
overall achieving a relative improvement in a by increasing the 
degree of inequality? Insider-outsider dichotomies are numerous, 
involving the unemployed versus the employed, and within the 
latter group, involving high and low pay workers, public and
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private sector workers, and blue collar and white collar 
workers.5 High pay for insiders may or may not result in an 
improvement in a, but the effect of the increase in inequality 
makes the insiders better off (if it is enough for them to 
increase their real standard of living at the expense of 
outsiders).
Our examination of the complexities of corporatist 
cooperation immediately raises serious questions about the type 
of cooperation that had been achieved in the fair weather period. 
Are lower-level actors really cooperating with their 
encompassing-level leaders when they accept outcomes which 
consist of real gains in any case? Encompassing organisations and 
centralisation work far better in fair weather than in foul. 
Cooperation cannot be perfectly sustained in foul weather both 
because the temptation to free ride becomes much higher relative 
to the gains from cooperation and because the actors' strategies 
by definition become dysfunctional as the parameters a and 0 
change. It takes time for these strategies to be adjusted. 
Moreover, as the formal modelling in Chapter One implied, when 
foul weather affects a corporatist country which has hitherto 
become comparatively well off, such a corporatist country has, in 
an important sense, further to fall in order to make the 
adjustment.
Has corporatism broken down in Sweden, or is cooperation 
continuing albeit with great adaptation problems and reversals?
5 Interestingly, Schmitter sees corporatism possibly 
reorganising into more decentralised sectoral divisions which 
closely parallel our insider-outsider distinction. These include 
the periphery and the centre, the sunbelt and the rustbelt 
industries, light and heavy industry, importers and exporters, 
manufacturing and services, domestic and competitive sectors, and 
so forth. Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Sectors in Modern Capitalism: 
Modes of Governance and Variations in Performance', in Renato 
Brunetta and Carlo Dell'Aringa (eds), Labour Relations and 
Economic Performance. London, Macmillan, 1990, pp.3-39.
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Does corporatism "contains the seeds of its own destruction" and 
is it "laden with inherent contradictions"?6 To answer such 
questions we looked at Sweden more closely. In Chapter Five we 
examined the Swedish Model and found that it is a similar model 
to the theoretical model of corporatist cooperation we 
elaborated, and that it is a growth-dependent model. We found 
that Sweden only ever distributed gains in fair weather and now 
has to distribute real costs.
We saw that the very success of the earlier Swedish economy 
had made the actors wrongly expect that corporatism itself 
produces economic growth. The Rehn model and the EFO model had 
explicitly been constructed with the growth-objective in mind, 
hence economic growth tended to confirm the validity of the 
theory underlying the model. As a consequence of this belief, 
when the benefits stopped flowing, the actors had compelling 
reasons to conclude that the corporatist model itself must no 
longer be valid and so was no longer worth supporting. As Taylor 
writes:
'Many Swedes have become impatient and cynical at what 
they see as the failure of the [SAP] politicians to 
manage the economy competently. Many observers believe 
we are seeing what amounts to a crisis of national 
self-confidence in Sweden, which is undermining the 
popular belief held with various degrees of conviction 
for over forty years that the country could thrive by 
pursuing what was known as the Middle Way in economic
6 For example, Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of 
Organised Capitalism. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987; Scott Lash, 
'A Critical Theory', Economy and Society. 16, 1987, pp.143-58; 
James Fulcher, 'Labour Movement Theory Versus Corporatism: Social 
Democracy In Sweden', Sociology. 21, 2, 1987, pp.231-252.
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policy between centralised planning and free market
economics.'7
Any rational actors are likely to defect from cooperation when 
they think that the strategy no longer succeeds in its basic 
function: namely, maximising well-being.
In Chapters Six and Seven we made a detailed examination of 
the changes which have swept the old corporatist model in Sweden 
and found contradictory evidence of corporatist performance. On 
the one hand, the wage system has been in a process of massive 
disruption and development, characterised by wage breakouts and 
a decentralisation of wage determination practices. The 
impression of breakdown is strengthened by the election of a 
Liberal government. From the strikes in the late 1960s, through 
the wage blowout following the first oil shock, to the public 
sector blow out and massive distributional conflict of the early 
1980s, to the breakaway from solidarity of Metall in the mid- 
1980s, there have been plenty of examples of a breakdown in 
cooperation. Added to this is the constant rate of wage drift and 
the apparent need for centralised agreements to be high enough to 
absorb it, both in theory and in practice. And finally, the 
growing polarisation between low and high pay actors, especially 
in the form of Metall versus the public sector, both of which it 
should be noted were members of the blue collar federation LO, 
which indicates that the stresses and strains we predicted have 
indeed destabilised corporatism independently of other 
disorganising tendencies. In combination, each of these factors 
suggests that the earlier corporatist system was successful 
because overall growth absorbed any shocks to the income demands 
of actors, at least until the mid-1970s. Swedish corporatism was 
based on distributing the proceeds of growth, with even the FOS
7 Robert Taylor, 'The Economic Policies of Sweden's 
Political Parties', Current Sweden. Svenska Institutet, 383, June 
1991, p.3.
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model finding it difficult to countenance the prospect of 
achieving cooperation in the absence of it.
On the other hand, Sweden has managed to restructure quite 
effectively, has achieved an extraordinary across-the-board 
collective agreement (the Rehnberg Agreement) just before the 
formal close of central bargaining, and looking at wages 
performance overall we saw contradictory evidence of strong wage 
restraint despite signs of high pay defection from cooperation 
and high unit labour costs and inflation. In the 1980s Sweden 
achieved considerable wage restraint, largely through taxation 
and devaluation. There is always a danger of making sweeping 
generalisations. The possibility exists that Swedish performance 
is much better than might at first appear, with even the 
possibility that corporatism is still working even if with 
obvious inefficiencies and breakdowns.8
As support for this contrary view, there is some limited 
evidence of "green shoots” of corporatist cooperation that deals 
with the foul weather issue by both recognising the reality of 
cost distribution and deepening negotiation within the vertical 
dimensions of encompassing organisations. The LO strategy for 
more "decentralised centralisation" and the Rhenberg Agreement 
are two instances of the sort of corporatist cooperation which is 
implied by our modelling of foul economic weather. It may be the 
case that the political exchange, consensus and associative- 
action elements associated with corporatism are allowing the 
restructuring, adaptation and decentralisation of encompassing 
policy processes, producing corporatist forms which are less 
recognisable but equally efficient. In other words, despite the 
depth of the crisis which Swedish corporatism has apparently
8 For a positive assessment, with reservations about "recent 
overheating", see Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn, 
Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1992.
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fallen into, it may be premature to speak of either its demise or 
even of any relative underperformance of the Swedish economy.
The effect of foul weather on corporatist cooperation varies 
according to the depth of the shock and the degree of response. 
There are two forces coexisting and exerting influence in 
opposite directions at the same time. From one side is the 
capacity of the actors to make the necessary adjustment while 
maintaining full employment and societal welfare, and from the 
other is insider behaviour leading to a worsening of inequality 
and to open unemployment. The theory we have developed is 
strongly supported, and makes sense when applied to Sweden: 
corporatism is breaking down because of intensified prisoners' 
dilemmas in foul weather. But it is also renewing itself 
sufficiently to allow the possibility that this increasing 
inequality does not lead to a final break with the goal of 
cooperative full employment outcomes.9
The authors of the EFO and FOS Models argued that full 
employment generates maximum productivity growth and that there 
is an economic loss arising from the underutilisation of 
available labour. To sustain full employment, insiders must share 
part of their available income with outsiders, most likely 
through public employment. As Meidner argued, this would not be 
much more than the amount paid for passive unemployment 
transfers. But as predicted in our model, the amount of insider
9 As Lehmbruch writes, 'The optimum structure is, 
apparently, not rigid hierarchical centralisation but rather one 
which provides for some limited autonomy for lower organisational 
levels while giving sufficient authority to the peak association 
to coordinate these activities effectively'. Gerhard Lehmbruch, 
'Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks', in J.H. 
Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. 
Oxford, Clarendon, 1984, p.69. For further explorations of this 
theme, see P. Schmitter, 'Five Reflections on the Future of the 
Welfare State', Politics and Society. 4, 16, 1988, pp.503-15; and 
P. Schmitter, 'Corporatism is Dead! Long Live Corporatism', 
Government and Opposition. 24, 1, 1989, pp.60-74.
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behaviour increases in foul weather. Thus the high pay unions in 
LO have broken free, partly in response to the challenge from 
public and private sector workers and partly in response to the 
generalised slow-down in total income growth. The costs of 
maintaining full employment if everybody enjoyed the income of 
these insiders is simply beyond the income-producing powers of 
the economy, given the increase in jS.10
The question is whether or not these actors are reaching, 
more times than not and despite the breakouts, some sort of 
changing equilibrium determined by relative bargaining power and 
hence resulting in increasing inequality (in the sense of Nash), 
but which still effectively meets the full employment requirement 
because the stronger actors act as Stackelberg leaders and the 
weaker actors accept the imposition of inequality. The public 
sector workers may be relatively chastened enough to accept a 
greater share of the burden. TCO, SACO-SR and the PTK group of 
unions may increasingly become active participants in a new, 
developing Swedish Model. LO has been working on a more 
decentralised approach to the prisoners' dilemma which can 
achieve cooperation around an encompassing strategy. There are, 
however, several important qualifications attached to such a 
sanguine picture. As Paul Windolf points out, it is impossible to 
negotiate "generalised political exchange” if such decentralised 
actors are cut off from more encompassing organisational 
structures.
10 Moreover, several economic studies have shown that at high 
levels of unemployment, wage flexibility is lowest. Jacques Dreze 
and Charles Bean, 'European Unemployment: Lessons from a
Multicountry Econometric Study', in Bertil Holmlund and Karl- 
Gustaf Lofgren, Unemployment and Wage Determination in Europe. 
Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp.3-33; David G. Blanchflower 
and Andrew J. Oswald, 'The Wage Curve', Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics. 2, 92, 1990, pp.215-235.
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'The politics of decentralisation are likely to destroy a 
network of institutions which was successful in pacifying 
industrial conflict'.11 
In foul weather the encompassing solution is compromised by the 
lack of any real capacity, in the final instance, of central 
organisations to compel lower level actors to accept costs which 
alternatively can be passed on to other actors.12
In addition, due to the interdependence of nations, foul 
weather is always beyond the immediate control of actors.13 It 
seems that only a much more sophisticated brand of corporatism 
can cope with the distribution of costs over the long term. The 
return of fair weather may save the neck of corporatism in 
Sweden, but if the economic crisis continues to deepen the
11 Paul Windolf, 'Productivity Coalitions and the Future of 
European Corporatism', Industrial Relations. A Journal of Economy 
and Society. 28, 1, 1989, p.18.
12 As Crouch points out, different sectors have various 
levels of encompassingness, understood in terms of the "size 
effect". In the absence of a strong link with a centralised 
encompassing viewpoint, insider and outsider behaviour seems 
likely to be determined by these variations in the degree of 
vulnerability to the collective consequences of non-cooperation. 
Colin Crouch, 'Trade Unions in the Exposed Sector: Their 
Influence on Neo-Corporatist Behaviour', in Renato Brunetta and 
Carlo Dell'Aringa (eds), Labour Relations and Economic 
Performance. London, Macmillan, 1990, pp.68-91.
13 On the subject of cooperation between countries, see A.J. 
Hughs Hallett, 'How Much Could The International Co-ordination of 
Economic Policies Achieve? An Example from US-EEC Policy-Making', 
in Homa Motamen (ed), Economic Modelling in the OECD Countries. 
London, Chapman and Hall, 1988, pp.71-102; Stephen J. Turnovsky 
and Marcelo Bianconi, 'Strategic Wages Policy And The Gains From 
Cooperation', in Frederick Van Der Ploeg and Aart De Zeeuw (eds), 
Dynamic Policy Games in Economics. Amsterdam, North-Holland, 
1989, pp.191-222. Wage restraint strategies fail when they only 
facilitate consumption by privileged groups and succeed when they 
increase investment, leading to greater export output and the 
possibility of increasing import consumption. Otherwise, wage 
restraint is restrictive for international trade.
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corporatist actors will have to reach a qualitatively higher 
level of cooperation in order to meet this challenge. Whether or 
not this is eventually within the capacity of the Swedish labour 
movement is impossible to say, but the evidence strongly suggests 
that at this point the outcome hangs in the balance.
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APPENDIX.
THEORETICAL MODELS. DATA ANALYSIS.
AND PRIMARY SOURCES.
1. THEORETICAL MODELS.
The model of outcomes of corporatist interaction in Chapter 
One is designed to illustrate the operation of the "Restraint" 
strategy in foul weather. The model was based on Figure 14 in 
Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1985, p.183, which showed that in the long term 
the "Restraint" strategy outperforms the other strategies. In 
Przeworski's model, however, it is assumed that the rate of 
growth in output per unit of investment is always positive. In my 
model I wanted to examine what happens when a fair weather and a 
foul weather parameter are introduced, as well as when these can 
vary.
The model is very simple, in part because I am not a 
econometrician, and was produced on the LOTUS 123 spreadsheet. 
Thus the fair and foul weather parameters a and 0 serve to 
represent what would be a very complex mixture of economic 
variables. But this serves a useful function by keeping the focus 
on the parallel logic of cooperation in fair and foul weather. 
Whereas Przeworski had depicted the "Restraint" strategy as a 
wages strategy which involved gains (although smaller gains than 
the more "Militant" strategies), I wanted to show that even when 
costs were involved the logic of cooperation still applied. I 
also wanted to demonstrate that the effectiveness of a 
"Restraint" strategy depends to a great extent on changes in the 
fair and foul weather parameters a and 0.
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A serious problem with any model such as this is that it 
cannot represent reality. The time periods are not intended to 
represent years, or months, or any particular bargaining 
framework. They do, however, represent interactions over time. If 
in reality the time periods necessary to make an adjustment in 
incomes sufficient to compensate for foul weather are vast, this 
is not a problem for the model but for corporatist cooperation. 
The evidence from the Swedish case suggests that similar 
adjustments were made following foul weather shocks, such as the 
mid-1970s wage boom, and that these took several years of 
bargaining rounds. The model suggests that, with perfect 
information regarding a and 0 and no other complicating factors, 
cooperation produces the best long term outcome. This is a 
sufficiently robust finding to serve the purpose I had intended, 
which was to demonstrate formally that corporatism can function 
equally efficiently in foul weather, and that it need not always 
produce gains.
The use of two-actor and three-actor matrices of interaction 
in Chapter Two is useful primarily as a means of illustrating the 
shift in strategies and outcomes over time. Initially I had tried 
to incorporate values in the matrices in order to show, in true 
prisoners' dilemma fashion, how the actors are constrained by the 
logic of their interaction and hence fail to cooperate. As there 
was no empirical basis for such values, I decided that the best 
course with three of the tables was to use descriptive terms 
instead which denote the various outcomes of interaction under 
fair and foul weather. A similar approach has been used in David 
Soskice, 'Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: 
Coordinated and Non-co-ordinated Market Economies', in Renato 
Brunetta and Carlo Dell'Aringa (eds), Labour Relations and 
Economic Performance. London, Macmillan, 1990, pp.188-89.
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2. DATA ANALYSIS.
The use of data analysis in the corporatist literature is 
extensive, so extensive that Goran Therborn writes that 'an nth 
rerun of corporatism and whatever variable between the OECD 
countries is hardly likely to add very much to our understanding 
of anything', ('Lessons from "Corporatist” Theorisations', in 
Jukka Pekkarinen, Matti Pohjola, Bob Rowthorn (eds), Social 
Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?. Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1992, p.40.). I certainly felt much the same way, hence my 
approach attempts to be somewhat different.
First, the comparative data analysis is designed not just to 
examine whether or not corporatism is associated with this or 
that variable, but to identify a case study of a corporatist 
country in foul weather. Second, the analysis is designed to 
distinguish between the performance of corporatism in fair and 
foul weather. Third, the analysis is designed to demonstrate that 
corporatism cannot necessarily generate its own fair weather or 
avoid the impact of foul weather and, with respect to wage 
restraint, to test whether the data supports expectations derived 
from the theoretical work.
The data analysis techniques that I use are mostly non­
statist ical and rely on visual confirmation. There are several 
reasons for this. First of all, I am probably only slightly more 
of a statistician than I am an econometrician, and I wanted to 
present my data in a fashion that would be appropriate to my 
abilities. Secondly, I wanted to turn this to advantage by making 
the data readily accessible to my readers. Third, I wanted to 
avoid reliance on correlations and regressions because I believe 
that they can obscure important relationships, particularly when 
a wide variation in cases is involved. It would not be of much 
use to show that corporatism and variable n had a correlation of 
x during the time period y when what I really want to do is 
identify a foul weather corporatist country and look more
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specifically at its performance with respect to certain variables 
in comparison to other countries we know about.
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2.1. DATA RANKING
The first data analysis method I use other than Tables and 
Figures is a technique used by Francis G. Castles in which 
countries are ranked according to their performance on a 
variable. The presentation of these ranks, and of combinations of 
these ranks, allows a very clear indication of the comparative 
performance of the data set. Hence my Competitiveness Index 
serves to identify Sweden as a good example of a corporatist 
country experiencing foul weather. The data used in these Tables 
and Figures is presented in the text.
2.2. FAIR AND FOUL WEATHER PLOTS
A second technique I use is to plot using LOTUS 123 the 
performance of countries on a single variable in relation to 
other countries in a figure which has as the X-axis fair economic 
weather and as the X-axis foul economic weather. This technique 
enables the reader to see visually how much divergence in 
performance there has been over time and which countries show the 
greatest divergence. As explained in the text, the fair weather 
variable is represented by the years 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973,
1978, 1979, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989, and the foul 
weather variable by the years 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1981, 
1982, and 1983. The following section presents the OECD data 
which was used in these figures, which are distributed throughout 
Chapters Three, Four and Seven.
Data are averages for the years listed above for the 
following countries:
USA, CANADA, UK, ITALY, FRG, DENMARK, SWEDEN, NETHERLANDS,
JAPAN, BELGIUM, FRANCE.
The variables are:
(1) GNP percent growth
(2) Taxation as a percentage of GDP
(3) Percent increase in nominal wages for manufacturing
(4) Percent increase in real wages for manufacturing
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(5) Percent increase in unit labour costs
(6) Percent increase in FBT nominal wage
(7) Percent increase in CHEM nominal wage
(8) Percent increase in FBT real wage
(9) Percent increase in CHEM real wage
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Fair Weather GNP TAX
USA 3.71 28.90
CAN 4.90 32.02
UK 3.55 35.33
IT 3.75 29.98
FRG 3.34 36.37
DEN 3.03 45.63
SWE 3.13 47.52
NETH 3.16 43.28
JAP 5.92 24.57
BELG 3.33 41.83
FR 3.48 39.63
Foul Weather GNP TAX
USA 1.33 29.18
CAN 2.75 32.54
UK 0.54 36.23
IT 2.41 29.69
FRG 1.19 37.18
DEN 1.34 43.86
SWE 1.14 48.09
NETH 1.44 44.56
JAP 3.21 24.20
BELG 1.78 42.71
FR 2.03 39.98
NOMINAL REAL U.L.C.
5.47
6.42
11.30
13.91
6.97
10.16
7.94
6.38
9.39 
7.25
9.40
NOMINAL
7.86
11.38
15.64
21.40
6.70
12.60
10.69
8.05
9.89
11.56
14.94
0.09
1.04
3.78
5.14
3.58
3.24 
1.09 
1.98 
4.88 
2.72
3.24
REAL
0.29
1.69
1.40
3.34
1.61
1.66
0.11
0.59
0.94
2.33
2.95
2.69
3.68
7.49 
8.16 
5.55 
6.60 
5.74 
3.10 
2.38
3.50 
5.89
U.L.C.
6.68
10.33
14.04
16.76
4.76
8.29
10.71
4.96
5.39
5.35
11.70
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Fair Weather FBT-N CHEM-N
USA 5.21 6.05
CAN 6.55 6.68
UK 10.40 12.38
IT 14.07 14.96
FRG 6.89 7.40
DEN NA NA
SWE 8.91 9.46
NETH 7.36 4.39
JAP 8.40 10.05
BELG 7.54 8.83
FR 9.33 9.29
Foul Weather FBT-N CHEM-N
USA 7.80 8.95
CAN 11.10 11.66
UK 15.84 17.11
IT 21.88 19.35
FRG 6.96 6.79
DEN NA NA
SWE 10.84 10.91
NETH 9.00 8.06
JAP 10.95 10.73
BELG 12.18 11.14
FR 15.68 14.29
FBT-R
0.22
1.74
3.32
5.08
3.64
NA
1.82
3.12
4.10
3.42
2.95
FBT-R
0.20
1.91
1.79
3.90
1.84 
NA
-0.61
1.99
2.84 
3.38 
4.00
CHEM-R
1.06
1.87
5.30
5.97
4.15
NA
2.37
1.27
5.75
4.71
2.91
CHEM-R
1.35
2.48
3.06
1.38
1.66
NA
-0.54
1.05
2.61
2.34
2.61
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2.3. DATA SUPPLIED BY LO
In addition to OECD data I also used data supplied by Bengt 
Blomqvist, a statistics researcher at the Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation (LO). The data was supplied in raw form as figures 
for hourly wages, total increase, and contractual increase, in 
ore per hour, and I made several transformations of the data. 
Since this data is not readily available elsewhere I present it 
as a complete set in the following section.
The variables are:
(1) Pay rise pro-Year LO/SAF total percent increase
(2) Pay rise pro-year LO/SAF contractual percent increase
(3) Pay rise pro year LO/SAF other percent increase
(4) Pay rise per hour SAF/LO ore per hour
(5) Monthly salaries PTK/SAF full-time employed 
professional employees percent change
(6) Pay rise per hour SAF/LO ore per hour percent increase
(7) Part of the amount of wages which needs to be
redistributed in order to make all wage differentials 
disappear.
(8) Hourly wages ore per hour Steel Works total
(9) Hourly wages ore per hour Steel Works percent change
(10) Hourly wages ore per hour Clothing Industries total
(11) Hourly wages ore per hour Clothing Industries percent 
change
(12) Total increase ore per hour Steel Works total
(13) Total increase ore per hour Steel Works percent change
(14) Total increase ore per hour Clothing Industries total
(15) Total increase ore per hour Clothing Industries percent 
change
(16) Contractual increase ore per hour Steel Works total
(17) Contractual increase ore per hour Steel Works percent 
change
(18) Contractual increase ore per hour Clothing Industries
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(19
(20
(21
(22
(23
(24
(25
(26
(27
(28
(29
(30
(31
(32
(33
(34
(35
(36
(37
(38)
Appendix
total
Contractual increase ore per hour Clothing Industries 
percent change
Difference between Contractual increase and Total 
increase for Steel Works
Difference between Contractual increase and Total
increase for Clothing Industries
Hourly wages ore per hour Food Sector total
Hourly wages ore per hour Food Sector percent increase
Hourly wages ore per hour Chemical Sector total
Hourly wages ore per hour Chemical Sector percent
increase
Hourly wages ore per hour Chemical-Technical Sector 
total
Hourly wages ore per hour Chemical-Technical Sector 
percent increase
Total Increase ore per hour Food Sector total
Total Increase ore per hour Food Sector percent
increase
Total Increase ore per hour Chemical Sector total
Total Increase ore per hour Chemical Sector percent
increase
Total Increase ore per hour Chemical-Technical Sector 
total
Total Increase ore per hour Chemical-Technical Sector 
percent increase
Contractual Increase ore per hour Food Sector total 
Contractual Increase ore per hour Food Sector percent 
increase
Contractual Increase ore per hour Chemical Sector total 
Contractual Increase ore per hour Chemical Sector 
percent increase
Contractual Increase ore per hour Chemical-Technical
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Sector total
(39) Contractual Increase ore per hour Chemical-Technical 
Sector percent increase
(40) Difference between Contractual increase and Total 
increase for Food Sector
(41) Difference between Contractual increase and Total 
increase for Chemical Sector
(42) Difference between Contractual increase and Total 
increase for Chemical-Technical Sector
(43) Consumer price index percent change
(44) Hourly wages ore per hour percent change minus consumer 
price index percent change for Steel Works
(45) Hourly wages ore per hour percent change minus consumer 
price index percent change for Clothing Industry
(46) Hourly wages ore per hour percent change minus consumer 
price index percent change for Food Sector
(47) Hourly wages ore per hour percent change minus consumer 
price index percent change for Chemical Sector
(48) Hourly wages ore per hour percent change minus consumer 
price index percent change for Chemical-Technical 
Sector
(49) Hourly wages ore per hour percent change minus consumer 
price index percent change for PTK/SAF monthly salaries
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1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1 2
10.50 3.20 7.
9.20 5.70 3.
11.50 4.50 7.
8.10 3.80 4.
10.90 5.40 5.
18.40 11.70 6.
10.90 7.40 3.
9.40 6.20 3.
5.90 2.80 3.
7.90 4.20 3.
10.80 6.00 4.
9.10 3.20 5.
5.90 4.10 1.
6.20 4.50 1.
9.70 6.70 3.
7.10 4.10 3.
7.20 5.00 2.
6.90 4.00 2.
7.80 3.40 4.
10.80 6.60 4.
6 7
10.46 7.50 1270.
9.15 7.70 1422.
11.47 6.40 1589.
8.10 6.50 1736.
10.89 6.50 1961.
18.40 6.00 2293.
10.92 5.30 2642.
9.40 5.10 2785.
5.75 4.90 2987.
7.87 4.90 3293.
10.80 4.70 3623.
8.92 4.80 3893.
5.89 4.80 4209.
6.20 4.70 4434.
9.74 4.80 4987.
7.08 4.80 5329.
7.22 NA 5580.
6.89 5.00 6063.
7.77 5.00 6482.
10.75 5.20 7177.
4 5
1278.00 8.30
1395.00 8.10
1555.00 8.70
1681.00 8.70
1864.00 12.10
2207.00 18.80
2448.00 10.40
2678.00 9.46
2832.00 5.90
3055.00 8.00
3385.00 10.10
3687.00 6.50
3904.00 6.10
4146.00 8.80
4550.00 9.30
4872.00 6.60
5224.00 6.40
5584.00 6.00
6018.00 7.80
6665.00 10.10
9 10
11.01 992.00
11.97 1098.00
11.74 1247.00
9.25 1377.00
12.96 1515.00
16.93 1842.00
15.22 2096.00
5.41 2238.00
7.25 2473.00
10.24 2706.00
10.02 3026.00
7.45 3266.00
8.12 3440.00
5.35 3648.00
12.47 3951.00
6.86 4266.00
4.71 4639.00
8.66 4873.00
6.91 5245.00
10.72 5694.00
3
30
50
00
30
50
70
50
20
10
70
80
90
80
70
00
00
20
90
40
20
8
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
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11 12 13 14 15
1970 11.59 126.00 31.25 103.00 66.13
1971 10.69 152.00 20.63 106.00 2.91
1972 13.57 167.00 9.87 149.00 40.57
1973 10.43 147.00 -11.98 130.00 -12.75
1974 10.02 225.00 53.06 138.00 6.15
1975 21.58 332.00 47.56 327.00 136.96
1976 13.79 349.00 5.12 254.00 -22.32
1977 6.77 143.00 -59.03 142.00 -44.09
1978 10.50 202.00 41.26 235.00 65.49
1979 9.42 306.00 51.49 233.00 -0.85
1980 11.83 330.00 7.84 320.00 37.34
1981 7.93 270.00 -18.18 240.00 -25.00
1982 5.33 316.00 17.04 174.00 -27.50
1983 6.05 225.00 -28.80 208.00 19.54
1984 8.31 553.00 145.78 303.00 45.67
1985 7.97 342.00 -38.16 315.00 3.96
1986 8.74 251.00 -26.61 373.00 18.41
1987 5.04 483.00 92.43 234.00 -37.27
1988 7.63 419.00 -13.25 372.00 58.97
1989 8.56 695.00 65.87 449.00 20.70
16 17 18 19 20
1970 28.00 -41.67 58.00 -24.68 98.00
1971 55.00 96.43 87.00 50.00 97.00
1972 129.00 134.55 139.00 59.77 38.00
1973 30.00 -76.74 30.00 -78.42 117.00
1974 68.00 126.67 105.00 250.00 157.00
1975 171.00 151.47 220.00 109.52 161.00
1976 111.00 -35.09 160.00 -27.27 238.00
1977 84.00 -24.32 115.00 -28.13 59.00
1978 45.00 -46.43 64.00 -44.35 157.00
1979 63.00 40.00 82.00 28.13 243.00
1980 165.00 161.90 191.00 132.93 165.00
1981 91.00 -44.85 100.00 -47.64 179.00
1982 86.00 -5.49 100.00 NA 230.00
1983 65.00 -24.42 88.00 -12.00 160.00
1984 NA NA NA NA NA
1985 228.00 NA 228.00 NA 114.00
1986 226.00 -0.88 260.00 14.04 25.00
1987 190.00 -15.93 216.00 -16.92 293.00
1988 NA NA NA NA NA
1989 325.00 NA 357.00 NA 370.00
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1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
21 22
45.00 1157.00 12.
19.00 1266.00 9.
10.00 1457.00 15.
100.00 1555.00 6.
33.00 1723.00 10.
107.00 2071.00 20.
94.00 2385.00 15.
27.00 2523.00 5.
171.00 2739.00 8.
151.00 2949.00 7.
129.00 3204.00 8.
140.00 3624.00 13.
74.00 3821.00 5.
120.00 4058.00 6.
NA 4422.00 8.
87.00 4743.00 7.
113.00 5171.00 9.
18.00 5420.00 4.
NA 5832.00 7.
92.00 6425.00 10.
26 27
1155.00 12.79 127.
1273.00 10.22 109.
1439.00 13.04 191.
1546.00 7.44 98.
1765.00 14.17 168.
2112.00 19.66 348.
2461.00 16.52 314.
2597.00 5.53 138.
2775.00 6.85 216.
2971.00 7.06 210.
3234.00 8.85 255.
3627.00 12.15 420.
3807.00 4.96 197.
4104.00 7.80 137.
4647.00 13.23 364.
5050.00 8.67 321.
5406.00 7.05 428.
5757.00 6.49 249.
6325.00 9.87 412.
7016.00 10.92 591.
23 24 25
33 1141.00 11.10
42 1256.00 10.08
09 1406.00 11.94
73 1509.00 7.33
80 1694.00 12.26
20 1999.00 18.00
16 2262.00 13.16
79 2422.00 7.07
56 2622.00 8.26
67 2842.00 8.39
65 3117.00 9.68
11 3432.00 10.11
44 3601.00 4.92
20 3827.00 6.28
97 4275.00 11.71
26 4541.00 6.22
02 4964.00 9.32
82 5278.00 6.33
60 5669.00 7.41
17 6205.00 9.45
28 29 30
00 32.29 114.00
00 -14.17 115.00
00 75.23 150.00
00 -48.69 103.00
00 71.43 185.00
00 107.14 305.00
00 -9.77 263.00
00 -56.05 160.00
00 56.52 200.00
00 -2.78 220.00
00 21.43 275.00
00 64.71 315.00
00 -53.10 169.00
00 -30.46 226.00
00 165.69 448.00
00 -11.81 266.00
00 33.33 423.00
00 -41.82 314.00
00 65.46 391.00
00 43.45 536.00
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1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
31
6.54
0.88
30.43
-31.33
79.61
64.86
-13.77
-39.16
25.00
10.00
25.00 
14.55
-46.35
33.73
98.23
-40.63
59.02
-25.77
24.52
37.08
36
28.00
69.00
133.00
30.00
93.00
197.00
137.00
99.00
60.00
78.00
185.00
99.00
95.00
83.00 
NA
228.00
253.00
210.00 
NA
346.00
32
131.00
118.00
166.00
107.00
219.00
347.00
349.00
136.00
178.00
196.00
263.00
393.00
180.00
297.00
543.00
403.00
356.00
351.00
568.00
691.00
37
-62.16
146.43
92.75 
-77.44
210.00 .
111.83 
-30.46 
-27.74 
-39.39
30.00
137.18 
-46.49 
-4.04 
-12.63 
NA 
NA
10.96 
-17.00 
NA 
NA
33
47.19
-9.92
40.68
-35.54
104.67
58.45
0.58
-61.03
30.88
10.11
34.18
49.43
-54.20
65.00
82.83
-25.78
- 11.66
-1.40
61.82
21.65
38
28.00
64.00
129.00
30.00
83.00
187.00
127.00
94.00
53.00
71.00
179.00
99.00
94.00
76.00 
NA
228.00
235.00
197.00 
NA
327.00
34
28.00
70.00
139.00
30.00
88.00
196.00
136.00
100.00
57.00
75.00
181.00
100.00
94.00
74.00 
NA
228.00
245.00
205.00 
NA
342.00
39
-56.25
128.57
101.56
-76.74
176.67
125.30
-32.09
-25.98
-43.62
33.96
152.11
-44.69
-5.05
-19.15
NA
NA
3.07
-16.17
NA
NA
35
-64.56
150.00
98.57 
-78.42
193.33
122.73 
-30.61 
-26.47 
-43.00
31.58
141.33 
-44.75
- 6.00
-21.28
NA
NA
7.46
-16.33
NA
NA
40
99.00
39.00
52.00
68.00
80.00
152.00
178.00
38.00
159.00
135.00
74.00
320.00
103.00
63.00 
NA
93.00
183.00
44.00 
NA
249.00
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Appendix
2.4. OECD DATA 1970-1989
A third data source from the OECD was used for several of 
the Figures in Chapter Seven and for the Pearson's correlation 
coefficients presented in Table 7.4. This data covers the period 
1970 to 1989 for the US, the UK, the FRG, Sweden and Japan for 
the following variables:
(1) Percent change in nominal wages for FBT Industries
(2) Percent change in nominal wages for Chemical Industries
(3) Percent change in real wages for FBT Industries
(4) Percent change in real wages for Chemical Industries
(5) Percent change inflation
(6) Percent change unemployment
It may be the case that instead of using Pearsons' correlation 
coefficients I should have used time series regressions. The 
wages, inflation and unemployment data are classic time series, 
and the variables almost certainly contain significant degrees of 
autocorrelation. After attending the Essex University ECPR Social 
Science Summer School learning how to do time series analysis, I 
came away with the belief that the Box-Jenkins approach or the 
ARIMA model were not the most useful and reliable techniques for 
my purposes. The main reason for this is that time series is more 
complex and I do not yet have the technical skills to be 
confident that any findings I produced would be useful. It would 
not be difficult to run the data through an ARIMA package, but it 
would be difficult to interpret the diagnostics. I concluded 
that, for the moment, time series with economic data is best left 
up to the econometricians.
Pearsons' Correlation Coefficients.
The correlations were produced using the statistical 
software package SPSS, and measure the closeness with which the 
pairs of values fit a straight line.
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Standard Errors.
The standard error represents the standard deviation of a 
hypothetical distribution of correlation coefficients among 
samples of a given size drawn from the same population. The 
procedure I followed was to use LOTUS 123 and estimate the 
standard errors by squaring each correlation coefficient, 
subtracting it from one, and then dividing it by the square root 
of the number of pairs in the sample.1
A true correlation coefficient is certain to lie within 
three standard errors of the sample statistic. With a large 
correlation coefficient and a large sample of pairs we expect to 
find a small standard error, and can be reasonably certain that 
the relationship is genuine.
In our case the period 1970-1989 gives us a reasonably large 
sample of pairs and where the correlations are strong, as in the 
correlations between nominal wages in two sectors, the standard 
errors are small enough to support the correlations.
1-Tailed Test.
The 1-Tailed test is used to confirm or reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the 
mean score of each variable used in a correlation. If the null 
hypothesis is correct, then any apparently strong relationships 
observed will have occurred purely by chance. The 1-Tailed test 
is used because I wanted to test for specific expectations about 
the direction of the difference in values. The test requires a 
difference between means which is large enough to mean that the 
probability of its occurring by chance from the theoretical "no 
difference” population would be 1 percent or less. The procedure 
I followed was to use the SPSS 1-Tailed Test option. Most of the 
1-Tailed tests for the relationship between wages and inflation 
are insignificant, which supports the view that the direction of
1 Derek Rowntree, Statistics Without Tears. A Primer For 
Non-Mathematicians. London, Penguin Books, 1981, p.166.
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causation is not one way. The data is presented below:
USA
1
6.80
7.00
6.50
6.90 
8.80
10.00
8.00 
7.80 
8.00 
8.10
9.40
8.50
6.50
3.40
2.40 
2.10 
2.10 
2.20
1.90
2.40
UK
1
9.90 
14.10
12.40 
12.00
21.40 
30.90 
18.00
9.00
9.60 
13.50 
14.00 
13.70 
10.30
9.40
7.60
8.70
8.70
7.50
8.00 
9.30
2
6.30
7.60
7.30
5.90 
8.20
10.50
9.60 
8.80
9.20
8.30
9.20
9.90
9.20
6.20
4.60 
4.40
3.60
3.30 
2.50 
3.00
2
17.90 
28.80
12.90
10.40 
17.00
33.10 
20.60
9.50
10.10
10.40
22.30 
13.70
11.30 
9.40
8.50 
8.60 
7.90 
8.30 
8.60 
9.00
3
4.50
4.80
3.90 
6.10
10.50
8.10
5.80 
6.60
7.20
9.20 
10.80
9.20
5.70 
4.10
3.80 
3.30
2.40
4.70
3.90
4.40
3
5.90
8.60
6.50
8.50 
16.90 
23.70
15.80
14.80
9.00 
13.60 
16.20 
11.20
8.80
5.00
5.10 
5.20 
4.30
4.10 
4.80
5.50
4
2.30
2.20
2.60
0.80
-1.70
1.90
2.20
1.20
0.80
- 1.10
-1.40
-0.70
0.80
-0.70
-1.40
- 1.20
-0.30
-2.50
- 2.00
- 2.00
4
4.00
5.50 
5.90
3.50
4.50
7.20
2.20 
-5.80
0.60
- 0.10
- 2.20
2.50
1.50
4.40
2.50
3.50
4.40
3.40 
3.20 
3.80
5
1.80
2.80
3.40 
- 0.20 
-2.30
2.40 
3.80 
2.20 
2.00
-0.90
-1.60
0.70
3.50
2.10
0.80
1.10
1.20
-1.40
-1.40
-1.40
5
12.00
20.20
6.40 
1.90 
0.10
9.40
4.80 
-5.30
1.10
-3.20
6.10
2.50
2.50
4.40
3.40
3.40 
3.60 
4.20
3.80
3.50
6
5.00
6.00
5.60 
4.90
5.60
8.30
7.70
7.00 
6.10 
5.80
7.20
7.60
9.70
9.60
7.50
7.20
7.00
6.20
5.50
5.30
6
2.40
2.90
3.10
2.10 
2.20 
3.60 
4.80
5.20
4.90 
4.50 
6.10 
9.10
10.40 
11.20
11.40 
11.60 
11.80
10.40
8.20 
6.20
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FRG
1 2 3
10.80 20.20 3.60
12.90 10.90 5.60
10.00 8.80 5.70
10.30 9.60 6.30
12.90 12.50 7.00
9.40 8.70 6.20
6.30 7.20 4.20
6.70 7.30 3.60
6.20 5.10 2.70
5.10 4.20 3.90
6.00 4.80 5.80
6.10 5.90 6.20
4.70 4.40 4.80
3.60 3.50 3.20
3.20 3.30 2.50
3.10 3.90 2.10
3.40 3.90 -0.50
3.90 4.10 0.60
3.40 3.10 1.20
3.70 3.30 3.10
SWEDEN
1 2 3
12.00 12.90 5.00
11.20 10.00 7.70
14.20 12.40 6.40
6.60 7.00 7.60
10.40 12.20 10.30
19.70 18.40 10.90
15.80 16.30 11.00
7.60 8.20 10.80
7.10 7.60 11.60
7.60 8.40 8.00
11.40 11.00 14.40
8.10 6.40 12.40
6.70 7.10 '10.60
7.00 7.70 11.20
8.80 13.40 7.70
8.00 7.80 7.00
11.80 10.70 4.60
1.80 4.40 5.30
8.50 7.20 6.30
9.30 10.40 6.50
4 5 6
7.20 16.60 0.60
7.30 ' 5.30 0.70
4.30 3.10 0.70
4.00 3.30 0.60
5.90 5.50 1.30
3.20 2.50 3.10
2.10 3.00 3.20
3.10 3.70 3.30
3.50 2.40 3.10
1.20 0.30 2.90
0.20 -1.00 2.50
-0.10 -0.30 3.40
-0.10 -0.40 5.00
0.40 0.30 6.60
0.70 0.80 7.10
1.00 1.80 7.20
3.90 4.40 6.40
3.30 3.50 6.20
2.20 1.90 6.10
0.60 0.20 5.50
4 5 6
7.00 7.90 1.20
3.50 2.30 2.10
7.80 6.00 2.20
-1.00 -0.60 2.00
0.10 1.90 1.60
8.80 7.50 1.30
4.80 5.30 1.30
-3.20 -2.60 1.50
-4.50 -4.00 1.80
-0.40 0.40 1.70
-3.00 -3.40 1.60
-4.30 -6.00 2.10
-3.90 -3.50 2.60
-4.20 -3.50 2.90
1.10 5.70 2.60
1.00 0.80 2.40
7.20 6.10 2.20
-3.50 -0.90 1.90
2.20 0.90 1.60
2.80 3.90 1.40
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2.5. OECD DATA 1981-1987
Finally, a fourth set of data was taken from OECD Industrial 
Structure Statistics. Paris, various volumes, for the FBT, 
Chemical and FMP (Fabricated Metal Products) industries. This 
data covers the period 1981 to 1987 for the following countries: 
the US, the UK, the FRG, Sweden, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Italy, and Finland. The variables are:
(1) Employment in FBT Industries percent change
(2) Employment in Chemical Industries percent change
(3) Employment in FMP Industries percent change
(4) Inflation percent change
(5) Wage divided by Employment in FBT Industries 
percent change
(6) Wage divided by Employment in Chemical Industries 
percent change
(7) Wage divided by Employment in FMP Industries 
percent change
(8) Wage divided by Employment in FBT Industries 
percent change minus inflation
(9) Wage divided by Employment in Chemical 
Industries percent change minus inflation
(10) Wage divided by Employment in FMP Industries 
percent change minus inflation
(11) Total Wage in FMP Industries percent change minus 
inflation
(12) Total Wage in FBT Industries percent change minus 
inflation
(13) Total Wage in Chemical Industries percent change minus 
inflation
This data was also used to produce Pearsons' correlation 
coefficients which are presented in Table 7.5. The same 
procedures as described in the previous section were used here. 
There are several problems with the use of this data. First, the
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measure of changes in nominal and real wages is derived by 
dividing total wages for each industry by total employment for 
each year. Hence this measure is at best a very rough estimate of 
the average wage per person corrected for employment. One test of 
the usefulness of this method is provided by comparing the 
correlation coefficients produced between nominal and real wages 
and inflation with those produced in the previous Table using a 
different data set. In fact, three separate data sets for the FBT 
and Chemical Industries are used in the thesis: the OECD
Historical Statistics set, the OECD Industrial Structure 
Statistics set, and the set supplied by LO. A comparison shows 
that the data are not dissimilar enough to warrant a rejection of 
this method.
Second, due to the limited number of cases recorded the 
standard errors and the 1-Tailed tests are nearly always 
unfavourable. Why, then, proceed? The main reason is because I 
believe that we can have a reasonably firm expectation that the 
relationship observable (whether significant or not) did not 
arise purely by chance. Wages, particularly in Sweden, are 
negotiated in a process which does not produce random outcomes. 
The sampling methods used by the Swedish authorities to produce 
data on these wages are also comprehensive enough to warrant a 
strong degree of confidence in their representativeness. We know 
from the previous Table that, with a larger data set, the 
correlation coefficients and the standard errors are significant 
enough. I also examined each pair of variables using LOTUS 123 
plots and found that the pairs exhibited a linear progression 
over each time period. For these reasons I believe the data are 
useful from the perspective of testing my hypotheses concerning 
the strategies of rational actors in foul economic weather, even 
if in purely statistical terms they cannot be regarded as 
significant.
The data is presented in the following section.
374
USA
1 2 3 4 i
1981 NA NA NA 9.20 NA
1982 -1.27 -1.59 -5.28 5.70 7.15
1983 -3.35 -1.21 -3.57 4.10 5.54
1984 -0.73 1.86 4.64 3.80 3.40
1985 -1.28 -0.69 -0.79 3.30 3.93
1986 -1.02 -1.50 -3.26 2.40 2.68
1987 2.61 5.32 2.19 4.70 3.29
6 7 8 9 11
NA NA NA NA NA
7.43 6.30 -2 .05 -1.77 -2.90
5.20 7.05 -0.16 -0.50 1.35
5.76 6.53 -0.70 1.66 2.43
3.72 5.11 0.13 -0.08 1.31
4.04 4.23 -0.62 0.74 0.93
2.07 2.70 0.89 -0.33 0.30
11 12 13
NA NA NA
-8.51 -14.67 -3.47
-2.47 -7.67 -1.78
7.37 -6.68 3.63
0.47 -6.34 -0.80**•CM1 -4.91 -0.82
2.54 -8.05 5.10
375
UK 1 2 3 4
1981 NA NA NA 11.20
1982 -4.63 -6.17 -7.91 8.80
1983 -3.75 -4.40 -5.83 5.00
1984 1.63 0.20 -2.47 5.10
1985 -3.39 -2.40 -1.73 5.20
1986 -1.69 0.38 -2.71 4.30
1987 NA NA NA 4.10
6 7 8 9
NA NA NA NA
10.07 11.02 -1.68 -1.13
9.06 7.83 0.10 0.26
6.20 9.36 1.33 1.20
9.57 8.79 2.46 4.47
7.08 7.23 2.91 1.88
NA NA NA NA
11 12 13
NA NA NA
-8.96 -15.46 -7.92
-7.25 -13.39 -4.54
1.66 -12.45 1.41
1.81 -8.86 1.84
-0.87 -11.11 2.28
NA NA NA
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5
NA
9.52
8.90
6.33
7.56
8.11
NA
10
NA
-0.18
-0.97
4.36
3.69
2.03
NA
FRG 1 2 3
1981 NA NA NA
1982 -3.26 -1.59 -2.49
1983 -3.86 -2.05 1.01
1984 -0.93 0.92 -0.56
1985 -0.91 1.54 3.34
1986 -0.67 2.27 3.77
1987 -0.02 1.58 0.72
6 7 8
NA NA NA
4.90 4.12 -0.98
3.87 3.58 -1.27
4.36 3.13 -0.86
4.17 4.27 0.11
3.36 4.46 1.07
3.82 3.34 3.46
11 12 13
NA NA NA
-4.68 -7.96
-0.17 -4.34
-0.64 -4.57
5.25 -4.15
6.30 -4.52
4.59 -2.35
4 5
6.20 NA
4.80 5.22
3.20 3.53
2.50 2.34
2.10 2.61
0.50 3.17
0.60 2.96
9 10
NA NA
1.30 -2.08
0.93 -1.22
1.16 -0.07
1.67 1.77
1.26 2.36
4.32 3.84
-2.97
-3.06
2.12
3.27
3.61
5.96
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SWEDEN 1 2 3 4
1981 NA NA NA 12.40 NA
1982 -2.82 -3.08 -3.58 10.60 7.64
1983 -1.02 -0.30 -3.87 11.20 7.25
1984 -0.59 3.03 2.07 7.70 9.18
1985 0.15 -0.29 1.35 7.00 7.69
1986 1.77 2.51 0.35 4.60 6.25
1987 -0.29 2.16 -0.35 5.30 7.75
6 7 8 9 1(
NA NA NA NA NA
7.78 8.36 -4.76 -4.62 -4.04
7.72 8.20 -3.35 -2.88 -2.40
9.64 9.84 -2.02 -1.56 -1.36
8.82 6.50 -0.01 1.12 -1.20
7.37 8.06 -0.75 0.37 1.06
3.10 5.26 3.15 -1.50 0.66
11 12 13
NA NA NA
-7.92 -16.8 -7.94
-6.59 -16.4 -3.20
0.91 -19.06 1.77
0.24 -14.98 0.80
1.44 -14.52 3.07
0.30 -11.52 0.73
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JAPAN 1 2 3 4
1981 NA NA NA 4.40 NA
1982 0.27 -0.21 -0.18 2.60 3.83
1983 7.79 5.44 7.85 1.90 -1.67
1984 -6.15 -2.12 -0.37 2.10 8.43
1985 2.39 1.45 2.90 2.20 4.82
1986 2.68 1.63 -0.36 0.60 2.60
1987 NA NA NA -0.20 NA
6 7 8 9 1<
NA NA NA NA NA
5.41 5.77 -0.57 1.01 1.37
0.49 -0.72 -4.27 -2.11 -3.32
5.59 6.73 6.53 3.69 4.83
4.82 4.76 2.72 2.72 2.66
2.10 3.77 0.40 -0.10 1.57
NA NA NA NA NA
11 12 13
NA NA NA
1.19 -8.35 0.78
4.47 -8.25 3.35
4.44 -3.64 1.45
5.70 -8.93 4.24
1.20 -7.28 1.56
NA NA NA
379
NORWAY 1 2 3
1981 NA NA NA 13.40
1982 -1.26 -2.47 -1.45 11.00
1983 -4.01 -5.07 -8.49 8.40
1984 NA NA -0.71 6.40
1985 0.57 -3.44 1.66 5.90
1986 0.95 1.58 1.37 7.70
1987 0.19 -0.39 -1.30 7.60
6 7 8 9
NA NA NA NA
9.01 10.23 -3.12 -4.39
9.98 9.62 0.85 -1.02
9.32 9.02 -1.46 0.92
-5.49 -4.88 -12.44 -11.89
8.64 8.27 5.36 2.74
27.02 28.91 20.60 19.32
11 12 13
NA NA NA
-4.77 -21.56 -7.09
-10 .69 -17.86 -6.60
-0. 16 -14.89 0.92
-9.70 -0.58 -15.14
3.85 -16.87 4.46
19.54 -29.9 18.82
380
4 5
NA
10.28
11.85
6.94
-6.04
11.26
28.30
10
NA
-3.17
-1.38
0.62
-11.28
2.37
21.21
NETHERLANDS
1
1981 NA
1982 -3.20 -1
1983 -4.38 8
1984 1.28 -0
1985 -1.48 3
1986 -0.75 2
1987 0.61 1
6
NA
7.54 7
8.69 7
1.73 -3
2.15 1
2.88 -4
NA 6
2 3 4
NA NA 6.30
73 -5.01 5.30
50 -6.97 2.80
94 2.39 2.20
44 2.78 2.20
33 4.94 0.20
46 -0.09 -0.30
7 8 9
NA NA NA
77 2.22 1.24
84 3.17 3.39
81 -5.19 -1.07
87 1.60 -0.05
58 2.54 0.68
20 NA NA
11 12 13
NA NA NA
-3.93 -11.10 -0.62
-4.97 -8.89 12.63
-4.32 -1.65 -2.03
2.50 -4.41 3.46vo0 •
CM1 -6.00 3.08
5.91 NA NA
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5
NA
8.52
8.47 
-2.39
3.80
4.74
NA
10
NA
1.47 
2.54
-6.61
-0.33
-6.78
6.00
DENMARK 1 2 3
1981 NA NA NA 12.00
1982 -0.67 -1.16 0.28 10.20
1983 NA 1.75 -0.56 6.80
1984 5.23 6.90 5.91 6.40
1985 NA 5.91 10.43 4.30
1986 0.76 3.05 1.62 2.90
1987 -1.64 2.96 -4.09 4.80
6 7 8 9
NA NA NA NA
11.13 11.51 -1.23 -0.87
7.83 8.17 -2.67 -2.37
5.91 3 I 97 -5.98 -0.89
4.01 3.52 -1.59 -2.39
7.10 7.89 1.45 2.80
8.33 6.26 4.53 5.43
11 12 13
NA NA NA
-0.18 -21.12 -2.16
-2.64 -17.2 -0.48
3.32 -12.54 6.42
7.92 -10.99 3.76
5.35 -10.46 6.06COa\•01 -8.26 8.63
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4 5
NA
10.77
7.53
0.82
4.81
5.75
7.43
10
NA
-0.49
-2.03
-2.83
- 2.88
3.59
3.36
ITALY 1 2 3
1981 NA NA NA 18.10
1982 -2.24 -10.05 -5.66 16.90
1983 3.67 3.35 1.58 15.20
1984 1.33 3.24 -0.82 11.80
1985 -3.49 -3.93 -5.30 9.00
1986 -4.52 -2.18 1.05 5.80
1987 NA NA NA 4.90
6 7 8 9
NA NA NA NA
18.06 14.07 0.57 -0.04
11.89 12.07 -6.91 -5.01
12.20 16.01 2.39 -3.00
12.28 3.11 -4.53 0.48
10.01 0.26 0.98 1.01
NA NA NA NA
11 12 13
NA NA NA
-10.49 -31.9 -11.91
-3.05 -29.2 -1.26
-0.14 -31.28 0.63
-14.15 -15.2 -3.93
-7.69 -13.76 -1.39
NA NA NA
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4 5
NA
18.67
9.99
17.59
7.27
9.98
NA
10
NA
-4.03
-4.83
0.81
-8.69
-8.74
NA
FINLAND 1
1981 NA NA
1982 -1.81 -1.00
1983 -2.01 -0.50
1984 -0.68 0.25
1985 -1.20 -1.26
1986 -0.87 -0.51
1987 -0.88 -0.51
6
NA 
10.39
10.65
9.73 
8.79
7.86
8.11
11
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2 3 4 5
NA 11.90 NA
NA 9.40 9.93
NA 8.90 9.00
NA 7.10 8.82
NA 5.90 8.45
NA 3.20 8.98
NA 3.70 7.91
7 8 9
NA NA NA
NA -1.97 -1.51
NA -0.40 1.25
NA -0.08 0.83
NA 1.35 1.69
NA 3.08 1.96
NA 4.71 4.91
10
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
12 13
NA
19.26
15.77
16.37
13.76
13.33
9.71
NA
-2.61
0.70
1.11
0.32
1.41
4.36
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Appendix
3. PRIMARY SOURCES.
Writing a case study on Sweden I faced the problem that I do 
not read or speak Swedish, and apart from the one-week research 
trip I made to Sweden in 1992 have I have not lived in that 
country. Being a New Zealander I am very much an outside 
observer.
Because of this problem the thesis makes use of the great 
mass of secondary sources available on Sweden and on corporatism. 
In order to make the thesis as original as possible, I tried to 
look at the Swedish material from a fresh perspective. The 
corporatist literature is a well-trodden area and it was an 
important objective to avoid merely updating previous work. For 
this reason I started literally at the beginning and redefined 
the questions I was asking. Instead of producing another paper 
which demonstrates that corporatism arises because of this and 
that, and shows that corporatism produces low unemployment and so 
on, I took the approach of questioning the assumption that 
corporatism is a growth-strategy. I raised questions about the 
operation of corporatism in foul weather which I believe have not 
yet been explored.
This means that my use of previously published material is 
not simply repetition of well-known facts. The aim was to be 
comprehensive in marshalling evidence for my argument, and to 
show how previously known facts also had previously unconsidered 
implications when considered from the perspective of this thesis. 
The case study is, therefore, somewhat revisionist. It takes 
facts which have been used in other contexts to support various 
sorts of arguments and argues that these facts support the 
theoretical model of corporatism I have developed and that this 
model is a useful framework for explaining what has happened in 
Sweden.
The primary source material in the thesis is spread among 
the theoretical, comparative, and case study elements. The
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theoretical modelling is original. All of the empirical data is 
primary source material, and most of the data analysis either 
updates this data or presents it in an original form. I collected 
considerable published information from the Swedish Consulate in 
London. In addition to the interviews conducted in Sweden I 
collected English-language publications not available at the LSE 
library or in London, in particular the monograph 'Wage Formation 
And The Economy In The Nineties', by Karl-Olof Faxen, Clas-Erik 
Odhner and Roland Spant. I made as much use as possible of this 
material, where it was directly relevant to the thesis.
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